Bramhall, John, 1594-1663.
The works of the Most
Reverend Father in God,
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015
https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram
THE
WORKS
OF THE
MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
JOHN BRAMHALL, D. D.
SOMETIME LORD ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,
PRIMATE AND METROPOLITAN OF ALL IRELAND.
WITH
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,
AND A COLLECTION OF HIS LETTERS.
VOL. IV.
OXFORD :
JOHN HENRY PARKER.
MDCCCXLIV.
OXFORD :
PRINTED BY I. SHRIMPTON.
PREFACE.
In the volume now published will be found the whole of
BramhalFs Discourses against Hobbes_, which form the third
part of his collected Works. An account of the controversy
that gave rise to them has been given in vol. i. pp. xxxi —
xxxiii. A list of the tracts relating to it is here subjoined.
1 . A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity by John Bramhall
Bishop of Derry. — Written, and sent to the (then) Marquis
of Newcastle to be transmitted to Hobbes, in 1645, after a
verbal discussion of the subject in the Marquis's presence;
but first published in 1655 with the two tracts to be next
mentioned.
i. Of Liberty and Necessity ; a Treatise wherein all Con-
troversy concerning Predestination, Election, Free will,
Grace, Merit, Reprobation, &c., is fully Decided and
Cleared : in Answer to a Treatise by the Bishop of
Londonderry on the same Subject. Lond. 1654. 12mo.
by Thomas Hobbes. — AVritten as a letter to the Marquis
of Newcastle, Aug. 20. 1645% from Bouen, in answer to
" The original edition of this letter (see p. 23 of the present volume), and
(in 165 1) the present editor has not as the date of the letter as published in
seen ; and Hobbes (Qu., Aniinadv. 1679 by Bp. Laney (see p. 19, note b
upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader, of this vol.) is as above given (viz.
p. 19) speaks of it as written in 1616 Aug. 20. 1645), it seems probable that
instead of 161-5. But as Bramhall had Hobbes was himself mistaken, and that
had the MS. in his possession a con- 1645 is the true date,
siderable time so early as April 1646
PREFACE.
BramhalVs Discourse^ and to be transmitted to liim. It
was first published in 1654 without Hobbes's knowledge,
with the above title and a Preface, for neither of which
is Hobbes responsible, and with the erroneous date of
1652b.
2. Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent Necessity,
&c. &c., by John Bramhall, D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.
In answer to the last named; written in 1646, and com-
municated then to the Marquis of Newcastle and to Hobbes,
but first published in 1655 (8vo. Lond.), upon the appearance
of Hobbes^s Letter just mentioned ; the original Discourse
and that Letter being divided into sections, and published
together in one volume, section by section, with BramhalFs
reply to each.
These three tracts, thus intermixed one with the other,
constitute the first Discourse in the present volume.
ii. The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and
Chance, clearly Stated and Debated between Dr. Bram-
hall Bishop of Derry and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury
(Lond. 4to. 1656). — Containing all three of the above
named tracts, printed section by section, together with
Hobbes^s rejoinder, in the shape of Animadversions^^
upon each section.
3. Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last Animadversions in
the case concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity, by
John Bramhall, D.D. and Bishop of Derry (Lond. 8vo. 1657 —
1658). — The second Discourse in the present volume.
4. The Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale, &c. &c.,
by John Bramhall, D.D. and Bishop of Derry (Lond. 8vo.
1658) : — at first designed to form a part of the Castigations,
^ Molesworth in his late edition of neous date of the original publication
Hobbes's Works (vol. iv. p. 278) has in 1654: the case at best (i. e. sup-
mistaken the matter altogether. He posing 1646 were the true date and not
imagines 1652 to be the correct date of 1645) being precisely the reverse,
the letter, and gives 1646 as the erro-
PREFACE.
but enlarged afterwards into a distinct tract, although still
printed as an appendix and continuation of that work. It is
professedly an exposure of the gross and dangerous errors of
Hobbes's Leviathan, but refers also to his book De Give and
to his Questions just now mentioned : and forms the third
Discourse in the present volume.
iii. An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall, late
Bishop of Derry, called The Catching of the Leviathan ;
together with an Historical Narration concerning Heresy
and the Punishment thereof: by Thomas Hobbes. — Pub-
lished at London in 1682 (8vo.) after the author's death,
but written (according to the ^Advertisement to the
Reader) ten years only after the publication of BramhalFs
book (which had not sooner come to the wi'iter's know-
ledge). This would mark its date to 1668, in which year
Hobbes was in great alarm lest legal measures should be
taken against him on account of his writings (see his Life
in the Biogr. Brit, note K). Among other steps to justify
and protect himself, he appears to have composed this
tract; of which the first part is an "answer" (what
Hobbes at least called such) to the first chapter of the
Leviathan, that relating to his religious sentiments. To
the Castigations he made no reply, nor to the remainder
of BramhalFs attack upon his Leviathan.
Such was the course of the controversy, with which the
present volume is concerned ; from which Hobbes appears
to have come off with less loss of credit than from his
complete defeat he deserved (see, for instance, Brucker's ac-
count of the matter). It is to be regretted, that Bramhall
should have been led to cast his thoughts upon such a sub-
ject into the form of an answer to Hobbes^s tracts. The
consequence is, that instead of a complete and connected
discussion of a very abstruse subject, such as his peculiar
talents and knowledge especially fitted him to produce, and
PREFACE.
of which passages in these tracts as they at present stand
afford a specimen, the course of his argument is now too often
broken off by the necessity of perpetual rephes to the feeble
and perverse crotchets of his adversary : and the reader is
forced to conclude,, that in this (as in nine-tenths of his other
writings) BramhalFs fame would have stood higher, had his
opponent been more worthy of him.
A. W. H.
August J 1844.
CONTENTS OF VOL. IV.
Page
Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecal
Necessity ; Against Mr. Hobbes. Part iii. Discourse i. 3
Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last Animadversions in the
Case concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity. Part iii.
Discourse ii. . . . . . .197
The Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale. Part iii.
Discourse iii. . . . . . . 507
THE WORKS
OP
ARCHBISHOP BRAMHALL.
PART THE THIRD;
CONTAINING
THE DISCOURSES AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
BRAMHAI.I..
B
DISCOURSE 1.
A DEFENCE
OF
TRUE LIBERTY
FROM
ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSECAL NECESSITY;
BEING
AN ANSWER
TO A LATE BOOK OF MR. THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY,
ENTITLED
A TREATISE OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
WRITTEN BY THE EIGHT REVEREND
JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.
AND V
LORD BISHOP OF DERRY.
B 2
CONTENTS.
[Epistle to the Marquis of Newcastle
Advertisement to the Reader.]
[Introduction.]
NUMBER I.
D — [Introduction of the subject.
T. H. — Introduction of the subject.
J. D.'s Reply. ....
T. H.'s own words convict his theory of falsehood.]
NUMBER II.
IT. H.'s boast.
J. D.'s Reply.]
NUMBER III.
[r. H.'s Ansiver to J. D.'s Preface.
Liberty to act does not imply liberty to will.
J. D.'s Reply. ....
1. T. H. confounds liberty with spontaneity.
2. And hypothetical with antecedent necessity.
3. True liberty includes liberty to will.]
6
CONTENTS.
Page
[The Stating of the Question.]
NUMBER IV.
J. D. — [True liberty, an universal immunity from all determination to one. 33
T. H's Answer. . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . .34
Different senses of the word liberty explained. . . . ib.
Liberty of contradiction and of contrariety, of exercise and of speci-
fication.] . . . . . . .36
NUMBER V.
J. D. — [Division of the argument. . . . . .37
7'. H.'s Ansiver. . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply.] lb.
T. Proofs of Liberty out of Scripture^
NUMBER VI.
T. D. — Argument 1. — [That men have power of election, and therefore
true liberty. . . . . . . . ib.
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . .38
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . ib.
1. Election is only of alternatives conceived possible. . . ib.
2. Universal consent. . . . . , .39
3. Holy Scripture.] . . . . . .41
NUMBER VII.
[T. H.'s assertion, that the last act of the reason necessitates the will. . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . .42
1. The last act of the reason is itself an act of the will. . . ib.
2. It determines the will morally, not necessarily ; . . ib.
3. Nor yet to one course unalterably ; . . . .43
4. Nor in such a way, that the will cannot suspend its own act ; . ib.
5. Nor antecedently or extrinsecally. . . . . ib.
6. T. H.'s affectation of new terms of art. . . . 44
Further answer of T. H. . . . . . . ib.
.1. D.'s Reply.] ....... ib.
CONTENTS. 7
Page
NUMBER VIII.
[ T. H.'s Further Answer . . . . . ,4)5
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . .47
1. T. H. mistakes the author's words. . . . . ib.
2. And contradicts himself. . . . . . ib.
3. Actions which proceed from fear, may or may not be spontaneous. 48
4. Definition of voluntary and involuntary acts. . . .49
5. Necessity and election inconsistent in the same act. . . ib.
6. Irrational beings neither deliberate nor elect. . . .50
7. Habitual actions voluntary. . . . . .53
8. How they differ from actions done in passion.] . . ib.
NUMBER IX.
J. D. — Argument 2. — [That men may do many things and do them not,
and therefore have true liberty. . . . .54
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . .55
J. D.'s Reply.] . . . . . . . ib.
NUMBER X.
J. D. — Argument 3. — [That the interrogations, expostulations, and the like,
in Scripture, prove men to have true liberty. . . 56
T. H.'s Answer deferred. . . . . . .57
J. D.'s Reply.] . . . . . . . ib.
NUMBER XI.
J. D. — Argument 4. — [That every theory of necessity proves too much, in
proving Adam a necessary agent; which yet Necessitarians deny. 58
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.
T, H.'s own theory of necessity. . . . . . ib.
Of the theories of necessity held by others. . . . ib.
Election as well as action necessary. . . . .59
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . ib.
The decrees and foreknowledge of God. . . . .60
The influences of the stars. . . . . . ib.
The concatenation of causes. . . . . . ib.
Physical and moral efficacy of objects. . . . .61
The last dictate of the understanding. . . . . ib.
Adam was a necessary agent if other men are. . . .62
Horrid consequences of the doctrine of necessity.] . . 63
8 CONTENTS.
Page
NUMBER XII.
J. D. — Argument 5. — [That the theory of Necessity leaves no room for
reward or punishment. . , . . . .64
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . . ih.
St. Paul's argument in the Epistle to the Romans. . . . ib.
The power of God alone is sufficient to justify any action He doth. . 65
There is no difference between a will active and a will permissive, or a
will causing the act and a will causing the sin. . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . 66
The passage of St. Paul explained, as to its general scope. . 67
, in its particular passages. . ib.
1. How Jacob was loved and Esau hated. . . .68
2. Of the freedom of God's mercy. . . . ib.
3. In what sense God's glory is either the end or the consequence
of man's sin. . . . . . .69
4. In what sense God is said to harden men's hearts. . . ib.
There is a real difference between an operative and a permissive will. 71
How God is the cause of the act, yet not of the sin of the act. . 74
God's justice not measured by His power, but by His will, and that
the will of One Who is perfect. . . . . .75
The case of Job. . . . . . . . 7&
And of the blind maa mentioned in St. John's Gospel. . . 79
And of the brute beasts . . . . . . ib.
Power to be regulated by justice, not justice by power. . . 80
T. H.'s theory makes God inevitably the cause of sin.] . . 81
II. Proofs of Liberty drawn from Reason.
NUMBER XIII.
J. D. — Argument 1. — [Story of Zeno : — necessity of sin implies necessity
of pimishment. . . . , . .82
T. H.^s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply.] . . . . . . . ib.
NUMBER XIV.
J. D. — Argument 2. — [The doctrine of necessity overthrows the frame- work
of all human society. . . . . .84
T. H.'s Answer. ' . . . . . .85
The law not unjust because the violntioii of it is necessary. . . ib.
Necessity does not supersede consultation. . . . .86
Nor admonition. . . . . . . .87
Nor praise or dispraise. . .... . ib.
Nor the use of means. . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . .88
CONTENTS.
9
Page
T. H.'s answer both irrelevant and untrue. . . . .88
Laws de facto may be unjust. . . . . .89
Not all laws made by consent of those subject to them. . . 90
Punishment unjust for sin committed through antecedent necessity. . ib.
Temptation does not involve an antecedent necessity of sin. . 91
Law useless on the theory of necessity. . . , .92
Punishment vindicatory, not corrective only. , . . ib.
T. H.'s inconsistencies. . . , . .93
Right and wrong antecedent to human pacts. . . .94
Consultation does imply liberty, and does not necessitate determination. 96
Admonitions do imply liberty, because they are addressed to those only
who are conceived to be free. . . . . .98
Praise moral, although not praise metaphysical, does imply liberty. . ib.
Of rewards and punishments ; — the parallel of brute beasts not re-
levant. ........ 100
1. All the actions of brute beasts not necessary. . . . ib.
2. The terms reward and punishment applied to them by analogy
only. . . . . . . .101
3. They act in such cases, not from reason, but from sense of
present or memory of past joy or pain.] . . . ib.
NUMBER XV.
J. D. — Argument 3. — [The opinion of necessity inconsistent with piety. . ib.
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . .102
The opinion of necessity doth not involve impiety in right-minded men. . 103
Kor exclude repentance. . . . . . . ib.
Nor prayer. . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . .104
T. H. mistaketh piety to be an act of the judgment. . . ib.
And to respect God's power only. , . . . . ib.
His opinion destroys the moral attributes of God. . . . ib.
And the outward worship of God. ..... 105
And repentance. . . . . . . . ib.
T. H. denieth prayer to be either a cause or a means of God's
blessings.] . . . . . . .107
NUMBER XVL
J. D Argument 4. — [The opinion of necessity destroys the variety and per-
fection of the universe. ..... 109
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . .110
Hypothetical, distinct from antecedent, necessity. . , ib.
Contingent events.] . . . . . .111
10
CONTENTS.
Page
NUMBER XVII.
J. D. — Argument 5. — [If there be no true liberty, there is no formal sin. . 112
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . , ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . .113
Sin, to be sin, must be an act of a, free will against a, just law.] . 114
[III. Distinctions made by Necessitarians,]
NUMBER XVIII.
J. D. — [Distinction i. — Between Stoical and Christian necessity. . .116
1. That the Stoics subject God to destiny, they subject
destiny to God. . . . . . . ib.
2. That the Stoics hold a necessary connection of cavxses,
they hold God to be the one pervading Cause. . . ib.
3. That the Stoics deny contingents, they admit them. . ib.
Distinction ii. — Between the First Cause, which necessitates all things, and
second causes, which do not. . . . . . .117
1. The two parts of this distinction contradict one another, ib.
2. The First Cause being necessary, second causes must
be so likewise. . . . . . . ib.
T. H.'s Answer.'] — Certain distinctions, which he supposing may be
brought to his arguments, are by him removed. . .118
[r. //. disavows both distinctions. . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . ib.
Christian necessity (so called) only disguised Stoical necessity. . ib.
The terms are employed by Lipsius. . . .119
The First Cause not a necessary cause of all effects.] . .120
NUMBER XIX.
J. D — [Distinction iii. — Between liberty from compulsion and liberty from
necessitation. . . . . . . . .121
Antecedent necessity involves compulsion. . . . ib.
Of the freedom of God, and of the good Angels. . . . ib.
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . .122
Hypothetical necessity. . . . . . . ib.
Of God, and of the good Angels. . . . . . ib.
Degrees of liberty impossible. . . . . . . 1 23
Liberty of exercise and liberty of specification cannot exist apart. . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . .121'
Actions proceeding from fear are not compulsory actions. . . ib.
CONTENTS.
11
Page
Proper compulsion extrinsecal. . . . . .125
Men ordinarily, not always, free. . . . . ib.
Hypothetical necessity. . . . . . .126
Of God and of good Angels. ..... 127
Degrees of liberty possible. . . . . . ib.
Liberty of exercise not necessarily accompanied by liberty of specifi-
cation, . . . . . . • .128
T. H.'s presumptuous censure of the doctors of the Church.] . ib.
NUMBER XX.
J. D. — [Election opposed to coarctation as well as to coaction. . .130
Elicit acts of the will cannot be necessitated. . . . ib.
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . .131
Election not inconsistent with necessity. . . . . ib.
The distinction vain, betiveen imperate and elicit acts of the will. . 132
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . .133
Compulsion and necessitation both opposite to liberty, , . ib.
Of mixed actions. . , . . . .134
Of fear and other passions. . , . . . ib.
Motives cannot compel the will. . , . .136
Liberty not ignorance of necessitation. . , .* . 137
T. H.'s impertinent instance of fire burning. . . . ib.
Distinction of imperate and elicit acts not improper. . .138
Nor unnecessarily obscure. , , , . ,140
T. H, entirely mistakes the author's words.] , . . . ib.
[IV. Theories concerning the cause of a supposed necessity.]
NUMBER XXI.
J. D.— [i. Astrology, . , . . , . .141
ii. The complexion and temperature of the body. . . .142
T. H.'s Answer. , . . . . , . ib.
J. D.'s Reply.] . . . . . . . ib.
NUMBER XXTI.
J. D. — [iii. The moral efficacy of outward objects. .... 143
Such efficacy partly our own fault. . . . ib.
not irresistible. . . , . ib.
may be overcome by a settled resolution. . 144
/'. H.'s Answer. . . . . , . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply,] . . . , . , ,115
12
CONTENTS.
Page
NUMBER XXIII.
J. D. — [iv. The natural efficacy of the last dictate of the understanding. . 147
The case otherwise in point of fact. . . . ib.
Such a cause neither extrinsecal nor antecedent. . . ib.
The understanding may be equally balanced between two
alternatives. ...... 148
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply, . . . . . . .149
The last feather breaketh the horse's back. . . . .150
T. H.'s example of a man that strikes. .... 151
Of Medea's choice. . . . . . . ib.
And Caesar's. . . . . . . . ib.
Affection sometimes prevails against reason.] . . . 152
NUMBER XXIV.
•T. D. — [v. The prescience and decrees of God. .... 153
Our ignorance a sufficient answer. . . . ib.
Futurity ever present to God. . . . . ib.
T. H.'s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.
Events necessarily determined by antecedent and extrinsecal causes. . 154
Eternity not an indivisible point but a succession. . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . .155
A certain and received truth not to be deserted because it is hard to
be understood. . . . . . . . ib.
How contingent events are reconcileable with God's prescience and
decrees. . . . . . . .156
The aspect of God. . . . . . . ib.
Necessity not identical with God's decrees. . . . ib.
Other explanations have been offered of the subject besiJes the
author's. ....... 157
That eternity is not a succession but an indivisible point. . ib.
T. H.'s boastful conclusion.] ..... 159
[v. REMAINDER OF T. H.'s ANSWER.]
NUMBER XXV.
T. H. — My opinion about liberty and necessity. . . . ib.
[i. Of actions done without deliberation. . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . iGO
Of actions done in sudden passions. .... 161
Of actions done without present deliberation. . . . 162
Actions done in passion justly punished, because done through past
or present choice.] . . . . . . ib.
NUMBER XXVI.
T. II. — [ii. Of actions done with deliberation. . . . .163
J. D.'s Reply.] . . . . . . . .164
CONTENTS. 13
Pago
NUMBER XXVII.
T. H. — [iii. The will the last step before action. . . • .164
J. D.'s Reply. i''-
T. H. confounds the act of volition with the will itself.] . . ib.
NUMBER XXVIII.
T, H. — [iv. A voluntary act free until deliberatimi ends. . . .165
J. D.'s Reply ] i^^-
NUMBER XXIX.
T. H.—l\. Definition of liberty. . . . . • • 166
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . • • • -167
T. H.'s definition one of negatives. . . . . ib.
His instances. . . . • • . . ib.
His definition far removed from the idea of moral liberty.] . 168
NUMBER XXX.
T. H. — [vi. All things take their beginning from an antecedent and extrinsecal
cause. . . . . . . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . .169
Nothing finite begins to be of itself. . . . . ib.
Many things begin to act of themselves. . . . . ib.
The will is not a necessary cause of its particialar acts.] . .170
NUMBER XXXI.
T. H. — [vii. Every actual event hath a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause. 171
J. D.'s Reply. ....... ib.
1. Causes singly insufficient which jointly are sufficient. . . ib.
2. That cause properly sufficient which produceththe eflfect intended. 172
3. A cause is sufficient in respect of its ability, not of its will, to act. ib.
4-. A sufficient cause inclusive of will, only hypothetically necessary.] 1 73
14
CONTENTS.
Page
NUMBER XXXII.
T. H. — [viii. Free agency a self contradiction, because it implies a sufficient
cause without an actual effect. . . . . .173
J. D.'s Reply. ........ ib.
Sufficient causes include not the actual determination of the will. . 174
• refer to the producibility, not to the production, of
an event.] . . . . . . . ib.
NUMBER XXXIII.
T. H. — \_Pr oof of necessity, from men's experience of their own meaning in the
use of words. . . . . . . .175
.T. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . .176
Truth to be sought in reason, not in vulgar notions. . . ib.
Men's experience contrary to T. H.'s conclusions.] . .177
NUMBER XXXIV.
T. H. — [Sufficieiit causes necessary causes. . . . . .180
Instance of throwing dice. . , . . . ib.
a shower of rain. . . . . .181
J. D.'s Reply. . . . . . . . . ib.
Our question, of human actions, not of natural contingencies. . ib.
of absolute, not of hypothetical, necessity. . .184
Of T. H.'s instance of the shower of rain. . . . .185
A contrary instance.] . . . . . .187
NUMBER XXXV.
T. H. — \A free agent impossible, because a sufficient ?nusi be a necessary cause. 188
J. D.'s Reply.] ....... ib.
NUMBER XXXVI.
T. JI. — lOf the inconveniency of denying necessity. . . . .189
J. D.'s Reply. ........ ib.
Freedom of man not inconsistent with God's eternal decrees. . 190
Nor with Ills eternal prescience.] ..... 191
CONTENTS. 15
Page
NUMBER XXXVII.
T. H.~-[Co7iclusioii. . . . . . . .192
J. D.'s Reply. ........ ib.
Of T. H.'s desire of secrecy.] . . . . . ib.
NUMBER XXXVIII.
T. H. — Postscript. . , . . . . .193
[ The cause of the erroneous opinion of liberty. . . . ib.
J. D.'s Reply.] . . . . . . ib.
•7
TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE,
&c.
Sir,
If I pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this
subject, I should not refuse those large recruits of reasons
and authorities, which offer themselves to serve in this cause,
for God and man, religion and policy, Church and common-
wealth, against the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive
opinion of fatal destiny. But as mine aim, in the first dis-
course, was only to press home those things in writing
which had been agitated between us by word of mouth (a
course much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as
being freer from passions and tergiversations, less subject to
mistakes and misrelations, wherein paralogisms are more
quickly detected, impertinencies discovered, and confusion
avoided), so my present intention is only to vindicate that
discourse, and together with it, those lights of the Schools,
who were never slighted but where they were not understood.
How far I have performed it, I leave to the judicious and
unpartial reader, resting for mine own part well contented
with this, that I have satisfied myself.
Your Lordship's most obliged
to love and serve you,
J. D.
r.RAMlIAI.L-
C
648
TO THE READER.
Christian E/Eader, this ensuing treatise was neither
penned nor intended for the press, but privately undertaken,
that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared
from mistakes*. The same was Mr. Hobbes his desire at that
time; as appeareth by four passages in his book, wherein
he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept private^.
But either through forgetfulness or change of judgment, he
hath now caused or permitted it to be printed in England^,
without either adjoining my first discourse, to which he wrote
that answer, or so much as mentioning this reply, which he
hath had in his hands now these eight years'^. So wide is the
date of his letter, — " in the year 1652^,^' — from the truth,
and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from
ingenuity (if the edition were with his own consent). How-
soever, here is all that passed between us upon this subject,
without any addition, or the least variation from the original.
* [For an account of the dispute
which led to the publication of this and
the following tracts, see vol. i. pp.
xxxi. — xxxiii. of the present edition of
Bramhall's works, and the Preface to
this volume.]
b pp. 18, 26, 35, and 80. [viz. of
Hobbes' Letter to the Marquis of
Newcastle as first published, Lond.
12mo. 1654: see below Numbers xi,
xiv, XV, xxxvii. The latter part of
Hobbes' Letter, viz. from Numb. xxv.
inclusive to the end, was republished
in 1676 (12mo. Lond.), with "Ob-
servations by a Learned Prelate of
the Church of England lately de-
ceased," viz. Dr. Benjamin Laney,
who was Bishop of Peterborough, Lin-
coln, and Ely, successively from 1660
until his death in 1674 ; and the whole
letter was published again, according
toWood(Ath.Oxon., iii. 1212), in 1684
(8vo., as the third edition).]
[The present editor has been unable
to meet with the original edition of
Hobbes' Letter; but it appears from
Hobbes' reply to Bramhall's Defence
(Animadv. on the Bishop's Epistle to
the Reader, p. 19), that it was printed
in London without the author's know-
ledge or consent, by " an English young
man," who had been allowed to trans-
late it for the benefit of a French ac-
quaintance of Hobbes', and who,
*' being a nimble writer, took a copy of
it also for himself." See also Bramhall's
Castigations of the Animadversions
(below p. 751, fol. edit.). Disc. ii.
Pt. iii.]
[Scil. 1646—1654. See below
notes a, b. pp. 23, 24.]
* [It appears by the passage of
Hobbes' reply to Bramhall's Defence
above quoted in note c, that the person
who edited Hobbes' Letter in the first
instance, mistook the date, and printed
it as "in 1652," instead of Aug. 20,
1645, which was the true date.]
c 2
20
TO THE READER.
Concerning the nameless autlior of the preface^, who takes
upon him to hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece
of sublimated stoicism, to invite passengers to purchase it, as
I know not who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard
either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions.
The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as
he is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of
Dionysius by himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest
that it is more sweet than nectar^: we emy him not; much
good may it do him. His very frontispiece is a sufficient
confutation of his whole preface ; wherein he tells the world,
as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that " all controversy
concerning Predestination, Election, Free-will, Grace, Merits,
Reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared ^.^^ Thus he
accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth
and discretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological
controversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we
are fallen, when blind men ^vill be the only judges of colours.
" Quid tanto dignum feret hie promissor hiatu^?"
There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise
the reader. Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to
[A.D.1645] his Book De Cive^, it is true, that ten years since I gave him
about sixty exceptions, the one half of them political, the
other half theological, to that book, and every exception
justified by a number of reasons ; to which he never yet
vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it ; for since
that, he hath published his Leviathan —
" Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptuml," —
which aff'ords much more matter of exception. And I am
informed, that there are already two, the one of our own
Church, the other a stranger"^, who have shaken in pieces
^ [Scil. to the surreptitious edition ^ [From the title-page, apparently,
of Hobbes' Letter. Who this was does of the first edition of Hobbes' Letter.]
not appear; further than what has been i [Hor., A. P., 138.]
said above. For the style of his Pre- p. 1. [of T. H.'s Letter, ed. 1654.
. face, see below in the Castigations of See below Numb.i. p. 23.]
Mr. Hobbes' Animadversions, Answ. to i [Virg., JEn., iii. 658.]
Animadvers. on the Bishop's Epistle ™ [See below, in the Preface to the
to the Reader, p. 751 (fol. edit.). Disc. Catching of Leviathan, p. 869 (fol.-
ii. Pt. iii.] edit.). Disc. iii. Pt. iii.]
K [Athen. Deipnosoph. vi. 13.]
TO THE READER.
21
the whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in the air,
and resolved that huge mass of his seeming Leviathan into a
new nothing, and that their labours will speedily be pub-
lished. But if this information should not prove true, I will
not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that
his principles are pernicious, both to piety and policy, and
destructive to all relations of mankind, between prince and
subject, father and child, master and servant, husband and
wife; and that they, who maintain them obstinately, are
fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than in any
Christian or political society". So God bless us.
[Vide The Catching of the Leviathan, &c., below, Disc. iii. Pt. iii., at the
end of this volume. ]
Y
A
yiNDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
FROM
ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSECAL NECESSITY.
[first printed at LONDON, A.D. 1655.]
[INTRODUCTION.]
NUIVEBER I.
J. D. — Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty Discourse
against necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have ob- ^^^^^J^^^
tained the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I tion of the
be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not ^^^j^^*"^
out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable neces-
sity^
T. H. — Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer {Tntroduc
J. D.^s objections to my book De Cive in the first place, 3-8 subject.']
that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine
this discourse of liberty and necessity, which (because I never
had uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But
seeing it was both your Lordship's and J. D.'s desire, that I
should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do. And
here I present and submit it to your Lordship's judgment.
J. D. — The first day that I did read over T. H. his defence [Reply.]
of the necessity of all things, was April 20, 1646 : which pro-
* [The present " Discourse" is com- to this discourse, written also in 1645
posed of three several tracts, printed as a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle,
in successive portions: viz. 1. "a and surreptitiously printed in 1654;
discourse of liberty and necessity," and 3. Bramhall's reply to Hobbes'
written by Bramhall in 1645 in con- answer, written also in 1645, and sent
sequence of a conversation between at that time (through the Marquis) to
Hobbes and himself in the presence of Hobbes, but printed for the first time
the Marquis of Newcastle, but not (with his original discourse and Hobbes'
printed until 1655 ; 2. Hobbes' answer letter, as here reprinted) in 1655.]
24
k VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
P A^RT ceeded not out of any disrespect to him^ ; for if all his dis-
'- — courses had been geometrical demonstrations^ able not only
to persuade but also to compel assent^ all had been one to me ;
first my journey, and afterwards some other trifles (which we
call business), having diverted me until then. And then my
occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend
awakening me, I set myself to a serious examination of it.
[T.H.'sown We commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if
words con- , .
Vict his they have line enough, coniute themselves, and their specu-
faisehood.] l^tives and their practicks familiarly interfere one with
another. The very first words of T. H. his defence trip up
the heels of his whole cause ; — " I had once resolved/^ To
"resolve'^ pre-supposeth dehberation; but what deliberation
can there be of that, w^hich is inevitably determined by
causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? Can a
condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed
or not ? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to con-
sult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his
breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly,
to "resolve^^ implies a man^s dominion over his own actions, 650
and his actual determination of himself; but he who holds
an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this domi- |
nion over himself, and (which is worse) hath quitted it to
the second extrinsecal causes, in which he makes all his
actions to be determined. One may as well call again yester-
day, as " resolve," or newly determine, that which is deter-
mined to his hand already. I have perused this treatise,
weighed T. H. his answers, considered his reasons ; and con-
clude, that he hath missed and misted the question, that the
answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms,
that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a
result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that
the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no
better defence ; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved
to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man, read-
ing this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent
and well founded. How comes this to pass ? The treatise
[Hobbes' letter was dated Aug. had met Hobbes) to Brussels, which
20, 1645, from Rouen. The journey was his ordinary place of residence
of Bramhall alluded to appears to have from 1644 to 1648 : See above in vol. i.
been his return from Paris (where he p. x.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
25
is the same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolu- Discourse
tion is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose?
Do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to
maintain ? What is it then ? The difference must be in
ourselves ; either in our intellectuals, because the one sees
clearer than the other, or in our affections, which betray our
understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the
one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference
is in ourselves. The outward causes alone do not chain me
to the one resolution, nor him to the other resolution. But
T. H. may say, that our several and respective deliberations
and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolu-
tions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up
one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of
this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make
all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or
doubted of. When all the causes have actually determined
themselves, then the effect is in being ; for though there be
a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet
they are together in time. And the old rule is, — " whatso-
ever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is*^.^^ This is no ab-
solute necessity, but only upon supposition, — that a man hath
determined his own liberty. When we question whether all
occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they
be necessary when they are, nor whether they be neces-
sary in sensu composito — after we have resolved and finally
determined what to do, but whether they were necessary
before they were determined by ourselves, by or in the pre-
cedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior causes with-
out ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true liberty to
determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be
determined by another without itself.
T. H. saitli further, that "upon your Lordship's desire
and'' mine, he "was contented" to "begin with this dis-
course of liberty and necessity," that is, to change his former
resolution. If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that
it may be snapped so easily in sunder, if his will was no
["Tb jxcv elvaL rh tv 'Stuv 77, Kai rh Tavr6v icrri rh hy airav chai e| avdyKrjs
HV tv ij.^ eli/ai '6rav fx^ 77, avayKt]' ov ot€ iari, kui rh awKais dyai avdyKr^s.''
fxivroi otjTi rh t>v airav avayKt) elvai, Aristot., De Interpret., c, ix. § 11.]
oi/Tc rh fxT] hv avdyKT) fx^ iivai' ov yap
26
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
P^A^R T otherwise determined from without himself but only by the
signification of your Lordship^s desire" and my modest
entreaty, then we may safely conclude, that human afi*airs
are not always governed by absolute necessity, that a man is
lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordi-
nate to the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth, and that
all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward
and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral per-
suasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent
that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which
otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an
antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical or natural
determination of all causes, "shall be great Apollo to me*^."
Whereas T. H. saith, that he "had never uttered" his
" opinion" of this question, I suppose he intends in writing.
My conversation with him hath not been frequent ; yet I
remember well, that when this question was agitated be-
tween us two in your Lordship^s chamber by your command,
he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute
necessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity,
the flux or concatenation of the second causes.
NUMBER II.
T. H. — And, first, I assure your Lordship, I find in it no
new argument, neither from Scripture nor from reason, that
I have not often heard before ; which is as much as to say,
that I am not surprised.
[Reply.] J. D. — Though I be so unhappy, that I can present no
novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if he be not
"surprised," then in reason I may expect a more mature
answer from him, and where he fails, I may ascribe it to the
weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation. But in
this case I like Epictetus^ his counsel well, that the sheep
should not brag how much they have eaten, or what an
excellent pasture they do go in, but shew it in their lamb
and wool. Apposite answers and downright arguments
["Et eris mihi magnus Apollo." ® [Vide Epicteti Enchirid., c. xlvi.
Virg., Eel., iii. 104.] § 2. p. 222. ed. Schweigh.]
[ T. h:s
boast. ]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
27
advantage a cause. To tell what we have heard or seen, is Discourse
to no purpose, ^yheu a respondent leaves many things un '■
touched, as if they were too hot for his fingers, and declines
the weight of other things, and alters the true state of the
question, it is a shrewd sign, either that he hath not weighed
all things maturely, or else that he maintains a desperate
cause.
NUMBER III.
T. H. — The preface is a handsome one, but it appears [Ansicer to
even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For^^Y^''^'
whereas he says thus — " If I be free to write this discourse,
I have obtained the cause,^^ — I deny that to be tnie ; for ^tis
not enough to his fi'eedom of wi-iting, that he had not
written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the
cause, he must prove, that before he wi'it it, it was not
necessary he should write it afterward. It may be, he [Liberty to
thinks it all one to say, I was free to wi'ite it, and, it was not ^(^^^^^^^
necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he ^'^.^^^^^
is free to do a tiling, that may do it if he have the will to do
it, and may forbeai* if he have the will to forbear : and yet,
if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it,
the action is necessai'ily to follow ; and if there be a neces-
sity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbeai'ing
also -will be necessaiy. The question therefore is not, whether
a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can wi'ite
or forbeai', speak or be silent, according to his will ; but
whether the will to write, and the will to forbeai', come upon
him according to his will, or according to any thing else in
his own power. I acknowledge this libeity, that I can do if
I will; but to say I can will if I will, I take it to be an
absurd speech. \Mierefore I cannot grant him the cause
upon this preface.
J. D. — Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which 'Rei iy.]
evermore begin with a man's praise-. The crisis or the
catastrophe of theii' discom-sc is when they come to their
" bfff.^' As, he is a good natuved man, but he liath a
^ [Vide Agric. c. tl.]
28
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part naughty quality ; or, he is a wise man, hut he hath com-
— — mitted one of the greatest follies. So here, — " The preface
is a handsome one, hut it appears even in this, that he hath
mistaken the question." This is to give an inch, that one
may take away an ell without suspicion ; to praise the hand-
someness of the porch, that he may gain credit to the vilify-
ing of the house. Whether of us hath mistaken the ques-
tion, I refer to the judicious reader. Thus much I will
maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls
necessity, nor that liberty which he calls liberty, nor that
the question which he makes the question.
1 . [T. H. First, for libertj^, that which he calls liberty is no true liberty,
liberty with For the clearing whereof it behoveth us to know the diffe-
spontanei- ^.g-^^g between these three, necessity, spontaneity, and liberty.
Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together,
so may spontaneity and liberty, but real necessity and true
liberty can never meet together. Some things are necessary
and not voluntary or spontaneous, some things are both
necessary and voluntary ; some things are voluntary and not
free, some things are both voluntary and free; but those
things which are truly necessary can never be free, and
those things which are truly free can never be necessary.
Necessity consists in an antecedent determination to one ;
spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either
intellectual or sensitive, to the object ; true liberty consists
in the elective power of the rational will. That which is
determined without my concurrence, may nevertheless agree
well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subse-
quent consent ; but that which is determined without my
concurrence or consent, cannot be the object of mine elec-
tion. I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon
me by another ; but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by
extrinsecal causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and
impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or
not. Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true
liberty ; which judgeth and representeth to the will, whether
this or that be convenient, whether this or that be more
convenient. Judge, then, what a pretty kind of liberty it is
which is maintained by T. H. Such a liberty as is in little
children, before they have the use of reason, before they can 652
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
29
consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a childish Discourse
liberty ? And such a liberty as is in brute beasts^ as bees '■
and spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our
trades, by experience and consideration. This is a brutish
liberty. Such a liberty as a bird hath to fly when her wings
are clipped. Or (to use his own comparison such a liberty as
a "lame" man who hath lost the use of his limbs hath to walk.
Is not this a ridiculous liberty ? Lastly (which is worse than
all these), such a liberty as "a river" hath " to descend down
the channel^." What ? Will he ascribe liberty to inanimate
creatures also, which have neither reason, nor spontaneity,
nor so much as sensitive appetite? Such is T.H. his liberty.
His necessity is just such another; a necessity upon suppo- [2. And
sition, arising from the concourse of all the causes, including ca?with
the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures. n"ce^gsjjy"-]
The adequate cause and the effect are together in time ; and
when all the concurrent causes are determined, the eflPect is
determined also, and is become so necessary, that it is actu-
ally in being. But there is a great difference between de-
termining, and being determined. If all the collateral causes
concurring to the production of an effect, were antecedently
determined, what they must of necessity produce, and when
they must produce it, then there is no doubt but the effect is
necessary. But if these causes did operate freely, or con-
tingently, if they might have suspended or denied theii' con-
currence, or have concurred after another manner, then the
effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either
free or contingent. This will be yet clearer by considering
his own instance of " casting ambs ace^ though it partake
more of contingency than of freedom. Supposing '^''the
posture of the party^s hand" who did throw the dice, sup-
posing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves,
supposing " the measure of force applied," and supposing all
other things which did concur to the production of that cast,
to be the very same they were, there is no doubt but in this
case the cast is necessary. But stUl this is but a necessity of
supposition; for if all these concurrent causes or some of
them were contingent or free, then the cast was not abso-
^ [See below T. H. Numb. xxix. [See below T. H. Numb, xxxiv.
p. 715. fol. edit.] p. 722. fol. edit.]
30
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
P T lutely necessary. To begin with the caster ; — he might have
'- — denied his concurrence, and not have cast at all ; he might
have suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon ;
he might have doubled or diminished his force in casting,
if it had pleased him ; he might have thrown the dice into
the other table. In all these cases what becomes of his
"ambs ace?'^ The like uncertainties offer themselves for
the maker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and
for the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I
know not how many other circumstances. In such a mass
of contingencies, it is impossible that the effect should be
antecedently necessary. T. H. appeals to every man's ex-
perience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon him-
self; and he shall find no convincing, much less constraining
reason, to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts
more than another, but only his own will or arbitrary deter-
mination. So T. H. his necessity is no absolute, no antecedent,
extrinsecal necessity, but merely a necessity upon supposition.
3. [True Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the
eludes li^" question. " The question is not,'' saith he, whether a man
berty to write" if he will, and "forbear" if he will, "but whether
the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him
according to his will, or according to any thing else in his
own power." Here is a distinction without a difference. If
his will do not " come upon him according to his will," then
he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which
is T. H. his liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent
is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power
over itself, the agent is no more free than a staff in a man's
hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty show of a power
in the will, either to write or not to write. If it be precisely
and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever,
what a man shall will and what he shall not will, what he
shall write and what he shall not write, to what purpose is
this power ? God and nature never made anything in vain ;
but "vain and frustraneous is that power, which never was
and never shall be deduced into act." Either the agent is
determined before he acteth, what he shall Avill and what he
shall not will, what he shall act and what he shall not act ;
and then he is no more free to act than he is to will : or else
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
31
he is not determined ; and then there is no necessity. No Discourse
653 effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the action be
free, to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will or
nill must of necessity be more free. " Quod efficit tale illud
magis est tale\'^ If the will be determined, the writing
or not writing is likewise determined ; and then he should
not say, he may write or he may forbear, but he must write,
or he miLSt forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts the
sense of all the world ; — that the will of man is determined
without his "will," or without "any thing in his power/' Why
do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? why
do we represent reasons to them ? why do we pray them ?
why do we entreat them ? why do we blame them ? if
their will "come" not "upon them according to their will."
" Wilt thou be made clean ?" said our Saviour to the paraly- john v. 6.
tic person ; to what purpose, if his will was extrinsecally [./j™e/*?]^
determined? Christ complains, "We have piped unto you, Matt.xLi?.
and ye have not danced." How could they help it, if their
wills were determined without their wills to forbear ? And,
" I would have gathered your children together as the hen i^iatt. xxiii.
gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not."
How easily might they answer, according to T. H. his doc-
trine,— Alas ! blame not us ; our wills are not in our own
power or disposition ; if they were, we would thankfully em-
brace so great a favour. Most truly said St. Austin, "Our
wiU should not be a will at aU, if it were not in our power j."
This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned
from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature.
" We need not turn over any obscure books" to find out this
truth. "The poets chant it in the theatres, the shepherds
in the mountains j the pastors teach it in their churches, the
doctors in the universities ; the common people in the
markets, and all mankind in the whole world, do assent unto
it^ ;" except a handful of men, who have poisoned their intel-
' [Aristot., Analyt. Poster., lib. i. ^ [" Etiamne hi libri obscuri mihi
c. 2. § 15. — " At' & inrdpxei %KaaTov, scrutandi eraiit, unde discerem, nemi-
4kuvo fxaWov virdpx^L' oTou, 5t' h (pi- nem vituperatione suppliciove dignum,
AoCjuev, iKelvo ixaWou c^iAov."] qui aut id velit quod justitia velle non
j De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 3. [§ 8 ; prohibet, aut id non faciat quod facere
Op. torn. i. p. 613. F. — "Voluntas nos- non potest ? Nonne ista cantant et in
tra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nos- montibus pastores et in tlieatris poetae
tra potestate."] et indocti in circulis et docti in bi-
32
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
PjAjR T lectuals with paradoxical principles. Fourthly, this necessity
'■ — which T. H. hath devised, which is grounded upon the neces-
sitation of a man^s will without his will, is the worst of all
others; and is so far from lessening those difficulties and
absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics,
that it increaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable.
No man blameth fire for burning whole cities ; no man tax-
eth poison for destroying men ; but those persons, who apply
them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his
own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or
the poison. Three things are required to make an act or
omission culpable : first, that it be in our power to perform
it or forbear it ; secondly, that we be obliged to perform it
or forbear it respectively; thirdly, that we omit that which
we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have
omitted. No man sins in doing those things which he could
uot shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his
power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have
also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpable.
It is true ; but if this appetite be determined by another,
not by themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to
curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a
stone descending downward according to its natural aj)petite,
or the brute beasts, who commit voluntary errors in follow-
ing their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. The question then
is not, whether a man be necessitated to will or nill, yet free
to act or forbear. But, lea\ing the ambiguous acceptions of
the word " free/' the question is plainly this — whether all
agents^ and all events, natural, ci\dl, moral (for we speak not
now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this ques-
tion), be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without
their own concurrence in the determination ; so as all actions
and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor
can be otherwise, after any other manner, or in any other
place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end,
than they are ; and all this, in respect of the Supreme Cause,
or a concourse of extrinsecal causes, determining them to one.
So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was
hliothecis et magistri in scholis et an- abus A nimabus contra Manichaeos, c.xi.
tistites in sacratis locis et in orbe terra- § 15; Op. torn. viii. pp. 85. F, G,
rum genus luunanum ?" Aug.,De Du- 86. A.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
33
extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this dis- Discourse
course, without any concurrence of mine in tlie determination,
and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was
not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not to be
blamed ; for no man is justly blamed for doing that, which
never was in his power to shun. If I was not so predeter-
mined, then mine actions and my wiU to act are neither
654 compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes, but I
elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, according to
mine own will, and by mine own power. And when I have
resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition,
which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real
antecedent necessity. The two horns of this dilemma are so
strait, that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between
them. And the two consequences are so evident, that instead
of answering he is forced to decline them.
[the stating of the question.]
NUMBER IV.
J. D. — And so to fall in hand with the question, without [Tmeiiber-
any further proems or prefaces. By liberty, I do understand, terSi im"
neither a liberty from sin, nor a liberty from misery^, nor a fvom Si
liberty from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I jlQ^jf^^™^"*^"
understand a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessita- one.]
tion, that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and
determination to one : whether it be of exercise only, which
the Schools call a liberty of contradiction^ y and is found in
God, and in the good and bad angels ; that is, not a liberty
to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this
or that good, this or that evil, respectively ; or whether it be
a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools
call liberty oi contrariety^, and is found in men endowed with
reason and understanding; that is, a liberty to do and not to do,
good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared, &c.
T. H. — In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of [Answer.l^
liberty, and says, he means not " liberty from sin," nor
' [" Est namque libertas arbitrii tri- of liberty of exercise, &c., see Bellarm.,
plex, scz. a necessitate, a peccato, et a De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. c.
miseria." Pet. Lomb,,Sent.,lib.II. dist. 3 ; Op. torn. iii. pp. 651. C, 654. A.]
XXV. qu. i. art. 5. For the distinction
BRAMHALL.
34
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
p R T <( from servitude/' nor from violence/' but " from necessity,
necessitation^ inevitability, and determination to one.'' It
had been better to define liberty tban thus to distinguish ;
for I understand never the more what he means by liberty.
And though he says, he means " liberty from necessitation/'
yet I understand not how such a liberty can be. And it is
a taking of the question without proof ; for what else is the
question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible
or not ? There are in the same place other distinctions : as,
a liberty of exercise" only, which he calls " a liberty of con-
tradiction" (namely, of doing, not good or e^dl simply, but
of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively),
and a liberty of " specification and exercise also," which he
calls " a liberty of contrariety" (namely, a liberty not only
to do or not do, good or evil, but also to do or not do, this
or that good or evil). And with these distinctions, he says,
he " clears the coast /' whereas in truth he darkeneth his
meaning, not only with the jargon of "exercise only, specifi-
cation also, contradiction, contrariety," but also with pre-
tending distinction where none is ; for how is it possible for
the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil,
to consist (as he says it doth in God and angels) without a
liberty of doing or not doing good or evil ?
[Reply.] J. D. — It is a rule in art, that words which are homo-
nymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever
in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in
confused generalities but either sophisters or bunglers.
^ Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus' — ' deceitful men do not
love to descend to particulars f and when bad archers shoot,
[Different the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes
the word opposed to the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as Rom. vi.
pia1ned?f " — " "^^^ being made free from sin — sometimes to misery
and oppression, — Isai. Iviii. 6, — " To let the oppressed go
free/' — sometimes to servitude, as Levit. xxv. 10, — In the
year of jubilee "ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the
land j" — sometimes to violence, as Psalm cv. 20, — " The
prince of his people let him go free." Yet none of all these
are the liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity,
that is, a determination to one, or rather from necessitation,
AGAIXST MR. HOBBES.
35
that is, a necessity imposed by another, or an extrinsecal Discol use
determination. These distinctions do virtually imply a de- L
scription of true liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it
than T. H. his roving definition ; as we shall see in due place.
And though he say that he " understands never the more
what^^ I ^^mean by liberty/^ yet it is plain by his ow^n inge-
nuous confession, both that he doth understand it, and that this
is the very question where ^^the water sticks" between us; —
whether there be such a liberty, free from all necessitation
and extrinsecal determination to one. Which being but the
stating of the question, he calls it amiss the " taking of the
question." It were too much weakness to beg this question,
which is so copious and demonstrable. It is strange to see,
with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all
the schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of
former ages, as if they were not worthy to unloose the [Mark i. 7.
' jj shoe-strings" of some modern author, or did " sit in darkness ^plj' ^^^j,-
and in the shadow of death," until some third Cato dropped ^0.]
down from heaven™," to whom all men must repair, as to the
altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did never
wonder to hear a raw diWne out of the pulpit declaim against
school dignity to his equally ignorant auditors. It is but
as the fox in the fable, who having lost his own tail by a
mischance, would have persuaded all his fellows to cut ofi"
theirs and throw them away as unprofitable burdens. But
it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath been long
admitted into the innermost closet of nature, and seen the
hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to forget him-
self, as to style school-learning no better than a plain
" jargon," that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian
language, like the clattering noise of sabots. Suppose
they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreads, or
delight in abstruse expressions ; yet, certainly, this distinc-
tion of liberty into " liberty of contrariety^' and " liberty of
contradiction," or (which is all one) of ^' exercise only" or
" exercise and specification jointly," which T. H. rejects T\'ith
so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received,
that there is scarce that writer of note, either di\ine or
philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he
^ ["Tertius e coelo cecidit Cato." Juv., ii. 40.]
D 2
36
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part uscth it. Good and evil are contraries_, or opposite kinds of
things : therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is
contracHc^-^ a liberty of contrariety or of specification. To choose this, and
contrariety! choosc this, are contradictory, or (which is all one) an
of exercise exercise or suspension of power : therefore to be able to do
and of spe- ^ ^ . .
cification.] or forbear to do the same action, to choose or not choose
the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of
contradiction, or of exercise only. Now man is not only able
to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able
both to do and to forbear to do, both good and evil ; so he hath
not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary
objects ; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification;
not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety.
On the other side, God, and the good angels, can do or not do
this or that good, but they cannot do or not do both good
and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradic-
tion, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It ap-
pears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in
the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than
the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only
good. But withal, the liberty of man comes short in the
intension of the power. Man is not so free in respect of
good only, as God, or the good angels ; because (not to speak
of God, Whose liberty is quite of another nature) the under-
standings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion
over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites
to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then,
this distinction is cleared from all darkness.
And where T. H. demands, "how it is possible for the
liberty of doing, or not doing, this or that good or evil, to
consist in God and angels without a liberty of doing or not
doing good or evil the answer is obvious and easy, ^ refe-
renda singula singulis/ rendering every act to its right object
respectively. God, and good angels, have a power to do or
not to do this or that good ; bad angels have a power to do
or not to do this or that evil ; so both, jointly considered,
have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, accord-
ing to the words of my discourse, God, and good, and bad
angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or
evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.
AGAIXST MR. HOBBES.
37
Discourse
NOIBER V. '
J. D. — Thus the coast being cleared_, the next thing to be [Division
done is to draw out om- forces against the enemy. And be- mentf*^^"
cause they are divided into two squadrons^ the one of Chris-
tians, the other of heathen philosophers, it will be best to
dispose ours also into two bodies, the former drawn from
Scrip tiu'e, the latter fi'om reason.
T. H. — The next thing he doth after the clearing of the lAnswer.]
coast, is the dividing of his forces," as he calls them, " into
two squadrons," one of places of Scripture, the other of reasons ;
which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addi^esseth
the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All
that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great
part of those his forces do look and march another way, and
some of them do fight among themselves.
J. D. — If T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them [Reply.]
together among themselves, it were his only way to conquer
i56 them. But he will find, that those imaginary contradictions
which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but fan-
cies ; and my supposed impertinencies will prove his o^\*n real
mistakings.
I. PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.
NUMBER VI.
J. D. — First, whosoever have power of election have true Argument
hberty, for the proper act of Hberty is election. A sponta- men have
neity may consist with determination to one : as we see in election!
children, fools, madmen, brute beasts, whose fancies are ^^^^
determined to those things which they act spontaneously ; I'^ert v.]
as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of
these have a hberty of election ; which is an act of judgment
and understanding, and cannot possibly consist with a deter-
mination to one. He that is determined by something before
himself or without himself, cannot be said to choose or elect :
unless it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in Cambridge,
38
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part whether lie will have the least part or nothing ; and scarcely
'■ — so much. — But men have liberty of election. This is plain,
Numb. XXX. 14 [13], — If a wife make a vow, it is left to her
husband^s choice, either to "establish it,^^ or to " make it void.''
And Josh. xxiv. 15, — " Choose you this day whom ye will
serve,'' &c., " but I and my house will serve the Lord ;" he
makes his own choice, and leaves them to the liberty of
their election. And 2 Sam. xxiv. 12, — "I offer thee three
things, choose thee which of them I shall do;" if one of
these three things was necessarily determined and the other
two impossible, how was it left to him to choose what should
be done ? — Therefore we have true liberty.
[Answer.^ T. H. — And the first place of Scripture, taken from Numb.
XXX. 14 [13], is one of them that look another way. The
words arcj " If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's
choice, either to establish it or make it void." For it proves
no more but that the husband is a free or voluntary agent ;
but not that his choice therein is not necessitated, or not
determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary
causes.
[Reply.] J. D. — My first argument from Scripture is thus formed;
— Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, are not
determined to one by precedent necessary causes ; but men
have liberty of election. The assumption, or minor proposi-
tion, is proved by three places of Scripture ; Numb. xxx. 14
[13], Josh. xxiv. 15, 2 Sam. xxiv. 12. I need not insist
upon these; because T. H. acknowledgeth, that "it is clearly
proved that there is election in man"." But he denieth the
major proposition, because (saith he) man is " necessitated,"
or " determined to what he shall choose by precedent neces-
sary causes."
I take away this answer three ways.
1. [Eiec- First, by reason. Election is evermore either of thinsrs
tion is only -i i i p i •
ofaiteina- possiblc, or at Icast of thmgs conceived to be possible: that
clfved'^pos- efficacious election, when a man hopeth or thinketh of
sibie.] obtaining the object. Whatsoever the will chooseth, it
chooseth under the notion of good, either honest or delight-
» [liclow, T. H. at the end of Numb. vii. p. 44.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
39
ful or profitable; but there can be no real goodness ap- Discourse
prehended in that which is known to be impossible. It '■
is true, there may be some wandering pendulous wishes of
known impossibilities ; as a man who hath committed an
offence, may wish he had not committed it : but to choose
efficaciously an impossibility, is as impossible as an impossi-
bihty itself. No man can think to obtain that, which he
knows impossible to be obtained. But he who knows that
all things are antecedently determined by necessary causes,
knows that it is impossible for anything to be otherwise than
it is. Therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election, to
choose this or that indifferently, is to make the same thing
to be determined to one, and to be not determined to one ;
which are contradictories. Again, whosoever hath an elective
power, or a liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power
to refuse. Isa. vii. 16, — Before the child shall know to
refuse the e\dl and choose the good.^^ He who chooseth this
rather than that, refuseth that rather than this. As "Moses, Heb.xi.24,
choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God,'' did ^^^'^
thereby refuse ''^the pleasures of sin.'' But no man hath
any power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined
to be : unless it be as the fox refused the grapes, which were
beyond his reach. When one thing of two or three is abso-
lutely determined, the others are made thereby simply impos-
sible.
Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by that universal 2. [Univer-
notion which the world hath of election. What is the diffe- sentT"
rence between an elective and hereditary kingdom, but that
in an elective kingdom they have power or liberty to choose
657 this or that man indifferently, but in an hereditary king-
dom they have no such power nor liberty? Where the
law makes a certain heir, there is a necessitation to one ;
where the law doth not name a certain heir, there is no
necessitation to one, and there they have power or Hberty
to choose. An hereditary prince may be as grateful and
acceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received by them
(according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or
violence), as he who is chosen ; yet he is not therefore an
I elective prince. In Germany all the nobility and commons
may assent to the choice of the emperor, or be well pleased
40
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part witli it when it is concluded ; yet none of them elect or
^ — choose the emperor, but only those six princes who have a
consultative,, deliberative, and determinative power in his
election. And if their votes or suffrages be equally divided,
three to three, then the king of Bohemia hath the casting
voice °. So likewise in corporations or commonwealths,
sometimes the people, sometimes the common council, have
power to name so many persons for such an office, and the
supreme magistrate, or senate, or lesser council respectively,
to choose one of those. And all this is done with that cau-
tion and secrecy, by billets or other means, that no man
knows which w^ay any man gave his vote, or with whom to
be offended. If it were necessarily and inevitably predeter-
mined, that this individual person and no other shall and
must be chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to
do that which is not possible to be done otherwise, which
one may do as well as a thousand, and for doing of which no
rational man can be offended, if the electors were necessarily
predetermined to elect this man and no other? And though
T. H. was pleased to pass by my university instance, yet I
may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. The
junior of the mess in Cambridge divides the meat into four
parts. The senior chooseth first, then the second and third
in their order. The junior is determined to one, and hath
no choice left ; unless it be to choose whether he will take
that part which the rest have refused, or none at all. It may
be, this part is more agreeable to his mind than any of the
others would have been, but for all that he cannot be said to
choose it, because he is determined to this one. Even such
a liberty of election is that which is established by T. H. : or
rather much worse, in two respects. The junior hath yet a
liberty of contradiction left, to choose whether he will take
that part or not take any part ; but he who is precisely pre-
determined to the choice of this object, hath no liberty to
refuse it. Secondly, the junior, by di^dding carefully, may
preserve to himself an equal share; but he who is wholly
° [This is the account given by The- tracts in the beginning of Goldastus as
odoric a Niem, as quoted by Schardius, just quoted, and Robertson's Hist, of
De Elect. Iinper., c. i. inter Goldast. Charles V., Introd., Proofs and lllus-
Polit. Imper. p. 12 For a more cor- trations, note xli. § 2.]
rect account of the matter, see the
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
41
determined by extrinsecal causes, is left altogether to tlie Discourse
mercy and disposition of another. ~
Thirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. Numb. xxx. 13 ; I^^^^^^^J'^ -j
" If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband's choice,
either to ' estabhsh it' or ' make it void.' '' But if it be pre-
determined that he shall "establish it,'' it is not in his power
to "make it void." If it be predetermined that he shall
"make it void," it is not in his power to "estabhsh it."
And howsoever it be determined, yet, being determined, it is
not in his power, indifferently, either to "establish it" or to
"make it void" at his pleasure. So Joshua xxiv. 15;
" Choose you this day whom ye will serve, . . but I and my
house will serve the Lord." It is too late to choose that
"this day," which was determined otherwise yesterday.
" Whom ye will serve, whether the gods whom your fathers
served, or the gods of the Amorites :" — where there is an
election of this or that, these gods or those gods, there must
needs be either an indifferency to both objects, or at least a
possibility of either. "I and my house will serve the Lord :"
— if he were extrinsecally predetermined, he should not say,
" I will serve," but, I must serve. And 2 Sam. xxiv. 12 ;
" I offer thee three things, choose thee which of them I shall
do." How doth God " offer three things" to David's choice, if
He had predetermined him to one of the three by a concourse
of necessary extrinsecal causes ? If a sovereign prince should
descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice, whether he
would be fined or imprisoned or banished, and had under-
hand signed the sentence of his banishment, what were it
else but plain drollery, or mockery ? This is the argument
which in T. H. his opinion "looks another way." If it do,
it is as the Parthians used to fight, flyingP. His reason fol-
lows next to be considered.
NUMBER VII.
T. H. — For if there come into the husband's mind greater [That the
good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the esta- ^tVe reason
bhshing will follow necessarily. And if the evil that will "^^^'/ff '
58 follow thereon in the husband's opinion outweigh the good,
the contrary must needs follow. And yet in this following
V [Justin., in Trog. Pomp. Hist., lib. xli. c. 2. — &c,]
42
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part
III.
of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of election. So
that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this.
And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.
[Reply.] J. X). — There is nothing said with more show of reason in
this cause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true
liberty than this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly
follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last
judgment of right reason. And in this, and this only, I con-
fess T. H. hath good seconds'^. Yet the common and approved
opinion is contrary. And justly. For, —
1. [The First, this very act of the understanding is an effect of the
the reason will, and a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the
acfof\he" ^^^^f which, affecting some particular good, doth engage and
will ] command the understanding to consult and deliberate what
means are convenient for attaining that end. And though
the will itself be blind, yet its object is good in general,
which is the end of all human actions. Therefore it belongs
to the will, as to the general of an army, to move the other
powers of the soul to their acts, and among the rest the
understanding also, by applying it and reducing its power
into act : so as, whatsoever obligation the understanding doth
put upon the will, is by the consent of the will, and derived
from the power of the will ; which was not necessitated to move
the understanding to consult. So the will is the lady and
mistress of human actions ; the understanding is her trusty
counsellor, which gives no ad^dce but when it is required by
the will. And if the first consultation or deliberation be not
sufficient, the will may move a review, and require the un-
derstanding to inform itself better, and take advice of others,
from whence many times the judgment of the understanding
doth receive alteration.
2. [It deter- Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth
wnrmo-^ determine the will, it is not naturally but morally. The will
neces "''^ is moved by the understanding, not as by an efficient, having
ndrWy.] a causal influence into the effect, but only by proposing and
representing the object. And therefore, as it were ridiculous
[E. g. Bellarmine, De Grat. et Lib. cessario ab ultimo judicio practicEC ra-
Arb., lib. iii. c. 8 ; Op. torn. iii. p. 6(57. tionis."]
C, &c. — "Voluntatis clcctio peudct nc-
I
i
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
43
to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, so Discourse
it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the under
standing to the will is the cause of willing. And therefore
the understanding hath no place in that concourse of causes
which according to T. H. do necessitate the will.
Thirdly, the iuderment of the understanding is not always 3. [Nor
.V r, -, • • 1/. ^ , ,/ yet to one
practice prachcum'', nor of such a nature m itseli as to oblige course un-
and determine the wijl to one. Sometimes the understand- ^^^^^^^^^-1
ing proposeth two or three means equally available to the
attaining of one and the same end. Sometimes it dictateth,
that this or that particular good is eligible or fit to be
chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it must
be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means,
but not the only means, to attain the desired end. In these
cases, no man can doubt but that the will may choose or not
choose, this or that, indifferently. Yea, though the under-
standing shaU judge one of these means to be more expedient
than another, yet, forasmuch as in the less expedient there
is found the reason of good, the will in respect of that
dominion which it hath over itself may accept that which the
understanding judgeth to be less expedient, and refuse that
which it judgeth to be more expedient.
Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so effi- 4. [Nor in
caciously, but that it may be, and often is, deterred from the thauVe^^'
prosecution of it by the difficulty of the means : and notwith- ^'^^^ canriot
. , " suspend its
standing the judgment of the understanding, the wiU may own act.]
still suspend its own act.
Fifthly, supposing but not granting, that the wiU did 5. [Nor an-
necessarily foUow the last dictate of the understanding, yet or^e^trlnse-
this proves no antecedent necessity, but co-existent with the ^^^^^'^
act ; no extrinsecal necessity, the -will and understanding
being but two faculties of the same soul ; no absolute neces-
sity, but merely upon supposition. And therefore the same
authors who maintain that the judgment of the understand-
ing doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more
earnestly oppugn T. H. his absolute necessity of all occur-
rences. Suppose the will shall apply the understanding to
dehberate, and not require a review ; suppose the dictate of
^ [See below in the Castigations of vii. p. 768 (fol. edit.) Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]
Mr. Hobbes's Animadversions, Numb.
44
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part the Understanding shall be absolute, not this or that indiffer-
III
ently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but this posi- 659
tively, not this freely, but this necessarily ; and suppose the
will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act ;
then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor ex-
trinsecal, nor antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes
without ourselves, but a necessity upon supposition, which
we do readily grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth,
whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension of a greater
good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute
necessity.
[6. T. H.'s Lastly, whereas he saith, that " the nature of election^^
affectation ^^^^ cousist^' in following our hopes and fears,'' I cannot
terms of j^^^ observe, that there is not one word of art in this whole
treatise which he useth in the right sense. I hope it doth
not proceed out of an aff'ectation of singularity, nor out of a
contempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to take in
sunder the whole frame of learning, and new mould it after
his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would
give us a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense.
But because this is but touched here sparingly and upon the
by, I will forbear it, until I meet with it again in its proper
place. And for the present it shall sufiice to say, that hopes
and fears are common to brute beasts, but election is a
rational act, and is proper only to man, who is
" Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altae'."
[Further T. H. — The second place of Scripture is Josh. xxiv. 15,
^.^ifj'^'^ the third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12 ; whereby 'tis clearly proved, that
there is election in man, but not proved, that such election
was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considera-
tions of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the
will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer
serves all such places, if they were a thousand.
[Reply.] J. D. — This answer being the very same with the former,
word for word, which hath already been sufficiently shaken in
pieces, doth require no new reply.
« [Ovid., Mctani., i. 76.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
45
DlSCOUIlSK
I.
NUMBER VIII.
T. H. — Supposing, it seems^ I might answer as I have [Further
done, that necessity and election might stand together; and t. h.]
instance in the actions of children, fools, and brute beasts,
whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined
to one ; before these his proofs out of Scripture he desires to
prevent that instance, and therefore says, that the actions of
" children, fools, madmen, and beasts,^^ are indeed " deter-
mined,^^ but that they proceed not from election, nor from
free, but from spontaneous agents ; as, for example, that the
bee when it maketh honey does it spontaneously, and when
the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, and not
by election. Though I never meant to ground any answer
upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and
beasts do, yet, that your Lordship may understand what can
be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary,
I will answer that distinction, and shew, that it fighteth
against its fellow arguments. Your Lordship is therefore to
consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that in-
duceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and
said to be done by a man's own accord. As when a man
giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out
of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord ; which in
Latin is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous :
though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid kill-
ing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the
motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spon-
taneous action is not therefore voluntary : for voluntary pre-
supposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some
consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both
upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated
of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and be
therefore spontaneous, of which nevertheless as he thinks we
never consulted, nor deliberated of in ourselves ; as when,
making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but
that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in
anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous but not
voluntary nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions
46
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Pa^r t he says necessitation may stand, but not with such as are
voluntary, and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now
if I make it appear to you_, that even these actions which he
says proceed from spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to
" fools, children, madmen, and beasts,^^ proceed from deliber-
ation and election ; and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and
spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those, that are by
themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than
ordinary men are ; then his argument concludeth, that neces-
sity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that
which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove.
And, first, your Lordship^ s own experience furnishes you
with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, <
do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take. The
horse retiring from some strange figure he sees, and com-
ing on again to avoid the spur. And what else does man
that dehberateth, but one while proceed toward action,
another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good
draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him ? A child
may be so young as to do all which it does without all
deliberation ; but that is but till it chance to be hurt by
doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod ;
for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be de-
liberated on the second time. Fools and madmen mani-
festly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they
make not so good a choice, the images of things being by
diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so little to
do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have con-
fessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in
them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees, Aristotle
says, their life is " civil*. " He is deceived, if he think any
spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, difi'ers
from an action voluntary and elective ; for even the setting
of a man's foot in the posture of walking, and the action of
ordinary eating, was once deliberated how and when it should
be done ; and though it afterward become easy and habitual,
so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not
hinder but that the act is voluntary and] proceeds from
' [Ilist. Animal., lib. I. c. i. § 25. — yiuerai irauruv rh fpyow . . . eari 5e
" UoXiTiKO. S' 4(Tr\u wv eV rt Ka.\ KOivhv roiovrov &udpu}nos, /xfAirra," k. r. A.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
47
election. So also are the rashest actions of choleric persons Discourse
voluntary and upon deliberation : for who is there but very
3^oung children, that has not considered, when and how far
he ought or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then he
agrees with me, that such actions are necessitated, and the
fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions
they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of
election does not take away the necessity of electing this or
that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments fights
against another.
J. D. — We have partly seen before, how T. H. hath coined [Reply.]
a new kind of liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of
election ; and now, in this section, a new kind of spontaneity,
and a new kind of voluntary actions. Although he say, that
here is nothing " new^" to him, yet I begin to suspect, that
either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his
election is not the result of a serious mature " deliberation."
The first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my [i. T. H.
meaning in this one section. First, I make voluntary and the author's
spontaneous actions to be one and the same; he saith I dis- ^^'°^^^-l
tinguish them, so as spontaneous actions may be necessary,
but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, I distinguish be-
tween free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always
deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate ; all fi'ee acts are
volimtary, but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith
I confound them, and make them the same. Thirdly, he
saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children, madmen,
and beasts ; but I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in
rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and as
it is distinguished from liberty.
Yet I have no reason to be offended at it ; for he deals no [2. And
otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he Mmseif.']^^
tells us, that "voluntary presupposeth deliberation." But,
Numb. XXV, he tells us contrary; — "that whatsoever follow-
eth the last appetite" is " voluntary, and where there is but
one appetite, that is the last;" and that "no action of a
man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so
sudden''." So, Numb, xxxiii, he tells us, that "by spon-
" [See above T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.] ^ [Below, p. 712. fol. edit.]
48
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part tancity is meant inconsiderate proceedings or else nothing is
— meant by it yet here he tells us^ that " all voluntary
actions" which proceed not from "fear/' are "spontaneous/'
whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth
himself, to give " money for merchandise/' Thirdly, when
I said, that children before they have the use of reason, act
spontaneously (as when they suck the breast), but do not
act freely, because they have not judgment to deliberate or
elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove, that they do deliberate
and elect; and yet presently after confesseth again, that
" a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all
deliberation."
3. [Actions Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other
Teed from' eiTors also in this section. As this, that no actions proceed-
oTmaym)t ^^^^ "fear" are "spontaneous." He who throws his goods
be spon- into the sea to avoid drowning, doth it not only " spontane-
tcinGOus 1 o «/
ously" but even freely. He that wills the end, wills the
means conducing to that end. It is true, that if the action
be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man
willingly or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But
if we take the action as in this particular case invested with
all the circumstances, and in order to the end, that is, the 661
saving of his own life, it is not only voluntary and spon-
taneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the most
probable means for his own preservation. As there is
an antecedent and a subsequent will, so there is an an-
tecedent and a subsequent spontaneity. His grammatical
argument, grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous
from spontCj weighs nothing; we have learned in the rudi-
ments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only,
and not in deed. He who casts his goods in the sea, may do
it of his own accord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs
in this also, that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only
" fear." Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the
nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that
knowledge which should and would have prohibited the J
action. As a man, thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush,
shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have
shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord. I
w [Below, p. 719. fol. edit.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
49
For the clearer understanding of these things, and to Discouuse
know what spontaneity is^, let us consult awhile with the ^ [Defi-
Schools^ about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary "'ti^" of
. " voluntar}'
actions. Some acts proceed wholly from an extrmsecal and in-
cause ; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the acts!]*'^^^
drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idoFs temple.
These are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from
an intrinsecal cause, but without any manner of knowledge
of the end; as the falling of a stone downwards. These are
called natui'al acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal
principle with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where
there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor
election ; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and the in-
considerate acts of men of judgment. These are called
voluntaiy or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from
an intrinsecal cause with a more perfect knowledge of the
end, which are elected upon deliberation. These are called
fi'ee acts. So then the formal reason of liberty is election.
The necessary requisite to election is deliberation. Delibera-
tion implieth the actual use of reason. But deliberation and
election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsecal predeter-
mination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose
which way to go, who knows that all ways are shut against
him, and made impossible to him, but only one ? This is the
genuine sense of these words voluntary" and ^'"spontaneous"
in this question. Though they were taken twenty other ways
-vulgarly or metaphorically (as we say spontaneous ulcers,"
where there is no appetite at all), yet it were nothing to this
controversy ; which is not about words, but about things, not
what the words voluntary or fi'ee do or may signify, but
whether all things be extrinsecally predetermined to one.
These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the [5. Neces-
words, the next thing to be examined is that contradiction e/e^J^on
which he hath espied in mv discourse, or how this argument inconsis-
tent in the
fights against its fellows." " If I," saith T. H., " make it same act.]
appear," that the spontaneous actions of " fools, children,
madmen, and beasts," do "proceed from election and de-
liberation," and that " inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions
* [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Se- Aristot., Ethic, V. x. 6—9 ; Rhet., I.
cund., Qu. vi. artt. 1, 2. And compare x. 7, 8.]
BR.\MHALL. £
50
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part are found in the wisest men, " then his argument concludes,
— that necessity and election may stand together ; which is
contrary^^ to his assertion. If this could be made appear as
easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much ; who,
when he should prove that rational men are not free from
necessity, goes about to prove, that brute beasts do de-
liberate and elect, that is as much as to say, are free from
necessity. But it concerns not me at all. It is neither my
assertion, nor my opinion, that necessity and election may
not meet together in the same subject. Violent, natural,
spontaneous, and deliberative or elective acts, may all meet
together in the same subject. But this I say, that necessity
and election cannot consist together in the same act. He
who is determined to one, is not free to choose out of more
than one. To begin with his latter supposition, — that wise
men may do "inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions. I
do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a
general conclusion from particular premisses ? as thus, — be-
cause wise men do some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they
do is free or elective. Secondly, for his former supposition,
— " that fools, children, madmen, and beasts, do deliberate
and elect." If he could make it good, it is not I who contra-
dict myself, nor "fight against" mine own assertion; but it
is he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny.
He may well find a contradiction between him and me ;
otherwise to what end is this dispute ? But he shall not be o
able to find a difi*erence between me and myself. But the
truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing; and that
brings me to my sixth consideration : —
6. [ina- That neither horses, nor bees, nor spiders, nor children,
ingTnei- fools, nor madmen, do deliberate or elect. His first
liberate' iiistaucc is in the horse or dog, but more especially the
nor elect.] horsc. He told me, that I divided my argument "into
squadrons," to apply myself to your Lordship, being " a mili-
tary man^ ;" and I apprehend, that for the same reason he
gives his first instance of the horse with a submission to
your " own experience." So far well, but otherwise very
disadvantageously to his cause. Men use to say of a dull
fellow, that he hath no more brains than a horse. And the
y [See above T. II. Numb. v. p. 37.]
AGAINST MK. HOCBES
51
Prophet David saith^ Be not like tlie horse and mule, which Discol-rse
have no understandincr/^ How do thev deliberate'^ vrithoiit '-
* P-.xxxii.O.
understanding And P^alm xlix. 20, he saith the same
of all brute beasts ; — Man being in honour had no under-
standing, but became like unto the beasts that perish/' The
horse "demurs upon his way." "Why not ? Outward objects
or inward fancies may produce a stay in his coui'se, though
he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect. He
" retires from some strange figure vrhich he sees, and
comes on again to avoid the spur." So he may, and yet be
far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the
sensitive passion of fear, which is "a perturbation arising from
the expectation of some imminent eviP.'' But he m'geth,
"what else doth man that deliberateth Yes, very much.
The horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a
comparing of several means conducing to tlie same end.
Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one ; fear
is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of
those things which are in oui' power^ ; fear ariseth many
times out of natm-al antipathies, but in these disconveniences
of natm-e deliberation hath no place at all. In a word, fear [" Fear is
is an enemy to dehberation, and ' betrayeth the succour's of eii^ut a
the soul.' If the horse did deliberate, he should consult of riS «uc-
with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to ^^'^^^
^ ^ which rea-
that way or not ; he should represent to himself all the son offtr-
dangers both of going and staving, and compare the one with xvii. 12.']
the other, and elect that which is less ; he should con-
sider, whether it v»ere not better to endure a Httle hazard,
than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty to his
master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the
horse doth not ; neither is it possible for him to do it.
Secondly, for childi-en, T. H. confesseth, that they may be so
" young," that they " do not deliberate at all." Afterwards,
as they attain to the use of reason by degrees, so by degrees
they become free agents. Then they do deliberate ; before,
they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make
them use their reason, when they have power to exercise it ;
but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it.
' [""Eo-Tctf St; 6 (p6fios \v1n7 tis fi ra- lib. II. c. v. § 1. — " Oaa yluerai 5i' hH-^'-',
paxh f f (pavTamas fx.4x\ovro$ kukov /utj w(TavT(as 5' det, Trepi tovtoov fijv\(v6-
(pdapTiKod ^ KvTTTjpov." Aristot., Rhet., ^e0a." Id., Ethic, III. v. 8. J
52
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part' Thirdly^ for fools and madmen: — it is not to be understood
'- — of such madmen as have their lucida intervalla, who are mad
and discreet by fits ; when they have the use of reason, they
are no madmen, but may dehberate as well as others : nor
yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less
wise than others j such may deliberate, though not so clearly
nor so judiciously as others : but of mere madmen, and mere
natural fools : — to say that they, who have not the use of rea-
son, do deliberate or use reason, implies a contradiction. But
his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders ; of whose
^' actions^^ (he saith) if I had been " a spectator," I " would
have confessed, not only election, but also art, prudence,
pohcy, very near equal to that of mankind whose " life," as
"Aristotle saith, is civil." Truly I have contemplated their J
actions many times, and have been much taken with their ^
curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much uponH
them, as upon their Maker, Who is ^^sic magnus in magnisP thatH
He is not minor inparvis" — "so great in great things, that HeH
is not less in small things." Yes, I have seen those silliest o^f
creatures ; and seeing their rare works, I have seen enoughH
to confute all the bold-faced atheists of this age, and theirH
hellish blasphemies. I see them, but I praised the marvel-H
lous works of God, and admired that Great and First Intel-H
lect. Who had both adapted their organs and determined™
their fancies to these particular works. I was not so simpleH
to ascribe those rarities to their own invention, which I knewM
to proceed from a mere instinct of nature. In all othei^
things they are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write
of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from their 66
common sense, spread over their whole body, and only per-
ceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them "politi-
cal" or sociable creatures % he did not intend it really that they
lived a civil life, but according to an analogy, — because they
do such things by instinct, as truly political creatures do out
of judgment. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose of their
" hexagonies" or sexangular cells ^, did I therefore conclude,
" ["noAtTtKct." Aristot., Hist, Ani- Aok" «. t. A.]
mal., lib. I. c. i, § 25. Compare his ^ [" Hexagonia cellularum." Am-
Politics , I. ii. 10: — " Ait^rt 8^ -no- bros., Hexaem., lib. v. c. 21. § 69 ; Op.
XiTiKhvb &ydp(t}rros (u>oi/ irdarjs fxcXlTrrjs tom. i. p. 107. C]
Koi Travrhs ay f\alov fwov /jluWou, Srj-
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
53
that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in Cres- Discourse
pet, that they invoke God to their aid, when they go out of
tlieir hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross and
bowing themselves, did I therefore think, that this was an
act of rehgious piety, or that they were capable of "theological
virtues whom I see in all other things, in which their
fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of creatures,
strangers not only to right reason but to all resemblances of it.
Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon 7. [Habitu-
precedent and past deliberations ; they are not only spon- voluntary. ]
taneous, but free acts. Habits contracted by use and ex-
perience do help the will to act with more facility, and more
determinately ; as the hand of the artificer is helped by his
tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and
serious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save
the labour of subsequent consultations. " Frustra fit per
plura, quod fieri potest per pandora." Yet, nevertheless, the
actions which are done by \irtue of these formerly acquired
habits are no less free, than if the deliberation were co-
existent with this particular action. He that hath gained a
habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new deli-
beration how to play, every time that he plays it over and
over. Yet I am far from giving credit to him in this, that
walking or eating universally considered are free actions, or
proceed from true liberty ; not so much because they want a
particular deliberation before every individual act, as because
they are animal motions, and need no deliberation of reason ;
as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same actions,
as they are considered individually, and invested with their
due circumstances, may be, and often are, free actions sub-
jected to the liberty of the agent.
Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash s. [How
attempts of " choleric persons" with such acquired habits, it fro^lc^^^
is a great mistake. Those rash attempts are voluntary Ij^p^ggiQ^J,^-]
actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired habits :
[" Virtutes Theologicae dicuntur, order of the Celestines at Paris, who
qunc? ordinant nos ad Deum ;" scz. died in 1594, was author of a Summa
"Fides, Spes, Caritas :" as distin- Fidei Catholicae, and of several mystical
guished from " moral " and " intellec- religious works, from one of which
tual" virtues. Tliom. Aquin., Summ. latter class the account in the text is
Prima Secund., Qu. Ixii. art. 2. § 2. probably taken. See Moreri, and the
— Father Peter Crespet, a monk of the Biogr. Univ.]
54
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
^'iii''^ but yet, forasmuch as actions are often altered and varied
by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act
which at one time is morally good, at another time may be
morally evil; and forasmuch as a general precedent deli-
beration how to do this kind of action is not sufficient to
make this or that particular action good or expedient, which
being in itself good, yet particular circumstances may render
inconvenient or unprofitable, to some persons, at some times,
in some places; therefore a precedent general deliberation how
to do any act (as, for instance, how to write), is not sufficient to
make a particular act (as my writing this individual reply) to
be freely done, without a particular and subsequent delibera-
tion. A man learns French advisedly, that is a free act.
The same man in his choler and passion reviles his friend
in French without any deliberation; this is a spontaneous
act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to advise,
he would not have reviled his friend. Yet, as it is not free,
so neither is it so necessary, as the bees making honey;
whose fancy is not only inclined but determined by nature to
that act. So every way he fails. And his conclusion — "that
the liberty of election doth not take away the necessity of
electing this or that individual thing" — is no consequent
from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my argu-
ments " fight one against another," but his private opinions
fight both against me and against an undoubted truth. A
free agent endowed with liberty of election, or with an
elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in some
individual acts ; but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do
not flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which
flow from his elective power necessitated.
NUMBER IX.
Argument J. D. — Secondly, they who might have done, and may do,
m^'"may^ many things which they leave undone, and they who leave
things"an(i ^^^^^^^^ many things which they might do, are neither corn-
do them pelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true
not, and _^ • ^ i ^ • i • ^
therefore liberty. J3ut wc might do many things which we do not,
liberty.]^ and we do many things which we might leave undone ; as is 6^
plain, 1 Kings iii. 11, — " Because thou hast asked this thing.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
55
and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked Discourse
riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies,"
&c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked
riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did ask.
He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which
yet he did not ask. And Acts v. 4, — "After it was sold, was it
not in thine own power?" It was in his own power to give it, and
it was in his own power to retain it ; yet if he did give it, he
could not retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give it.
Therefore we may do, what we do not ; and we do not, what
we might do : that is, we have true liberty from necessity.
T. H. — The second argument from Scripture eonsisteth in [Answer.]
histories of men, that did one thing, when if they would they
might have done another. The places are two : one is in the
1 Kings iii. 11 ; where the history says, God Avas pleased, that
Solomon, who might if he would have asked riches or
revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God^s hands : the
other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4, — "After
it was sold, was it not in thine own power ?"
To which the answer is the same with that I answered
to the former places; — that they prove there is election,
but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what
they so elect.
J. D. — We have had the. very same answer twice before^. [Reply.]
It seemeth, that he is well pleased with it ; or else he would
not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to
no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston — a
salve for all sores, or dictamnum" — sovereign "dittany^," to
make all his adversary's weapons drop out of the wounds of his
cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore.
I will not waste the time to shew any further, how the mem-
bers of his distinction do cross one another and one take away
another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed
by necessity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossi-
ble, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear
to press that in present. If I maybe bold to use his own phrase,
[ Thrice ; see above T. H., Numbers e [See Virg., tEu., xii. 41 1—419 ;—
iii, vi, vii. pp. 27, 38, 41.] Plin., Nat. Hist., viii. 27. xxv. 8.J
56
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
A^RT his answer "looks'^ quite "another way^^^ from mine argu-
— - — ment. My second reason was this j — " They who may do, and
might have done, many things which they leave undone,, and
who leave undone many things which they might do, are not
necessitated/^ nor preciseh^ and antecedently determined, to
do what they do ; " but we might do many things which we
do not, and we do many things which we might leave
undone as appears evidently by the texts alleged ; there-
fore we are not antecedently and precisely determined nor
necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of
" election^^ in this argument ? To what proposition, to what
term, doth T. H. apply his answer ? He neither affirms, nor
denieth, nor distinguisheth of anything contained in my
argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a
more pertinent answer.
NUMBER X.
Argument J. D. — Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things
the"fn^^^' come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those
toriePex i^^terrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions, and ex-
postuia- postulations, which we find so frequently in Holy Scriptures,
the like, in (be it spokcn with all due respect) but feigned and hypocriti-
prove^ men exaggerations ? " Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I
to have commanded that thou shouldest not eat Gen. iii. 11 : and
true h-
berty.] verse 13, He saith to Eve, " AYhy hast thou done this and
this^hoV^ to Cain, Why art thou wrath, and why is thy countenance
done?"] ^^^^ down?" And, "Why will ye die, O house of Israel?'^
[Gen. iv. 6. Doth God Command openh^ not to eat, and yet secretly by
xviii. 31 ; Himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat ? Doth
xxxiii. 1].] jjg reprehend him for doing that, which He hath antecedently
determined that he must do ? Doth He propose things under
impossible conditions ? Or were not this plain mockery and
derision ? Doth a loving master chide his servant, because
he doth not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor
servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the
master's own order, without the servant^s default or consent ?
They who talk here of a twofold will of God, " secret" and
"revealed," and the one opposite to the other, understand
not what they say. These two wills concern several persons.
f [See above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
57
The secret will of God is what He will do Himself ; the re- Discourse
vealed will of God is what He would have us to do. It may
65 be the secret will of God to take away the life of the father;
yet it is God's revealed will, that his son should wish his
life, and pray for his life^. Here is no contradiction, where
the agents are distinct. But for the same person to com-
mand one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is com-
manded to do another thing ; to chide a man for doing that,
which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he
must do ; this were (I am afraid to utter what they are not
afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. God's chiding
proves man's liberty.
T. H. — To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but [The
one answer. d^f^red.-]
J. D. — Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth [Reply.]
are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other drawn
from the justice of God, the one from His objurgations and
reprehensions, the other from His judgments after life, did
require distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither
here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in this
whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to
this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an
answer is contained Numb, xii: — "That which He does, is
made just by His doing; just, I say, in Him, not always just
in us by the example ; for a man that shall command a thing
openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he
punish him wliom he commanded so for not doing it, is
unjust^\" I dare not insist upon it. I hope his meaning is
not so bad as the words intimate, and as I apprehend ; that
is, to impute falsehood to Him that is Truth itself, and to
justify feigning and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny,
by the infiniteness of His power and the absoluteness of His
dominion. And, therefore, by his leave, I must once again
tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this
argument also. He tells us, that he was "not surprised^"
Whether he were or not, is more than I know. But this I
g [From Anselm., Lib. de Volunt. ^ [Below, T. H. Numb. xii. p. 65.]
Dei, Opusc. p. 85. M. fol. Paris. 1544.] ' [Above, in Numb. ii. p. 26.]
58
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
p A II r see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause
— ^Jh — admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingenuously,
when they met with a difficult knot which they could not
untie, to put it upon Elias ; — " Elias will answer it when he
comes/^
Argument
4. — [That
every
theory of
necessity
proves too
much, in
proving
Adam a
necessary
agent ;
vvliich yet
Necessi-
tarians
deny. ]
NUMBER XI.
J. D. — Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the fore-
knowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the con-
catenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of
objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take
away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true
liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same
prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the
same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. But,
"Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odiJ."
The greatest opposers of our liberty are as earnest main
tainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of thes
supposed impediments take away true liberty.
Anstcer. ]
[ T. h:s
T. H.— The fourth argument is to this eff*ect '^f th
decree of God, or His foreknowledge, or the influence of the
stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or mor?
efficacy of " causes, "or the last dictate of the understanding,'
or whatsoever it be, " do take away true liberty, then Adam
before his fall had no true liberty.
'Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odiJ.' "
That which I saynecessitateth and determineth every action.
"dfneces-"^^ — ^^^^ lougcr doubt of my meaning, — is the sum
Hy.-]
[Of the
theories of
of all those things, which, being now existent, conduce and
concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if
any one thing now were wanting, the eff'ect could not be
produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is
determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former
causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and
ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the
decree of God.
But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of
^ [Herat., A. P., 188. — " Quodcunque doctrine, Calvin., Instit., lib. I.e. xv.
ostendig mihi sic," &c. And for the § 8; Op. torn. viii. p. 44.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
59
anything, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is Discourse
knowledge, and knowledsre depends on the existence of the —
° ■' o jT necessity
things known, and not they on it. held by
The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole ^^^^''^'^
cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.
Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple
chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains
joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link, God
Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event
does not always depend upon one single chain, but on many
together.
Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents,
and necessitates the will, and consequently the action ; but
X for moral efficacy,^' I understand not what he means by it.
The last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad
66 that may follow on any action, is not properly the w hole
cause, but the last part of it ; and yet may be said to produce
the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather
may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so
many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it.
Now for his argument, — that if the concourse of all the [Election
causes necessitate that effect, that then it follows, Adam had ZthfrZ
no true liberty. I deny the consequence: for I make not
only the effect, but also the election of that particular effect,
to be necessary ; inasmuch as the w^ill itself, and each propen-
sion of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated,
and depends on a sufficient cause, as anything else whatso-
ever. As, for example, it is no more necessary that fire
should burn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs
be moved by fancy, should have election, that is, liberty to
do what he has a fancy to, though it be not in his will or
power to choose his fancy, or choose his election or will.
This doctrine, because he says he "hates," I doubt had
better been suppressed ; as it should have been, if both your
Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.
J. D.— This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to [Reply.]
make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of
T. H. his supposed necessity; which errand being done, and
the foundation whereupon he builds being found out, which
60
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
R T is, as I called it, " a concatenation of causes/^ and as he calls
it, " a concourse of necessary causes," it would now be a
superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake tlie
refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not
undertake to defend. And therefore I shall wave them for
the present, with these short animadversions.
[The de- Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the
forSnow- decree itself with the execution of His decree. And concern-
GodV^ ing the foreknowledge of God, he confounds that speculative
knowledge, which is called the "knowledge of vision V' which
doth not produce the intellective objects, no more than the
sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects, with that
other knowledge of God, which is called the " knowledge of
approbation^," or a practical knowledge, that is, knowledge
joined with an act of the will ; of which divines do truly say,
that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist
^°Heb cause of his work. God made all things " by His
2.] * * Word," that is, by His wisdom.
[The in- Concerning the influences of the stars, I wish he had ex-
?h"e^stars.]^ pressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant,
that those heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary
things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an
occult virtue, which we call influence, as we see by manifold
experience, in the loadstone, and shell-fish, &c. ; so, if he
intend, that by these influences they do naturally or physi-
cally determine the will, or have any direct dominion over
human counsels, either in whole or in part, either more or
less, he is in an error.
[The con- Concerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he makes
of causes.] ^ot One chain, but an innumerable number of chains" (I
hope he speaks hyperbolically, and doth not intend that they
are actually infinite), the diff'erence is not material whether
one or many, so long as they are all joined together, both in
the first link, and likewise in the eff*ect. It sers^es to no end,
but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or
rather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not
sufficient to load poor man, but he must be clogged with
innumerable chains. This is just such another freedom as
the Turkish galley slaves do enjoy.
^ [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu, xiv. artt. 8, 9.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
61
But I admire^, that T. H.^ who is so versed in this ques- Discourse
tion, should here confess, that he understands not the diffe '
[Physical
rence between physical or natural, and moral efficacy. And and moral
much more, that he should affirm, that outward objects do objects.]°^
"determine voluntary agents by a "natural efficacy.^'' No
object, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the
will of man naturally; but God alone, in respect of His
supreme dominion over all things. Then the will is deter-
mined naturally, when God Almighty, besides His general
influence, whereupon all second causes do depend as well for
their being as for their acting, doth moreover, at some times,
when it pleaseth Him, in cases extraordinary, concur by a
special influence, and infuse something into the will in the
nature of an act or a habit, w^hereby the will is moved and
excited and applied to will or choose this or that. Then the
"will is determined morally, when some object is proposed to
it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will.
Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend
its act is taken away from the will ; but not so, where the
determination is moral. In the former case, the will is
67 determined extrinsecally, in the latter case, intrinsecally ; the
former produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a
necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend but
assent, then the act is necessary ; but because the will may
suspend and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely neces-
sary. In the former case the will is moved necessarily and
determinately ; in the latter, freely and indeterminately.
The former excitation is immediate; the latter is mediate
mediante intellectu, and requires the help of the understand-
ing. In a word, so great a difference there is between natu-
ral and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and
mine in this question.
I There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, [The last
which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the the under-
determination of the will, and to the necessary production of ^*^"^"^°-l
the act ; " as the last feather may be said to break a horse^s
back, when there were so many laid on before that there
wanted but that to do it.'' I have shewed (Numb, vii.^), that
the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute
I 1 [Above, pp. 42, 43.]
62
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part in itself. nor conclusive to the will : and when it is conclu-
III . . .
'■ — sive, yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal necessity.
I shall only add one thing more in present, — that by mak-
ing the last judgment of right reason to be of no more
weight than a single feather, he wrongs the understanding as
well as he doth the will ; he endeavoui's to deprive the will of
its supreme power of application, and to deprive the under-
standing of its supreme power of judicature and definition.
Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive
appetite itself, being an inferior faculty, and affixed to the
organ of the body, have any direct or immediate dominion
or command over the rational will. It is without the sphere
of their activity. All the access which they have unto the
will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear
and sometimes disturbed, and of reason either right or mis-
informed. Without the help of the understanding, all his
second causes were not able of themselves to load the horse's
back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth
amount unto. But we shall meet with his horse-load of
feathers again Numb, xxiii.™
[Adam was These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to
agentTf his answer. My argument was this ; — If any of these or all of
other men thesc causcs formerly recited do take awav true libertv (that
are.] ... " ' .
is still intended, from necessity), then Adam before his fall
had no true liberty; but Adam before his fall had true
liberty. He mis-recites the argument, and denies the conse-
quence ; which is so clearly proved that no man li^-ing can
doubt of it, — because Adam was subjected to all the same
causes as well as we, the same decree, the same prescience,
the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the same
efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is
only a mistake ; for it appears plainly by his following dis-
course, that he intended to deny, not the consequence, but
the assumption. For he makes Adam to have had no liberty
from necessity before his fall ; yea, he proceeds so far as to
affirm, that all human wills, his and ours, and each propen-
sion^' of our wills, even "during^' our "deliberation,^^ are
" as much necessitated as any thing else whatsoever that
we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do,
^ [Below, p. 707. fol. edit.]
AGAINST MR. HOBCES.
63
than the " fire" hath power not to " burn." Though I honour Disco ursk
T. H. for his person and for liis learning, yet I must confess —
in^enuouslv, I hate this doctrine from mv heart. And I conse-
beheve both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall tTe jo?-''
seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it. [[p"^'^^*!^. -j
It destroys libcj'ty, and dishonours the natui'e of man. It
makes the second causes and outward objects to be the
rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls, of destiny. It
makes the First Cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the in-
troducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man ;
yea, more than man, by as much as the motion of the watch
is more from the artificer, who did make it and wind it ii]),
than either from the spring, or the wheels, or the thread. If
God by His special influence into the second causes did
necessitate them to operate as they did ; and if they, being
thus determined, did necessitate Adam ine^itably, ii'resisti-
bly, not by an accidental but by an essential subordination
of causes, to whatsoever he did ; then one of these two ab-
surdities must needs follow ; — either that Adam did not sin,
and that tliere is no such thing as sin in the world, because
8 it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially from God ;
or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil,
than man, because man is extrinsecally, inevitably deter-
mined, but so is not God ; and in causes essentially subordi-
nate, the cause of the cause is alwavs the cause of the eff*ect.
What tp'ant did ever impose laws that were impossible for
those to keep upon whom they were imposed, and punish
them for breaking those laws which he himself had necessi-
tated tliem to break, wliicli it was no more in their power not
to break, than it is in the power of the ^^fire" not to "burn?"
Excuse me if I " hate" this doctrine "with a perfect hatred [P?.cxx.\ix.
which is so dishonom-able both to God and man, which '
makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of necessity,
to be liauged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity.
And therefore I must say, and say again,
" Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incroduUis odi."
It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God ; or to
be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good, aud a
God of evil ; or with the heathens, to beheve thirty thousand
Gods ; than thus to charge tlie true God to be the proper
64
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
P^A^R T cause and the true author of all the sins and evils which are
'■ — in the world.
NUMBER XII.
Argument J. D. — Fifthly^ if there be no liberty, there shall be no Day
thT^thiiory of Doom, no Last Judgment, no rewards nor punishments after
?eaTe?no^^ death. A man can never make himself a criminal, if he be
room for not left at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be iustly
reward or . f _ , , tj ./
punish- punished for doing that, which was not in his power to shun,
ment] ^^-^^ away liberty, hazards Heaven ; but undoubtedly it
leaves no Hell.
[Answer.] T. H. — The arguments of greatest consequence are the
third and fifth, and fall both into one : namely, if there be
a necessity of all events, that it will follow, that praise and
reprehension, reward and punishment, are all vain and un-
just ; and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly
necessitate, the same action, punishing men for what they
could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of
Heaven or Hell.
[ St. PauTs To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from
7hTEphtie ^^^^^ 1^0^- i^- ^^e^s. 11. From the eleventh verse of the
totheRo- chapter to the eighteenth is laid down the very same objec-
tion in these words. — When they^^ (meaning Esau and
J acob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor
evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by
works but by Him that calleth, might remain firm, it was
said to her^^ (^dz. to Rebekah), that the elder shall serve
the younger^. *. . And what then shall we say ? Is there in-
justice with God ? God forbid. . . It is not therefore in him
that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God, that
sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have
stirred thee up, that I may shew My power in thee, and that
My name may be set forth in all the earth. Therefore, whom
God willeth. He hath mercy on, and whom He willeth He
hardeneth.^' Thus you see, the case put by St. Paul is the
same with that of J. D. ; and the same objection in these
[Rom. xi. words following, — "Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet
19.]
" [Hobbes has omitted here v. 13.— and Esau have I hated."]
** As it is written, Jacob have I loved
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
65
complain, for who hath resisted His will?'^ To this there- Discourse
fore the Apostle answers, not by denying it w^as God's will,
or that the decree of God concerning Esau w^as not before he
had sinned, or that Esau Avas not necessitated to do what he
did, but thus— Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest f
God? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou
made me thus ? hath not the potter power over the clay, of
the same stuff, to make one vessel to honom^, another to dis-
honour ?" According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I [The power
answer J. D.'s objection, and say, the power of God alone, alone is
without other help, is sufficient justification of any action He ]l'^,yP*Jy
doth. That which men make among themselves here by
pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and
according whereunto men are counted and termed rightly
just and unjust, is not that by which God Almighty's actions
are to be measured or called just ; no more than His counsels
are to be measui-ed by human wisdom. That which He does
is made just by His doing ; just, I say, in Him, not always
just in us, by the example ; for a man that shall command a
thing openly, and plot secretly the hindi-ance of the same, if
he punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust.
So also His counsels. They be therefore not in vain, because
they be His; whether we see the use of them or not. When
God afflicted Job, He did object no sin to him, but justified
that afflicting him bv telling him of His power. Hast [Job x. 9;
* xxxviii, 4
thou'' (says God) '*^an arm like Mine?" — " AYhere wast thou &c.]
when I laid the foundations of the earth?" — and the like. So [Johnix.3.]
our Sa\iour, concerning the man that was born blind, said, ^it
was not for his sin, nor his parents' sin, but that the power
of God might be shewn in him.' Beasts are subject to
death and torment, yet they cannot sin. It was God's will it
should be so. Power irresistible justifieth all actions really
and properly, in whomsoever it be found. Less power does
not. And because such power is in God only. He must needs
be just in all His actions. And we, that not comprehending
I His counsels call Him to the bar, commit injustice in it.
I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by dis- [ There is
tinguishing between will and permission : as, that God Infe 'te^'
Almighty does indeed permit sin sometimes, and that ^Q*ZTive\in'd
also foreknoweth that the sin He permitteth shall be com- «
^ imssivt, or
II
BRAMHALL.
66
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part mitted. but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know also
III. ...
^ — they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, savins:,
a will cans- ^ t , , -, . -, , • -> J &^
ingtheact Cjod Almighty docs mdccd cause the action, whatsoever
^causing^the ^ction it bc, but uot the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that
is, the discordance between the action and the law. Such
distinctions as these dazzle my understanding. I find no
difference between the will to have a thing done, and the
permission to do it, when He that permitteth it can hinder
it, and knows it will be done unless He hinder it. Nor find
I any difference between an action that is against the law,
and the sin of that action ; as, for example, between the
[2Sam.xi.] killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah : nor
when one is cause both of the action and of the law, how
another can be cause of the disagreement between them ; no
more than how one man making a longer and shorter gar-
ment, another can make the inequality that is between
them. This I know, God cannot sin, because His doing
a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin ; and because
whatsoever can sin, is subject to another's law, which God is
not. And therefore 'tis blasphemy to say, God can sin. But
to say, that God can so order the world as a sin may be neces-
sarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dis-
honour to Him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can
make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau's or Pharaoh's
actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that,
proceeding from His will, [they] could not therefore without
injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand
them, turn unto J. D.'s opinion. For I now hold nothing in
all this question between us, but what seemeth to me (not
obscurely but) most expressly said in this place by St. Paul.
And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.
[Reply.] J. D. — T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and
satisfy two arguments with one answer ; whereas in truth he
satisfieth neither. First, for my third reason. Though all
he say here, were as true as an oracle ; though punishment
were an act of dominion, not of justice, in God ; yet this is no
sufficient cause why God should deny His own act; or why He
should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which
He Himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof He
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
67
was the actor more tlian they, they being but as the stone, but Discourse
He the hand that threw it. Notwithstanding anything which '-
is pleaded here, this Stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisy
and dissimulation close to God, Who is the Truth itself.
And to my fifth argument, which he chanffcth and relateth [The pas-
u • • -.1 1 • X.- sage in St.
amiss, as by comparing mine with his may appear, his Paul ex-
chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul, Eom. to^ts^gc'tie".
ix. 11. Hath he never heard, that to propose a doubt is not i^is^^oi'^^-]
to answer an argument ?
* Nec bene respondet qui litem lite resolvit".'
But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore to
this place alleged by him I answer, the case is not the same.
The question moved there is, how God did keep His promise
made to Abraham, to be " the God of him and of his seed," [Gen. xvii.
if the Jews, who were the legitimate progeny of Abraham,
were deserted. To which the Apostle answers, that that verses 6, 7,
promise was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham,
that is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which were
the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing Christians ;
which answer he expUcateth, first by the allegory of Isaac and
Ishmael, and after, in the place cited, of Esau and of Jacob.
Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of
their posterities. And though some words may be accommo-
dated to God^s predestination, which are there uttered, yet it
is not the scope of that text to treat of the reprobation of any
man to Hell-fire. All the posterity of Esau were not eternally
reprobated ; as holy Job, and many others. But this question
which is now agitated between us, is quite of another nature ;
— how a man can be a criminal, who doth nothing but that
which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do ; or how God in
justice can punish a man with eternal torments, for doing
that, which it was never in his power to leave undone ;
that He who did impress the motion in the heart of man,
should punish man, who did only receive the impression from
Him. So his answer " looks another wayP."
But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it [In its par-
0 can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine sages^]
all those passages which may seem to favour his cause.
° [" Nil agit exemplum litem quod [See above, T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]
lite resolvit." Horat., Sat., Il.iii. 103.]
68
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part First^ these words, vers. 11, — " Being not yet born, neither
^^'^ having done any good or evil/^ — upon which the whole weight
Jacob was of his argument doth depend, have no reference at all to
Esa^ those words, vers. 13, " Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I
hated.] hated;" for those words were first uttered by the prophet
Mai.i.2,[3.] Malachi, many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead; and
intended of the posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed
from captivity, as the Israelites were : but they are referred
to those other w^ords, vers. 13, " The elder shall serve the
Gen. XXV. younger ;" which indeed were spoken before Jacob or Esau
were born. And though those words of Malachi had been
used of Jacob and Esau before they were born, yet it had
advantaged his cause nothing; for hatred" in that text
doth not signify any reprobation to the flames of Hell, much
less the execution of that decree, or the actual imposition
[Gen.i. 31.] of punishment, nor any act contrary to love. "God saw
all that He made, and it w^as very good." Goodness itself can-
not hate that which is good. But ^hatred' there signifies com-
parative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a nega-
tion of love. As Gen. xxix. 31, — " When the Lord saw that
Leah was hated -/^ — we may not conclude thence, that Jacob
hated his wife. The precedent verse doth fully expound the
vers. 30. scnsc ; — " Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah." So Matt. y\.
24, — " No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate
the one and love the other." So Luke xiv. 26, — " If any man
hate not his father and mother," &c., " he cannot be My dis-
Matt. X. 37. ciple." St. Matthew tells us the sense of it ; — " He that
loveth father or mother more than Me, is not worthy of Me."
2. [Of the Secondly, those words, vers. 15, — "IwiU have mercy on
God's^'^ whom I will have mercy," — do prove no more but this, that
mercy.] tlie preferring of Jacob before Esau, and of the Christians
before the Jews, was not a debt from God, either to the one
or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of this ?
All men confess, that God's mercies do exceed man's de-
serts; but God's punishments do never exceed man's mis-
Matt. XX. deeds. As we see in the parable of the labourers ; — " Friend,
1*3, 15.] J ^^^^^ wrong ; did not I agree with thee for a penny ? . .
Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will ? Is
thy eye evil, because I am good ?" Acts of mercy are free,
but acts of justice are due.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
69
That wliich follows_, vers. 17, comes something nearer the Discourse
cause ; — " The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, For this same '■
purpose I have raised thee up" (that is, I have made thee a sen?e"(5!?s
king, or T have preserved thee), " that I might shew My fj^h^/ the
power in thee." But this particle—" that"— doth not always ^nd^^^^ the
signify the main end of an action, but sometimes only a con- quence of
sequent of it. As Matt. ii. [14,] 15; — "He departed into
Egypt, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the
Prophet, ' Out of Egypt have I called My son •/ " without
doubt Joseph's aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil
prophecies, but to save the life of the Child ; yet, because the
fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Joseph^s jour-
ney, he saith, " that it might be fulfilled." So here, — " I have
raised thee up, that I might shew My power." Again, though
it should be granted, that this particle — "that" — did denote
the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red Sea, yet
it was not the antecedent intention of God, which evermore
respects the good and benefit of the creature, but God's conse-
quent intention upon the pre\dsion of Pharaoh's obstinacy, —
that since he would not glorify God in obeying His word, he
should glorify God [in] undergoing His judgments. Hitherto
we find no eternal punishments, nor no temporal punish-
ments, without just deserts.
It follows, vers. 18, "Whom He will He hardeneth." In- 4. [in what
deed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment that God is said to
lays upon a sinner in this life, worse than all the plagues of men's"
Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? Not by a ^^^^^^-l
natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor
by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy
and rebellion; for " God tempteth no man, but every man is James i. 13,
tempted when he is di-awn away of his own lust and enticed."
Then God is said to harden the heart three ways. — 1. First,
negatively, and not positively; "not by imparting wickedness,
but by not imparting graced :" as the sun, descending to the
tropic of Capricorn, is said with us to be the cause of winter,
that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat.
1 [" Nec obdurat Deus impartiendo sam excsecationis et indurationis posi-
malitiam sed non impartiendo niiseri- tive (ut sic loquar), sed negative; viz.
cordiam." Aug., Epist. cxiii, Ad Six- permittendo, deserendo, non miseren-
tum,c. 3. §4; Op. tom. ii. p. 719. D. do." Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et
— " Respondeo,ex communi sanctorum Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 14 ; Op. tom. iii.
Patrum sententia, Deum non esse cans- p. 177. C]
70
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part It is an act of mercy in God to give His grace freely, but to
'- — detain it is no act of injustice. So the Apostle opposeth
" hardening to ^' shewing of mercy To harden is as much
as not to shew mercy — 2. Secondly^ God is said to harden the 6
heart occasionally and not causally; by doing good^ which
incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and
worse, and doing evil : as a master_, by often correcting an
untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden
his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he
grows even to despise the rod ; or as an indulgent parent by
his patience and gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son
to become more rebellious. So, whether we look upon God^s
frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God^s iterated favours
in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon Pha-
raoh^s request, both of them in their several kinds were occa-
sions of hardening PharaoVs heart, the one making him
more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebellious.
So that which was good in it, was God^s ; that which was
evil, was Pliaraoh^s. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh
was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly
confirmed, Exod. viii. 15, — "When Pharaoh saw that there
was respite, he hardened his heart f — and Exod. ix. 34, —
"When Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the
thunders were ceased, he sinned jet more, and hardened his
heart, he and his servants.^^ So Psalm cv. 25, — " He turned
their hearts, so that they hated His people, and dealt sub-
tilly with them that is, God blessed the children of Israel,
whereupon the Egyptians did take occasion to hate them ; as
is plain, Exod. i. verses 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened Pha-
raoh^ s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart. God
hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as He did to
[Dan. iv. Nebuchaduczzar, who was as great a sinner as he ; or God
3-1—3/] ijardened it occasionally : but still Pharaoh was the true
cause of his own obduration, by determining his own will to
evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. So are all
Ps. xcv. 8. presumptuous sinners. " Harden not your hearts, as in the
provocation, as in the day of temptation in the wilderness."
— 3. Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but
' [" Obduratio Dei est nolle mise- Simplicianum, lib. i. qu. 2. § 15; Op.
reri." Aug., De Divers. Quaest. Ad torn. vi. p. 96. E.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
71
not operatively, nor effectively ; as he who only lets loose a Discourse
greyhound out of the slip_, is said to hound him at the hare. '-
Will you see plainly what St. Paul intends by ^' hardening
Eead vers. 22 ; — " What if God, willing to shew His wrath
and to make His power known" (that is_, by a consequent
will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin),
endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath
fitted to destruction; and that He might make known the
riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy," &c. There is
much difference between " enduring" and impelling, or in-
citing, " the vessels of wrath." He saith of " the vessels of
mercy," that God " prepared them unto glory ;" but of " the [Rom. ix.
vessels of wrath," he saith only, that they were '^fitted to
destruction," that is, not by God, but by themselves. St.
Paul saith, that God doth " endure the vessels of wrath with
much long-suffering." T. H. saith, that God wills and
effects by the second causes all their actions, good and bad ;
that He necessitateth them, and determineth them irresisti-
bly to do those acts which He condemneth as evil, and for
which He punisheth them. If doing willingly, and "endur-
ing," if "much long-suffering" and necessitating, imply not
a contrariety one to another, reddat mihi minam Diogenes'^ —
let hun that taught me logic " give me my money again ^"
But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the operative [There is a
and permissive ^vill of God, and that other between the ence be-
action and the ii-regularity, do " dazzle his understanding." operative
Though he can find no difference between these two, vet ^ p^^"
° ' - missive
others do^ St. Paul himself did: Acts xiii. 18, "About the ^iH-]
time of forty years suffered He theii' manners in the wilder-
ness;" and Acts xiv. 16, "Who in times past suffered aU
nations to walk in then' own ways :" — T. H. would make
"suffering" to be inciting, "their manners'^ to be God^s
manners, "their ways" to be God's ways : — and Acts x\ii. 30,
"The times of this ignorance God winked at;" — it was
never heard that one was said to " wink" or connive at that
which was his own act : — and 1 Cor. x. 13, " God is faithful.
Who wiU not suffer you to be tempted above that you are
' [Cic, Lucull., XXX.] Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xx. art. 12 :
' [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. i. dist. from Aug., Enchirid., c. xcv. § 24, Op.
xlv. qu. 1. art. 3 ; and Thom. Aquin., tom. vi. p. 231. E.]
72 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY ^
p R T able — to tempt is the deviFs act, therefore he is called the I
— Terapter ; God tempts no man to sin, but He suffers them to ^
be tempted ; and so suffers, that He could hinder Satan, if
He would; but by T. H. his doctrine, to tempt to sin, and to
suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to
hinder it, is all one ; and so he transforms God (I write it with
horror) into the devil, and makes tempting to be God^s own
work, and the devil to be but His instrument : — and in that
noted place, Rom. ii. 4, [5], ^^Despisest thou the riches of
His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not know-
ing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance, but 672
after thj hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto
thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the
righteous judgment of God/' — here are as many comdncing
arguments in this one text against the opinion of T. H.
almost as there are words ; here we learn, that God is " rich
in goodness,^'' and will not punish His creatui'cs for that
which is His own act; secondly, that He suffers^' and
" forbears sinners long,^^ and doth not snatch them away by
sudden death as they deserve ; thirdly, that the reason of
God^s forbearance is to *^ bring men to repentance;^ fourthly,
that hardness" of heart and " impenitency'' is not causally
from God, but from ourselves ; fifthly, that it is not the in-
sufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on God^s
part, which is the cause of men^s perdition, but their own
contempt and ' despising^ of these means ; sixthly, that
punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an act
of "righteous judgment," whereby God renders to every man
according to his own deeds, "wrath" to them and only to
them who "treasure up wrath unto themselves," and
" eternal life" to those who " continue patiently in well-
doing." If they deserve such punishment, who only neglect
the goodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who
utterly deny it, and make God^s doing and His suffering to
be all one ? I do beseech T. H. to consider, what a degree of
wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood,
to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture. Of
1 Pet. iii. the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter : — " The lonsr-
20
suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah ;" and,
2 Pet. iii. " Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation."
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
73
This is the name God gives Himself; — "The Lord, the Lord Discourse
God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering/^ &c. ^ — ^
Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be com- xxxiv. 6.
monly true, — that he who doth permit anything to be done,
which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not
hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say, in
j some sort ; that is, either by an antecedent will or by a con-
I sequent will, either by an operative will or by a permissive
I! will, or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do
j| it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man
j to suffer that to be done, which otherwise he w^ould not suffer.
1 So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the lions^ den, to [Dan. vi.
( make good his rash decree : so Herod suffered John Baptist [ti^tt! xiv.
\ to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath; how much more ^-^
may the immutable rule of justice in God, and His fidelity in
keeping His word, draw from Him the punishment of obstinate
sinners, though antecedently He willeth their conversion?
He lovcth all His creatures well, but His ow^n justice better.
Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, which
he doth not wall directly in itself, but indirectly for some
other end, or for the producing of some greater good ; as a
man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body,
to save the life of the whole ; or as a judge, being desii'ous to
save a malefactor's life, and having power to reprieve him,
doth yet condemn him for example's sake, that by the death
of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not, then, if
God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to
their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the
greater manifestation of His glory, and for the greater benefit
of His faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that
God would not suffer evil to be in the world, unless He knew
how to draw good out of e\dl". Yet this ought not to be so
i understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time
i in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the
I antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another;
because the one respects man puie and uncorrupted, the
other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same,
" [" Neqiie enim Deus omnipotens, et bonus, ut benefaceret et de nialo."
. . cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo Aug., Enchirid., c. xi. § 3 ; Op. torn,
siueret mali aliquid esse in operibus vi. p. 199. A.]
suis, nisi usque adeo asset omnipotens
74 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part but Considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make
— — — these wills to be distinct in God ; for they are the same with
the Di\ine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in
order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we
make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission.
God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things,
both good and e\il.
[How God T. H. demands, how God should be the cause of the action
oVtheTr ^^^^^ irregularity of the action. I
yet not of ^uswcr, bccausc He concurs to the doing of evil by a general,
the sin of , . . ,
the act.] but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourish-
ment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat,
but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the
other poison to our destruction, is not from the general
nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the 673
root : even so the general power to act is from God, — " In
[Acts xvii. Him we live and move and have our being — this is good ;
^^'^ but the specification and determination of this general power
to the doing of any evil is from ourselves, and proceeds from
the free-will of man ; this is bad. And to speak properly,
the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the
root of the hemlock is of poison, sin ha^dng no true entity or
being in it, as poison hath ; but rather the deficient cause.
Now no defect can flow from Him, Who is the highest per-
fection^. Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the
particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from
God. The general power to act is from God ; but the speci-
fication of this general and good power to murder, or to any
particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man.
So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the
cause of the law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that
\_" Nemo quaerat efficientem caus- tem," &c. Bellarm,, De Amiss. Grat.
sam malas voluntatis; non enim est et Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c, 17 ; Op. torn.
efficiens sed deficiens, quia nee ilia effec- iii. p. 207. B. — " Non est enim injusti-
tio est sed defectio." Aug., De Civ. tia quaiitas aut actio aut aliqua essen-
Deijlib. xii. c. 7; Op. torn. vii. p. 306, tia, sed tantum absentia debitae justi-
C. — " Ex his apertissima erit ratio cur tiae ; nec est nisi in voluntate, ubi debet
Deus non peccet neque peccati causa esse justitia." Anselm., De Concord,
jure dici possit, quamvis concurrat ad Praescient. &c. cum Lib. Arb., c. i. p.
illam actionem efficiendam quae homini 88. B. Opusc. fol. Paris. ISii — "Pec-
sit peccatum;" viz. "quia Deus non catum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines
efficit actionem illam ut caussa particu- cum peccant." Aug., In Joh. Evang.
laris sed ut caussa universalis, prsebens Tract, i. § 13 ; Op. torn. iii. P. 2. p. 294.
vim et influxum quendam indifferen- D.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
75
is, by general influence, and yet another cause, concurring Discourse
by special influence and determining this general and good
power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the
irregularity. And therefore he may keep his " longer and
shorter garments^^ for some other occasion. Certainly they
will not fit this subject, unless he could make general and
special influence to be all one.
But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, [God's jus-
and the objection used by the Jews, vers. 19, — " Why doth measured
He yet find fault ? who hath resisted His will is the very Jj^o "er'but
same with mv ar":ument : and St. PauFs answer, vers. 20, — ^^'!^,'^??u'
^ , , and that the
" O man, who art thou that repliest against God ? shall the will of One
thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made fect?]^^^^^
me thus ? hath not the potter power over his clay &c. —
is the very same with his answer in this place, drawn from
the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God, which
justifieth all His actions ; and that the Apostle in his answer
doth not denj', that it was God's will, nor that God's decree
was before Esau's sin. To which I reply : —
1. First, that the case is not at all the same, but quite dif-
ferent; as may appear by these particulars. First, those
words — Before they had done either good or evil'' — are not,
cannot be, referred to those other words — "Esau have I
hated." Secondly, if they could, yet it is less than nothing ;
because, before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were
known to God. Thirdly, by " the potter's clay" here is not
to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass, of
mankind. Fourthly_, the hating" here mentioned is only a
comparative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fifthly,
the "hardening" which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive,
but a negative obdiu'ation, or a not imparting of grace.
Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to
eternal punishment ; much less doth he speak of the actual
inflicting of punishment without sin ; which is the question
between us, and wherein T. H. diff'ers from all that I re-
member to have read, who do all acknowledge that punish-
ment is never actually inflicted but for sin"'. If the question
^ ["Omnis poena, si justa est, i. c. 9. § 5 : Op. torn. i. pp. (331. B, 14.
peccati poena est." Aus;., De Lib. Arb., E.]
lib. iii. c. 18. § 51; and Retract., lib.
76
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part be put^ why God doth good to one more than to another, or
'■ — why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it
is there, the answer is just and fit, — because it is His pleasure,
Matt. XX. and it is sauciness in a creature in this case to reply. " May
not God do what He will with His own?^^ No man doubteth
but God imparteth grace beyond man's desert. But if the
case be put, why God doth punish one more than another, or
why He throws one into Hell-fire and not another, which is
the present case agitated between us ; to say with T. H ., that
it is because God is omnipotent, or because His power is
irresistible, or merely because it is His pleasure, is not only
not warranted, but is plainly condemned, by St. Paul in this
place. So many difi'erences there are between those two cases.
It is not therefore " against God'' that I '^'^ reply," but against
T. H. I do not "call my Creator to the bar," but my fellow
creature. I ask no account of God's counsels, but of man's
presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their
own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justify them
[Rom. xi. by reason, to plead His omnipotence, or to cry, "O altitudoP^
that "the ways of God" are "unsearchable." If they may
justify their drowsy dreams because God's power and dominion
is absolute, much more may we reject such fantastical devices,
which are inconsistent with the truth, and goodness, and
[2 Cor. i. 3. justice of God, and make Him to be a tyrant, who is " the
6.] ' Father of mercies," and "the God of" all "consolation."
The unsearchableness of God's ways should be a bridle to
restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for spirits of
error.
2. Secondly, this objection contained vers. 19, to which the 67
Apostle answers vers. 20, is not made in the person of Esau
or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews ;
who thought much at that grace and favour which God was
pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them
for His people, which honour they would have appropriated
to the posterity of Abraham. And the Apostle's answer is
not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to
impart His grace to whom He pleaseth, as hath been shewed
already, but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the
Jews; as appeareth vers. 22, — "What if God, willing" (that
is, by a consequent will) " to shew His wrath, and to make
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
77
His power known, endured witli much long-suffering the Discourse
vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." They acted, God '
endured;'^ they were tolerated by God, but "fitted to
destruction" by themselves ; for their much wrong doing,
here is God's "much long-suffering." And more plainly
vers. 31, [32;] — "Israel hath not attained to the law of
righteousness ; wherefore ? because they sought it not by
faith, but as it were by the works of the law." This reason
is set down yet more emphatically in the next chapter,
vers. 3; — "They" (that is, the Israelites), " being ignorant of
God's righteousness" (that is, by faith in Christ), " and going
about to establish their own righteousness" (that is, by the
works of the law), "have not submitted themselves to the
righteousness of God;" — and yet most expressly chap. xi.
vers. 20, — " Because of unbelief they were broken off, but thou
standest by faith." Neither was there any precedent binding
decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and conse-
quently to punishment. It was in their own power, by their
concurrence with God's grace, to prevent these judgments,
and to recover their former estate; — vers. 23, " If they" (that
is, the unbelieving Jews) "abide not still in unbelief, they
shall be graffed in." The crown and the sword are immove-
able* (to use St. Anselm's comparison), but it is we that
move and change places. Sometimes the JeAvs were under
the crown, and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the
Jews under the sword, and the Gentiles under the crown.
3. Thirdly, though I confess, that human "pacts" are not
the measure of God's justice, but His justice is His own immut-
able will, whereby He is ready to give every man that which is
his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad ; so,
nevertheless, God may oblige Himself freely to His creature.
! He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and
1 therefore He punisheth not man contrary to His own cove-
nant, but for the transgression of his duty. And Divine
justice is not measured by omnipotence, or by " irresistible
power," but by God's will. God can do many things according
to His absolute power which He doth not ; He " could raise [Matt. iii.
|i up children to Abraham of stones," but He never did so. It ^'^
is a rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which
argues any wickedness or imperfection ; as, God " cannot 2 Tim. ii.
78
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
P R T deny Himself," — He cannot lie." These and the like are
rp;^ j 2 — fruits of impotence, not of power. So God cannot "destroy
Gen. xviii. the righteous with the wicked f He " conld not" destroy
Gen. xix. Sodom whilst Lot was in it : not for want of dominion or
power, but because it was not agreeable to His justice, nor to
that law which Himself had constituted. The Apostle saith,
Heb. vi. " God is not unrighteous to forget your work." As it is a
good consequence to say. This is from God, therefore it is
righteous ; so is this also. This thing is unrighteous, therefore
it cannot proceed from God. We see how all creatures by
instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her chickens;
how thej^ will expose themselves to death for them : and yet
all these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards
His creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God
did create so many millions of souls to be tormented eternally
in Hell without any fault of theirs, except such as He Himself
did necessitate them unto, merely to shew His dominion, and
because His power is irresistible ! The same privilege which
T. H. appropriates here to " power absolutely irresistible," a
friend of his, in his book De Cive (cap. vi. p. 70) ascribes to
power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates ;
whose power he makes to be " as absolute as a man^s power
is over himself, not to be limited by any thing but only by
their strength." The greatest propugners of sovereign power
think it enough for princes to challenge an immunity from
coercive power, but acknowledge, that the law hath a directive
power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their
strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly,
[The case But, saith he, " God objected no sin to Job, but justified His 675
of Job.] afflicting him by His power." First, this is an argument from
authority negatively, that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly,
the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punishments, to
take vengeance of his sins (whereof we dispute), but probatory
chastisements, to make trial of his graces. Thirdly, Job was
not so pure, but that God might justly have laid greater
punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suf-
Job iii. 3. fered. Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the
Job day of his nativity. Indeed God said to Job, " Where wast
XXXVI11.4. *^
* [Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia de Cive, c. vi. § 18. p. 70. first ed.
Paris, 4to. 1642.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
79
thou when I laid the foundations of the earth that is, how Discourse
canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou '-
wast born, or comprehend the secret causes of My judgments?
— and, " Hast thou an arm hke God — as if He should say, job xi. p.
Why art thou impatient? dost thou think thyself able to
strive vrith. God ? But that God should punish Job without
desert, here is not a word.
Concerninfif the blind man, mentioned John ix, his blind- [And of
® . . , . the blind
ness was rather a blessing to him than a punishment, being man men-
the means to have his soul illuminated, and to bring him to st"john's
see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body Gospel.]
is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of the soul
with the blessed angels. We read of some, who have put out
their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impedi-
ment to the eye of the soul. Again, neither he nor his
parents were innocent, being " conceived and born in sin and Psai. li.o.
iniquity/^ and, "In many things we oflPend all.^^ But our Jam. iii.2.
Sariour's meaning is erident by the disciples^ question, vers. 2.
They had not so sinned, that he should be born blind; or,
they were not more grievous sinners than other men, to de-
sen^e an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corpo-
ral blindness befell him principally by the extraordinary pro-
vidence of God, for the manifestation of His own glory in re-
storing him to his sight. So his instance halts on both sides ;
neither was this a punishment, nor the blind man free from sin.
His third instance, of the death and torments of beasts, is of [And of
no more weight than the two former. The death of brute beasts beasts.]
is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though
they be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a
vast difference between those light and momentary pangs,
and the unsufferable and endless pains of Hell ; between the
mere depriring of a creature of temporal life, and the sub-
jecting of it to eternal death. I know the philosophical
speculations of some, who affirm, that entity is better than
non-entity ; that it is better to be miserable, and suffer the
torments of the damned, than to be annihilated, and cease to
be altogether. This entity which they speak of, is a meta-
physical entity, abstracted from the matter ; which is better
than non-entity, in respect of some goodness, not moral nor
natural, but transcendental, which accompanies everj^ being.
80
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
^ni^' But in the concrete it is far otherwise; where that of our
'^^^ ^ Saviour often takes place^ — " Woe unto that man by whom
xxvi. 24. the Son of Man is betrayed ; it had been good for that man,
that he had not been born/^ I add, that there is an analogi-
[Deutxxv. cal justice and mercy, due even to the brute beasts. " Thou
shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the
corn and, ^ A just man is merciful to his beast^/ M
[Power to But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to
la^eTby" make justice to be the proper result of power. Power doth
justice'by^* not measure and regulate justice, but justice measures and
power. ] regulates power. The will of God, and the eternal law which
is in God Himself, is properly the rule and measure of justice.
As all goodness, whether natural or moral, is a participation
of Divine goodness, and all created rectitude is but a par-
ticipation of Divine rectitude ; so all laws are but participa-
tions of the eternal law, from whence they derive their power.
The rule of justice then is the same both in God and us; but
it is in God, as in Him that doth regulate and measure ; in
us, as in those who are regulated and measured. As the will
of God is immutable, always willing what is just and right
and good, so His justice likewise is immutable. And that
individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us,
cannot possibly proceed from the special influence and de-
terminative power of a just cause. See then how grossly
T. H. doth understand that old and true principle, that
" the will of God is the rule of justice as if, by willing
things in themselves unjust, He did render them just, by
reason of His absolute dominion and irresistible power : as 676
fire doth assimilate other things to itself, and convert them
into the nature of fire. This were to make the eternal law a
Lesbian rule 2. Sin is defined to be " that, which is done, or
said, or thought, contrary to the eternal law*.^' But by this
doctrine nothing is done nor said nor thought contrary to
the will of God. St. Anselm said most truly, Then the will
of man is good and just and right, when he wills that which
God would have him to will^." But according to this doc-
s' ["A righteous man regardeth the turn vel concupitum aliquid contra le-
life of his heast." Prov. xii. 10.] gem aeternam." Aug., Cont. Faustum,
[Aristot,, Eth. Nic. V. xiv. 7 ;— see lib. xxii. c. 27 ; Op. torn. viii. p. 378. F.]
above, in vol. iii. p. 303, note 1.] ^ [Lib. de Voluntate Dei, Opusc. pp.
» ["Peccatum est dictum vel fac- 85. K, 86. A. ed. 1544.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
81
trine, every man always " wills tliat wliicli God would have Discourse
him to will/' If this be true, we need not pray, " Thy will be — — -
done in earth as it is in Heaven." T. H. hath devised a
new kind of Heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is a Heaven
wdthout justice. Justice is a constant and perpetual act of
the will to give every one his own*^ but to inflict punishment
for those things which the Judge Himself did determine and
necessitate to be done, is not to give every one his ow^n. Right
punitive justice is a relation of equality and proportion be-
tween the demerit and the punishment^; but supposing this
opinion of absolute and universal necessity, there is no
demerit in the world. We use to say, that right springs
from law and fact : as in this syllogism ; — Every thief ought
to be punished, there^s the law ; but such an one is a thief,
there's the fact ; therefore he ought to be punished, there's
the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to
be punished, neither upon law, nor upon fact, but upon the
irresistible power" of God. Yea, it overtumeth as much
as in it lies all law : first, the eternal law ; which is the
ordination of Divine wisdom, by which ail creatures are
directed to that end which is convenient for them^; that is not,
to necessitate them to eternal flames : then, the law parti-
cipated; which is the ordination of right reason, instituted
for the common good, to shew unto man what he ought
to do and what he ought not to do^ ; to what purpose is it
to shew the right w^ay to him, who is drawn and haled a
contrary w^ay by adamantine bonds of inevitable necessity ?
Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin, yet [t. h.'s
in truth he makes Him to be the principal and most proper makS g
cause of all sin. For he makes Him to be the cause not onlv inevitably
" the c<ius6
of the law, and of the action, but even of the irregularity itself, of sin.]
and the diff'erence between the action and the law ; wherein
the essence of sin doth consist. He makes God to determine
David's wdll, and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes
physically and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause'
is evermore the cause of the eff'ect. These are those deadly
fruits which spring from the poisonous root of the absolute
necessity of all things ; which T. H. seeing, and that neither
*■ [" Perpetua et constans voluntas tit. i. lex 10.]
jus suum unicuique tribuens." Thorn. [Vide Aristot., Ethic, lib. V. c. iv.]
Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. « [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prima
Iviii. art. 1 ; from the Digest, lib. 1. Secund., Qu. xci. art. 3, xciii. art. 1.]
BRAMHALL G
82
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part the sins of Esau nor Pharaoh nor any wicked person do pro-
— ceed from the operative but from the permissive will of God,
and that punishment is an act of justice, not of dominion only,
I hope that according to his promise he will change his opinion.
II. PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON.
NUMBER XIII.
Argument J. D. — The first argument is Herculeum or baculinum,
ofZenoT— ^^^^^ from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his
necessity of j^an. The servant had committed some petty larceny, and
sm implies ^ , . i • i
necessity of the master was cudgelling him well for it ; the servant thmks
mlTnt.Y *o creep under his master's blind side, and pleads for himself,
that "the necessity of destiny did compel him to steal." The
master answers, The same necessity of destiny compels me to
beat thee^. He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted
with rods than with arguments, until he confess, that it is free
for him that beats him either to continue striking or to give
over ; that is, to have true liberty.
{Answer.'] T. H. — Of the arguments from reason, the first is that,
which he saith " is drawn'' from Zeno's beating of his man,
which is therefore called argumentum " haculinum^^ that is to
say, a wooden ai'gument. The story is this : — Zeno held, that
all actions were necessary ; his man, therefore, being for
some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it ;
to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded Hkewise the neces-
sity of beating him. So that, not he that maintained, but he
that derided, the necessity of things, was beaten ; contrary to
that he would infer : and the argument was rather with-
drawn than " drawn" from the story.
[Reply.] J. D. — ^Whether the argument be withdrawn from the
story," or the answer withdrawn from the argument, let the
reader judge. T. H. mistakes the scope of the reason ; the
strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno,
a rigid Stoic, which is not worth a button in this cause ; nor
in the servant's being an adversary to Stoical necessity, for it
appears not out of the story that the servant did "deride neces-
sity," but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own
f [Diog. Laert, vii. 23.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
83
justification ; nor in the success of the fray ; we were told Discourse
even now that no power doth justify an action but only that
which is " irresistible such was not Zeno^s ; and therefore
it advantageth neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno,
nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the staff
out of his master's hand and beaten him soundly ; would not
the same argument have served the man as well as it did the
master ? — that the necessity of destiny did compel him to
strike again. Had not Zeno smarted justly for his paradox?
And might not the spectators well have taken up the judges'
apophthegm, concerning the dispute between Corax and his
scholar, " an ill egg of an ill bird ^ But the strength of
this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno, that great
champion of necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause,
which admitted no defence but with a cudgel. No man
(saith the servant) ought to be beaten for doing that which
he is compelled inevitably to do, but I am compelled inevita-
bly to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be
denied. If a strong man shall take a weak man's hand per-
force, and do violence with it to a third person, he whose
hand is forced is innocent, and he only culpable who com-
pelled him. The minor was Zeno's own doctrine. What
answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant?
Very learnedly he denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his
servant ; telling him in effect, that though there was no rea-
son why he should be beaten, yet there was a necessity why
he must be beaten. And partly in the evident absurdity of
such an opinion, which deserves not to be confuted with rea-
sons but with rods. There are four things, said the philoso-
pher, which ought not to be called into question : first, such
things whereof it is wickedness to doubt ; as, whether the
soul be immortal, whether there be a God ; such an one
should not be confuted with reasons, but 'cast into the sea fMatt.xviii.
with a null-stone about his neck,' as unworthy to breathe the ^'^^'^
air or to behold the light : secondly, such things as are
above the capacity of reason; as, among Christians, the
mystery of the Holy Trinity : thirdly, such principles as are
evidently true ; as, that two and two are four, in arithmetic,
that the whole is greater than the part, in logic : fourthly,
K [Above T. H. Niimb. xii. p. 66.] Sext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. ii.
[" 'E/c KttKov KdpaKos KaKbu u6v.'' p. 81. C. fol. Colon. Allob. 1621.]
g2
84
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part such things as are obvious to the senses ; as, whether the snow
— be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was justly-
sentenced to be scorched with fire ; and he that denied
motion, to be beaten until he recanted. So he who denies
all liberty from necessitation, should be scourged until he be-
come a humble suppliant to him that whips him, and con-
fess that he hath power either to strike or to hold his hand.
society,]
NUMBER XIV.
Argument J. D. — Secondly, this very persuasion — that there is no true
doctrine of liberty — is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths
overthrows world. The laws are unjust, which prohibit that which
the frame- ^ man Cannot possibly shun. All consultations are vain,
work of all . . .
human if every thing be either necessary or impossible. Who ever
deliberated, whether the sun should rise to-morrow, or whether
he should sail over mountains ? It is to no more purpose to
admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or
madmen, if all things be necessary. Praises and dispraises,
rewards and punishments, are as vain as they are undeserved,
if there be no liberty \ All counsels, arts, arms, books, instru-
ments, are superfluous and foolish, if there be no liberty. In
vain we labour, in vain we study, in vain we take physic, in
vain we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come to pass
alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we be idle or
industrious, by unalterable necessity. But it is said, that
though future events be certain, yet they are unknown to us;
and therefore we prohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dis-
praise, reward, punish, study, labour, and use means. Alas !
how should our not knowing of the event be a sufficient mo-
tive to us to use the means, so long as we believe the event
is already certainly determined, and can no more be changed
by all our endeavours, than we can stay the course of heaven
with our finger, or add a cubit to our stature ! Suppose it
be unknown, yet it is certain ; we cannot hope to alter the
course of things by our labours. Let the necessar}^ causes do
their work ; we have no remedy but patience, and shrug up
the shoulders. Either allow libertj^ or destroy all societies.
■ OvT€ 8e ot eiraiuoi oyre ol \p6yoi KaKids oi;(rr]5." Clem. Alex., Strom.,
oV6i' at Ti/xal ovd' at koXolths SiKaiai, /xtj lib. i. c, 17 ; Op. torn. i. p. 368. foL
T7)s ^\/vxvs e'xoi^o'rjs rriv i^ovcriau rf/s Oxon. 1715.]
opfirjs Koi a(popiJ.TiS a\\' aKovalov rrjs
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
85
T. H. — The second arg^ument is taken from certain incon- Dtscolrsf.
• • I
veniences, which he thinks would follow snch an opinion. It - — —
is true, that ill use may be made of it; and therefore vour
78 Lordship and J. D. ought at my request to keep private that
I say here of it. But the inconveniences ai'e indeed none :
and what use soever be made of truth, yet tmth is truth ;
and now the question is not what is fit to be preached, but
what is true. The first inconvenience, he savs, is this, that
" laws which prohibit'^ any action are then " unjust. The
second, that " all consultations are vain.^^ The thii'd, that
admonitions to " men of understanding^^ are of no more use
than to fools, childi'en, and madmen." The fourth, that
" praise, dispraise, reward and punishment," are in vain. The
fifth, that "counsels, arts, arms, books, instminents, study,
tutors," medicines, are " in vain." To which ai'gument ex-
pecting I should answer by saying, that the ignorance of the
event were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it were
a reply to my answer foreseen) these words, — "Alas I how
should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to
make us use the means I" wherein he saith right, but my
answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer, —
First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the [ The law
law which prohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the hfcausethe
necessity, but the will to break the law, maketh the acrion ^iif"ne7e,f
unjust, because the law regardeth the will, and no other *°'"^-l
precedent causes of action ; and to let pass, that no law can
be possibly unjust, inasmuch as every man makes by his con-
sent the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently
must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself ; I sav,
what necessary cause soever precedes an action, yet, if the
action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be
punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death
prohibit steahng, and there be a man who by the strength of
temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to
death : does not this punishment deter others fi'om theft ?
is it not a cause that others steal not? doth it not fi-ame
and make then will to justice ? To make the law is therefoi^
to make a cause of jusrice, and to necessitate justice, and
consequently it is no injustice to make such a law. The in-
stitution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that
86
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part which is passed_, and not to be undone, but to make him and
: — others just, that else would not be so ; and respecteth not the
evil act past, but the good to come : insomuch as without
this good intention of future, no past act of a delinquent
could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will
say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what
were done were necessary ? To this I answer, that men are
justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated,
but that they are spared and preserved, because they are not
noxious : for where there is no law, there no killing nor any
thing else can be unjust; and by the right of nature we
destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts
and men. And for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do
it in order to our own preservation; and yet J. D. con-
fesseth, that their actions, as being only spontaneous and not
free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing
which they shall do. For men, when we make societies or
commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill, excepting in
certain cases, as murder, theft, or other offensive actions : so
that the right which the commonwealth hath to put a man
to death for crimes, is not created by the law, but remains
from the first right of nature, which every man hath, to pre-
serve himself ; for that the law doth not take that right away
in case of criminals, who were by law excepted. Men . are
not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft
proceedeth from election; but because it was noxious, and
contrary to men's preservation, and the punishment conducing
to the preservation of the rest : inasmuch as to punish those
that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh
men^s wills such as men would have them. And thus it is
plain, that from necessity of a voluntary action cannot be
inferred the injustice of the law that forbiddeth it, or of the
magistrate that punisheth it.
[Necessity Secondly, I deny, that it makes consultations to be in
supersfde It is the cousultatiou that causeth a man and neces-
consuita- sitatcth him to choose to do one thiner rather than another ;
tion.\ °
SO that, unless a man say that cause to be in vain which
necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness
of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding
from it. But it seems he reasons thus, — If I must needs do
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
87
this rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, Discourse
though I consult not at all ; — which is a false proposition, a
false consequence, and no better than this, — If I shall live till
to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself
through with a sword to-day. If there be a necessity that an
action shaU be done, or that any effect shall be brought to
pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing
necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And
therefore, when it is determined that one thing shall be
chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what cause
679 it shall be chosen ; which cause for the most part is delibera-
tion or consultation. And therefore consultation is not in
vain : and indeed the less in vain, by how much the election
is more necessitated.
The same answer is to be given to the third supposed in- [Nor ad-
conveniency, namely, that admonitions are in vain ; for ad- ]
monitions are parts of consultations, the admonitor being a
counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.
The fourth pretended inconveniency is, that praise and dis- [Nor praise
praise, reward and punishment, will be in vain. To which I 'praise.]
answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all
on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For
what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good ? good,
I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and com-
monwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to
say, it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or
according to the will of the state, that is to say, according to
law ? Does J. D. think, that no action can please me or him
or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity ?
Things may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy, as
also necessary and yet dispraised ; and neither of both in
vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and
punishment, do by example make and conform the will to
good or evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that
Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he was good by
nature, ' et quia aliter esse non potuit^.'
The fifth and sixth inconvenience, that counsels, arts, iNor the
use of
means. ]
arms, books, instruments," study, medicines, and the like, "-^
[ " Qui uunquam recte fecit ut von poterat." Veil. Paterc, Histor.
facere videretur, sed qtda aliter facere lib. ii. c. 35.]
88
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part would be " superfluous," the same answer serves that to the
— former ; that is to say, that this consequence — if the effect
shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass
without its cause — is a false one. And those things named,
" counsels, arts, arms," &c., are the causes of those effects.
[Reply.] J. D. — Nothing is more familiar with T. H. than to de-
cline an argument. But I will put it into form for him.
The first inconvenience is thus pressed ; — those laws are
unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely
impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not
doing of them ; but, supposing T. H. his opinion of the
necessity of all things to be true, all laws do prescribe abso-
lute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing
of them. The former proposition is so clear, that it cannot
be denied. Just laws are the ordinances of right reason ; but
those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not
the ordinances of right reason. Just laws are instituted for
the public good ; but those laws which prescribe absolute
impossibilities, are not instituted for the public good. Just
laws do shew unto a man what is to be done, and what is to
be shunned ; but those laws which prescribe impossibilities,
do not direct a man what he is to do, and what he is to
shun. The minor is as evident. For if his opinion be true,
all actions, all transgressions, are determined antecedently
inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of ex-
trinsecal causes ; yea, even the will of man, and the reason
itself, is thus determined : and therefore, whatsoever laws
do prescribe any thing to be done which is not done, or to be
left undone which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibili-
ties, and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. In all
his answer there is not one word to this argument, but only
[T. H.'s an- to the conclusioii. He saith, that " not the necessity, but
^rrefevant the will to break the law, makes the action unjust." I ask,
true j"' what makes the will to break the law ?" Is it not his ^^neces-
sity ?" What gets he by this ? A perverse will causeth in-
justice, and necessity causeth a perverse will. He saith,
" The law regardeth the will, but not the precedent causes of
action." To what proposition, to what term, is this answer?
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
89
He neither denies^ nor distinguislieth. First, the qnestion Discourse
here is not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes •
laws to be unjust. So his answer is impertinent. It is like-
wise untrue. For, first, that will which the law regards, is
not such a will as T. H. imagineth. It is a free will, not a
determined, necessitated will ; a rational will, not a brutish
will. Secondly, the law doth look upon "precedent causes^'
as well as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, before
he be seven years old, or have the use of reason, in some
childish quarrel do willingly stab another, whereof we have seen
experience, yet the law looks not upon it as an act of mur-
der, because there wanted a power to deliberate, and conse-
quently true hberty. Man-slaughter may be as voluntary as
murder ; and commonly more voluntary, because, being done
in hot blood, there is the less reluctation. Yet the law con-
siders, that the former is done out of some sudden passion
) without serious deliberation, and the other out of prepensed
malice and desire of revenge, and therefore condemns mur-
der as more wilful and more punishable than man-slaughter.
He saith, that "no law can possibly be unjust;^' and I [Lawst/e
say, that this is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no'bTunjusf.]
reply. But to give him satisfaction, I will follow him in this
I also. If he intended no more, but that unjust laws are not
genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience, because they are
not the ordinations of right reason, nor instituted for the
common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done, he
said truly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he in-
tend (as he doth), that there are no laws de facto, Avhich are
the ordinances of reason erring, instituted for the common
hurt, and prescribing that which ought not to be done, he is
much mistaken. Pharaoh^s law to drown the male children Exod. i. 22.
of the Israelites, — Nebuchadnezzar's law, that whosoever Dan. iii. 4-'
did not fall down and worship the golden image which he ^^'^
had set up, should be cast into the fiery furnace, — Darius Dan. vi. 7.
his law, that whosoever should ask a petition of any God or
man for thirty days, save of the king, should be cast into
the den of lions, — Ahasuerosli his law, to destroy the Jewish Esther iii.
nation, root and branch, — the Pharisees' law, that whoso- John ix. 22.
ever confessed Christ should be excommunicated, — were all
unjust laws.
90
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part The ground of this error is as great an error itself (such
pjj — an art he hath learned of repacking paradoxes) ; which is
laws made this, — that " every man makes by his consent the law which
of thosf"* is bound to keep/^ If this were true, it would preserve
them ]^ them, if not from being unjust, yet from being injurious ;
but it is not true. The positive law of God, contained in the
Old and New Testament ; the law of nature, written in our
hearts by the finger of God; the laws of conquerors, who
come in by the power of the sword ; the laws of our ances-
tors, which were made before we were born; — do all oblige us
to the observation of them : yet to none of all these did we
give our actual consent. Over and above all these excep-
tions, he builds upon a wrong foundation, — that all magis-
trates at first were elective. The first governors were fathers
of families; and when those petty princes could not afford
competent protection and security to their subjects, many of
them did resign their several and respective interests into
the hands of one joint father of the country. And though
his ground had been true, — that all first legislators were elec-
tive,— which is false, yet his superstructure fails ; for it was
done in hope and trust, that they would make just laws. If
magistrates abuse this trust and deceive the hopes of the
people by making tyrannical laws, yet it is without their
consent. A precedent trust doth not justify the subsequent
errors and abuses of a trustee. He who is duly elected a
legislator, may exercise his legislative power unduly. The
people^s implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical laws
of their legislators to be just.
But his chiefest answer is, that ^^an action forbidden,"
though it proceed from "necessary causes,^' yet, if it were
" done willingly, it may be justly punished ;" which accord-
ing to his custom he proves by an instance, — " A man neces-
sitated to steal by the strength of temptation," yet, if he steal
" willingly," is justly " put to death." Here are two things^
and both of them untrue.
[I. Punish- First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly foi
j'ust'f.rrTin tliose necessities which we ourselves have contracted by oui
comniitted Q^yn fault, but iiot for extrinsecal, antecedent necessities
thnjiif^h an- ^ . ^ '
tocedent wliich wcrc imposcd upon us without our fault. If that
necessity. J ^^^^ oblige to punishment which is not intimated, becaus(
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
91
the subject is invincibly ignorant of it; how much less that Discourse
law which prescribes absolute impossibilities ! unless perhaps
invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ig-
norance. That which he adds, — if it were done " willingly/^
— though it be of great moment if it be rightly understood,
yet, in his sense, that is, if a man^s vvill be not in his own
disposition, and if his wilKng do not " come upon him accord-
ing to his will, nor according to anything else in his power
it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-
load. For if that law be unjust and tyrannical, which com-
mands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do,
then that law is likewise unjust and tyrannical, which com-
mands him to will that which is impossible for him to will.
Secondly, his instance supposetli an untruth, and is a plain 2.[Tempta-
ji begging of the question. No man is extrinsecally, antece- not involve
dently, and irresistibly " necessitated by temptation to steal.'' dent neceL
The devil' may sohcit us, but he cannot necessitate us. He sityofsin.]
hath a faculty of persuading, but not a power of com-
pelling. Nos ignem habemuSy spiritus flammam ciety^ as
Nazianzen™; — "he blows the coals, but the fire is our
own." ^ Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientem' as
St. Austin^; — Mie bites not until we thi'ust ourselves into
his mouth.' He may propose, he may suggest, but he can-
not move the will effectively. " Resist the devil and he will Jam. iv. 7.
fly from you." By " faith" we are " able to quench all the Eph. vi. 16.
fiery darts of the wicked." And if Satan, who can both
propose the object, and choose out the fittest times and places
to work upon om- frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot
necessitate the will (which is most certain), then much less
can outward objects do it alone. They have no natural
efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be occasions,
but they cannot be causes, of evil. The sensitive appetite
may engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal.
And if it should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but
moral, not natural; hypothetical, not absolute; coexistent,
' [See above, T. H. Numb, iii. bolus) " nisi eum qui se ad ilium ultro
p. 27, and Numb. xi. p. 59.] mortifera securitate conjunxerit; . . la-
^ ["TJ) TTvp Trap rjfxwi/ 7] Se (p\h^ tov trare potest, sollicitare potest, mordere
TTUfvixaros.'' Greg. Naz., Carm. xxxiii., non potest, nisi volentem. " Pseudo-Aug.,
I) rvwfjLoK. TerpdffTixos, v. 208 ; Op. tom. Serm. xxxvii., De David et Golia, § ti ;
' ii. p. 608. ed. Bened.] Op. tom. v. Append, p. 74?. F.]
° [" Neminem potest mordere" (Dia-
92
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part not antecedent; from ourselves, not extrinsecal. This neces-
- — sity, or rather procli\-ity, was free in its causes. We ourselves,
by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we
should and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion
over us. Admit, that some sudden passions may and do ex-
traordinarily surprise us; and therefore we say, '^motus primo
primi°'' — "the first motions" are not always in our power, nei-
ther are they free : yet this is but very rarely ; and it is our
own fault, that they do surprise us. Neither doth the law
punish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of
stealing. Th^ intention makes the thief. But of this more
largely Numb. xxv.P
[Law use- He pleads, moreover, that the law is "a cause of justice,"
Igss oil the
theory of that it "frames the wills'^ of men "to justice," and that "the
necessity.] p^^^ishment" of one dotli "conduce to the preservation" of
many. All this is most true of a just law justly executed.
But this is no God-a-mercy to T. 11. his opinion of absolute
necessity. If all actions and all events be predetermined
naturally, necessarily, extrinsecally, how should the law frame
men morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the
law to do, but either that which is done already, or that which
is impossible to be done. If a man be chained to every
individual act which he doth, and from every act which he
doth not, by indissolvible bonds of inevitable necessity, how
should the law either "deter" him or "frame" him? If a
dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw
him from it. Make a thousand laws that the fire shall not
burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do, (according
to T. H.) they do it as necessarily, as "the fire burneth^."
Hang up a thousand thieves; and if a man be determined in-
evitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.
[Punish- He adds, that the sufi'erings imposed by the law upon
catory,"not delinquents, "respect not the evil act past, but the good to
onw^f^^^^ come," and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the
magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified
before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others
by his example. The truth is, the punishing delinquents by
° [See below in the Castigations, [Below, p. 714 (fol. edit.).]
Numb.vii., p. 768. (fol. edit.) ; Disc.ii. [Above, T. H. Numb, xi., p. 59.]
Pt. iii.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
93
law respectetli both "the evil act past" and ''the good to come." Discourse
The ground of it is " the evil act past the scope or end of it
is "the good to come.'' The end without the ground cannot
justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action
bad ; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good.
It is not lawful to " do evil, that good may come'' of it ; nor [Rom. iii.
to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others :
that is, to ' fall into a certain crime, for fear of an uncertain.'
Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted,
neither probatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only
vindicatory, to satisfy the law, out of a zeal of justice, by
giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and
warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in itself without all
undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the lawful
magistrate, who is the vicegerent or lieutenant of God, from
Whom he derives his power of life and death.
T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth [T. H.'sin-
at every bulrush, so he lays hold on every pretence to save a cies.]
desperate cause. But, first, it is worth our observation to see
how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. First, he
told us, that it was the " irresistible power" of God that "justi-
i fies all His actions," though He command one thing openly
and plot another thing secretly, though He be the cause, not
only of the action, but also of the irregularity, though He
both give man power to act and determine this power to evil
as well as good, though He punish the creatures for doing
that, which He Himself did necessitate them to do^. But,
being pressed with reason, — that this is tyrannical, first to
necessitate a man to do His will, and then to punish him for
doing of it, — he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and
flies to a second; — that therefore a man is justty punished for
that which he was necessitated to do, because the act was
voluntary on his part^. This hath more show of reason than
the former, if he did make the will of man to be in his own
disposition; but, maintaining, that the will is irresistibly
determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and
absurdity is the same : — first, to necessitate a man to will,
and then to punish him for willing. The dog only bites the
stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand ; but they
r [See T. H. Numb, xii., above p. 66.] » [Sec above, p. 8-1]
94
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part make the First Cause to pumsh the instrument for that which
is His own proper act. Wherefore^ not being satisfied with
this, he casts it off, and flies to his third shift. Men are not
punished^^ (saith he) " therefore, because their theft proceeded
from election" (that is, because it was willingly done, for "to
elect and will," saith he, " are both one*," — is not this to
blow hot and cold with the same breath?), "but because it was
noxious, and contrary to men's preservation." Thus far he
saith true, that every creature, by the instinct of nature, seeks
to preserve itself. Cast water into a dusty place, and it con-
tracts itself into little globes ; that is, to preserve itself. And
those who are "noxious" in the eye of the law, are justly
punished by them to whom the execution of the law is com-
mitted; but the law accounts no persons "noxious" but those
who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth not a
thorn for pricking, because it is the nature of the thorn, and
it can do no otherwise ; nor a child before it have the use of
reason. If one should take mine hand perforce and give
another a box on the ear with it, my hand is " noxious," but
the law punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore he
hath reason to propose the question, " how it is just to kill
one man to amend another,^' if he who kiUed did nothing but
what he was "necessitated^' to do. He might as well de-
mand, how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent
infants, to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing
the leprosy. It had been a more rational way, first, to have
demonstrated that it is so, and then to have questioned why
it is so. His assertion itself is but a dream ; and the reason
which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.
[Right and The sum of it is this, — that " where there is no law, there
ce'^Lienuo^ killing or anything else can be unjust ;" that before the
pactsT constitution of commonwealths every man had power to kill
another, if he conceived him to be hurtful to him ; that at
the constitution of commonwealths particular men " lay
down" this right in part, and in part reserve it to them-
selves, " as in case of theft, or murder ;" that " the right
which the commonwealth hath to put'^ a malefactor "to
death, is not created by the law, but remaineth from the first
right of nature, which every man hath, to preserve himself/'
' [See below, T. II. Numb. xx. p. 700 (fol. edit.).]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
95
that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts Discourse
"in order to our own preservation." This may well be called L
stringing of paradoxes.
1. But J first, there never was any such time when man-
kind was ^"ithout governors and laws and "societies."
Paternal government was in the world from the beginning,
and the law of nature. There might be sometimes a root of
such barbarous thieWsh brigands_, in some rocks, or deserts,
or odd corners of the world; but it was an abuse, and a
degeneration from the nature of man, who is a political
creature. This savage opinion reflects too much upon the
honour of mankind.
2. Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawful
ordinanly for private men to kill one another for their own
preservation. If God would have had men live like wild
beasts, as lions, bears, or tigers, He would have ai-med them
with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks ; but of all creatm-es
man is bom most naked, without any weapon to defend him-
self, because God had provided a better means of security for
him, that is, the magistrate.
3. Thirdly, that right which private men have, to preseiTC
themselves, though it be with the killing of another, when
they are set upon to be mui'dered or robbed, is not a re-
mainder or a resen e of some greater power which they have
resigned, but a pri\ilege which God hath given them, in case
of extreme danger and in\ancible necessity, that when they
cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that
is, the magistrate, every man becomes a magistrate to himself.
4. Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had.
The people, whilst they were a dispersed rabble (which in
some odd cases might happen to be), never had justly the
I power of Hfe and death, and therefore they could not give it
;by their election. All that they do is to prepare the matter;
but it is God Almighty, that infuseth the soul of power.
5. Fifthly, and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason
and parts to compare the murdering of men with the
slaughtering of brute beasts. The elements are for the
plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute beasts for
man. AVhen God enlarged His former grant to man, and
gave him liberty to eat the flesh of the creatures for his sus- Gen. ix. 3.
96
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
l^^^^j^T tenance^ yet man is expressly excepted, — ^'^^Tioso sheddeth
— r man^s blood, by man shall his blood be shed — and the
Gen. IX. b. ^ * ^
reason is assigned, — "For in the image of God made He
(Rom. V. man/^ Before "sin entered into the world," or before any
creatures were hurtful or " noxious" to man, he had do-
minion over them, as their lord and master. And though
the possession of this sovereignty be lost in part for the sin
of man, which made not only the creatures to rebel, but also
the inferior faculties to rebel against the superior (from
whence it comes, that one man is hurtful to another), yet
the dominion still remains : wherein we may observe, how
sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross ; that
though the strongest creatures have withdrawn their o1)e-
dience, as lions and bears, to shew that man hath lost the
excellency of his dominion, and the weakest creatures, as
flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he is
fallen, yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as
sheep and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.
[Coiisuita- The next branch of his answer concerns " consultations ;"
imply which (saith he) are not superfluous, though all things come
doernot"^ to pass necessarily, because they are " the cause which doth
determi^^^ necessitate the eff'ect," and the " means to bring it to pass."
nation.] We were told Numb, xi.", that the last dictate of right
reason was but as the last feather which breaks the horse's
back. It is well; yet that reason hath gained some command
again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly, if
anything under God have power to determine the will, it is
right reason. But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason
doth not determine the will physically nor absolutely, much
less extrinsecally and antecedently; and therefore it makes
nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to
prove. He adds further, that as the end is necessary, so are
the means ; and " when it is determined that one thing shall
be chosen before another, it is determined also for what cause
it shall be so chosen." All which is truth, but not the whole
truth. For, as God ordains means for all ends, so He adapt'
and fits the means to their respective ends; free means t(
free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessarj
means to necessary ends : whereas T. H. would have al
■ [Above p. 59.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
97
means, all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered Discourse
the world, that a man ought to use and may freely use those
means of good, which he doth neglect, not by virtue of God's
decree but by his own fault ; if a man use those means of
evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God^s decree
he had power to forbear ; if God have left to man in part the
free managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath en-
dowed him with understanding; then consultations are of use,
then provident care is needful, then it concerns him to use
the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a
man cannot if he w^ould neglect any means of good, which by
\irtue of God^s decree it is possible for him to use, and that
he cannot possibly use any means of evil but those which are
irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent
decree ; then not only consultations are vain, but that noble
faculty of reason itself is vain. Do we think, that we can
help God Almighty to do His proper work? In vain we
trouble ourselves ; in vain we take care to use those means,
^\ Inch are not in our power to use or not to use. And this
is that which was contained in my prolepsis or prevention of
his answer, though he be pleased both to disorder it and to
silence it. We cannot hope by our labours to alter the
course of things set down by God. Let Him perform His
' decree. Let the necessary causes do their work. If we be
those causes, yet we are not in our own disposition ; we must
do what we are ordained to do, and more we cannot do.
Man hath no remedy but patience, and shrug up the
shoulders. This is the doctrine [which] flows from this opinion
of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the
clock, which sets all the little wheels a going, to be as the
decree of God ; and that the motion of it were perpetual, in-
falhble, from an intrinsecal principle, even as God's decree is
infallible, eternal, all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser
wheels to be the second causes ; and that they do as certainly
follow the motion of the great wheel, without missing or
swerving in the least degi-ee, as the second causes do pursue
'the determination of the first cause. I desire to know in
'this case, what cause there is to call a council of smiths, to
Consult and order the motion of that w hich was ordered and
Ictermined before their hands ? Are men wiser than God ?
HRAMHALL.
H
98
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part Yet all men know, that the motion of the lesser wheels is a
III
— necessary means to make the clock strike.
But he tells me in great sadness, that my argument is just
like this other, — " If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live
till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-
^ay -/^ — which, saith he, is " a false consequence,^' and " a
false proposition/' Truly, if by " running through'' he
understands killing, it is a "false," or rather a foolish propo-
sition, and implies a contradiction. To live till to-morrow,
and to-day to die, are inconsistent. But, by his favour, this
is not my "consequence," but this is his own opinion. He
would persuade us, that it is absolutely necessary that a man
shall live till to-morrow, and yet that it is possible that he
may kill himself to-day. My argument is this ; — If there be
a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself to-day, then
it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till to-morrow ;
but there is such a liberty ; therefore no such necessity. And
the "consequence" which I make here is this; — If it be abso-
lutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it
is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate,
whether he should die to-day or not. And this is a true con-
sequence. The ground of his mistake is this, — that though
it be true that a man may kill himself to-day, yet, upon the
supposition of his absolute necessity, it is impossible. Such
heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth ; which
are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half
upon his false grounds.
[Admoni- The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions; to
im'p^y^° which he gives no new answer, and therefore I need not
liberty, be- Ynake any new reply: saving; only to tell him, that he mis-
cause they *^ ' & J }
are ad- takes my argument. I say not only, — If all things be neces-
those only sary, then admonitions are in vain, — but, — If all things be
conceived iiecessary, then "it is to no more purpose to admonish men of
to be free.] understanding than fools, children, or madmen." That they
do admonish the one and not the other, is confessedly true ;
and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, —
that the former have the use of reason, and true liberty, with
a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and
madmen, have not.
[Praise ^ Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
99
The scope of his discourse is, that " things necessary'^ may Discourse
be " praiseworthy/' There is no doubt of it. But withal i'_ -
their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the praise of a p^aise^me-^
statue reflects upon the workman who made it. " To praise Jfo^g^^i^^J'iy
a thing'' (saith he) is " to say, it is good.'' True : but this liberty.]
goodness is not a metaphysical goodness ; so the worst of
things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good : — nor a natural
goodness; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of
natui'c ; "God saw all that He had made, and it was very fcen. i.
good :" — but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather ^^'^
than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the con-
formity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action
is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right
reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of
here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally
good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dis-
praise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing
from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the
good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of
hberty ; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is
quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise.
Whereas T. H. adds, that "to say a thing is good, is to say,
685 it is as I would wish, or as another would" wish, or as " the
state" would have it, or " according to the law" of the land,
he mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may
all wish that which is not really good but only in appearance.
We do often wish what is profitable or delightful, without
regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though
" the will of the state" where we live, or the law of the land,
do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of
moral goodness. And therefore to his question, — -whether
nothing "that proceeds from necessity can please" me, — I
answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me when I am
cold ; and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God
for my use and for my good : yet I do not mean to attribute
any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to
it ; as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to com-
municate its heat or to suspend it : but I praise first the
Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for
the praise "which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato," — that
H 2
100
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part « j^e was good by nature,, et quia aliter esse non potuif^^^ — it
'■ — hath more of the orator than either of the theologian or
philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and
become evil ; what privilege hath Cato more than he ? No,
by his leave,
" Narratur et dii Catonis
Ssepe mero caliaisse virtus y."
But the true meaning, — that he was naturally of a good
temper, not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were, —
this is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not moraUy.
Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet proved as
good a man^ The more his praise ; by how much the difficulty
was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right
reason.
[Ofrewards Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word,
mentr;"^^" ^^t Only that they frame " and conform the will to good j^'
of brut?^^^ which hath been sufficiently answered. They do so indeed ;
beasts not but if his Opinion were true, they could not do so. But
relevant.] ' <i
(because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to
satisfy myself) though it be not urged by him, yet I do
acknowledge, that I find some improper and analogical
rewards and punishments used to brute beasts ; as the hunter
rewards his dog, the master of the coy-duck whips her, when
she returns without company. And if it be true, which he
affirmeth a little before, that I have confessed, that "the
actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to
that one thing which they shall do%^^ the difficulty is increased.
1. [All the But, first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some
bruteb^easts kinds of actious, which are most excellent in brute beasts and
TaTy.^f ^^k® greatest show of reason, as the bees working their
honey and the spiders wearing their webs, are yet done
without any consultation or dehberation, by a mere instinct
of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these
only kinds of works ^. But I did never say, I could not say,
that all their individual actions are necessary, and antece-
dently determined in their causes; as what days the bees
shall fly abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall keep
[See above, p. 87. note c] Fato, c. 5.]
y [Horat., Carm., III. xxi. 11, 12. » [See above, T. H. Numb, viii.,
" Narratur et frisci Catonis," &c.] p. 47,]
^ [Cic., Tusc. Quaest., iv. 37 ; De ^ [See in Numb, vi., above p. 37.]
AGAINST MR. IIOBBES.
101
in the hive, how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day, and Discourse
from whence. These actions and the like, though they be —
not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet
they are contingent, and therefore not necessary.
Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some 2. [The
brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and waid and
exquisite works, so in others, where it finds a natural pro- nIenT'ip.
pension, art, which is the imitator of nature, may frame and Pjijjjj {jj^
form them according to the will of the artist to some par- analogy
ticular actions and ends; as we see in setting-dogs, and coy- °"^^*-'
ducks, and parrots : and the principal means whereby they
effect this, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or
by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of
rewards and punishments. But we take the word here pro-
perly, not as it is used by \Tilgar people, but as it is used by
divines and philosophers, for that recompense which is due to
honest and dishonest actions. Where there is no moral
liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true
reward nor punishment.
Thirdly, when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, 3. [They
it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by cases" not**
inferring or concluding one thing from another (which they son"^bur
are not capable of, neither are they able to conceive a reason from sense
niT Txi 1 n n .of present
01 what they do), but merely out of memory, or out of a sensi- or memory
686tive fear, or hope. They remember, that when they did after oJpahI."j°^
one manner they were beaten, and when they did after another
manner, they were cherished ; and accordingly they apply
themselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely
necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most cer-
tainly, if there be any desert in it, or any praises due unto it,
it is to them who did instruct them.
Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study,
physic, and the like, he answereth not a word more than what
is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent.
NUMBER XV.
J. D. — Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the Argiiment
minds of men, that there is no true liberty, and that all oph^on of
102
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
I' A R T things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the
Tiece^si'tv study of piety. Who will bewail his sins with tears ? what
jnconsisj. become of that grief/' that " zeal/' that " indignation/'
piety.] that holy "revenge/' which the Apostle speaks of? if men be
Hj^^ once throughly persuaded that they could not shun what
they did. A man may grieve for that which he could not
help ; but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own
fault, which flowed not from his own error, but from an ante-
cedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to per-
form obedience, that believeth there are ine\dtable bounds
and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go
beyond nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to
avert those evils which are inevitable? or to confer those
favours which are impossible ? We indeed know not what
good or evil shall happen to us ; but this we know, that if all
things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot
alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason, why
those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do some-
times pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of
nature and the strength of reason and the evidence of Scrip-
ture do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen
grounds, and expel those Stoical fancies out of their heads.
A complete Stoic can neither pray nor repent nor serve God
to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as
well as commonwealth, religion as well as policy.
[Answer.] T. H. — His third argument consisteth in other incon-
veniences, which he saith will follow ; namely, impiety, and
negligence of religious duties, repentance and zeal to God's
service. To which I answer, as to the rest, that they follow
not. I must confess, if we consider far the greatest part of
mankind, not as they should be, but as they are ; that is, as
men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or prefer-
ments, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the im-
patience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong
principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things ;
that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help
their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer,
I would not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope
your Lordship and he will keep it in private. Neverthe-
AGAINST MR. IIOBBES.
103
less, in very truth, the uecessity of events does not of itself Discourse
draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth only in
1 • 11 1 • 1 1-1 [Theophi-
two things : one, that we honour (jod m our hearts ; which ion of ne-
is, that we think of His power as highly as we can ; for to not'invoive
honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great ^"^^If^
power : the other, that we signify that honour and esteem by minded
our words and actions ; which is called " cultuSj^ or worship
of God. He therefore that thinketh, that all things proceed
from God's eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does
he not think God omnipotent ? does he not esteem of His
power as highly as possible ? which is to honour God as much
as can be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not
more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than
he that thinketh otherN^dse? Yet is this external acknow-
ledgment the same thing which we call worship. So this
opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally, internally ;
and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, ^Nor ex-
which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way pentance.'\
after the grief of being out of the way, though the cause
that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no
reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the
cause why he returned into the way w^ere necessary, there
remains still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the
actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance,
grief for the error, nor joy for the returning. And for \_Nor
prayer, whereas he saith, that the necessity of things destroys ^^^^^^-^
prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the causes
that move God's will, His will being unchangeable, yet, since
we find in God's word, He will not give His blessings but to [Matt. vii.
those that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same.
Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessings. And
the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein
the blessing is decreed. 'Tis manifest, that thanksgiving
is no cause of the blessing past ; and that which is past is
sure, and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks is in use
as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should
expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And praj^er to God
Almighty is but thanksgiving for His blessings in general.
And though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is
not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect
104
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
, Part nothing but from God, in such manner as He, not as we, will.
— And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, " Thy will,^'
la— Luke not our will, '^be done;^^ and by example teaches us the
fLukexxii. same, for He prayed thus, "Father, if it be Thy will, let tliis
3 cup pass,'^ &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not
to move, but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging
that what we ask can be effected by Him only.
[Re{)iy.] J. D. — I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, that it is
not the covetousness, or ambition, or sensuality, or sloth, or
prejudice of his readers, which renders this doctrine of ab-
solute necessity dangerous ; but that it is in its own nature
destructive to true godliness. And though his answer con-
sist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not
[T. H. mis- willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. First, he
piety^o be in making inward piety to consist merely in the estima-
the^judg judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that
meiit.] the devils should have as much inward piety as the best
f James ii. Christians ? for they esteem God^s power to be infinite " and
^^'^ tremble.^^ Though inward piety do suppose the act of the
understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the
will ; being that branch of justice, which gives to God the
honour which is due unto Him^. Is there no love due to
[And to God, no faith, no hope ? Secondly, he errs in making inward
God?^* piety to ascribe no glory to God but only the glory of His
only.] power or omnipotence. What shall become of all other the
Divine attributes ? and particularly of His goodness, of His
truth, of His justice, of His mercy ? which beget a more true
and sincere honour in the heart than greatness itself. " Maff-
[Hisopin- nos facile laudamus, bonos lubenter.'^ Thirdly, this opinion of
stroy^the absolute necessity destroys the truth of God ; making Him
iH?t2 o?"' command one thing openly and to necessitate another
God.] privately, to chide a man for doing that which it hath deter-
mined him to do, to profess one thing and to intend another.
It destroys the goodness of God ; making Him to be a hater
of mankind, and to deUght in the torments of His creatures,
( Luke xvi. whereas the very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and
"^''J commiseration of him. It destroys the justice of God;
making Him to punish the creatures for that which was His
[Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. Ixxxi. art. 5.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
105
own act, which they had no more power to shun than the fire Discourse
hath power not to burn^^. It destroys the very power of God ;
making Him to be the true Author of all the defects and
evils which are in the world. These are the fruits of im-
potence, not of omnipotence. He who is the effective cause
of sin, either in himself or in the creature, is not almighty.
There needs no other devil in the world, to raise jealousies
and suspicions between God and His creatures, or to poison
mankind with an apprehension that God doth not love them,
but only this opinion ; which was the office of the serpent. Gen. iii. 5.
Fourthly, for the outward worship of God. How shall a man [And the
praise God for His goodness, who believes Him to be a greater worship of
tyrant than ever was in the world. Who creates millions to ^^^-^
bum eternally without their fault, to express His power ? How
shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence and
devotion and faith which is requisite, who believeth, that God
causeth His Gospel to be preached to the much greater part
of Christians, not with any intention that they should be
converted and saved, but merely to harden their hearts, and
to make them inexcusable ? How shall a man receive the
blessed Sacrament with comfort and confidence, as a seal of
God's love in Christ, who believeth, that so many millions
are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the
Passions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil ?
How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who
apprehendeth, that "eating and drinking unworthily'^ is not [See 1 Cor.
the cause of damnation, but because God would damn a man, ^^'"^
therefore He necessitates him to "eat and drink unworthily?''
How shall a man make a free vow to God, without gross
ridiculous h}q)Ocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform
nothing but as he is extrinsecally necessitated? Fifthly, for [And 10-
repentance, how shall a man condemn and accuse himself
for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a watch which
is wound up by God, and that he can go neither longer
nor shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is
ordered by God ? If God sets him right, he goes right. If
sGod set him wrong, he goes wrong. How can a man be
said to " return into the right way," who never was in any
other way but that which God Himself had chalked out for
d [See above, T. H. Numb, xi., p. 59.]
106
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part him ? What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute of all
. 151: — power, but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings, or
a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse purpose to build
hospitals ? We use to say, " Admit one absurdity, and a thou-
sand will follow^/' To maintain this unreasonable opinion of
absolute necessity, he is necessitated (but it is hypothetically,
— he might change his opinion if he would) to deal with all
ancient writers, as the Goths did with the Romans ; who de-
stroyed all their magnificent works, that there might remain
no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth.
Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions,
nor one of their definitions, nay, not one of their terms of art
standing. Observe what a description he hath given us here of
repentance " It is a glad returning into the right way after
the grief of being out of the way.^^ It amazed me to find
' gladness^ to be the first word in the description of repent-
ance. His repentance is not that repentance, nor his piety
that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer, which the
Church of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, and
sackcloth, and ashes, and tears, and humicubations^, used to
be companions of repentance. Joy may be a consequent of
it, not a part of it. It is a " returning,^' but whose act is
this returning ? Is it God^s alone, or doth the penitent per-
son concur also freely with the grace of God ? If it be God's
alone, then it is His repentance, not man's repentance.
What need the penitent person trouble himself about it ?
God will take care of His own work. The Scriptures teach
Rev. iii. us otherwise, — that God expects our concurrence : — " Be
19 [20 ]
zealous and repent ; behold, I stand at the door, and knock ;
if any man hear My voice, and open the door, I will come in
to him.'' It is " a glad returning into the right way ;" — who
dare any more call that a wrong way, which God Himself
hath determined ? He that willeth and doth that which God
would have him to will and to do, is never out of his " right
way." It follows in his description, — " after the grief," &c.
It is true, a man may grieve for that which is necessarily
imposed upon him ; but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of
e Posito uno absurdo sequuntur awfxaTos, r^v di e^ayopevfffojs koI art-
inille.' J fjLOTcpas dy(ji}y^s iirauSpdcocrip." Greg.
' ["AaKpva, (TTfuayixovs, duaKX-f}(T€Ls, Naz., Orat. xl. in Sanct. Baptisma, Op.
Xanevfias, dypvirvias, rriiiv r\>vxris koX torn. i. p. f)42. B. fol. Paris. 1609.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
107
his own, if it never was in his power to shun it. Suppose Discourse
a writing-master shall hold his scholar's hand in his, and '
write with it : the scholar's part is only to hold still his hand,
whether the master write well or ill; the scholar hath no
ground, either of joy or sorrow, as for himself ; no man will
interpret it to be his act, but his master's. It is no fault to
be out of the right way," if a man had not liberty to have
kept himself in the way.
And so from repentance he skips quite over new obedience, [T. H. de-
. . .. - nieth
to come to prayer_, which is the last religious duty insisted prayer to
upon by me here ; but according to his use, without either
cause or a
answering or mentioning what I say : which would have qI^^
shewed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, — not blessings.]
contemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving,
but that most proper kind of prayer which we call petition,
which used to be thus defined, — to be an act of religion, by
which we desire of God something which we have not, and
hope that we shall obtain it by Him?." Quite contrary to
this T. H. tells us, that prayer "is not a cause nor a means'^
of God's blessing, but only " a signification that we expect"
it from Him. If he had told us only, that prayer is not a
meritorious cause of God's blessings, as the poor man by
begging an alms doth not deserve it, I should have gone
along with him. But to tell us, that it is not so much as " a
means" to procure God's blessing, and yet with the same
breath, that God " will not give His blessings but to those"
who pray; — who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scrip-
tures teach us otherwise : — " Whatsoever ye shall ask the John xvi.
Father in My name, He will give it you ;" — " Ask, and it Matt. vii. 7.
shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall
be opened unto you." St. Paul tells the Corinthians, that
he was "helped" by their "prayers;" — that's not all; — that 2 Cor. i. 11.
" the gift was bestowed upon him by their means :" so prayer
is a "means." And St. James saith, "The effectual fervent [James] v.
prayer of a righteous man availeth much :" if it be
"effectual," then it is "a cause." To shew this efficacy of [iMatt. vii.
prayer, our Saviour useth the comparison of a father towards L^ke xi!
his child, of a neighbour towards his neighbour ; yea, of an [[^ke .Ji
unjust iudge, to shame those who think, that God hath not ^— ...
I K [See Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. Ixxxiii. art. 3.] ' — S-J
108
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part more compassion than a wicked man. This was signified by (
rcen xxxii ^'^^^^^'^ Wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like
24-30.] 'the tradesman's tools, wherewithal he gets his living for
himself and his family. But, saith he, God's " will" is un-
changeableWhat then ? He might as well use this
against study, physic, and all second causes, as against
prayer. He shews even in this, how little they attribute to
the endeavours of men. There is a great difference between
these two ; mutare voluntatem^^ — " to change the will^,'' —
fJamesi. (which God never doth, in Whom there is not the least
^^■^ shadow of turning by change ; His will to love and hate was
the same from eternity, which it now is, and ever shall be ;
His love and hatred are immoveable, but we are removed ; —
" Non tellus cymbam tellurem cymba reliquit ;") —
and ^'velle mutationerrC'' — "to will a change^ which God often
doth. To change the will argues a change in the agent, but
to will a change only argues a change in the object. It is
no inconstancy in a man, to love, or to hate, as the object is
changed. " Prcesta mihi omnia eadem et idem sum." Prayer
works not upon God but us. It renders not Him more
propitious in Himself, but us more capable of mercy. He
saith, this — that God doth not bless us, except we pray — is
" a motive to prayer.^' Why talks he of " motives,^'' who
acknowledgeth no liberty, nor admits any cause, but abso-
lutely necessary ? He saith, " Prayer is the gift of God no
less than the blessing which we pray for, and contained
"in the same decree" with "the blessing." It is true, the
spirit of prayer is the gift of God ; will he conclude from
thence, that the good employment of one talent, or of one
gift of God, may not procure another ? Our Saviour teach-
[iMatt XXV. eth us otherwise ; — " Come, thou good and faithful servant ;
thou hast been faithful in little, I will make thee ruler over
much." Too much light is an enemy to the light, and too
much law is an enemy to justice. I could wish we wrangled
less about God's decrees, until we understood them better.
But, saith he, "thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing
past," and " prayer is but a thanksgiving." He might even as
well tell me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when
[Thorn. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xix. art. 7.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
109
he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving is a Discourse
kind of prayer ; but every prayer, and namely petition, is h
not a thanksgiving. In the last place he urgeth, that in our
prayers we are bound to submit our wills to God^s will.
Who ever made any doubt of this ? We must submit to the
preceptive will of God, or His commandments; we must
submit to the effective will of God, when He declares
His good pleasure by the event or otherwise. But we deny,
and deny again, either that God wills things " ad ea^tra'' —
"without Himself necessarily, or that it is His pleasure
that all second causes should act necessarily at all times;
which is the question, and that which he allegeth to the con-
trary comes not near it.
NUMBER XVI.
J. D. — Fourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection of the Argument
world doth require, that in the universe should be agents of oplniori^of
all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He JJggfpoyg^
that shall make either all thinsrs necessary, guided by des- the variety
-.11. n T 1 , . n 1 . and perfec-
tmy, or all things tree, governed by election, or all things tion of the
contingent, happening by chance, doth overthrow the beauty ""^^^'"^^•^
and the perfection of the world.
T. H. — The fourth argument from reason is this, "The [Answer.]
order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth, that in
the universe should be agents of all sorts, some necessary,
some free, some contingent ; he that shall make all things
necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth
overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world. In
which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For, see-
ing he that maketh anything, in that he maketh it, he mak-
eth it to be necessary, it followeth, that he that maketh all
things, maketh all things necessary to be. As, if a workman
make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so, if
God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be.
Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know
it not), that some agents should work without deliberation.
110
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part which he calls necessary agents ; and some agents with deli-
— beration^ and those both he and I call free agents ; and that
some agents should work and we not know how, and their
effects we both call contingent. But this hinders not, but that
he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined
to one by former causes ; and that which is contingent and
imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and depend
on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do
not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not for
cause anything which we perceive. As, for example, when
a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and
the rain had a cause, sufficient enough to produce it, but
because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the
journey, we say, they were contingent one to another. And
thus, you see, though there be three sorts of events, neces-
sary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary
without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the
universe.
[Reply.] J. D. — The first thing he observes in mine argument is
"contradiction," as he calls it, but in truth it is but a de-
ception of the sight ; as one candle sometimes seems to be
two, or a rod in the water shews to be two rods. " Quicqidd
recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis.'^ But what is this
" contradiction ?" Because I say, " he who maketh all
things, doth not make them necessary." What? A "con-
tradiction," and but one proposition ? That were strange. I
say, God hath not made all agents necessary ; he saith, God
hath made all agents necessary. Here is a " contradiction"
indeed, but it is between him and me, not between me and
myself. But yet though it be not a formal " contradiction,"
yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in adjecto. Where-
fore, to clear the matter, and dispel the mist which he hath
[Tiypothe- raised. It is true, that every thing when it is made, it is
tinctfrom neccssary that it be made so as it is; that is, by a necessity
deriT^ne infallibihty, or supposition — supposing, that it be so made ;
cessity.j but this is not that absolute, antecedent necessity, whereoi
the question is between him and me. As, to use his own
instance, before the garment be made, the tailor is free to,
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
Ill
make it either of the Italian, Spanish, or French fashion in- Discourse
differently; but after it is made, it is necessary that it be of '
that fashion whereof he hath made it ; that is, by a necessity
of supposition. But this doth neither hinder the cause from
being a free cause, nor the effect from being a free effect;
but the one did produce freely, and the other Avas freely pro-
duced. So the " contradiction^^ is vanished.
In the second part of his answer he grants, that there are [Contin-
some free agents, and some contmgent agents ; and that events.]
"perhaps the beauty of the world doth " require it; but,
hke a shrewd cow, which after she hath given her milk casts
it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells us, that
nevertheless they are "all necessary .^^ This part of his
answer is a mere logomachy (as a great part of the contro-
versies in the world are), or a contention about words; — what
is the meaning of necessary, and free, and contingent actions.
I have shewed before, what free and necessary do properly
signify; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all agents
which want "deliberation" to be "necessary;" but I ac-
knowledge, that many of them are contingent. Neither do
I approve his definition of contingents, though he say, I con-
cm- with him; — that they are such agents as " work we know
not how." For, according to this desciiption, many neces-
sary actions should be contingent, and many contingent
actions should be necessary. The loadstone draweth iron,
the jet chaff, we "know not how;" and yet the effect is
necessary : and so it is in all sympathies and antipathies or
occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the streets, a tile
falls down from a house, and breaks his head. We know
all the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man
walked that way, the pin failed, the tile fell just when he was
under it. And yet this is a contingent effect. The man
might not have walked that way, and then the tile had not
fallen upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in this
place by contingents, such events as happen besides the
scope or intention of the agents ; as when a man, digging to
make a grave, finds a treasure; though the word be some-
times so taken. But by contingents, I understand all things,
which may be done and may not be done, may happen or
may not happen, by reason of the indetermination, or acci-
112
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part dental concurrence, of the causes. And those same things
' — which are absolutely contingent, are yet hypothetically
necessary; as, supposing the passenger did walk just that
way, just at that time, and that the pin did fail just then,
and the tile faU, it was necessary that it should fall upon the
passenger^ s head. The same defence will keep out his
shower of rain.^^ But we shall meet with his shower of
rain" again. Numb, xxxiv'; whither I refer the further ex-
plication of this point.
NUMBER XVII.
Argument J. D. — Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the
there be nature of cvil, and the formal reason of sin. If the
liberty^ hand of the painter were the law of painting, or the hand of
there is no the Writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write,
formal sin.] other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing there-
fore, that the First Cause is the rule and law of goodness, if
it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by itself
immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes,
it will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this,
that one commit that which he might avoid. If there be no 691
liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin in the
world. Therefore it appears, both from Scripture and reason,
that there is true liberty.
lAnswer.] T. H. — To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that
if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin
is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence. The
nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed
from our will, and be against the law. A judge, in judging
whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks
at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer.
Now when I say the action was necessary, I do not say it
was done against the will of the doer, but with his will ; and
so necessarily, because man's will, that is, every act of the
i [Belo;v, pp. 724, 725 (fol. edit.).]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
113
will, and purpose of man, had a sufficient and therefore a Discourse
necessary cause; and consequently every voluntary action
was necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and
a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And because God may
afflict by right derived from His omnipotency, though sin
were not ; and the example of punishment on voluntary sin-
ners is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less
frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed
before^ is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to
his objections, both out of Scripture and reason.
J. D. — " Scis tu simulare cupressuTUj quid hoc^ It was [Reply.]
shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when
he was busy about his accounts to the state, that he should
rather study how to make no accounts"'. So, it seems, T. H.
thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument, than
to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an
Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he
hath quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn.
And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as
' those who have a politic deafness, to hear nothing but what
liketh them, I will first reduce mine argument into form, and
then weigh what he saith in answer or rather in opposition to
it. That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin,
and by consequence sin itself, is not to be approved. — This is
clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture,
1 do prove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. —
' But this opinion of the necessity of all things, by reason of a
conflux of second causes ordered and determined by the First
I Cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin. — This
I is proved thus. That which makes sin itself to be good and
I just and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys
1 the essence, of sin ; for if sin be good and just and lawful,
' it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion
of the necessity of all things makes sin to be very good and
just and lawful : for nothing can flow essentially by way of
physical determination from the First Cause, which is the law
k [Above T. H. Numb. xiv. p. 85.] [Pint., in Vita Alcib., torn. ii. pp.
Ill ' [Horat., A.P., 19, 20.] 11, 12. ed. Bryant.]
v\ BRAMHALL. j
III
114
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part and rule of goodness and justice, but tliat which is good and
III — just and lawful ; but this opinion makes sin to proceed essen-
tially by way of physical determination from the First Cause,
as appears in T. H. his whole discourse. Neither is it
material at all, whether it proceed immediately from the First
Cause, or mediately ; so as it be by a necessary flux of second
and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To
these proofs he answers nothing, but only by denjdng the
first " consequence,^^ as he calls it ; and then sings over his
[Sin, to be old soug, that the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the
be thTact action procccds from our will, and be against the law which
agamsTa^^^ in our scusc is most true, if he understand a just law, and a
jWiaw.] fj,gg rational will ; but supposing (as he doth), that the law
enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it is
an unjust and tyrannical law, and the transgression of it is no
sin, not to do that which never was in our power to do ; and
supposing likewise (as he doth), that the will is inevitably
determined by special influence from the First Cause, then it
is not man^s wiU, but God^s wiU, and flows essentially from
the law of goodness.
That which he adds of a "judge,'Ms altogether impertinent
as to his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge,
nor the law of the land the proper rule, of sin. But it makes
strongly against him. For the judge gees upon a good ground.
And even this which he confesseth, — that the judge "looks at
no higher cause than the will of the doer,^^ — proves, that the
will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the
malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would.
Certainly, a judge ought to look at all material circumstances,
and much more at aU essential causes. Whether every
"sufficient cause" be a necessary cause, will come to be
examined more properly Numb, xxxi.^ For the present it 6
shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency,
and contingency from the debihty, of the cause. Nature
never intends the generation of a monster. If all the causes
concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by
reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aber-
ration of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is pro-
duced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the
" [Below pp. 171 — 173.] ,
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
115
production of that which was produced, that is_, a monster ; Discourse
otherwise a monster had not been produced. What is it h
then ? A monster is not produced by virtue of that order
which is set in nature,, but by the contingent aberration of
some of the natural causes in their concurrence. The order
set in nature is, that every like should beget its like. But
supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is in
the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is
necessary ; as all the events in the world are, when they are;
that is, by a hypothetical necessity. Then he betakes him-
self to his old help, — that God may punish '^^by right of
omnipotence, though there were no sin.^^ The question is
not now, what God may do, but what God will do, according
to that covenant which He hath made with man, — " Fac hoc [Lev. xviii.
et vives'^ — " Do this and thou shalt live;^' — whether God doth x'.~5.]
punish any man contrary to this covenant. O Israel, thy Hosea xiii.
destruction is from thyself, but in Me is thy h'elp.^' He that ^'
" wills not the death of a sinner," doth much less will the
death of an innocent creature. By death or destruction in
I this discourse, the only separation of soul and body is not
intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as lord
of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punish-
ment but a blessing to the party; but we understand the
subjecting of the creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he
tells of that benefit which redounds to others from exemplary
justice : which is most true, but not according to his own
grounds ; for neither is it justice to punish a man for doing
that which it was impossible always for him not to do, neither
is it lawful to punish an innocent person " that good may [Rom. iii.
\\ come^' of it: and if his opinion of absolute necessity of all ^'^
i 1 things were true, the destinies of men could not be altered,
' li either by examples or fear of punishment.
[distinctions made by necessitarians.]
NUMBER XVIII.
J. D. — But the patrons of necessity being driven out of
the plain field with reason, have certain retreats or distinc-
tions, which they fly unto for refuge.
I 2
116
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
P -A R T
III.
[Distinc-
tion i. —
Between
Stoical and
Christian
necessity. 1
1. [That the
Stoics sub-
ject God
to destiny,
they sub-
ject destiny
to God.]
2. [That the
Stoics hold
a necessary
connexion
of causes,
they hold
God to be
the one
pervading
cause.]
3. [That
the Stoics
deny con-
tingents,
they admit
them.]
1. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and
Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold
difference^.
First, say they, the Stoics did " subject Jupiter to destiny,"
but we "subject destiny to God." I answer, that the Stoical
and Christian destiny are one and the same ; — ^^fatum quasi
effatum Jovis.'^ Hear Seneca ; — " Destiny is the necessity of
all things and actions, depending upon the disposition of
Jupiter"^," &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater liberty to
Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoical Christians do to God
over His decrees; either for the beginnings of things, as
Euripides^, or for the progress of them, as Chrysippus^, or
at least of the circumstances of time and place, as all of them
generally. So Virgil, — " Sed trahere et moras ducere^,'' &c.
So Osiris, in Apuleius, promiseth him to prolong his life
" ultra fato constituta tempora" — " beyond the times set down
by the destinies^."
Next, they say, that the Stoics did " hold an eternal flux and
necessary connexion of causes," but they believe that God
doth act prmter et contra naturam^' — "besides and against
nature." I answer, that it is not much material, whether
they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, or to a con-
nexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former
reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of
necessity, but much more necessity itself, upon what ground
soever. Either they must run into this absurdity, — that the
effect is determined, the cause remaining undetermined, —
or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the
Stoics did.
Lastly, they say, the Stoics did "take away liberty and
contingence," but they " admit" it. I answer, what Kberty or
" [From Lipsius, De Constantia,
lib. i. c. 20, Op. torn. 11. p. 12. fol.
Lugd. 1613 : from whom what follows
In the text is taken.]
^ ["Quid enim intelligis fatum?
existimo necessitatem rerum omnium
actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat."
Senec, Nat. Quaest., lib. 11. c. 36 ; —
" Hunc eundem" (Jovem) '* et fatum
si dixeris non mentlerls ; nam cum
fatum nihil allud sit quam series Im-
plexa causarum, lUe est prima omnium
causa, ex qua caeterae pendent." Id.,
De Benef , lib. iv. c. 7.]
e [See e. g. his Suppllces, vv. 734 —
736. ed. Barnes ; &c.J
f [See Aul. Gell., vl. 2 ; and Euseb.,
Praep. Evang., lib. vl. c. 7. pp. 255, B, C,
257. C. fol. Paris, 1628 ; and Plut., De
Placit. Philos., § 28, Op. Moral, torn.
Iv. p. 376. ed. Wyttenb.]
^ ["At trahere atque moras tantis
licet addere rebus." Vlrg.,iEn.,vll.315.]
^ [" Seles ultra statuta fato tuo
spatla vltam quoque tlbl prorogare mlhi
tantum licere." L. Apul., Metam., lib.
xl. p. 367. in usum Delph. — " Osiris"
in the text is a mistake for " Isls."]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
117
contingence was it they admits but a titular liberty, and an Discourse
empty shadow of contingence ? who do profess stiffly, that '■
all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot
but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any
other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end,
93 than they are ; and that in respect of God, determining them
to one. What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingence is this !
2. Secondly, they distinguish between the First Cause and [Distinc-
the second causes. They say, that in respect of the second Be"wee^
causes many things are free, but in respect of the First Cause Qause"^*
all things are necessary \ This answer may be taken away ^g^gg^J^^gg"
two ways. all things,
. . and second
l irst, so contraries shaU be true together : the same thing causes,
at the same time shall be determined to one, and not deter- ^ot!]^
mined to one ; the same thing at the same time must neces- p^^^^/^^
sarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in this dis-
• the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this contradict
question is this ; — if all the causes were only collateral, this other.]
exception might have some colour ; but where all the causes,
being joined together and subordinate one to another, do
make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the
first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be neces-
sary, it determines the rest, and without doubt makes the
effect necessary. Necessit}^ or liberty is not to be esteemed
from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If
one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.
Secondly, I would have them tell me, whether the second 2. [The
causes be predetermined by the First Cause or not. If they bein^^^"^^
be determined, then the effect is necessary, even in respect of gg^^Q^^^*^'
the second causes. If the second cause be not determined, causes
how is the effect determined, the second cause remaining un- likewise.]
determined ? Nothing can give that to another which it
hath not itself. But, say they, nevertheless, the power or
faculty remaineth free. True, but not in order to the act, if
it be once determined. It is free ' in sensu diviso/ but not
I ' in sensu compositoJ When a man holds a bird fast in his
hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will, because she
hath mngs ? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he there-
fore free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and
i [L'ps., De Const., lib. i. c, 19 ; Op. torn. ii. p. 11.]
118
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part a locomotive faculty ? Judge without prej adice, wliat a
'- — miserable subterfuge is this_, which many men confide so
much in.
CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT
TO HIS ARGUMENTS ARE BY HIM REMOVED.
[Answer T. H. — He saith, a man may perhaps answer, that the
Ivowshoth necessity of things held by him is not a Stoical necessity,
distinc- "b^^ a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have
tions. ]
not used, nor indeed have ever heard before. Nor do I
think any man could make " StoicaP^ and " Christian" two
kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of doc-
trine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from
the authority of any sect, but from the natiu'e of the things
themselves.
But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this
place, as making against his own tenet. "Where all the
causes," saith he, "being joined together and subordinate one
to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause
(much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of
causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt
maketh the effect necessary." For that which I call the
necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all
causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any
one of those, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect
necessarily, then all the rest are determined, and the effect also
necessary. Now it is manifest, that the First Cause is a neces-
sary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to
it ; and therefore, by his own reason, all effects are necessary.
Nor is that distinction, of necessary in respect of the First
Cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine. It
does (as he well noteth) imply a contradiction.
[Reply.] J. D. — Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I
[Christian have joined them together in one paragraph. He likes not
(so-called) the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoical and
guise'd ''' Christian ; no more do I. We agree in the conclusion, but
stoical our motives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknow-
necessity.] . . ,
ledge no such necessity either as the one or as the other ; and
because I conceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
119
detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into Discourse
those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which '-
flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly),
under another form of expression, introduce it again at the
back door after they had openly cast it out at the fore door.
But T. H. rusheth boldly, without distinctions (which he
accounts but '^jargon") and without foresight, upon the
grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics.
He confesseth, that " they may be two kinds of doctrine.^^
" May be V Nay, they are, without all perad venture. And
he himself is the first who bears the name of a Clu-istian that
69i I have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost out of its
grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he likes
not the names of " StoicaP^ and " Christian" destiny (do not
blame him), though he would not willingly be accounted a
Stoic. To admit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is
to make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first call
that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Christians,
Christian destiny, and that other maintained by Stoics,
Stoical destiny ? But I am not the inventor of the term. If
he had been as careful in reading other men's opinions as he
is confident in setting down his own, he might have found
not only the thing but the name itself often used. But if [The terms
the name of '^fatum Christianum'' do offend him, let him call ecf by Lfp-
it with Lipsius, ^'fatum verum : " who divides destiny into four ^
kinds; 1. "mathematical" or astrological destiny, 2. "na-
tural" destiny, 3. " StoicaP' or "violent" destiny, and 4.
" true destiny ;" which he calls ordinarily " nostrum' ' — " our"
destiny, that is, of Christians, and "fatum pium,^' that is,
godly destiny, and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny,
to be a " series or order of causes depending upon the Divine
couuseP." Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline
those rocks which some others have made shipwreck upon,
yet the divines thought he came too near them ; as appears by
his Epistle to the reader in a later edition^, and by that note in
the margent of his twentieth chapter, — "Whatsoever I dispute
[Lipsius,] De Const., lib. i. cc. 17, stantia mea Prsescriptio." He begins
18,19. [Op. torn. ii. pp. 10, 11. fol. with a complaint, that — " Negant satis
Lugd. If) 13.] pie hoc argumentum a me tractatum,
' [In the 3rd edition, 8vo. Antwerp. negant locis aliquot satis vere."]
158f), headed ** Ad Lectorem pro Con-
120
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part here^ I submit to the judgment of the wise_, and being ad-
'- — monished, I will correct it ; one may convince me of error_, but
not of obstinacy"." So fearful was heto overshoot himself ; and
yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency.
T. H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any " sect.^'
And I say, so much the worse. It is better to be the disciple
of an old sect, than the ringleader of a new.
[The First Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of
necessaiy ^ the First Causc, and liberty in respect of the second causes, —
effects^] though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer,
like those old Lamise, which could put out their eyes when
the}^ list ; as, namely, that the faculty of willing, when it is
determined in order to the act (which is all the freedom
that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a bird,
when she is fast in a man^s hand, &c., — yet he hath espied
another thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm,
that '^if any one causp in the whole series of causes, much
more the First Cause, be necessary, it determineth the rest
but, saith he, " it is manifest, that the First Cause is a neces-
sary cause of all the effects that are next." I am glad; yet it
is not I who contradict myself, but it is one of his "manifest''
truths which I contradict, — that " the First Cause is a neces-
sary cause of all effects — which I say is a " manifest" false-
hood. Those things which God wills without Himself, He
wills freely, not necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works
necessarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all that is
in its power. But it is evident, that God doth not all things
without Himself which He can do, or which He hath power
Luke iii. 8. to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of
the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan, but
Matt. xxvi. He did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to
the succour of Christ, but He did not. God can make T. H.
live the years of Methuselah ; but it is not necessary that He
shall do so, nor probable that He will do so. The productive
power of God is infinite, but the whole created world is finite;
and therefore God might still produce more if it pleased
Him", But this it is, when men go on in a confused way,
and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had considered the
[p. 12. B. in marg. ed. 1613.] Prima, Qu. xxv. art. 5.]
" [See Thorn. Aquin., Summ., P.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
121
difference between a necessary being and a necessary cause, Discoukse
or between those actions of God, which are immanent within ~
Himself, and the transient works of God, which are extrin-
secal without Himself'', he would never have proposed such an
evident error for a manifest truth. Qui pauca considerate
facile pronuntiatJ'
NUMBER XIX. ^
J. D. — 3. Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from [Distinc-
compulsion, and liberty from necessitation. The will, say BetweerT
they, is free from compulsion, but not free from necessitation. {-[.I^l^^com
And this they fortify with two reasons : first, because it is pulsion and
granted by all divines, that hypothetical necessity, or neces- from neces-
sity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty; secondly,
because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and
yet are more free than we.
To the first reason, I confess, that necessity upon a sup- [Antece-
position may sometimes consist with true liberty ; as when
it signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding ^^^1^?^^"^"^'
695 in that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the
supposition be not in the agent^s power, nor depend upon
any thing that is in his power ; if there be an exterior ante-
cedent cause, which doth necessitate the effect ; to call this
free, is to be mad with reasonP.'^
To the second reason, I confess, that God and the good [Of the
angels are more free than we are ; that is, intensively, in the God^^and*^
degree of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the angeh^]°°^
object ; according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specifi-
cation. A liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do,
may consist well with a necessity of specification, or a deter-
mination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise and
a necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification and a ne-
cessity of specification, are not compatible, nor can consist
together. He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is
not free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all to the
purpose.
" [See Cajetan's Comment, in Thorn. P [" Ut cum ratione insanias."
Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xxvii. Terent., Eun,, I. i. 18.]
art, 1.1
122
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Pa^rt T. H. — But the distinction of free into free from compul-
[Answer ] ^^^^ ^^^^ from ncccssitation, I acknowledge. For to be
free from compulsion^ is to do a thing so^ as terror be not the
cause of his will to do it. For a man is then only said to be
compelled, when fear makes him willing to it ; as when a
man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself^
or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all
men that do any thing from love_, or revenge, or lust, are free
from compulsion : and yet their actions may be as necessary
as those which are done upon compulsion ; for sometimes
other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from neces-
sitation I say nothing can be ; and ^tis that which he under-
took to disprove.
[Hypothe- Tliis distinction, he says, useth to be " fortified by two
sitj/.'\ reasons/^ but they are not mine. The first, he says, is, that " it
is granted by all divines, that a hypothetical necessity, or neces-
sity upon supposition, may stand with liberty .^^ That you may
understand this, I will give you an example of hypothetical ne-
cessity. If I shall live, I shall eat, — this is a hypothetical neces-
sity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition ; that is to say, it is
necessary that that proposition should be true, whensoever ut-
tered : but ^tis not the necessity of the thing; nor is it therefore
necessary, that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat.
I do not use to fortify^^ my distinctions with such reasons.
Let him confute them as he will, it contents me. But I
would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an easy
and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave
usage of such terms as hypothetical necessity and necessity
upon supposition, and such like terms of schoolmen, obscured
and made to seem profound learning.
[ Of God, The second reason, that may confirm the distinction of free
and of the . ^
good from compulsion and free from necessitation, he says, is, that
angels. ^ good augcls do good ncccssarily, and yet are more
free than we.'' The reason, though I had no need of, yet I
think it so far forth good, as it is true, that " God and good
angels do good necessarily," and yet are "free f but because
I find not in the articles of our faith nor in the decrees of
our Church set down, in what manner I am to conceive God
and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they
work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point ; and am
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
123
content, that there may be a freedom from compulsion and Discourse
yet no freedom from necessitatiou ; as hath been proved in ^
that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without
threats and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid
the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing
God and good angels are freer than men and yet do good
necessarily, that we must now examine.
"I confess^^ (saith he), '^^that God and good angels are [Degrees of
more free than we ; that is, intensively, in degree of free- possible.]
dom, not extensively, in the latitude of the object ; accord-
ing to a Hberty of exercise, not of specification.'^ Again, we
have here two distinctions, that are no distinctions ; but
made to seem so by terms, invented by I know not whom to
cover ignorance and blind the understanding of the reader.
For it cannot be conceived, that there is any liberty greater
than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he
wiU. One heat may be more intensive than another, but
not one liberty than another. He that can do what he will,
hath all liberty possible ; and he that cannot, has none
at all.
Also Hberty (as he says the Schools call it) of ^^exercise,'' [Liberty of
which is (as I have said before^) a liberty to do or not to liberty
do, cannot be without a liberty (which they call) of " speci- fjP^^'^^
fication," that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or not exist
that in particular ; for how can a man conceive, that he has
liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this or that
or somewhat in particular ? If a man be forbidden in Lent to
eat this and that and every other particular kind of flesh, how
can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than
he that hath no licence at all ?
96 You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used
in the Schools. And I do not doubt, but that the imposing
of them by authority of doctors in the Church hath been a
great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and
evil courses, to shake them off : for nothing is more apt to
beget hatred, than the tj^rannising over man's reason and
understanding ; especially when it is done, not by the Scrip-
ture, but by pretence of learning and more judgment than
that of other men.
1 [Sec above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.]
124
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part J. D. — He wlio will speak with some of our great under-
'- — takers about the ^rounds of learning, had need either to
[Reply-] . 1 . 11 /-r 1
speak by an interpreter, or to learn a new language (i dare
not call it ^^jargon'"''^ or canting), lately devised, not to set
forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must learn
a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new
sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a
new kind of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and,
in conclusion, a new nothing. This proposition, — ' The will
is free,' — may be understood in two senses ; either that the
will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessi-
tated : for if it be ordinarily or at any time free from neces-
sitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from
necessity. The former sense — that the will is not compelled
— is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.
" Voluntas non cogitur." For, if the will may be compelled,
then it may both will and not will the same thing at the
same time under the same notion ; but this implies a contra-
diction. Yet this author (like the good woman whom her
husband sought up the stream when she was drowned, upon
pretence that when she was living, she used to go contrary
courses to aU other people), — he holds, that true compulsion
and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will,
that is, in his sense, may compel the will ; " as when a man
willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or
submits to his enemy for fear of being killed.'^ I apswer,
that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse.
1. [Actions First, he erreth in this, — to think, that actions proceeding
frJmTear"^ from fear are properly compulsory actions^ ; which in truth are
compulsory ^^^J Voluntary but free actions, neither compelled, nor so
actions.] much as physically necessitated. Another man, at the same
time, in the same ship, in the same storm, may choose, and
the same individual man otherwise advised might choose, not
to throw his goods overboard. It is the man himself, who
chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It is true,
that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed
from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose
neither the casting of his goods into the sea nor the submit-
ting to his enemy. But considering the present exigence of
' [See above T. H. Nunnb. iv. p. 31.] Sccuud., Qu. vi. art. 6.]
^ [Sec Thoni. Aquin., Summ., Prim.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
125
his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences Discourse
the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither '■
doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his
desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear
doth in these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c., may do in other
cases ; that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to
obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect.
As Jacob, to serve seven years more, rather than not to enjoy [Gen.xxix.
his beloved Rachel ; the merchant, to hazard himself upon ^^'-^
the rough seas, in hope of profit. Passions may be so
violent, that they may necessitate the will ; that is, when
they prevent deliberations ; but this is rarely, and then the
will is not free : but they never properly compel it. That
which is compelled, is against the will; and that which is
against the will, is not willed.
Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that " a 2. [Proper
man is then onlj^ said to be compelled when fear makes him skm extrin-
willing to" an action. As if force were not more prevalent secai.]
with a man than fear. We must know therefore, that this
word compelled" is taken two ways: sometimes improperly,
that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or
fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have
done, if those threats or that passion had not been : some-
times it is taken properly, when we do anything against our
own inclination, moved by an external cause, the will not con-
senting nor concurring but resisting as much as it can ; as in a
rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the
idoFs temple, or as in the case of St. Peter — " Another shall johnxxi.
gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldst not." This
is that compulsion which is understood when we say, the will
may be letted, or changed, or necessitated ; or that the im-
697 perate actions of the will (that is, the actions of the inferior
faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will*) may be
compelled, but that the immanent actions of the will, that
is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled, because it is the
nature of an action properly compelled to be done by an ex-
trinsecal cause without the concurrence of the will".
Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man 3. [Men or-
be free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some not always,
free.]
' [See below Numb. xx. pp. 130, " [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prim.
131.] Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4.]
126
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part passioiis are so sudden and violent, that they surprise a man,
and betray the succours^' of the soul, and prevent delibera-
xTiir^i20 ^^^^ ^ some " motus primo primi" or antipathies,
how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects
upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power
to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not
ordinary, so they are not free ; because there is no delibera-
tion nor election. But where dehberation and election are,
as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship,
or submits to his enemy to save his life, there is always true
liberty.
[Hypothe- Though T. H. shght the two reasons which I produce in
sity.^]"^^^^ favour of his cause, yet they who urged them, deserved not to
be slighted, unless it were because they were Schoolmen.
The former reason is thus framed ; — a necessity of supposition
may consist with true liberty, but that necessity which flows
from the natural and extrinsecal determination of the will is
a necessity of supposition. To this my answer is in effect, —
that a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes
the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do or not
to do : as for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon sup-
position that he be a Romish priest, is necessary, but because
it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest, there-
fore his vow is a free act. So, supposing a man to have
taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at home ; yet, be-
cause it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it,
therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the
thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do or not
to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary
that he keep at home; or supposing that a man hath a
natural antipathy against a cat, he runs necessarily away so
soon as he sees her. Because this antipathy and this sickness
are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these
[^erhxiix.] acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons ; Balaam blessed
xxiii.xxiv.] Israel ; these two acts, being done, are both necessary upon
supposition : but it was in Jacob's power not to have blessed
Numb. his sons ; so was it not in Balaam's power not to have blessed
xxn. 38. Israel. Jacob's will was determined by himself ; Balaam's
will was physically determined by God. Therefore Jacob's
benediction proceeded from his own free election; and
Balaam's from God's determination. So was Caiaphas his
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
127
prophecy. Therefore the text saith, He spake not of him- Discourse
self.^^ To this T. H. saith nothing : but only cleclareth by an — —
impertinent instance, what " hypotheticaF^ signifies; and " "'^'•^ •
then adviseth your Lordship to take notice, how errors and
ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms.
And I do likewise entreat your Lordship to take notice, that
the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the
pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip
up their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing,
before they begin to play their tricks.
Concerning the second argument, drawn from the liberty [Of God,
of God and the good angels, as I cannot but approve his angeil^^^^
modesty in suspending his judgment concerning the manner
how God and the good angels do work, necessarily^ or freely,
because he finds it not set down m the articles of our faith,
or the decrees of our ChiuTh especially in this age, which
is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter
prophesied of, who neither believe that there is God or angels, 2 Pet. iii. 3.
or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies
from putrefaction ; so I can by no means assent unto him in
that which follows : that is to say, that he hath " proved
that liberty and necessity of the same kind may "consist
together," that is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of
exercise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity of
specification. Those actions, which he saith are necessitated
by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, either
truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself.
But it troubles him that I say, that "God and the good
angels are more free than men intensively, in the degree
of freedom^ but not extensively, in the latitude of the object,
698 according to a liberty of exercise but not of specification
which, he saith, " are no distinctions,^^ but " terms invented
to cover ignorance." Good words. Doth he only see ? Are
all other men stark blind ? By his favour, they are true
and necessary distinctions. And if he alone do not conceive
them, it is because distinctions, as all other things, have
their fates according to the capacities or prejudices of their
readers.
But he urgeth two reasons. " One heat," saith he, " may [Degrees
be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than pclsibie/]
128
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part another." Why not, I wonder. Nothing is more proper to
— iii — a man than reason, yet a man is more rational than a child,
and one man more rational than another ; that is, in respect
of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of
understanding, so there are of Hberty. The good angels
have clearer understandings than we, and they are not
hindered with passions as we ; and, by consequence, they have
more use of Hberty than we. His second reason is, — " He
that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot"
do what he will, "hath no" hberty. If this be true, then
there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he
calls hberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty ; — to do
whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot or not to shoot,
although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We
do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctation than
the good spirits. The more rational and the less sensual the
will is, the greater is the degree of liberty.
[Liberty of His othcr exception, against liberty of exercise and liberty
nornec^es- ^f specification, is a mere mistake ; which grows merely from
companTed rightly understanding what liberty of specification or
by liberty contrariety is. A liberty of specification, saith he, is "a
cation.] liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular." Upon
better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of
specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of speci-
fication, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do
this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction ; so
hkewise to be free to do or not to do this or that particular
e^dl. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of
contrariety, which extends to contrary objects, or to diverse
kinds of things. So his reason to prove, that a hberty of
exercise cannot be without a hberty of specification, falls flat
to the ground; and he may lay aside his Lenten licence"
for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these
things ; which are so evident, that no man can question them
who doth understand them.
[T. H.'s And here he falls into another invective against distinctions,
ous censure
and scholastical expressions, and the " doctors of the Church,"
ulrfof the ^^'^^ ^^"^ means " tyrannised over the un der standings" of other
Church.] men. What a presumption is this ! for one private man, who
will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to himself such
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
129
a licence, to control so magistrallv, and to censure of gross Discourse
'^ignorance" and "tp'annising over men^s judgments/^ yea,
as causes of the troubles and tumults ^vliich are in tlie world,
the "doctors of the Church in general, who have flourished
in all ages and in all places, only for a few necessary and
innocent distinctions. Truly said Plutarch, that a sore eye
is off'ended with the light of the sun". What then ? Must
the logicians lay aside their "first and second intentions,"
their "abstracts^' and "concretes,^^ their "subjects^' and "pre-
dicates,^^ their " modes and " figures,^^ their " method
synthetic^^ and "analytic," theii' "fallacies of composition
and division," &c. ? Must the moral philosopher quit his
"means" and "extremes," his ^'principia congenita'' and ''ac-
guisita,'" his "hberty of contradiction" and " contrariety," his
"necessity absolute" and "hypothetical," &c.? Must the
natural philosopher give over liis "intentional species," his
"understanding agent" and "patient," his "receptive and
eductive power of the matter," his "qualities," infinitce'' or
influxce/* " symbol ce'' ov " dissymboke/' his "temperament
ad pondus'' and "ad justitiam" his parts "homogeneous" and
" heterogeneous," his " sympathies " and " antipathies," his
" antiperistasis," &c. ? Must the astrologer and the geo-
grapher leave their "apogeeimi" and " perigaeum," theii'
"arctic" and "antarctic poles," their "equator, zodiac,
zenith, meridian, horizon, zones," &:c. ? Must the mathe-
matician, the metaphysician, and the divine, rehnquish all
their terms of art, and proper idiotisms, because they do not
relish with T. H. his palate ? But he will say, they ai*e
"obscure" expressions. What marvel is it, when the things
themselves are more obscm-e? Let him put them into as
"plain English^" as he can, and they shall be never a whit the
better understood by those who want all grounds of learning.
Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration ; yet
(599 let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it,
and he will hold it to be, as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain
fustian or " jargon •'." Every art or profession hath its proper
mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons
" [See the De Adiilat. et AmiciDis- * [See below T. H. Xumb. xxiv. in
crini.. c. 2S ; Op. Moral., torn. i.p. 181. fin., p. loo.]
ed. WyttenK] y [See above. T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.]
BRAMHALL. K
130
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part of art_, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military
— — — men, with physicians, with navigators, and he shall find this
true by experience; let him go on shipboard, and the
mariners will not leave their starboard'^ and "larboard,"
because they please not him, or because he accounts it gib-
berish. No, no ; it is not the School divines, but innovators
and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present
troubles of Europe. T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his
book De Cive cap. xii, — that it is " a seditious opinion," to
teach, that " the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private
persons^;" — and cap. 17, — that in "questions of faith" the
civil magistrates ought to consult with " the ecclesiastical
doctors," to whom " God^s blessing is derived by imposition
of hands," so as " not to be deceived in necessary truths," to
whom "our Saviour hath promised infallibility^." These are
the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes
"infallibility^' to them; here he accuseth them of gross
superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to
them ; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he
[Numb.xvi. " takes too much upon" him. " The spirits of the prophets
I'cor. xiv. are subject to the prophets."
32. * '
NUMBER XX.
[Election J. D. — Now, to the distinction itself, I say first, that the
coarStuon P^^opcr act of liberty is election, and election is opposed (not
as well as to only to coaction but also) to coarctation or determination to
coaction.] • i • -i ■ a- i • • i
one. Necessitation or determination to one may consist with
spontaneity, but not with election or liberty ; as hath been
shewed. The very Stoics did acknowledge a spontaneity.
So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of
the Stoics.
[Elicit Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business. This I
will ^nnot ta^6 ^® ^^^^^ resolution of the Schools. — There is a
be neces- double act of the will : the one more remote, called " im-
sitated.] . .
peratus/' that is, in truth, the act of some inferior faculty,
subject to the command of the will ; as to open or shut one's
eyes. Without doubt these actions may be compelled. The
other act is nearer, called ''actus elicitus/' an "act drawn out"
[De Cive, c. xii. § 1. title, p. 125. " [Ibid., c. xvii. § 28. p. 256.]
ed. 1642.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
131
of tlie will; as to will, to choose, to elect^. This may be Discourse
stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the '■
understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its
natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of
omnipotence : but the will cannot be compelled to an act
repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown up-
wards into the air; for that is both to incline and not to
incline to the same object at the same time, which implies a
contradiction. Therefore, to say the will is necessitated, is
to say the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of
compulsion. If a strong man, holding the hand of a weaker,
should therewith kill a third person, " hcBC quidem vis esV —
" this is violence ;^' the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the
fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong
man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the
hand, and should not only incline but determine it secretly
and insensibly to commit this act, is not the case the same ?
Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by
amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her
but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her eflFectu-
ally and draw her inevitably and irresistibly to follow him
spontaneously; Lucretia, in both these conditions, is to be
pitied, but the latter person is more guilty and deserves
greater punishment, who endeavours also so much as in him
lies to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare
not apply it, but thus only ; — take heed, how we defend those
secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spon-
taneous and free from coaction.
These are their fastnesses.
T. H. — In the next place, he bringeth two arguments lAnsu-er.^
against distinguishing between being free from compulsion
and free from necessitation. The first is, that "election is [Election
opposite, not only to coaction'' or compulsion, "but also to 'shtenTwUi
necessitation or determination to one." This is it he was to ^^cess?;//.]
prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new
argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I
have abeady answered. And in this place I deny again, that
[Thorn. Aquiii., Summ., Prim. Ductor Dubit, bk. II. c. iii. eontin.
Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4. And see Taylor, § 1 ; Works, vol. xiii. pp. 1, 5.]
k2
132
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part election is opposite to either. For when a man is compelled
'- — (for example^ to subject himself to an enemy or to die), he
hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink
which of these two he can better endure. And he that is led
to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether
he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of
his feet. Likewise, when there is no compulsion, but the
strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater
than the motives to abstain, necessarily determine him to the
doing of it, yet he deliberates ; whilst sometimes the motives
to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him ;
and, consequently, he electeth which he will. But commonly,
when we see and know the strength that moves us, we ac-
knowledge necessity ; but when we see not or mark not the
force that moves us, we then think there is none ; and that it
is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence
it is, that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity
chooseth it ; but they might as well say, fire does not burn,
because it bums of necessity.
I The dis- The second argument is not so much an argument, as a
vaLlTe- distinction ; to shew in what sense it may be said, that volun-
pemteTnd ^^^^ actious are necessitated, and in what sense not. And
elicit acts
of the loill.
elicit acts^ ^ therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of ^' the Schools
and that which " rippeth up the bottom" of the question, that
"there is a double act of the will." The one, he says, "is
^ actus imperatus' an act done at the command of the will by
some inferior faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one^s
eyes ; and this act may be compelled." The other, he says,
"is 'actus elicituSj* an act allured, or an act ^ drawn forth' by
allurement, out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect ; this,"
he says, "cannot be compelled." Wherein, — letting pass
that metaphorical speech, of attributing command and sub-
jection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a common-
wealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to
another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the
question, — you may observe, first, that to compel a voluntary
act is nothing else but to will it ; for it is all one to say, my
will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any
other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes.
So that " actus imperatus" here, might as easily have been
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
133
said in English, a voluntary action ; but that they that Discou
invented the term, understood not anything it signified.
Secondly, you may observe, that actus elicitus'' is exempH-
fied by these words, " to will, to elect, to choose,'' which are
all one ; and so to will is here made an act of the will. And
indeed, as the will is a faculty or power in a man's soul, so to
will is an act of it according to that power. But as it is
absm-dly said, that to dance is an act allured or "drawn" by fair
means out of the ability to dance ; so it is also to say, that to
will is an act allured or "drawn out" of the power to will, which
power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the
sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done
on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that,
or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means.
Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, pro-
duce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as
threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will may be
made as necessary as anything that is done by compulsion.
So that the distinction of " actus ii7iperatus/' and " actus
elicitus'' are but words, and of no effect against necessity.
J. D. — In the next place follow two reasons of mine own [Reply.]
against the same distinction ; the one taken from the former
grounds, that election cannot consist with determination to
one. To this (he saith) he hath " answered already.'' No,
truth is founded upon a rock ; he hath been so far from pre-
vailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it.
Now again he tells us, that " election is not opposite to [Compui-
either (necessitation or compulsion). He might even as necessita-
well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves natui'ally ; oppo^ue\(
or that a woman can be ra^-ished with her own will. Consent li^^^ty.]
takes away the rape. This is the strangest hberty that ever
was heard of ; — that a man is compelled to do what he would
not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us
upon the old score, that he " who submits to his enemy for
fear of death, chooseth to submit." But we have seen for-
merly*^, that this, which he calls compulsion, is not compid-
siou properly, nor that natui'al determination of the will to
one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to
= [Above T. H. Numb. xix. pp. 124, &c.j
134
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part an enemy for saving his life, dotli either only counterfeit ; —
and then there is no will to submit ; this disguise is no more
than a stepping aside to avoid a present blow ; — or else he
doth sincerely will a submission, and then the will is changed.
There is a vast difference between compelling and changing
the will. Either God or man may change the will of man,
either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the
party otherwise ; but compelled it cannot be : that is, it can-
not both will this and not nill this, as it is invested with the
same circumstances, though, if the act were otherwise cir-
cumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now it wills
[Of mixed freely. Wherefore these kind of actions are called mixed 7o:
actions.] g^^j^^Q^s^, that is, partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary. That
which is compelled, is a man's present condition or distress ;
that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, is
the remedy of [his ^] distress; that is voluntary. So, hypothe-
tically, supposing a man were not in that distress, they are
involuntary ; but absolutely, without any supposition at all,
taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. His other in-
stance, of " a man forced to prison," that he may choose
whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk
upon his feet," is not true. By his leave, that is not as he
pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their
power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk ; and if
they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged.
[Of fear, Haviuff laid this foundation, he beerins to build upon it: —
and other ° , • i r ^
passions.] that other passions do necessitate as much as fear." But he
errs doubly ; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not deter-
mine the rational will naturally and necessarily. The last
and greatest of the five terrible things^ is death ; yet the fear
of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest
16 ^"i8]' which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery
furnace could not compel the three children to worship an j
[Dan. vi. idol ; nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his '
duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of
empty shadows than of substantial dangers, because they are
nearer our senses ; as httle children fear a mouse or a vizard, ■
[""Oo-a Se 5ia (pS/iou fJLfi(6uoov III. 1.4, 6.]
Ka/cwj/ TrpaTTerai ^ Sia kuK6v t6, . . . e ["its" in the original edition.]
fiiKToi flail/ al ToiavTai irpd^eLs, 'Eoucaai ' [Scil. " 'A5o|ta, irfi/la, t6aos, d<piKia,
5e ixuKKov fKovalois." Aristot., Ethic, edvaros." Aristot, Ethic, III. vi. 3.],
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
135
more than fire or weatlier. But as a fit of the stone takes Discourse
away the sense of the gout for the present, so the greater
passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God's wrath
and eternal torments, doth expel corporal fear. " Fear not Luke [xii.]
them who kill the body, but fear Him who is able to cast
both body and soul into Hell." — " Da veniam imperator, tu
carcerem, Ille gehennam minatur^' — Excuse me, O emperor,
thou thi'eatenest men with prison, but He threatens me with
hell^/^ Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There
is a great difference, as to this case of justifying or not justi-
fying an action, between force, and fear and other passions.
Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away.
He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die ; " but unto
the damsel" (saith He) "thou shalt do nothing, there isDeut. xxii,
in her no fault worthy of death." Tamar's beauty, or
Amnon's love, did not render him innocent ; but Amnon's [2 Sam.
force rendered Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent
as force. Indeed, if fear be great and justly grounded, such
as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense
with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or
nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the
offence, even against them, and pleads for pardon. But it
dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the posi-
tive law, either Di\ine or human ; because it is not probable,
that God or the law would oblige man to the observation of
all positive precepts with so great damage as the loss of his
hfe. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the [Josh. v.
Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.
his permission, I will propose a case to him. A gentleman
sends his servant with money to buy his dinner ; some
ruffians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force ;
the servant cried for help, and did what he could to defend
himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if
he was to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or suppose
the ruffians did not take it from him by force, but di'ew their
swords and threatened to kill him, except he delivered it
himself ; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the
master's intention, or the servant's duty, to hazard his life, or
his hmbs, for saving of such a trifling sum. But, on the
8 [Aug., De Verb. Uoni., Serm. Ixii ; Op. torn. v. p. 362. F.]
136
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part other side, suppose this servant, passing by some cabaret or
— tennis-court, where his comrades were drinking or playing,
should stay with them, and drink or play away his money,
and afterwards plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was over-
come by the mere strength of temptation : I trow, neither
T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, but
punish him for it ; because neither was he necessitated by
the temptation, and what strength it had, was by his own
fault, in respect of that vicious habit which he had con-
Jaraesi. 14. tracted of drinking or gaming. "Every man is tempted
when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." Dis-
ordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent
(as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation
and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but
they aggravate it, and render it much greater.
[]Motives He talks much of " the motives to do, and the motives to
com^pei the ^^rbear," how they "work upon" and determine a man; as if a 702
^^1'- J reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed
to and fro by the rackets of the second causes; as if the will
had no power to move itself, but were merely passive, like an
artificial popinjay removed hither and thither by the bolts of
the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are
" motives" but reasons or discourses framed by the under-
standing, and freely moved by the will ? What are the will
and the understanding but faculties of the same soul ? And
what is liberty but a power resulting from them both ? To
say that the will is determined by these motives, is as much
as to say, that the agent is determined by himself. If there
be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth
dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinse-
cal necessitation at all. All the world know^s, that when the
agent is determined by himself, then the efi*ect is determined
likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely,
then the efi'ect is free. Motives determine not naturally,
but morally ; which kind of determination may consist with
true liberty. But if T. H. his opinion were true,— that the
will were naturally determined by the physical and special
influence of extrinsecal causes, — not only motives were vain,
but reason itself and deliberation were vain. No, saith he,
they are not vain, because they are the "means." Yes, if i
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
137
the means be superfluous^ they are vain. What needed such Discourse
a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when
it is already determined extrinsecally what must be done ?
He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes and their [Liberty
power is the reason, why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but mnce of"
when we seriously consider the causes of things, we aclinow- tjon?]^^*^
ledge a necessity. No such thing, but just the contrary.
The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the
greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of our
own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable
that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the
knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration, nor
use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither moral
good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exterior
senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their
sleep. Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself
down a pair of stairs, or from a bridge, and break his neck,
or drown himself, it were a mad jury that would find this
man accessary to his own death. Why ? Because it was
not freely done ; he had not then the use of reason.
Lastly, he tells us, that the will doth choose of necessity," [t. h.'s im-
as well as " the fire burns of necessity.^^ If he intend no instance of
more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of
the will, as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power
is as necessarily in a man as the ustive in the fire ; he speaks
truly, but most impertinently. For the question is not now
of the elective power " in actu prhno" whether it be an essen-
tial faculty of the soul ; but whether the act of electing this
or that particular object be free, and undetermined by any
antecedent and extrinsecal causes. But if he intend it in
this other sense, — that as the fire hath no power to suspend
its burning, nor to distinguish between those combustible
matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is put
unto it necessarily if it be combustible, so the will hath no
poAvcr to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own
appetite, — he errs grossly. The will hath power either to
will^ or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither to will nor nill
the same object. Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be
considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances,
is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagincth.
138
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part Two tilings are required to make an effect necessary : first,
— — that it be produced by a necessary cause, sucb as fire is ;
secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an
atheist, began his book thus, — "Concerning the Gods, I have
nothing to say, whether they be, or they be not — for
which his book was condemned by the Athenians to be
burned^. The fire was a necessary agent ; but the sentence
or the application of the fire to the book, was a free act ;
and therefore the burning of his book was free. Much more
the rational will is free ; which is both a voluntary agent,
and acts voluntarily.
[Distinc My sccoud reason against this distinction of hberty, from
perate^and Compulsion but not from necessitation, is new ; and demon-
ehcit acts g^^ates clcarlv, that to necessitate the will by a phvsical ne-
not impro- ► _ j x
per.] cessity is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of
compulsion; and that he, who doth necessitate the will to
evil, after that manner is the true cause of e\dl, and ought 70;
rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all
he saith he is " not surprised V can be contented upon better
advice to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergi-
versation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty
show of braving against that famous and most necessary dis-
tinction between the 'elicit^ and ^imperate' acts of the will :
first, because the terms are ' improper •/ secondly, because
they are 'obscure.^ What trivial and grammatical objections
are these, to be used against the universal current of di\dnes
and philosophers! "Vey^borum ut nummorum'^ — it is "in
words, as it is in money use makes them proper and cur-
rent. A "tj-rant" at first signified a lawful and just prince;
now use hath quite changed the sense of it, to denote either
an usurper or an oppressor. The word ^' prcBmunire'^ is now
grown a good word in our English laws by use and tract of
time ; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a " prcemo-
nere/' The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were de-
rived at first from those heathenish deities, the sun, the
moon, and the warhke god of the Germans; now we use
them for distinction' sake only, without any relation to their
first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a piece of
[Cic.,DeNat. Deorum, lib. i. c. 23; p. 319. B.;— Diog. Laert., lib. ix. § 51.]
— Sext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. viii. ' [See above, T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 139
coin that is current throngliout the world, because it is not Discourse
stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good ~
word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We
see foreign words are daily naturalized, and made free deni-
zens in every country. But why are the terms improper?
Because, saith he, it " attributes command and subjection to
the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or
family among themselves, and could speak one to another."
Therefore he saith, " they who invented this term of ' actus
imperatus/ understood not any thing what it signified."
No? Why not? It seemeth to me they understood it
better than those who except against it. They knew there
ai-e ' mental terms,^ t\ hich are only conceived in the mind, as
well as ' vocal terms,^ which are expressed with the tongue.
They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction
to his inferior, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded
his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, and was
by him both understood and obeyed Though there be no
formal ^^commonwealth" or "family," either in the body or
in the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in the body
of the inferior members to the head, there is a subordination
in the soul of the inferior faculties to the rational will. Far
be it from a reasonable man, so far to dishonour his own
nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the sensi-
tive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command
there is without all question, though there be some doubt in
what faculty this command doth principally reside, whether
in the will or in the understanding. The true resolution is,
that the directive command for counsel is in the understand-
ing, and the applicative command, or empii^e, for putting in
execution of what is dii-ected, is in the will. The same
answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word
' ehcit.' For, saith he, " as it is absurdly said, that to dance
is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to
dance ; so it is absui-dly said, that to will or choose is an act
drawn out of the power to will." His objection is yet more
improper than their expression. The art of dancing rather
resembles the understanding, than the will. That "di-aw-
ing," which the schools intend, is clearly of another nature
^ [Tit. Liv., i.
140
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part from that which he conceives. By " elicitation/' he under-
— — stands a persuading or enticing with flattering words, or
sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or that. But that
" elicitation/^ which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the
power of the will into act ; that dra^ving/^ which they men-
tion, is merely from the appetibility of the object, or of the
end; as a man " draws a child after him ^ith the sight of a
fair apple, or a shepherd " draws" his sheep after him with
the sight of a green bough; so the end " draws" the will to it
by a metaphorical motion. ^Tiat he understands here by an
ability to dance," is more than I know, or any man else,
until he express himself in more proper terms, whether he
understand the locomotive faculty alone, or the art or ac-
quired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It
may be said aptly without any absiu-dity, that the act of
dancing is drawn out" {" elicitur") of the locomotive fa-
culty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupu-
lous about the received phrases of the Schools, should not
have let so many improper expressions have dropped from
his pen ; as, in this very passage, he confounds the " compel-
ling of a voluntary action" with the commanding of a volun-
tary action, and "willing" -with "electing,^' which he saith, ;
" are all one." Yet to will properly respects the end ; to
elect, the means.
[Nor unne- His other objection against this distinction of the acts of
obs?urZ] i^to ehcit and imperate, is " obscurity :" — " Might
it not" (saith he) "have been as easily said in English a vo-
luntaiy action." Yes, it might have been said "as easily," but
not as truly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original
from the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether it
be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, or an act of the
understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferior
faculties, or of the members, is a voluntary action ; but nei-
ther the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive
appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts of the will,
nor drawn immediately out of the will itself; but the mem-
bers and faculties are applied to their proper and respective
acts by the power of the will.
[T. H. en- And SO he comes to cast up the total sum of my second
takelthe" reason, with the same faith that the unjust steward did make
author's
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
141
his accounts. "The sum of J. D/s distinction is" (saith he), Discourse
"that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion" (just ^.^^^^'^ —
contrary to what I have maintained), " that is to say, by foul Luke xvi.
means ; but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allure-
ment or fair means." I confess the distinction is mine, be-
cause I use it ; as the sun is mine or the air is mine ; that is,
common to me with all who treat of this subject. But his
mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind and his own,
that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his
known way. I will do my duty to shew him the right way.
First, no acts, which are properly said to be compelled, are
voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror (which he calls "foul
means"), which are sometimes in a large improper sense
called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are,
consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding
from blandishments or sweet persuasions (which he calls
"fair means"), if they be indeliberated (as in children, who
want the use of reason), are not presently free actions.
Lastly, the strength of consequent and deliberated desires
doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from punishment ; as
just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by
extrinsecal agents often do : because the strength of the
former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected
in the causes of it ; but neither desires nor fears, which are
consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will.
[iV. THEORIES CONCERNING THE CAUSE OF A SUPPOSED
NECESSITY.]
NUMBER XXI.
J. D. — The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, [i- Astro-
the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions
of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the stars.
..." Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni,
" Quam si iios Veneris commendet epistola Marti'."
I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes
' [Juv., xvi. 4, 5.]
142
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part swimming besides them in the rivers^ yet believe they see
— — those which are in heaven ; who promise great treasures to
others, and beg a groat for themselves. The stars, at the
most, do but incline, they cannot necessitate,
[ii. The Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion
STaild^' and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home
tu^^oHhe ^ necessity. Socrates™, and many others, by assiduous
body.] care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed
from their temperatures.
[Atmver.'] T. H. — In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the
opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes,
wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, con-
sisteth. And, first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his
necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attri-
buteth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not
of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the
temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any
effect without the concurrence of all other agents. For there
is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the
causing whereof concur not whatsoever is " in rerum naturd."
Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many
antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.
[Reply.] J- D. — Towards the latter end of my discourse I answered
some specious pretences against liberty. The two first were
of the astrologer and the physician; the one subjecting
liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies,
the other to the complexions of men. The sum of my answer
was, that the stars and complexions do " incline,^^ but not at 70
all "necessitate" the will. To which all judicious astrono-
mers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not
dissent from it. So as to this part there needs no reply.
But whereas he mentions a great paradox" of his own, —
that " there is hardly any one action, to the causing of which
concurs not whatsoever is ' in rerum naturd,^ " — I can but
smile to see, with what ambition our great undertakers do
[See above, p. 100, note p.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
143
affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions ; Discourse
as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as great
an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of
the new world. And to this paradox in particular: — I meddle
not with natural actions, because the subject of my discourse
is moral liberty; but if he intend not only the kinds of
things, but every individual creature, and not only in natural
but voluntary actions, I desire to know, how Prester John,
or the Great Mogul, or the King of China, or any one of so
many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of
this reply. If they do not, among his other speculations
concerning this matter, I hope he will give us some restric-
tions. It were hard to make all the negroes accessary to all
the murders that are committed in Europe.
NUMBER XXII.
J. D. — Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us, how we are [iii. The^
haled hither and thither with outward objects. To this Icacyof
answer,- ^ ^^^^
First, that the power which outward objects have over us, [Such effi-
is for the most part by our own default ; because of those our^owrf*^^
vicious habits which we have contracted. Therefore, though ^^^^^ '^
the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them, yet they
were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a para-
lytic man, to use Ai'istotle^s comparison, shedding the liquor
deserves to be punished ; for though his act be unwilling,
yet his intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this
infirmity".
Secondly, I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and [Not irre-
bad company, and outward objects, do indeed make a procli- ^^^^^^^^-^
vity, but not a necessity. By prayers, tears, meditations,
vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations, a man may get a
contrary habit ; and gain the victorj^, not only over outward
objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the
king of the little world of himself.
» [Vide Aristot., Ethic, III. vii. 15.]
144
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part "Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris ira,
III. " Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas
" Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis,
" Cum poteris rex esse tui"."
[Maybe Thirdly^ a resolved mind^ which weighs all things judi-
overcome . , -, • i n • i. •^
by a set- Clously, and provides for all occurrences_, is not so easily sur-
tion J^^"^"' prised with outward objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the
meeting with his wife and son?. "I would beat thee" (said
the philosopher), "but that I am angry^." One spake lowest
[2 Sam. when he was most moved. Another poured out the water
xxm. 15, ^^]^en he was thirsty. Another "made a covenant with"
[jobxxxi. liis "eyes." Neither opportunity nor enticement could pre-
[Gen. vail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire with the three
xxxix. /— is not the strength of the ^vind, but the light-
la^^Ts ]' ^^^^ chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Out-
ward objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical,
necessity; they may be dangerous, but cannot be destruc-
tive, to true liberty.
[Answer.} T. H. — Thirdlj^, he disputeth against the opinion of them
that say, external objects presented to men of such and such
temperatures do make their actions necessary ; and says, the
power that such objects have over us proceeds from our own
fault. But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of
ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power. And
therefore that opinion may hold true for all this answer.
Further he saith, " Prayer, fasting," &c. may alter our habits.
^Tis true ; but when they do so, they are causes of the con-
trary habit, and make it necessary ; as the former habit had
been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not been. Besides,
we are not moved nor disposed to prayer, or any other action,
but by outward objects ; as pious company, godly preachers,
or something equivalent. Thirdly, he saith, "a resolved mind
is not easily surprised :" as the mind of Ulysses, who when
others wept, he alone wept not ; and of the philosopher that
abstained from striking, because he found himself angry ;
[2 Sam. and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty ;
Te.]" ^^ch things, I confess, have or may have been
® [Claudian., De IV. Consul. Hono- i [An anecdote told of Plato ; see
rii, Carm.viii. vv. 258—261.] Diog. Laert., iii. 39.]
P [See the Odyss., xix. 204—212.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
145
done ; and do prove only^ that it was not necessary for Discourse
706 Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor ^'
for that other man to drink ; but it does not prove, that it
was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain as he did from
weeping, nor the philosopher to abstain as he did from strik-
ing, nor the other man to forbear drinking. And yet that
was the thing he ought to have proved.
Lastly, he confesseth, that the disposition of objects may
be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive.^^ To
which I answer, 'tis impossible : for liberty is never in any
other danger than to be lost ; and if it cannot be lost, which
be confesseth, I may infer it can be in no danger at all.
J. D. — The thii'd pretence was out of moral philosophy [Reply.]
misunderstood, — that outward objects do necessitate the wiU.
I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to
satisfy his exceptions. The first is, that it is not material,
though the power of outward objects do " proceed from our
own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in
our own power.'' Well, but what if they do proceed from
causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do?
Then his answer is a mere subterfuge. If oui' faults proceed
from causes that ai'c not and were not in our own power,
then they ai-e not oiu- faults at all ; it is not a fault in us, not
to do those things which never were in oui' power to do ; but
they ai-e the faults of these causes from whence they do pro-
ceed. Next, he confesseth, that it is in our power by good
endeavours to alter those \icious habits which we had con-
tracted, and to get the contrary habit. " True" (saith he),
*but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as
well as the former habit did the other way.' By which very
consideration it appears, that that which he calls a ' necessity'
is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it
could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The
truth is, acquii-ed habits do help and assist the faculty, but
they do not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to
himself a habit of temperance, may yet upon occasion commit
an intemperate act ; and so on the contrary. Acts are not
opposed to habits, but other habits. He adds, that we are
not moved to prayer or any other action but by outward
BRAMHALL. ^
146
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part objects ; as pious company, godly preachers, or something
— equivalent." Wherein are two other mistakes : first, to
make " godly preachers,'^ and " pious company," to be " out-
ward objects," which are outward agents; secondly, to affirm,
that the will " is not moved but by outward objects." The
will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive
passions, by angels good and bad, by men, and most
effectually, hj acts or habits infused by God, whereby the
will is excited (extraordinarily indeed but) efficaciously and
determinately. This is more than "equivalent" with "out-
ward objects."
Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and
prepared mind is able to resist both the appetibility of objects
and the unruliness of passions ; as I shewed by examples.
He answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to
weep, nor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that
they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I am
not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth suffi-
ciently prove that which I intend ; — that the rational will
hath power, both to slight the most appetible objects, and to
control the most unriily passions. When he hath given a
clear solution to those proofs which I have produced, then it
will be time for him to cry for more work.
Lastly, whereas I say, that " outward objects may be
dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty ;" he
catcheth at it, and objects, that " liberty is in no danger, but
to be lost, but" I " say, it cannot be lost, therefore" he in-
fers, that it is " in no danger at all." I answer, first, that
liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost ; —
many more men do abuse their wits than lose them; —
secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or
diminished, as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted
by om-selves, and yet it is not totally lost ; thirdly, though
liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be
totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the exercise
of it. Reason is the root of liberty ; and though nothing be
more natural to a man than reason, yet many, by excess of
study, or by continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant
passion, which they have cherished in themselves, or by doting
too much upon some affected object, do become very sots, and
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
147
deprive themselves of the use of reason, and consequently of Discourse
liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is not thus univer-
sally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or that parti-
707 cular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath
lost his former liberty to choose a good one.
NUMBER XXIII.
J. D. — Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth teach, that [iv. The
the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the under- cacy^of^
standing. It is true, indeed, the will should follow the ^^^tatf of
direction of the understanding, but I am not satisfied that it the "r^^er-
dotli evermore follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place, [The case
" Video meliora probogue, deteriora sequor^.^' As that great hl^polnt'of
Roman said of two suitors, that the one produced the better ^^^^-^
reasons, but the other must have the ofiice* ; so reason often
lies dejected at the feet of aff'ection. Things nearer to the
senses move more powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall
sorrow more for the death of his child than for " the sin of [See Mi-
his soul yet appreciatively, in the estimation of judgment, ^^^^ ^'^
he accounts the off'ence of God a greater evil than any tem-
poral loss.
Next, I do not believe, that a man is bound to weigh the [such a
expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to ther extrin-
the least grain in the balance of his understanding, or to
run up into his watch-tower mth his perspective to take dent.]
notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hidden
danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to
petite observations ; as concerning every rag that a man
wears, each drop of drink, each morsel of bread that he eats,
each pace that he walks. Thus many steps must he go, not
one more, nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What is
this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience ? But God
leaves many things indifi'erent, though man be so curious he
will not. A good architect will be sure to provide sufficient
materials for his building ; but what particular number of
stones, or trees, he troubles not his head. And suppose he
[Ovid., Metam., vii. 20, 21.] p. 165. ed. Bryant.]
5 [ Plut, in Vita Jul. Caesar., torn. iv.
L 2
148
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part should wcigh cach action thus^ yet lie doth not ; so still there
'- — is liberty.
[The un- Thirdl}^, I conceive it is possible, in this mist and weakness
ing may "be of human apprehension, for two actions to be so equally cir-
baianced cumstantiated, that no discernible difference can appear be-
tvvoaiter ^"""^^^ them upon discussion. As suppose a chirui'geon
natives.] should give two plasters to his patient, and bid him apply
either of them to his wound ; what can induce his reason
more to the one than to the other, but that he may refer it
to chance, whether he will use ?
But leading these probable speculations, which I submit to
better judgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus : —
admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate
of the understanding, as certainly in many things it doth ;
j^et, first, this is no extrinsecal determination from without,
and a man^s own resolution is not destructive to his own
liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is still free.
Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined
with the action. The understanding and the will are not
different agents, but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here
is an infallibility, or a hypothetical necessity ; as we say,
" Quicquid est, quando est, necesse est esse^ a necessity of
consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though an
agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become
infalHble, jet, if the agent did determine freely, the action
likewise is free.
[Answer.! T. H. — The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them
that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the
understanding. But it seems he understands that tenet in
another sense than I do. For he speaketh, as if they that
held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every
action they do, great and smaU, to the least grain; which
is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But
I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last
opinion or judgment immediately preceding the action, con-
cerning whether it be good to do it or not ; whether he
hath weighed it long before or not at all. And that I take
to be the meaning of them that hold it. As, for example,
^ [See above, p. 25. note c.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
149
when a man sti^ikes^ his will to strike follows necessarily that Discourse
thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before '■
the lifting of his hand. Now^ if it be understood in that
sense^ the last dictate of the understanding does certainly
necessitate the action ; though not as the whole cause^ yet as
the last cause ; as the last feather necessitates the breaking
of a horse's back, when there are so many laid on before as
there needeth but the addition of that one to make the
weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is,
first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, Video
meliora jiroboque, deteriora sequor'' But the sajdng (as pretty
as it is) is not true ; for though ^ledea saw many reasons to
forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judg-
ment was, that the present revenge of her husband out-
weighed them all. And thereupon that wicked action fol-
lowed necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of
708 two competitors said, one had the better reasons, but the
other must have the office. This also maketh against him ;
for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of
the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe
than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that "things
nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason." AMiat
foUoweth thence but this, that the sense of the present good
is commonly more immediate to the action, than the fore-
sight of the e^il consequents to come ? Foui'thly, Avhereas
he says, that " do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for
the death of his son than for the sin of his soul it makes
nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it
argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary : and, by
consequence, repentance proceedeth fi'om causes.
J. D. — The fourth pretence alleged against liberty was, [Reply.]
that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the
understanding. This objection is largely answered before in
several places of this reply; and particularly. Numb. \ii."
In my former discourse, I gave two answers to it : the one
certain and undoubted, that supposing the last dictate of the
understanding did always determine the will, yet this deter-
mination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from
" [Above pp. 42— M".]
150
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part extriusccal causes, but from the proper resolution of the
— — agent, who had now freely determined himself, it makes no
absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, — upon supposition
that the agent hath determined his own will after this or
that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so
far from taking it away, that he takes no notice of it. The
other part of mine answer was probable : that it is not always
certain, that the will doth always actually follow the last
dictate of the understanding, though it always ought to follow
it. Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that
actions may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so
intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but
leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers
not a word. Another of my reasons was, b&cause reason doth
not weigh, nor is bound to weigh, the convenience or incon-
venience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in
the balance of true judgment. The truth of this reason is
confessed by T. H.; though he might have had more abettors
in this than in the most part of his discourse — that nothing
is indifferent, that a man cannot stroke his beard on one
side, but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it :
■ — fi'om which confession of his it follows, that in all those
actions, wherein reason doth not define what is most con-
venient, there the will is free from the determination of the
understanding, and by consequence the last feather" is
wanting, to break the horse's back." A third reason was,
because passions and affections sometimes prevail against
judgment, as I proved by the example of Medea and Caesar,
by the nearness of the objects to the senses, and by the esti-
mation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against this rea-
son his whole answer is addressed.
[The last And, first, he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the
bTeaketh Comparison of the " last feather," wherewith he seems to be
back!f delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time^. But let
him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons. First,
the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight,
but is the sentence of the trier. The understanding weigheth
all things, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, incon-
venience ; but itself is not weighed. Secondly, the sensitive
» [See above, Numb. xi. p. 62, and T. H. Numb. xi. p. 59.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
151
passion in some extraordinary cases may give a counterfeit Discourse
weight to the object, if it can detain or divert reason from
the balance ; but ordinarily the means, circumstances, and
causes concurrent, — they have their whole weight from the
understanding ; so as they do not press " the horse^s bacV
at all until reason lay them on. Tliirdly, he conceives, that
as each feather hath a certain natural weight, whereby it
concurs not arbitrarily but necessarily towards the over-
charging of the horse, so all objects and causes have a natural
efficiency, whereby they do physically determine the will;
which is a great mistake. His objects, his agents, his
motives, his passions, and all his concurrent causes, ordi-
narily do only move the will morally, not determine it natu-
rally; so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion
over itself.
His other example, — of a man that strikes, ^' whose will to [T. H. 'sex-
strike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel ^Jl^that^
of his stroke immediately before the lifting up of his hand,^^ strikes, j
— as it confounds passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the
dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain ; for between
the cup and the lips, between the lifting up of the hand and
the blow, the will may alter, and the judgment also : and,
709 lastly, it is impertinent ; for that necessity of striking pro-
ceeds from the free determination of the agent, and not from
the special influence of any outward determining causes.
And so it is only a necessity upon supposition.
Concerning Medea's choice, the strength of the argument [OfMe-
doth not lie either in the fact of Medea, which is but a fic- choice.]
tion, or in the authority of the poet, who writes things rather
to be admired than believed, but in the experience of all
men, who find it to be true in themselves : — that sometimes
reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion,
that what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he
loseth by such a choice is an honest good, that that which is
honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant ; yet the
will pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that which
is honest. St. Paul saith as much in earnest as is feigned of Rom. vii.
Medea ; — that he " approved not that which" he " did,'' and
that he " did that which" he " hated." The Roman story is [And
mistaken; there was no bribe in the case but affection. ^***'"^1
152
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
sometimes
prevails
against
reason. ]
Part Whereas I urge, that those things which are nearer to the
— ^ — senses/^ do " move more powerfully/^ he lays hold on it ; and
without answering to that for which I produced it, infers,
that the sense of present good is more immediate to the
action than the foresight of evil consequents which is true,
but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity.
Let a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do:
and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by
his own fault and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate con-
cupiscence doth sometimes (but rarely) surprise a man, and
render the action not free. But consequent and deliberated
concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will, doth
render the action more free, not less free ; and introduceth
only a necessity upon supposition.
[Affection Lastly, he saith, that a man^s mourning "more for the loss
of his child than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictate
of the understanding.'^ Yes, very much. Reason dictates,
that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child,
and ought more to be lamented for ; yet we see daily, how
affection prevails against the dictate of reason. That which
he infers from hence, — that " sorrow for sin is not voluntary,
and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes,"
— is true, as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense.
The "causes^^ from whence repentance doth proceed, are
God^s grace preventing, and man^s will concurring. God
prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those inferior agents,
which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of
God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And there-
fore the former part of his inference, — that " sorrow for sin
is not voluntary,^^ — is untrue, and altogether groundless.
That is much more truly and much more properly said to be
voluntary, which proceeds from judgment, and from the
rational will, than that which proceeds from passion, and
from the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all
T. H. his errors in this question is, that he acknowledgeth
no efficacy but that which is natural. Hence is this wild
consequence — ''repentance hath causes,^' and therefore it "is
not voluntary." Free effects have free causes; necessary
effects necessary causes ; voluntary effects have sometimes
free, sometimes necessary causes.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
153
NUMBER XXIV. ""''T^'^
J. D. — Fifthly, and lastly, the divine labours to find out a [v. The
way, how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees ancf de-
of God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to qq^Y^
write a full discourse, in answer to a treatise against the pre-
science of things contingent. I shall for the present only
repeat these two things.
First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we [Our igno-
are not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should Silent^n^.^
be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to comprehend ^^^^ ^
all His actions and attributes.
Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do and ever [Futurity
shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile contin-
sent to
gence and liberty with the decrees and prescience of God,
and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to
subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to
that presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that
things future, which are not yet existent, are co-existent with
God : but because the infinite knowledge of God, encircling
all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future
being ; from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible
beingy. The main impediment which keeps men from sub-
scribing to this way is, because they conceive eternity to be
loan everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point. But
if they consider, that " whatsoever is in God is God,^' that
there are no accidents in Him, for that which is infinitely
perfect cannot be further perfected ; that as God is not wise
but wisdom itself, not just but justice itself, so He is not
eternal but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that
therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisi-
ble : and therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite
point, comprehending all times within itself.
T. H. — The last part of this discourse containeth his opi- lAnswer.'}
nion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees
of God, otherwise than some divines have done, against whom
he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he only " re-
peateth two things.^^ One is, that "we ought not to desert
y [So Boethius, Dc Consolat., lib. v. Prosa ().]
154
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part a Certain truth for not being able to comprehend the certain
— — — manner^* of it. And I say the same ; as, for example, that
he ought not to desert this certain truth, — that there are
certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will
what he willeth, — though he do not yet conceive in what
[Events manner the will of man is caused. And yet, I think, the
"determined manner of it is not very hard to conceive ; seeing that we see
\ntand ^'^^^ ^ praisc, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and
extrinsecai evil, scqucls of mcu's actious retained in memory, do frame
and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we
elect; and that the memory of such things proceeds from
the senses ; and sense from the operation of the objects of
sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God
Almighty ; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and
voluntary agents, are necessary.
[Eteridty The othcr thing he repeateth is, that the best way "to
^ISihie' reconcile contingency and liberty with the prescience and
point hut a decrees of God, is to subiect future contingents to the aspect
succession.\ . . .
of God.^^ The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what
he hath all this while laboured to prove ; for hitherto he held
liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees
of God, irreconcileable : unless "the aspect of God" (which
word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify
somewhat else besides God^s will and decree, which I cannot
understand. But he adds, that we must subject them " ac-
cording to that presentiality which they have in eternity
which he says cannot be done by them that " conceive eter-
nity to be an everlasting succession," but only by them that
conceive it an " indivisible point. To this I answer, that as
soon as I can conceive eternity " an indivisible point," or
any thing but "an everlasting succession," I will renounce
all I have written in this subject. I know St. Thomas Aqui-
nas calls eternity nunc stans'^ — "an ever abiding now
which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I
never could conceive it. They that can, are more happy
than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men
to be of my opinion, save only those that conceive in their
minds a "nunc stans/^ which I think are none. I under-
stand as little how it can be true, that " God is not just but
' [Summ., P. Prima, Qu. x. art 2.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 155
justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eter- Discourse
nity itself nor how he concludes thence, that eternity is a
point indivisible, and not a succession ; nor in what sense it
can be said, that an infinite point, &c., wherein is no succes-
sion, can comprehend all times though time be successive.
These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder there-
fore, what was the design of the School-men, to bring them
up ; unless they thought a man could not be a true Chris-
tian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such
hard sayings.
And thus much in answer to his discourse, wherein I
think not only his squadrons but also his reserves of dis-
tinctions, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have
my doctrine concerning the same question, with my reasons
for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of
art, in plain English.
J. D. — That poor discourse which I mention was not writ- [Reply.]
ten against any ^Mivines,^^ but in way of examination of a
French treatise, which your Lordship^s brother did me the
honour to shew me at York. My assertion is most true, [A certain
that we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are ceived"
not able to comprehend the certain manner.^' Such a truth [^^^
is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary verted be-
' , cause it IS
actions is free from extrinsecal determination ; a truth de- hard to be
monstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world, stood.]
And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend or ex-
press exactly the certain manner how it consists together
with God^s eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my
weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is
manifest. But T. H. his opinion of the absolute necessity of
all events, by reason of their antecedent determination in
their extrinsecal and necessary causes, is no such certain
truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without proba-
ble grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world.
Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so
obscure, or so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the
a [See above, Numb. v. p. 37.] 1653, and was buried at Bolsover (Col-
[Sir Charles Cavendish of Walling- lins' Peerage by Sir E. Brydges, vol. i.
ton, the brother of the Marquis (after- p. 317). Bramhall was at York with
wards Duke) of Newcastle, died Feb. 4, the Marquis from 1642 to 1644.]
156
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part eternal decrees of God are. And therefore in both these 71
respects he cannot challenge the same privilege. I am in
possession of an old truth derived by inheritance or succes-
sion from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not
able to clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my
possession until a better title were shewed for another. He
is no old possessor, but a new pretender; and is bound to
make good his claim by evident proofs, not by weak and in-
consequent suppositions, or inducements, such as those are
which he useth here, of praises, dispraises, rewards, punish-
ments, the memory of good and evil sequels, and events/^
which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessi-
tate the will j nor by uncertain and accidental inferences,
such as this, — "the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards,
punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us'^ (he should
say, dispose us) " to elect what we elect, but the memory of
these things is from the sense, and the sense from the opera-
tion of the external objects, and the agency of external ob-
jects is only from God, therefore all actions, even of free and
voluntary agents, are necessary." To pass by all the other
great imperfections which are to be found in this sorites, it
is just like that old sophistical piece, — he that drinks well
sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks
no hurt Hves well, therefore he that drinks well lives weU.
[How con- In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine
evcfntsVre own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the
abie"with ^^^^^^^ prcsciencc and decrees of God are consistent with
God's pre- true liberty and contingency. And this I set down in as
science and tit /»t i*
decrees.] plain terms as i could, or as so profound a speculation would
permit ; which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H., and
[The aspect many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As, first,
f^'^Mtus where I speak of "the aspect of God,'' that is. His view. His
Dei.''] knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions
Heb.iv.i3. wcre manifest to Him from eternity, — "All things are naked
and open to His eyes;'' — and this not discursively, but intui-
tively, not by external species, but by His internal essence'';
he confounds this with the will and the decrees of God.
Though he "found not the word 'aspect' before in this dis-
[Nccessity coursc," hc might have found prescience. Secondly, he
not identi-
•= [Tliom. Aquin., Suinin., P. I'rima, Qu. xiv. art. 13 ; and sec also art. 7.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
157
chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained, that " liberty Discourse
and the decrees of God are irreconcileable/^ If I have
said any such thmg, my heart never went along with my God's de-
pen. No ; but his reason why he chargeth me on this ^^^^^''^
manner, is because I have maintained, that liberty and
the absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable."
That is true indeed. What then? Why" (saith he), " ne-
cessity and God^s decrees are all one." How? "All one?" That
were strange indeed. Necessity may be a consequent of
God's decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. But to cut
his argument short. God hath decreed all effects which
come to pass in time; yet not all after the same manner,
but according to the distinct natures, capacities, and condi-
tions of His creatures, which He doth not destroy by His
decree : some He acteth, with some he co-operateth by spe-
cial influence, and some He only permitteth. Yet this is no
idle or bare permission; seeing He doth concur, both by
way of general influence, giving power to act, and also by
disposing all events, necessary, free, and contingent, to His
own glory. Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I " allow all men to [Other ex-
, p., , . . . , , , . . , . planations
be 01 his "opinion, save only those that conceive m their have been
minds a ^ nunc stans/ " or hoAv eternity is an indivisible point, ^i^^ subject
rather than an everlasting succession. But I have given no {|^g^^u^
such allowance. I know there are many other ways pro- thor's.]
posed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and
decrees of God with the liberty and contingency of second
causes; some of which may please other judgments better
than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could compre-
hend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that
" a certain truth ought not to be rejected," because we are
not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand "the
certain manner," or reason of it. I know the load-stone
hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it ; and yet I
know not how it comes to have such a power.
But the chief est difficulty which offers itself in this section [That eter-
is, whether eternity be " an indivisible point" (as I maintain "ucccsdon^
it) or "an everlasting succession" (as he would have it). Jj^Jj^^',^,'""
According to his constant use, he gives no answer to what point.]
was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapa-
city ; — " I never could conceive," saith he, " how eternity
158
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part should be ail indivisible point/^ I believe, that neither we
'- — nor any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do
these inferior things. The nearer that any thing comes to7rj
the essence of God, the more remote it is from our appre-
hension. But shall we therefore make potentialities, and
successive duration, and former and latter, or a part without
a part (as they say), to be in God ? Because we are not able
to understand clearly the Divine perfection, we must not
therefore attribute any imperfection to Him.
He saith moreover, that he " understands as little how it
can be true which^^ I say, that God is not just but justice
itself, not eternal but eternity itself.^^ It seems, howsoever
he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his
head overmuch with reading School-di^dnes, or metaphysi-
cians ; if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really
distinct from His essence. God is a most simple or pure act,
which can admit no composition of substance and accidents.
Doth he think, that the most perfect essence of God cannot
act sufficiently without faculties and qualities ? The infinite
perfection of the Divine essence excludes all passive or recep-
tive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is by any
accidents. The attributes of God are not diverse \drtues or
qualities in Him, as they are in the creatures; but really
one and the same with the Divine essence, and among them-
selves. They are attributed to God, to supply the defect of
our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is
to be known of God under one name or one act of the under-
standing'^.
Furthermore he saith, that he "understands not how^^ I
" conclude from hence, that eternity is an indivisible point,
and not a succession." I will help him. The Divine sub-
stance is indivisible; but eternity is the Divine substance.
The major is evident : because God is " actus simplicissimm'^
— a most simple act ;" wherein there is no manner of compo-
sition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and acci-
dents, nor of parts, &c.; and by consequence no divisibility^.
The minor hath been clearly demonstrated in mine answer
•J [See Pet. Lomb., vSent.,lib. I. dist. « [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist.
viii. qu. iv. tit. " Qualiter, cum Deus viii. qu. iv. art. 1 ; — and Aug., De Trin., ;
sit simplex, multiplex tamen dicatur."] lib. v. c. 1. § 2, Op. torn. viii. p. 833.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
159
to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, — that "what- Discourse
soever is in God, is God^" ■
Lastly, he saith, he "conceives not how it can be said,
that an infinite point, wherein is no succession, can compre-
hend all time, which is successive." I answer, that it doth
not comprehend it formally, as time is successive, but emi-
nently and virtually, as eternity is infinite. To-day all eter-
nity is co-existent with this day. To-morrow all eternity
will be co-existent with to-morrow. And so in like manner
with all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He
saith, he " finds not these phrases in the Scripture." No, but
he may find the thing in the Scripture ; — that God is infinite
in all His attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.
And so, to shew his antipathy against the School-men, that [T. H.'s
he hath no liberty or power to contain himself, when he conciu-
meets with any of their phrases or tenets, he falls into an-
other paroxysm or fit of inveighing against them; and so
concludes his answer with a ' plaudite^ to himself, because
he hath defeated both my "squadrons" of arguments, and
"reserves of distinctions." — *
" Dicite, lo pasan ; et io, bis dicite, paean
But because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were
towards him, he quite mistook the matter. Those whom he
see routed and running away, were his own scattered forces.
[v. THE REMAINDER OF T. H.^S ANSWER.]
NUMBER XXV.
MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
T. H. — First, I conceive that when it cometh into a man^s [i. ofac-
mind, to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no tTthJirde-
time to deliberate the doing or abstaining, [he] necessarily liberation.-]
followeth the present thought he had of the good or evil
consequence thereof to himself. As, for example, in sudden
' [" Hujus autem" (Dei) " Essentiae Pet. Lomb., Sent, lib. I. dist. viii. qu. v.
simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod tit. " Quod non est in Deo aliquid
non est in Ed aliquid quod non sit Ipsa; quod non sit Deus."]
sed idem est habens et quod habetur." k [Ovid., Art. Amat., ii. 1.]
160
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge^ in
'■ — sudden fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath
time to dehberate, but deliberates not^ because never any
thing appeared that could make him doubt of the conse-
quence_, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or
harm of it. These actions I call voluntary. He^ if I under-
stand him aright,, calls them spontaneous. I call them volun-
tary, because those actions that follow immediately the last
appetite are voluntary. And here, where there is one only
appetite, that one is the last.
Besides, I see 'tis reasonable to punish a rash action, which
could not be justly done by man, unless the same were volun-
tary : for no action of a man can be said to be without de-
liberation, though never so sudden, because 'tis supposed he
had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life,
whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence
it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall 713
nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time
wherein he was able to consider, whether to kill were good or
evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and con-
sequently the kilhng shall be judged to proceed from election.
[Reply.] J. D. — This part of T. H. his discourse hangs together hke
a sick man's dreams. Even now he tells us, that " a man
may have time to dehberate, yet not deliberate by and by
he saith, that " no action of a man, though never so sudden,
can be said to be without deliberation.'' He tells us. Numb,
xxxiii, that the scope of this section is to shew what is spon-
taneous^. Howbeit he sheweth only what is voluntary, so
making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one ; whereas
before he had told us, that ' every spontaneous action is not
voluntary, because indeliberate, nor every voluntary action
spontaneous, if it proceed from fear^' Now he tells us^
that those actions which follow the last appetite, are volun-
tary, and where there is one only appetite, that is the last."
But before he told us, that "voluntary presupposeth some
precedent deliberation and meditation of what is hkely to
follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action^."
h [Below, p. 175.] j [Ibid.]
' [Above, Numb. viii. p. 45.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
161
He defines liberty, Numb, xxix, to be " the absence of all ex- Discouuse
trinsecal impediments to action '^.^ And yet in his whole dis '■
course he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not
done, is therefore not done, because the agent was necessitated
by extrinsecal causes not to do it. Are not extrinsecal causes,
which determine him not to do it, " extrinsecal impediments to
action So no man shall be free to do anything but that
which he doth actually. He defines a free agent to be "him, who
hath not made an end of deliberating^^ (Numb, xxviii^), and
yet defines liberty to be " an absence of outward impediments."
There may be "outward impediments,^' even whilst he is
deliberating ; as a man deliberates whether he shall play at
tennis, and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is
fast locked against him. And after a man hath ceased to de-
liberate, there may be no outward impediments ; as when a
man resolves not to play at tennis, because he finds himself
ill disposed, or because he will not hazard his money. So the
same person, at the same time, should be free and not free,
not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds,
so he confounds all things, the " mind" and the " will,'' the
" estimative faculty'' and the " understanding," " imagina-
tion" with " deliberation," the end with the means, " human
will" with the "sensitive appetite," "rational hope or fear"
with " irrational passions," "inclinations" with "intentions," a
" beginning of being " with a " beginning of working," " suf-
ficiency" with " efficiency ;" so as the greatest difficulty is to
find out what he aims at : so as I had once resolved not to
answer this part of his discourse; yet, upon better advice, I will
take a brief survey of it also, and shew how far I assent unto,
or dissent from, that which I conceive to be his meaning.
And, first, concerning sudden passions, as anger or the like. [Of actions
That which he saith, that " the action doth necessarily follow sudden
the thought," is thus far true, that those actions, which are Passions.]
altogether undeliberated and do proceed from sudden and
violent passions, or motus primo primi, which surprise a man,
and give him no time to advise with reason, are not properly
and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions ;
as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard, out of a
secret antipathy.
" [Below p. 166.] 1 [Below p. 165.]
BRAMHALL. TVf
162
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part
III.
[Of actions
done with-
out present
delibera-
tion.]
[Actions
done in
passion
justly
punished,
because
done
through
past or
present
choice.]
Secondly^ as for those actions_, " wherein actual deliberation
seems not necessary, because never anything appeared that
could make a man doubt of the consequence/' I do confess,
that actions done by ^drtue of a precedent deliberation, with-
out any actual deliberation in the present when the act is
done, may notwithstanding be truly both voluntary and free
acts ; yea, in some cases, and in some sense, more free, than if
they were actually deliberated of in present : as one who hath
acquired, by former deliberation and experience, a habit to
play upon the \drginals, needs not deliberate what man or
what jack he must touch, nor what finger of his hand he must
move, to play such a lesson ; yea, if his mind should be fixed
or intent to eveiy motion of his hand, or every touch of a
string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more
troublesome to him. Wherefore I believe, that not only his
playing in general, but every motion of his hand, though it be
not presently deliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his
precedent deliberation. So then (saving improprieties of
speech, as calling that voluntary which is free, and limiting
the will to the last appetite, and other mistakes, as that no act
can be said to be without deliberation), we agree also for the 714
greater part in this second observation.
Thirdly, whereas he saith, that " some sudden acts, pro-
ceeding from violent passions which surprise a man, are justly
punished. I grant they are so sometimes, but not for his
reason — because they have been formerly actually deliberated
of, but because they were virtually deliberated of, or because
it is our faults, that they were not actually deliberated of ;
whether it was a fault of pure negation, that is, of not doing
our duty only, or a fault of bad disposition also, by reason of
some vicious habit, which we had contracted by our former
actions. To do a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly
punishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us
by extrinsecal causes. As if a child before he had the use of
reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he wanted
malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it,
he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice,
unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case.
But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, and by our
own faults, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wanton
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
163
thoughts in the day-time, doth procure his own nocturnal Discourse
pollution. A man cannot deliberate in his sleep, yet it is —
accounted a sinful act, and consequently a free act, that is,
not actually free in itself, but virtually free in its causes ; and
though it be not expressly willed and chosen, yet it is tacitly
and implicitly willed and chosen, when that is willed and
chosen from whence it was necessarily produced. B}^ the
Levitical law, if a man digged a pit, and left it uncovered, so [Exod.
• xxi 33 3-1 ~1
that his neighbour's ox or his ass did fall into it, he was bound ' ' '
to make reparation ; not because he did choose to leave it un-
covered on purpose that such a mischance might happen, but
because he did freely omit that which he ought to have done,
from whence this damage proceeded to his neighbour.
Lastly, there is great difference between the first motions,
which sometimes are not in our power, and subsequent acts
of killing or stealing or the like, which always are in our
power, if we have the use of reason, or else it is our own fault
that they are not in our power. Yet to such hasty acts, done
in hot blood, the law is not so severe, as to those which are
done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice, " unless'^
(as I said) "there be some mixture of public justice in it." He
that steals a horse deliberately may be more punishable hj the
law, than he that kills the owner by chance-medley. Yet the
death of the owner was more "noxious" (to use his phrase),
and more damageable to the family, than the stealth of the
horse. So far wasT. H. mistaken in that also, that the right
to kill men doth proceed merely from their being noxious
NUMBER XXVI.
T. H. — Secondly, I conceive, when a man deliberates [u. o/ac-
whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, that he does ^.//Jf
nothing else but consider, whether it be better for himself to beration.]
do it or not to do it ; and to consider an action is to ima-
gine the consequences of it, both good and e\il : from whence
is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but alternate
imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or
"' [T. H.] Numb. xiv. [above, p. S6.]
164
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate
— — — appetite to do or quit the action of which he dehberateth.
[Reply.] J. D. — If I did not know what deliberation was, I should
be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Some-
times he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the under-
standing ; sometimes an imagination, or an act of the fancy ;
sometimes he makes it to be an alternation of passions, hope
and fear ; sometimes he makes it concern the end ; sometimes
to concern the means. So he makes it I know not what.
The truth is this, in brief : — deliberation is an inquiry made
by reason, whether this or that, definitely considered, be a
good and fit means, or, indefinitely, what are good and fit
means, to be chosen for attaining some wished end".
NUMBER XXVII.
[iii. The T. H. — Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is
Z% feforf to say, in aU alternate succession of contrary appetites, the
achon.} j^g|- ^^ist which wc Call the will, and is immediately before
the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become
impossible. All other appetites to do and to quit, that come
upon a man during his deliberation, are usually called inten-
tions and inclinations but not wills, there being but one will ;
which also in this case may be called last will, though the
intention change often.
[Reply.— J. D. — Still here is nothing but confusion. He confounds
foundsThe faculty of the wiU with the act of volition ; he makes the 71
tion^whh' ^^^^ P^^t deliberation ; he makes the inten-
itseif ] ^ tion, which is a most proper and elicit act of the will, " or a
willing of the end, as it is to be attained by certain means","
to be no willing at aU, but only some antecedaneous " incli-
nation" or propension. He might as well say, that the un-
certain agitation of the needle hither and thither, to find out
the pole, and the resting or fixing of itsehf directly towards
° [" Bov\€v6fie6a, . . 04ficuoi reXos iirneXovixevov irws 5ta rovrov ea-rai."
ri, TTus Kol Sta tluwi/ ea-rai, . . koI Sia Aristot,, Ethic, III. v. 11.]
■rrKeiduQsu fxtv (paivofxtuov y'lufaeai Sia " [Thorn. Aquui., Summ., Prim.
rlyos ^Sffra Ka\ KaWiffTa . . St' hhs 8' Secund., Qu. xii. art. 1. Ad quartum.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
165
the pole, were both the same thing. But the grossest mistake Discourse
is, that he will acknowledge no act of a man^s will to be his '■
will, but only the last act, which he calls the "last will." If the
first were no will, how comes this to be the " last will Ac-
cording to this doctrine, the will of a man should be as un-
changeable as the will of God ; at least so long as there is a
possibihty to effect it. According to this doctrine, concu-
piscence with consent should be no sin, for that which is not
truly willed is not a sin ; or rather should not be at all, unless
either the act followed, or were rendered impossible by some
intervening circumstances. According to this doctrine, no
man can say, this is my will, because he knows not yet
whether it shall be his last will. The truth is, there be
many acts of the will, both in respect of the means and of the
end. But that act, which makes a man's actions to be truly
free, is election, which is the ' deliberate choosing or refusing
of this or that means, or the acceptation of one means before
another, where divers are represented by the understanding p.*
NUMBER XXVIII.
T. H. — Fourthly, that those actions, which man is said to [iv. A vo-
do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon freTuntii^
choice and election. So that voluntary action, and action
proceeding from election, is the same thing ; and that of a
voluntary agent, ^tis all one to say, he is free, and to say, he
hath not made an end of deliberating.
J. D. — This short section might pass without an animad- [Reply.]
version but for two things. The one is, that he confounds a
voluntary act with a free act. A free act is only that which
proceeds from the free election of the rational will after
dehberation ; but every act that proceeds from the sensi-
tive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or
election, is truly voluntary. The other thing observable
is his conclusion, — that " it is all one to say, a man is
free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating."
Which confession of his overturns his whole structure of
absolute necessity : for if every agent be necessitated to act
P [Thorn. Aqiiin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. Ixxxiii. art. 3.] '
166
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of extrinse-
'■ — cal causes^ then he is no more free before he deliberates, or
whilst he deliberates, than he is after ; but by T. H. his con-
fession here, he is more free whilst he deliberates than he is
after. And so, after all his flourishes for an absolute or ex-
trinsecal necessity, he is glad to sit himself down, and rest
contented with a hypothetical necessity, which no man ever
denied or doubted of; ascribing the necessitation of a man
in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to
his last thought (Numb. xxv""). What is this to a natural and
special influence of extrinsecal causes? Again, "liberty,'*
saith he, is " an absence of extrinsecal impediments but
deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecal impediments;
therefore (let him choose which part he will) either he is free
after deliberation by his own doctrine, or he was not free
before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own
understanding, and the election of our own will, do produce
a hypothetical necessity, — that the event be such as the under-
standing hath directed, and the will elected. But forasmuch
as the understanding might have directed otherwise, and the
will have elected otherwise, this is far from an absolute
necessity. Neither doth liberty respect only future acts, but
present acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create the
world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, it is free,
according to a priority of nature though not of time, to elect
otherwise. And so, in a divided sense, the will is free, even
whilst it acts, though in a compounded sense it be not free.
Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty.
NUMBER XXIX.
LL^"^"'" H.— -Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in
liberti/.] this manner. Liberty is the absence of all the impediments
to action that are not contained in the nature and in the
intrinsecal quality of the agent. As, for example, the water
is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the
channel of the river, because there is no impediment that
way; but not across, because the banks are impediments.
[Above, p. IfiO.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
167
And though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants Discourse
the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power ; because the
impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsecal. So
also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because
716 the impediment is not in him but in his bands; whereas we
say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impedi-
ment is in himself.
J. D. — How that should be a right definition of liberty [Reply.—
which comprehends neither the genus nor the diflPerence, nitk)'n one
neither the matter nor the form of liberty, which doth not so [fv"s
much as accidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens;
how a real faculty, or the elective power, should be defined by a
negation, or by an " absence;" — is past my understanding, and
contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned.
Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By
this definition, a stone hath hberty to ascend into the air,
because there is no outward impediment to hinder it ; and so
a violent act^ may be a free act. Just like his definition are his [His in-
instances, of the liberty of the water to descend down the ^^^"^^^-J
channel, and a sick or a lame man's liberty to go. The latter
is an impotence, and not a power or a liberty. The former is
so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a natural act.
Certainly, the proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy
bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards the centre ;
as we see in rain, which falls down perpendicularly. Though
this be far from a free act, which proceeds from a rational
appetite, yet it is a natui-al act, and proceeds from a natural
appetite, and hath its reason within self. So hath not the
current of the river in its channel; which must not be ascribed
to the proper nature of the water, but either to the general
order of the universe, for the better being and preservation of
the creatures, — otherwise the waters should not move in seas
and rivers as they do, but cover the face of the earth, and
possess their proper place between the air and the earth,
according to the degree of their gravity, — or to an extrinsecal
principle, whilst one particle of water thrusteth and forceth
forward another, and so comes a current, or at least so comes
* [" 'H Se di'07K77 Bltt-t]' tj /xev yap &vu} (peperai, aW' ov 5to Tr]v airriiy
Karacpvaiu KaiTT}v 6pfxr]v,T] ^'la 7) wapa avdyKr^v." Aristot., Anal. Poster., II.
T7JI/ bpfxr\v' wa-irep \'idos Koi koltu koI xi. 9.]
168
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part the Current to be more impetuous ; to which motion the
'[ — position of the earth doth contribute much, both by restrain-
ing that fluid body with its banks from dispersing itself, and
also by affording way for a fair and easy descent by its pro-
clivity. He tells us sadly, that " the water wants liberty to
go over the banks, because there is an extrinsecal impediment ;
but to ascend up the channel it w^ants not liberty, but power."
Why ? Liberty is a power : if it want power to ascend, it
wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the
water ascends not up the channel to be intrinsecal, and the
reason why it ascends not over the banks to be extrinsecal ;
as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channel, as
well as up the banks, though it be not so discernible, nor
always so sudden. The natural appetite of the water is as
much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending
up the channel. And the extrinsecal impediment is as great
in ascending up the channel as over the banks, or rather
greater, because there it must move, not only against the
rising soil, but also against the succeeding waters, which
press forw^ard the former. Either the river wants liberty for
both, or else it wants liberty for neither.
[His defi- But to leave his metaphorical " faculties,^^ and his catachres-
removed^ tical liberty ; how far is his discourse wide from the true
from the moral hberty, which is in question between us ! His former
iTberty ] description of a free agent, — that is, '^^he who hath not made an
end of deliberating*," — though it was wide from the mark, yet
it came much nearer the truth than this definition of liberty :
unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deli-
berating whether it will go over the banks, but hath not done
deliberating whether it will go up the channel.
NUMBER XXX.
/A'' k ^ ^ — Sixthly, I conceive, nothing taketh beginning from
their being
itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent
^nt7cedenf ^i^hout itsclf. And that, therefore, when first a man had an
seciicauJe] ^PP^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^o Something, to which immediately before he
had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will
itself, but something else, not in his own disposing. So that,
' [Above, T. H. Numb, xxviii. p. 165.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
169
whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the Discourse
will is a necessary cause, and (by this which is said) the will '■
is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it
foUoweth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary
causes, and therefore are necessitated.
J. D. — This sixth point doth not consist in explicating of [Reply.]
terms, as the former, but in two proofs, that voluntary actions
are necessitated. The former proof stands thus, — " Nothing
takes beginning from itself, but from some agent without
itself, which is not in its own disposing ; therefore,^' &c. —
17 Concedo omnia — I grant all he saith. The will doth not " take
beginning from itself.^' Whether he understand by " will^' the
faculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it
" takes not beginning from itself,^^ but from God, who created
and infused the soul into man, and endowed it with this
power ; or whether he understand by " will " the act of
willing, it " takes not beginning from itself,^^ but fr'om the
faculty, or from the power of wilHng, which is in the
soul. This is certain, — finite and participated things can- [Nothing
not be from themselves, nor be produced by themselves, gin^^to be
What would he conclude from hence? that therefore the
act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of
the will? or that the faculty is alwaj^s determined antece-
dently, extrinsecally, to will that which it doth will ? He
may as soon " draw water out of a pumice as draw any
such conclusion out of these premisses. Secondly, for his
" taking a beginning.^^ Either he understands " a beginning
of being,^^ or " a beginning of working and acting/' If he
understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly, that
nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself. But
this is nothing to his purpose. The question is not between
us, whether the soul of man or the will of man be eternal.
But if he understand & beginning of working or moving
actually," it is a gross error. All men know, that when a [iNiany
stone descends, or fire ascends, or when water that hath been ghiTo^acT
heated returns to its former temper, the beginning or reason ge/v^s"]'
is intrinsecal, and one and the same thing doth move and is
moved in a diverse respect. It moves in respect of the form,
" [Plant., Pers., I. i. 42.]
170
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part and it is moved in respect of tlie matter. Much more man,
III •
■ '- — who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end, is
most properly said to move himself. Yet I do not deny but
that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do
concur with the wiU : some outward, as the First Cause by
general influence, '"'which is evermore requisite, angels or
men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or
end by its appetibility, the understanding by directing ; so [me
inward, as] passions and acquired habits. But I deny,
that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of
man by determining it physically to one, except God alone,
Who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases : and where there
is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute
necessity, but true liberty.
[The will His second argument is ex concessis. " It is out of con-
necessary troversy,^^ saith he, " that of voluntary actions the will is a
cause of its neccssarv cause." The argument may be thus reduced : —
particular n ^ 7
acts.] necessary causes produce necessary eflPects ; but the will is a
necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his
major. Necessary causes do not always produce necessary
effects, except they be also necessarily produced ; as I have
shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book"". But I
answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary
cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without
"controversy" indeed; for it is without all probability. That
it wills when it wills, is necessary ; but that it wills this or
that, now or then, is free. More expressly; — the act of the will
may be considered three ways ; either in respect of its nature,
or in respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. First,
for the nature of the act. That which the will wills is neces-
sarily voluntary, because the will cannot be compelled ; and
in this sense, " it is out of controversy, that the will is a
necessary cause of voluntary actions." Secondly, for the
exercise of its acts, that is not necessary. The will may
either will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object; that is
not necessary but free. The will is not extrinsecally deter-
mined to its objects. As, for example, the Cardinals meet in
the conclave to choose a Pope. Whom they choose, he is
necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary, that they shall
" [Above Numb. xx. p. 138.]
I
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
171
choose this or that day. Before they were assembled^ they Discourse
might defer their assembling ; when they are assembled, they
may suspend their election for a day or a week. Lastly, for
the person whom they will choose, it is freely in their own
power ; otherwise, if the election were not free, it were void,
and no election at all. So that which takes its beginning
from the will is necessarily voluntary, but it is not neces-
sary that the will shall will this or that in particular ; as it
was necessary, that the person freely elected should be Pope,
but it was not necessary, either that the election should be at
this time, or that this man should be elected. And therefore
voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes, that
is, they are not necessitated.
NUMBER XXXI.
T. H. — Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to [vii. Evert/
718 which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing oflafnituffi-
the effect. The same is also a necessary cause : for if it be ^J^^^^^d
^ therefore a
possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the necessary
C(Z11SC I
effect, then there w^anted somewhat which was needful to the
producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if
it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the
effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause ; for that is
said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce
it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is
produced necessarily ; for whatsoever is produced, hath had a
sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. And
I, therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.
J. D. — This section contains a third argument to prove [Reply.]
that all effects are necessaiy; for clearing whereof, it is need -
ful to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or
insufficient.
First, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, i. [Causes
and the same taken conjointly be sufficient, to produce an sufficient'
effect: as two horses jointly are sufficient to draw" a coach, ^l"^"!^
J " ^ jointly are
which either of them singly is insufficient to do. Now, to sufficient.]
make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach, necessary,
172
A VINDICATION OP TRUE LIBERTY
Part it is not Only required that the two horses be sufficient to
— draw it, but also that their conjunction be necessary, and
their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of
one of these horses will not suffer him to draw ; if the smith
have shod the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the
horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade and will not draw
but when he list ; then the effect is not necessarily produced,
but contingently, more or less, as the concurrence of the causes
is more or less contingent.
2. [That Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either be-
perfysuffi" ^ausc it produccth that effect which is intended, as in the
cient generation of a man, or else because it is sufficient to pro-
which pro- . „
duceth the ducc that which IS produced, as in the generation of a
teiSed"] monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause,
the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility
of the cause be not necessary but contingent, then the effect
is not necessary but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that
the conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the pre-
misses be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstra-
tive. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect
can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the ability or debility
of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be necessary.
3. [A cause Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from
in respe'ct"* necessity most nearly is, that a cause is said to be sufficient
ty not^of J^espect of the abihty of it to act, not in respect of its will
its will, to to act. The concurrence of the will is needful to the produc-
act. 1
tion of a free effect ; but the cause may be sufficient though
the will do not concur : as God is sufficient to produce a
thousand worlds, but it doth not follow from thence, either
that He hath produced them, or that He will produce them.
The Blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind;
but it doth not follow, therefore, that all mankind shall be
actually saved by virtue of His Blood. A man may be a
sufficient tutor, though he will not teach every scholar ; and
a sufficient physician, though he will not administer to every
patient. Forasmuch therefore as the concurrence of the will
is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the
cause may be sufficient ^ in sensu diviso/ although the will do
not concur; it follows evidently, that the cause may be
sufficient, and yet something which is needful to the produc-
i
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
173
tion of the effect may be wanting, and that every sufficient Discourse
cause is not a necessary cause. —
Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear 4. [A suffi-
light^ and say, that though the free agent be sufficient 'in Zl^^s^^^^
semu diviso/ yet he is not sufficient ^ in sensu compositOy to o^]y^\\ypQ
produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, he theticaiiy
says true : but, first, he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy "^'^^^^^^y-^
of the former argument, which is a mere trifling between
sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a com-
pounded sense : and seeing the concurrence of the will is
not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before
it do concur ; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but
hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.
NUMBER XXXII.
T. H. — Lastly, I hold, that the ordinary definition of a free [viii. Free
agent, — namely, that a free agent is that, which, when all W/contra-
things are present which are needful to produce the effect^ fausTn /m-
can nevertheless not produce ity, — implies a contradiction, and pli^sasuffi-
^ ^ cient cause
is nonsense ; being as much as to say, the cause may be without an
^' sufficient,^^ that is_, necessary/^ and yet the effect not follow. effect.'\
19 J. D. — This last point is but a corollary or an inference [Reply.]
from the former, doctrine, — that " every sufficient cause pro-
duceth its effect necessarily which pillar being taken away,
the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having
nothing left to support it. " Lastly, I hold,^^ saith he — (what
he is able to prove is something ; so much reason, so much
trust ; but what he " holds," concerns himself not others ;
but what holds he ? — " I hold,^' saith he), — " that the ordinary
definition of a free agent implies a contradiction, and is non-
sense." That which he calls the " ordinary definition of
liberty, is the very definition which is given by the much
greater part of philosophers and schoolmen. And doth he
think that all these spake ^' nonsense ?" or had no more judg-
ment than to ' contradict^ themselves in a definition ? He
might much better suspect himself, than censure so many.
y [" Ilia est potentia libera, quae, Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii.
omnibus positis quae requiruntur ad c. 7 ; Op. torn. iii. p. 663. B.J
agendum, potest agere et non agere."
174
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part Let US sce the definition itself : — "A free agent is that, which,
'■ — when all things are present that are needful to produce the
effect, can nevertheless not produce it/' I acknowledge the
old definition of liberty, with little variation : but I cannot
see this nonsense,^'' nor discover this " contradiction for
in these words, " all things needful,^' or " all things requisite,"
[Sufficient the actual determination of the will is not included. But
chid?iJot by " all things needful or requisite,^' all necessary power,
determina- ^^i^hcr Operative or elective, all necessary instruments and
tionofthe adjuments extrinsecal and intrinsecal, and all conditions, are
intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a table,
a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his
hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he
may forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money,
and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all
things requisite for war, yet he may make peace if he will.
Matt. xxii. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel, — " I have pre-
pared My dinner. My oxen and My fatlings are killed, all
things are ready, come unto the marriage.^' According to
T. H. his doctrine, the guests might have told him, that he
said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. And
indeed, if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated ex-
trinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear
willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will,
then, if the will were wanting, something requisite to the
producing of the effect was wanting. But now, when science
and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men's
experience, doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over
its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation ;
if the power to will be present Hn actu primo,^ determinable
by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in
this respect to the producing of the effect.
[And refer Secondly, these words ^to act or not to act, to work or
ducibiuty, work, to produce or not to produce,' have reference to
production effect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but
effJcT] ' ^ thing to be done. They imply not the actual produc-
tion, but the producibility, of the effect. But when once the
will hath actually concurred with all other causes and con-
ditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible
or producible, but it is in being, and actually produced.
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
175
Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The ques- Discoursk
tion is, whether effects producible be free from necessity.
He shuffles out ^effects producible/ and thrusts in their
places ' efl'ects produced/ or, ^ which are in the act of pro-
duction.' Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither non-
sense" nor " contradiction to say, that a free agent, when
all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may
nevertheless not produce it.
NUMBER XXXIII.
T. H. — For my first five points, — where it is explicated, first, [Proof of
what spontaneity is ; secondly, what deliberation is ; thirdh^, fZm''men\'i
what will, propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free o/MejVoJ-«
agent is ; fifthly, what liberty is; — there can be no other proof "
offered but every man's own experience, by reflecting on words.']
himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind,
that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is
spontaneous^ a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent
or that action is free. Now he that so reflecteth on himself
cannot but be satisfied, but that "deliberation'' is the con-
sidering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come ;
that by spontaneity" is meant inconsiderate proceeding (for
else nothing is meant by it); that "will" is the last act of
our deliberation ; that a " free agent" is he that can do if he
will, and forbear if he will ; and that " liberty" is the absence
of external impediments. But to those that out of custom
speak not what they conceive but what they hear, and are
not able, or will not take the pains, to consider what they
think when they hear such words, no argument can be suf-
ficient; because experience and matter of fact is not verified
20 by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and
memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a
thing and to think it good are all one, to a man that does
not mark his own meaning by those words ? Or how can it
be proved, that eternity is not " nunc stans/' to a man that says
these words by custom, and never considers how he can con-
ceive the thing itself in his mind ? Also the sixth point, — that
176
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part a mail cannot imag^ine anvtliinor to besrin without a cause, —
III & V O t5 >
'■ — can no other way be made known but by trying how he can
imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if
there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at
one time as another ; that is, he hath equal reason to think
it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And there-
fore he must think there w^as some special cause, why it began
then rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never,
but was eternal.
[Reply.]
[Truth to
be sought
in reason,
not in
vulgar
notions.]
J. D. — Now at length he comes to his main proofs. He
that hath so confidently censured the whole current of school-
men and philosophers of nonsense," had need to produce
strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons (Numb,
xxxvi^) "demonstrative proofs." All demonstrations are
either from the cause or the eff'ect, not from private notions
and conceptions, which we have in our minds. That which he
calls a 'demonstration,^ deserves not the name of an intimation.
He argues thus : — ' That which a man conceives in his mind
by these words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c., that they are.^
This is his proposition, which I deny. The true natures of
things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions
of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an
ordinary person what " upwards" signifies, and whether our
antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards ; and he
will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs
must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows
not the formal reason thereof ; — that the heavens encircle the
earth, and what is towards heaven is upwards. This same
erroneous notion of "upwards" and " downwards," before the
true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary
capacities ; as appears by their arguments of " penduli homines"
and pendulae arbor es^." Again, what do men conceive
ordinarily by this word " empty," as when they say an empty
vessel ; or by this word " body," as when they say, there is
no body in that room ? They intend not to exclude the air
either out of the vessel or out of the room. Yet reason tells
' [Below p. 189.]
" [ Lactam., Div. Inst., lib. iii. c. 24.
pp. 288, 289. ed. Oxon. 1684 ; and see
Aug., De Civ. Dei, lib. xvi. c. 9, Op.
torn. V. p. 423. E, F.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
177
US, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a Discourse
true body. I might give a hundred such like instances. He '
who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar
notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors : like him,
who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignis fatuus, or a will-
with-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. His reason, —
" that matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments,
but by every man's own sense and memory,'' — is likewise
maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not,
is matter of fact, and sense is the proper judge of it ; but
what these words do or ought truly to signify, is not to be
judged by sense, but by reason. Secondly, reason may and
doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object.
Sense tells us, that the sun is no bigger than a good ball ; but
reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the
whole globe of the earth. As to his instance, — " How can it
be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good is all
one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these
words?" — I confess it cannot be proved, for it is not true.
Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as
goodness. ^ Cos amoris amor.' Love is a passion of the will, but
to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father
may love an ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good.
A man loves his own house better than another man's, yet he
cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His
other instance, — " How can it be proved, that eternity is not
* nunc stanSj to a man that says these words by custom, and
never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his
mind ?" — is just like the former ; not to be proved by reason,
but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not un-
like the counsel, which one gave to a novice about the choice
of his wife, to advise with the bells : as he fancied, so they
sounded, either take her or leave her.
Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition ; [Men's ex-
— that by these words, spontaneity, &c., men do understand contrary to
as he conceives. No rational man doth conceive a spon- ciu^ons.^]""
taneous" action and an "indeliberate" action to be all one.
Every " indeliberate" action is not " spontaneous." The fire
721 considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is
not "spontaneous." Neither is every "spontaneous" action
BRAMHALL. N
• 178 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part indeliberate a man may deliberate what he will eat^ and
— yet eat it '^spontaneously/' Neither doth deliberation"
properly signify the "considering of the good and evil sequels
of an action to come but the considering whether this be a
good and fit means^ or the best and fittest means, for obtain-
ing such an end. The physician doth not deliberate whether
he should cure his patient, but by what means he should cure
him^. Deliberation is of the means, not of the end^. Much
less doth any man conceive, with T. H., that deliberation is
an " imagination," or an act of fancy, not of reason, common
to men of discretion with madmen and natural fools and
children and brute beasts. Thii^dly, neither doth any under-
standing man conceive, or can conceive, either that the " will
is an act of deliberation," — the understanding and the will
are two distinct faculties, — or that " only the last appetite is to
be called our will." So no man should be able to say, this is
my will ; because he knows not whether he shall persevere in
it or not. Concerning the foui'th point, we agree, that " he
is a free agent, that can do if he will and forbear if he will.'^
But I wonder how this dropped from his pen. What is
now become of his absolute necessity of all things ? If a man
be free to do and to forbear anything, will he make himself
guilty of the nonsense" of the Schoolmen, and run with
them into " contradictions" for company'^ ? It may be he will
say, he can do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot
will if he will. This will not serve his turn : for if the cause
of a free action, that is, the will, be determined, then the
efi'ect, or the action itself, is hkewise determined; a deter-
mined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect : either
the agent can will, and forbear to will, or else he cannot do,
and forbear to do. But we diflPer wholly about the fifth point.
He who conceives " hberty" aright, conceives both a " liberty
in the subject" — to will or not to will, and a " libei-ty to the
object" — to will this or that, and a "liberty from impediments."
T. H., by a new way of his own, cuts off the "liberty of the
subject ;" as if a stone was free to ascend or descend, because
it hath no outward impediment : and the " hberty towards
" [Aristot., Ethic, III. v. 11.] ibid.]
^ [" Bov\iv6fj.^Qa S' 01) ir€pl rwv re- d [See above, T. H. Numb, xxxii. p.
\wp aWa irepl ruu irphs ret TfXrj." Id., 173.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
179
the object as if the needle touclied with the loadstone were Discourse
free to point either to\yards the north or towards the souths
because there is not a barricado in its way to hinder it : yea^
he cuts off the " liberty from inward impediments" also ; as if
a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked,
but not when they are tied. And so he makes " liberty from
extrinsecal impediments" to be complete liberty ; so he
ascribes "liberty" to brute beasts, and "liberty" to rivers;
and by consequence makes beasts and rivers to be capable of
sin and punishment. Assuredly, Xerxes, who caused the
Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes % was of this
opinion. Lastly, T. H. his reason, — that "it is custom, or
want of ability, or negligence, which makes a man conceive
otherwise," — is but a begging of that which he should prove.
Other men consider as seriously as himself, with as much
judgment as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and
yet they can apprehend no such sense of these v/ords. Would
he have other men feign that they see fier\" dragons in the
air, because he affirms confidently that he sees them, and
wonders why others are so blind as not to see them ?
The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a fantas-
tical, or imaginative reason : — ' how can a man imagine any-
thing to begin without a cause ? or if it should begin without
a cause, why it should begin at this time rather than at
that time ?^ He saith truly, nothing can " begin without a
cause," that is, to be ; but it may " begin" to act of itself
without any other cause. Nothing can begin without a
cause, but many things may begin, and do begin, without
necessary causes. A free cause may as well choose his time
when he will begin, as a necessary cause be determined ex-
trinsecally when it must begin. And although free effects
cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predeter-
mined in their causes, yet, when the fi-ee causes do determine
themselves, they are of as great certainty as the other ; as,
when I see a bell ringing, I can conceive the cause of it
as well why it rings now, as I know the interposition of the
earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, or the most
certain occurrent in the nature of things.
And now that I have answered T. H. his arguments drawn
« [Herod., vii. 35.]
N 2
180
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Pa r t from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of
words^ I desire him seriously, without prejudice, to examine
himself, and those natural notions which he finds in himself,
not of words, but of things ; these are from nature, those are
by imposition : whether he doth not find by experience, that 722
he doth many things which he might have left undone if he
would, and omits many things which he might have done if
he would; whether he doth not some things out of mere
animosity, and will, without either regard to the direction of
right reason, or serious respect of what is honest or profit-
able, only to shew that he will have a dominion over his own
actions ; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise men find
at some times in themselves by experience, and I appre-
hend this very defence of necessity against liberty to be
partly of that kind : whether he is not angry with those
who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires ; —
if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be angry with
them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a
rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent
will : — whether he doth not sometime blame himself, and say,
O what a fool was I to do thus and thus ! or wish to himself,
O that I had been wise ! or, O that I had not done such an
act ! If he have no dominion over his actions, if he be irre-
sistibly necessitated to all things what he doth, he might as
well wish, O that I had not breathed ! or blame himself for
growing old, — O what a fool was I to grow old !
NUMBER XXXIV.
ISufficient T. H. — For the seventh point, — that all events have neces-
causes ne- • i • ,-i t»t it
cessary sary causcs, — it is there proved, in that they have sufficient
causes.'^ causcs. Further, let us in this place also suppose any event
[Instance ucvcr SO casual, as, for example, the throwing ambs-ace upon
%ce!]^^'^^ a pair of dice, and see if it must not have been necessary be-
fore it was thrown : for, seeing it was thrown, it had a begin-
ning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, con-
sisting partly in the dice, partly in the outward things, as
the posture of the party's hand, the measure of force applied
by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and the
like. In sum, there was nothing wanting that was necessa-
AGAIXST MR. HOBBES.
181
rily requisite to the producing of that particular cast ; and, Discourse
consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For if it ~
had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite
to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been suffi-
cient. In the hke manner it may be proved, that every other
accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary
soever it be, is produced necessarily ; which is that J. D. dis-
putes against. The same also may be proved in this manner. [And of a
Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. ^Tis neces- IJin!] "'^
sary, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. If therefore it
be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not
rain. Otherwise it is not necessary, that the proposition — it
shaU rain, or it shaU not rain — should be true. I know there
are some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the
two shall come to pass, but not singly — that it shall rain or it
shall not rain. "\A'hich is as much as to say, one of them
is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary ; and therefore
to seem to avoid that absui'dity they make a distinction,
that neither of them is true determinate but indeterminate ;
which distinction either signifies no more than this, one of
them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity
remains, though we know it not : or if the meaning of the
distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might
as well have said, one of them is true Tityrice, but neither
of them Tvpatulice.
J. D. — His former proof, — that all sufficient causes are [Rei>]y.]
necessary causes, — is answered before. Numb, xxxi.^ And
his two instances, of casting ambs-ace, and raining to-mor-
row, are altogether impertinent to the question now agitated
between us : for two reasons. —
I I. First, our present controversy is concerning free actions, j-^^^^"^^'
which proceed from the liberty of man^s will : both his in- human ac-
stances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the in- of natural
determination, or contingent concun-ence, of natural causes, p^g^^j""*^"'
First, that there are free actions, which proceed merely fi'om
election without any outward necessitation, is a truth so
evident as that there is a sun in the heavens; and he that
doubteth of it, may as well doubt whether there shall be " a
f [Above pp. 171—173.]
182
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part shell Tvithout tlic iiut, OY a stone within the olives." A man
— ^ proportions his time each day, and allots so much to his
devotions, so much to his study, so much to his diet, so
much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visits,
so much to his rest ; he who will seek for I know not what
causes of all this without himself, except that good God
Who hath given him a reasonable soul, may as well seek for*a
cause of the Egyptian pyramids among the crocodiles of
Kilus. Secondly, for mixed actions, which proceed from the
concurrence of free and natural agents, though they be not
free, yet they are not necessary : as, to keep my former in-
stance, a man walking through a street of a city to do his
occasions, a tile falls from a house and breaks his head ; the 723
breaking of his head was not necessary, for he did freely
choose to go that way without any necessitation, neither was
it free, for he did not deliberate of that accident, therefore it
was contingent, and by undoubted consequence there are
contingent actions in the world which are not free. Most
certainly, by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the good
and bad angels, and men, with natural agents, sometimes on
purpose and sometimes by accident, many events happen
which otherwise had never happened, many effects are pro-
duced which otherwise had never been produced. And
admitting such things to be contingent, not necessary, all
their consequent effects, not only immediate but mediate,
must likewise be contingent ; that is to say, such as do not
proceed from a continued connexion and succession of neces-
sary causes : which is directly contrary to T. H. his opinion.
Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, though they be
not free, though they have not the use of reason to restrain
their appetites from that which is sensitively good by the
consideration of what is rationally good, or what is honest,
and though their fancies be determined by nature to some
kinds of work, yet to think that every individual action of
theirs and each animal motion of theirs, even to the least
murmur or gesture, is bound by the chain of unalterable
necessity to the extrinsecal causes or objects, I see no
[Matt. X. ground for it. Christ saith, ^''one of these sparrows doth
not fall to the ground without your Heavenly Father,"
[" Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in mice duri." Hor., Epist., II. i. 31.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
183
that is, "without an influence of power from Hinij or ex- Discourse
empted from His disposition ; He doth not say, Which your ^ —
Heavenly Father casteth not down. Lastly, for the natural
actions of inanimate creatures, wherein there is not the least
concurrence of any free or voluntaiy agents, the question is
yet more doubtful ; for many things are called contingent in
respect of us, because we know not the cause of them, which
really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessar}^
Also many things are contingent in respect of one single
cause, either actually hindered, or in possibility to be hin-
dered, which are necessary in respect of the joint concur-
rence of all collateral causes. But whether there be a neces-
sary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, so
as they must all have concurred as they have done, and in
the same degree of power, and have been deficient as they
have been, in all .events whatsoever, would require a further
examination, if it were pertinent to this question of liberty ;
but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed,
that all elective actions are free from absolute necessity;
and moreover, that the concurrence of voluntary and free
agents with natural causes, both upon purpose and acciden-
tally, hath helped them to produce many effects which other-
wise they had not produced, and hindered them from pro-
ducing many effects which otherwise they had produced;
and that if this intervention of voluntary and free agents
liad been more frequent than it hath been (as without doubt
it might have been), many natural events had been other-
wise than they are. And therefore he might have spared his
instances of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow. And
first for his casting ambs-ace. If it be thrown by a fair
gamester with indifferent dice, it is a mixed action. The cast-
ing of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is contin-
gent : a man may deliberate wdiether he will cast the dice or
not, but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast ambs-
ace or not, because it is not in his power, unless he be a
cheater, that can cog the dice, or the dice be false dice ; and
then the contingency or the degree of contingency ceaseth,
accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning, or as
the figure or making of the dice doth incline them to ambs-
ace more than to another cast, or necessitate them to this
184
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part cast and no other. Howsoever^ so far as the cast is free, or
' — contingent, so far it is not necessary; and where necessity
begins, there Kberty and contingency do cease to be. Like-
wise, his other instance, of raining or not raining to-morrow, is
not of a free elective act, nor always of a contingent act. In
some countries, as they have their "stati venti" — their "certain
winds" at set seasons, so they have their certain and set rains.
The Ethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the cer-
tain inundation of Nilus. In some eastern countries they
have rain only twice a year, and those constant, which the
[Deut. xi. Scriptures call " the former and the latter rain." In such
remTv^ 24. pl^ccs, not Only the causes do act determinately and necessa-
— &c.] rWj, but also the determination or necessity of the event is
foreknown to the inhabitants. In our climate the natural 724
causes, celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so neces-
sarily at set times ; neither can we say so certainly and infal-
libly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow.
Nevertheless it may so happen, that the causes are so dis-
posed and determined, even in our climate, that this proposi-
tion, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow,
may be necessary in itself ; and the prognostics or tokens may
be such in the sky, in our own bodies, in the creatures, ani-
mate and inanimate, as weather-glasses, &c., that it may be-
come probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow, or it
will not rain to-morrow. But ordinarily it is a contingent
proposition to us. Whether it be contingent also in itself, that
is, whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely
necessary, whether the vapours or matter of the rain may not
yet be dispersed, or otherwise consumed, or driven beyond
our coast, is a speculation which no way concerns this ques-
tion. So we see one reason, why his two instances are alto-
gether impertinent, — because they are of actions which are
not free, nor elective, nor such as proceed from the liberty of
man's will.
[And of 2. Secondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity ; his
nordf hy- proofs extend only to hypothetical necessity. Our question
potheticai jg whether the concurrence and determination of the causes
necessity.]
were necessary, before they did concur or were determined.
He proves, that the effect is necessary after the causes
have concurred and are determined. The freest actions
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
185
of God or man are necessary by such a necessity of sup- Discowupe
position ; and the most contingent events that are : as '■
I have shewed plainly, Numb, iii^, where his instance of
ambs-ace is more fully answered. So his proof looks
another way" from his proposition. His proposition is,
that the casting of ambs-ace was "necessary before it was
thrown.''^ His proof is, that it was necessaiy when it was
thro'wn. Examine all his causes over and over, and they will
not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity. The fii'st
cause is in " the dice true ; if they be false dice there may
be something in it, but then his contingency is destroyed ; if
they be square dice, they have no more inclination to ambs-
ace than to cinque and quater, or any other cast. His se-
cond cause is " the posture of the party's hand but what
necessity was there that he should put his hand into such a
posture ? None at aU. The third cause is " the measure of the
force applied by the caster." Now, for the credit of his cause,
let him but name, I will not say a comincing reason, nor so
much as a probable reason, but even any pretence of reason,
how the caster was necessitated from without himself to
apply just so much force, and neither more or less. If he
cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold his peace for
ever. His last cause is " the posture of the table." But tell
us in good earnest, what necessity there was why the caster
must throw into that table rather than the other, or that the
dice must fall just upon that part of the table '^'^ before" the
cast "was thrown." He that makes these to be necessary
causes, I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary effects.
If any one of these "causes" be contingent, it is sufficient to
render the cast contingent ; and now that they are all so con-
tingent, yet he will needs have the effect to be necessary. And
so it is when the cast is thrown, but not before the cast was
throAvn, which he undertook to prove. Who can blame him
for being so angiy with the Schoolmen, and their distinc-
tions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing they
touch his freehold so nearly ?
But though his instance of raining to-morrow be imperti- [of T. h.'s
nent, as being no fi'ee action, yet, because he triumphs so the shower
much in his argument, I wiU not stick to go a little out of ^^""^'"-^
^ [Above, pp. 29, 30.]
186
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part my Way to meet a friend. For I confess, the validity of the
— reason had been the same_, if he had made it of a free action :
as thus, — either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, or I shall
not finish this reply to-morrow, is a necessaiy proposition.
But because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in
the alteration of his terms, I will for once adventure upon
his shower of rain. And, first, I readily admit his major, — that
this proposition (either it will rain to-morrow, or it will not
rain to-morrow) is necessarily true ; for of two contradictory
propositions the one must of necessity be true, because no
third can be given. But his minor, — that "it could not be
necessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily
true,^^ — is most false. And so is his proof likewise ; — that "if
neither the one nor the other of the members be necessarily
true, it cannot be affirmed that either the one or the other is
true.^^ A conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and
yet the proposition be true ; as. If the sun shine it is day, is a
true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth as much 725
Numb. xix. — " If I shall live I shall eat, . . is a necessary pro-
position, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition
should be true whensoever uttered ; but it is not the neces-
sity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man
shall live, or that the man shall eat'.^' And so T. H. pro-
ceeds, " I do not use to fortify my distinctions with such rea-
sons J.^' But it seemeth lie hath forgotten himself, and is
contented with such poor fortifications. And though both
parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false, because if
it be a right disjunction the members are repugnant, whereof
one part is infallibly true; yet vary but the proposition a
little to abate the edge of the disjunctions, and yon shall find
that Avhich T. H. saith to be true, that " it is not the necessity
of the thing^^ which makes the proposition to be true. As, for
example, vary it thus : — "I know that either it will rain to-mor-
row, or that it will not rain to-morrow, ■'^ is a true proposition :
but it is not true, that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither
is it true, that I know it will not rain to-morrow ; wherefore
the certain truth of the proposition doth not prove, that either
of the members is determinately true in present. Truth is a
conformity of the understanding to the thing known, whereof
' [Above p. 122.] j [Ibid.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
187
speech is an interpreter. If the understanding agree not Discourse
with the thing, it is an error; if the words agree not with
the understanding, it is a He. Now the thing known is
known either in itself or in its causes. If it be known in it-
self, as it is, then we express our apprehension of it in words
of the present tense ; as. The sun is risen. If it be known in
its cause, we express ourselves in words of the future tense ;
as, To-morrow will be an eclipse of the moon. But if we nei-
ther know it in itself nor in its causes, then there may be a
foundation of truth, but there is no such determinate truth
of it that we can reduce it into a true proposition. We cannot
say, it doth rain to-morrow or it doth not rain to-morrow.
That were not only false but absurd. We cannot positively
say, it will rain to-morrow ; because we do not know it in its
causes, either how they are determined, or that they are de-
termined. Wherefore the certitude and evidence of the dis-
junctive proposition is neither founded upon that which will
be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do not know
! that j nor yet upon the determination of the causes, for then
we would not say indiflPerently, either it will rain, or it will
not rain, but positively it will rain, or positively it will not
rain : but it is grounded upon an undeniable principle, that
of two contradictory propositions the one must necessarily be
true. And therefore to sa}", either this or that will infallibly
be, but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be,
is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a ^' TiiT/rice Tii-
patuRce,-' but an evident truth, which no man that hath his
eyes in his head can doubt of.
If all this will not satisfy him, I wiU give one of his own [a con-
kind of proofs ; that is, an instance. That which necessitates gfance!]'
all things, according to T. H., is the decree of God, or that
order which is set to all things by the eternal cause (Numb,
xi.)^'. Now God Himself, Who made this necessitating decree,
was not subjected to it in the making thereof, neither was
there any former order to oblige the First Cause necessarily
to make such a decree ; therefore this decree, being an act ad
esctra, was freely made by God without any necessitation.
Yet nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily
true, — Either God did make such a decree or He did not
[Above pp. 58, 59.]
188
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part make such a decree. Again, thougli T. H. his opinion were
-^^^ — true — that all events are necessary, and that the whole Chris-
tian world are deceived, who believe that some events are
free from necessity, yet he will not deny, but if it had been
the good pleasure of God, He might have made some causes
free from necessity, seeing that it neither argues any imper-
fection, nor implies any contradiction. Supposing, therefore,
that God had made some second causes free from any such
antecedent determination to one, yet the former disjunction
would be necessarily true : — either this free undetermined
cause will act after this manner, or it will not act after this
manner. Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunc-
tive proposition doth not prove, that either of the members of
the disjunction, singly considered, is determinately true in
present, but only that the one of them will be determinately
true to-morrow.
NUMBER XXXV.
[ A free T. H. — The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole
*possihh'be- Controversy, namely, that there is no such thing as an agent,
cause a svf- which whcu all thinsTS requisite to action are present, can
ficient must ^ .
'be a neces- nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that
sarycause.'\ ^^^^^ such thing as frccdom from necessity, is easily 72
inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it
be an agent, it can work ; and if it work, there is nothing
wanting of what is requisite to produce the action ; and con-
sequently the cause of the action is sufficient ; and if suffi-
cient, then also necessarj^, as hath been proved before.
[Reply.] J- 3^- — I wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole
weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition, —
That there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all
things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless for-
bear to act,'^ — and yet bring nothing but such poor bulrushes
to support it. " If it be an agent,^' saith he, " it can work.^'
What of this t A posse ad esse non valet argumentum — from
" can work" to " will work," is a weak inference : and from
" will work" to " doth work upon absolute necessity," is
another gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus : — " If it
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
189
work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to pro- Discourse
duce the action/^ True, there wants nothing to produce '
that which is produced, but there may want much to produce
that which was intended. One horse may pull his heart out,
and yet not draw the coach whither it should be, if he want
the help or concurrence of his fellows. " And consequently,"
saith he, " the cause of the action is sufficient.'^ Yes, suffi-
cient to do what it doth, though perhaps with much prejudice
to itself, but not always sufficient to do what it should do, or
what it would do : as he that begets a monster should beget
a man, and would beget a man if he could. The last link of
his argument follows : — And if sufficient, then also neces-
sary." Stay there. By his leave there is no necessary con-
nexion between sufficiency and efficiency, otherwise God
Himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his argument is
vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and
grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove,
— that every effect in the world hath sufficient causes. Yea
more, that supposing the determination of the free and con-
tingent causes every effect in the world is necessary. But
all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean, for
still it amounts but to a hypothetical necessity, and differs
as much from that absolute necessity which he maintains, as
a gentleman who travels for his pleasure differs from a
banished man, or a free subject from a slave.
NUMBER XXXVI.
T. H. — And thus you see, how the inconveniences, which [Ofthein-
he object eth must follow upon the holding of necessity, are l/^denying^
avoided, and the necessity itself demonstratively proved. To
which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the incon-
veniency of denying necessity : as, that it destroys both the
decrees and prescience of God Almighty ; for whatsoever God
hath purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or
foreseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty such as
he affirmeth from necessitation, might frustrate and make not
to come to pass ; and God should either not foreknow it and
not decree it, or He should foreknow such things shall be as
shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.
190
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
^ III ^ — 1*^^^ hath laboured in vaiu_, to satisfy my reasons
[Reply.] prove his own assertion; but for ^demonstration/ there
is nothing like it among his arguments. Now he saith_, he
could add^^ other arguments if he thought it good logic/'
There is no impediment in logic^ why a man may not press
his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opi-
nion. ^ Argumentum ducens ad impossibilej or ^ ad ahsurdumj
is a good form of reasoning. But there is another reason of
his forbearance, though he be loth to express it. Hceret
lateri lethalis arundo^J' The arguments drawn from the at-
tributes of God do stick so close in the sides of his cause, that
he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By the way, take
notice of his own confession, that he " could add other reasons
if" he "thought it good logic.'' If it were predetermined in
the outward causes that he must make this very defence and
no other, how could it be in his power to add or substract
any thing ? Just as if a blind man should say in earnest,
I could see if I had my eyes. Truth often breaks out
whilst men seek to smother it. But let us view his argu-
ment.—
If a man have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate
the decrees of God and make His prescience false.
[Freedom First, for the decrees of God ; this is His decree, that man
inconsis"^' should be a free agent. If he did consider God as a most
God'Teter ^^^P^^ without priority or posteriority of time, or any
nai de- Composition, he would not conceive of His decrees as of the
crees.l
laws of the Medes and Persians, long since enacted, and
passed before we were born, but as co-existent with our- 72
selves, and Avith the acts which we do by virtue of those
decrees. Decrees and attributes are but notions to help the
weakness of our understanding to conceive of God. The de-
crees of God are God Himself, and therefore justly said to
be before the foundation of the world was laid ; and yet co-
existent with ourselves, because of the infinite and eternal
being of God. The sum is this : — the decree of God, or God |
Himself, eternally constitutes or ordains all effects which |
come to pass in time, according to the distinct natures or ca- "
. pacities of His creatures. An eternal ordination is neither
past nor to come, but always present. So free actions do pro-
i [Virg. ^n., iv. 73.]
AGAIXST MR. HOBBES.
191
ceed as w ell from the eternal decree of God as necessary, Discourse
and from that order which He hath set in the world.
As the decree of God is eternal, so is His knowledge ; and, [Nor with
. . His eler-
therefore, to speak truly and properly, there is neither fore - nal pre-
knowledge nor after-knowledge in Him. The knowledge of ^'^^^"'^^•J
God comprehends all times in a point, by reason of the emi-
nence and m-tue of its infinite perfection. And yet I confess,
that this is called foreknowledge in respect of us. But this
foreknowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things
are not therefore because they are foreknown, but therefore
they are foreknown because they shall come to pass. If any-
thing should come to pass othei'wise than it doth, yet God^s
knowledge could not be irritated by it ; for then He did not
know that it should come to pass as now it doth, because
eA cry knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its object.
God did know, that Judas should betray Christ ; but Judas
was not necessitated to be a traitor by God's knowledge. If
Judas had not betrayed Christ, then God had not foreknown
that Judas should betray Him. The case is this: — a watch-
man standing on the steeple's top, as it is the use in Germany,
gives notice to them below (who see no such things), that
company are coming, and how many. His prediction is most
certain, for he sees them. TMiat a vain collection were it for
one below to say, what if they do not come, then a certain
prediction may fail. It may be ui'ged, that there is a differ-
ence between these two cases. In this case the coming is
present to the watchman, but that which God foreknows is
future. God knows what shall be; the watchman only knows
what is. I answer, that this makes no difference at all in the
case, by reason of that disparity which is between God^s
knowledge and ours : as that coming is present to the watch-
man which is future to them who are below, so all those
things which are futiu^e to us are present to God, because His
infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future being
of all agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged
by T.H. (Xumb.xi.™), — that foreknowledge is knowledge, and
knowledge depends on the existence of the things known,
and not they on it." To conclude : the prescience of God
doth not make things more necessary than the production of
[Above p. 59.]
192
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
the things tliemselves ; but if the agents were free agents, the
production of the things doth not make the events to be abso-
lutely necessary, but only upon supposition that the causes
were so determined. God^s prescience proveth a necessity of
infallibihty, but not of antecedent extrinsecal determination
to one. If any event should not come to pass, God did never
foreknow that it would come to pass ; for e\ery knowledge
necessarily presupposeth its object °.
NUMBER XXXVII.
T. H. — This is all that hath come into my mind touching
this question, since I last considered it : and I humbly beseech
your Lordship to communicate it only to J. D. And so,
praying God to prosper your Lordship in aU your designs, I
take leave, and am, my most noble and obliging Lord,
Your most humble servant, T. H.
J.D. — He is veiy careful to have this discourse kept secret, as
appears in this section, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth sec-
tions °. If his answer had been kept private, I had saved the
labour of a reply ; but hearing that it was communicated, I
thought myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and myself.
I do not blame him to be cautious ; for in truth this assertion
is of desperate consequence, and destructive to piety, policy,
and morahty. K he had desii'ed to have kept it secret, the
way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not
suffice to say, as Xumb. xivP, that " truth is truth this is the
common plea of all men : neither is it sufficient for him to
say, as Numb, xv'^, that " it was desired" by me. Long before
that he had discovered his opinion by word of mouth ; and
my desire was, to let some of my noble friends see the weak-
ness of his grounds, and the pernicious consequences of that
opinion. But if he think that this ventilation of the question
between us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of
his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any
rational man, who is not too much possessed with prejudice.
[Seethe passages from the Fathers « [Ahove pp. 85, 102. And see also
collected in Bellarmine, De Grat. et T. H. Numh. xi, above p. 60.]
Lib. Arb., lib. iv. cc. 9, 13 ; Op. torn. p [Above p. 85.]
iii. pp. 726—729, 738.] i [Above p. 102.]
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
193
DiscounsE
NUMBER XXXVIII. L
POSTSCRIPT.
T. H. — Arguments seldom work on men of wit and [The cause
^ . , . o/ the erro-
learning, when they have once engaged themselves m a
7ieous opi-
contrary opinion. If anything do it, it is the shewing of J^.J^^^^^^^-j
them the causes of their errors : which is this. — Pious men
attribute to God Almighty, for honour' sake, whatsoever
they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing,
willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c., but deny Him such
poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without
which we worms neither have nor can conceive such faculties
to be : and so far they do well. But when they dispute of
God's actions philosophically, then they consider them again
as if He had such faculties, and in that manner as we have
them ; this is not well : and thence it is they fall into so many
difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature; He is no
fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consist eth in
obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in gi^^ng God such
honom', both in attributes and actions, as they in their
several lieutenancies shall ordain.
J. D. — Though sophistical captions do seldom work on [Reply.]
men of wit and learning," because by constant "use they
have their senses exercised to discern both good and e\il Heb. v. i4.
yet solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them
than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance
is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into
it; especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or
opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply them-
selves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of
success with " men of wit and learning." Those whose gold
is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch. Since
the former way hath not succeeded, T. H. hath another, — to
"shew us the causes of our errors;" which he hopes will prove
more successful. When he sees he can do no good by fight,
he seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy. " Fistula
duke canit volucrem dum decipit auceps\^' As they who behold
' [Dionys. Caton., Distich., lib. i. dist. 27.]
BR.\MnALL. n
194
A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY
Part themselves in a glass, take the right hand for the left, and the
'■ — left for the right (T. H. knows the comparison) ; so we take
our own errors to be truths,, and other men's truths to be
errors. If we be in an error in this, it is such an error as we
sucked from nature itself ; such an error as is confirmed in
us by reason and experience ; such an error as God Himself
in His sacred Word hath revealed ; such an error as the
Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered ;
such an error wherein we have the concurrence of all the
best philosophers, both natural and moral ; such an error as
bringeth to God the glory of justice, and wisdom, and good-
ness, and truth ; such an error as renders men more devout,
more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent
for their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advan-
tages to dance blindfold after his pipe? No; he persuades
us too much to our loss. But let us see what is the imagi-
nary cause of an imaginary error. Forsooth, because we
" attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as
seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom ; but deny
Him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains and " so far,^^ he
saith, "we do well." He hath reason ; for since we are not able
to conceive of God as He is, the readiest way we have is by
removing all that imperfection from God which is in the
creatures; — so we call Him infinite, immortal, independent ;
or by attributing to Him all those perfections which are in
the creatures after a most eminent manner, — so we call Him
best, greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. But, saith he,
"when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then they
consider them again as if He had such faculties, and in the
manner as we have them.'' And is this the cause of our error?
That were strange indeed ; for they who dispute philosophi-
cally of God, do neither ascribe faculties to Him in that man-
ner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper
faculties at all to God. God's understanding and His will is
His very essence, which for the eminency of its infinite perfec-
tion doth perform all those things alone, in a most transcendent
manner, which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly
by distinct faculties. Thus to dispute of God with modesty
and reverence, and to clear the Deity from the imputation of 729
tyranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none do throw
AGAINST MR. HOBBES.
195
upon God witli more presumption than those who are the Discourse
patrons of absolute necessity, is both comely and Christian. '
It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed
error, which draws them ordinarily into these exclamations
against those w^ho dispute of the Deity. For some of them-
selves dare anatomise God, and publish His eternal decrees
with as much confidence as if they had been all their lives of
His cabinet council. But it is for fear, lest those pernicious
consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially, and
reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness, should
be laid open to the view of the world; just as the Turks
do, — first establish a false religion of their ovm debasing,
and then forbid all men, upon pain of death, to dispute
upon religion ; or as the priests of Molech the abomina- [ i Kings
tion of the Ammonites^^) did make a noise with their timbrels ^'
all the while the poor infants were passing through the fire
in Tophet, to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their
parents : so they make a noise with their declamations
against those who dare dispute of the nature of God, that is,
who dare set forth His justice, and His goodness, and His
truth, and His philanthropy, only to deaf the ears and dim
the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the
lamentable ejulations and bowlings, or see that rueful spec-
tacle, of millions of souls tormented for evermore in the
flames of the true Tophet, that is. Hell, only for that which
according to T. H. his doctrine was never in their power to
shun, but which they were ordered and inevitably necessi-
tated to do ; only to express the omnipotence and dominion,
and to satisfy the pleasures, of Him Who is in truth the " Fa- [2 Cor. i.
ther of^' all "mercies,^^ and the " God of^^ all consolation." xv. 5.°]™
"This is life eternal,^^ saith our Saviom^, to "know the only johnxvii.
true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom He hath sent.^^ " Pure j^^es i.
rehgion and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to
visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep
himself unspotted from the world," saith St. James. "Fear Eccies.
God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty
of man," saith Solomon. But T. H. hath found out a more
compendious way to Heaven. True religion," saith he, " con-
sisteth in obedience to Clmst^s lieutenants, and giving God
such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their
o2
196 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY, &C.
Part several lieutenancies shall ordain/^ That is to say, be of the
'• — religion of every Christian country where you come. To
make the civil magistrate to be " Christ^s lieutenant" upon
earth for matters of religion, and to make him to be su-
preme judge in all controversies, whom all must obey, is a
doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Chris-
tian ears, that I should have missed his meaning, but that I
consulted with his book De Cive, c. xv. sect. 16s, ^nd c. xvii.
sect. 28 1. What if the magistrate shall be no Christian
himself? What if he shall command contrary to the law of
Acts [v.] 29. God or nature ? Must we obey him rather than God Is
[1 Tim. iii. the civil magistrate become now the only "ground and pillar
^^'^ of truth?" I demand then, why T. H. is of a different mind
from his sovereign, and from the laws of the land, concern-
ing the attributes of God and His decrees? This is a new
paradox, and concerns not this question of liberty and neces-
sity. Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it further, and so
conclude my reply with the words of the Christian poet ; —
" Cae saris jussum est ore Gallieni
" Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes.
* * * *
" i^lternum colo Principem, dierum
" Factorem, Dominutnque Gallieni'*."
• [p. 188. The title of this section This quotation as printed in the original
(p. 173) runs thus, — In regno Dei edition of 1655, contained several mis-
naturali civitatem posse cultum Dei prints ; and among others, " colemus"
instituere arbitrio suo."] for " colo" in the third line : see below
* [pp. 254 — 256 : and the title (p. p. 502. Bramhall seems also to have
215), — " Christianam civitatem Scrip- followed the punctuation of the older
turas interpretari debere per pastores editions of Prudentius in vv. 3, 4; viz.
Ecclesiasticos." " Principem dierum, Factorem Domi-
u [Prudent., ITept Sre^aj/coi/, Hymn. numque Gallieni :" which after all
in honor. Fructuosi, &c., vv. 41 — 45. seems the better reading of the two.]
DISCOURSE II
CASTIGATIONS
OF
MR. HOBBES
HIS LAST ANIMADVERSIONS
IN THE CASE
CONCEKNING LIBERTY AND UNIVERSAL NECESSITY;
WHEREIN
ALL HIS EXCEPTIONS ABOUT THE CONTROVERSY
ARE FULLY SATISFIED.
BY
JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.
AND
BISHOP or DERRY.
THE LIP OF TRUTH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED FOR EVER, BUT A LYING
TONGUE IS BUT FOR A MOMENT." PrOV. xii. 19.
CONTENTS.
Page
An Answer to Mr. Hobbes his UpoXeyofieua : and first to his
Epistle to the Reader. . . . . .209
Mr. Hobbes his mistake of the question. . . . . ib.
Mr. Hobbes his principles refuted by his practice. . . .210
Freedom to do and not to will refuted. . . . .211
An Advertisement from the Author to the Reader. . 213
An Answer to [Mr. Hobbes] his relation of the occasion of
the Controversy. . . . . . .215
Eleven gross mistakes in a few lines. . . . . ib.
[Concerning the old philosophers. . . . . ib.
the primitive Christians. .... 216
St. Paul. . . . . . .217
the doctors of the Roman Church. . . ib.
— the Reformed Churches. . . . .218
Arminius.] . . . . . . ib.
Concerning the Stating of the Question. . . 219
The conversion of a wilful sinner concerneth not this question, . ib.
A wiKvil cavil. . . . . . . .220
Difference between natural and moral efficacy. • . . ib.
Not to will is a mean of abnegation between willing and nilling. . 221
His distinction between free to will and free to do, confuted. . . ib.
[Holy Scripture.] . . . . . ' . .223
The sensual and rational appetite very different. . . . 225
An Answer to his Fountains of Arguments in this Question. . 226
Mr. Hobbes his flourish. . . . . . . ib.
His presumption. . . . . . . .227
The attributes of God argumentative. ..... 228
His texts of Scripture cited impertinently. .... 229
All his arguments out of Scripture answered. . . . ib.
[Gen. xlv. 5. . . . . . . .230
Of God's hardening the heart. . . . . . ib.
200
CONTENTS.
Page
Of Shimei's cursing David. ..... 230
Jobxii. 14; &c.] .231
Jerem. x. 23. . . . . . . . ib.
John vi. 44. . . . . . . . ib.
[1 Cor. iv. 7. .232
^- xii. 6. ....... ib.
How we are God's workmanship. . . . . . ib.
Texts attributing the will to do good works to God.] . . ib.
How sinners are said to be dead, ..... 233
Man is more free to will than to do. . . . . 234
His second sort of texts do confute him unanswerably. . . 235
T. H., [in his third sort of texts,] first woundeth the Scripture, and
then giveth it a plaster. . . . . . . ib.
God's prescience doth not necessitate. .... 236
Yet is infallible. . . . . . . . ib.
[Of Joseph's brethren. . . . . . . ib.
How God is the cause of corporal motions.] . . . 237
Hardness of heart not derived from God's permission. . . ib.
God's hand in good and evil actions. .... 238
God's revealed will, and His secret will, not contrary. " . . ib.
[Inconveniences of] the doctrine of universal necessity. . . 240
[It] taketh away all care of doing well. . . . . ib.
That which shall be shall be, a poor fallacy. . . . 241
T. H. his confession, that no man is justly punished but for crimes
he might have shunned. . . ... 242
[What holds good of punishments, holds good of rewards also.] . 243
No proper punishment but for sin. . . . , . ib.
Why God did not make man impeccable. . . 244
Punishments of the damned are eternal. .... 246
God's prescience proveth infallibility, not necessity. . . ib.
[T. H.'s invectives against unsignificant words. . . . 249
His confusion between -vnlling and thinking.] . . . ib.
An Answer to the Animadversions upon the Epistle to my Lord
of Newcastle. . . . . . . .250
An Answer to the Animadversions upon the Bishop's Epistle to
the Reader. . . . . . . .251
[T. H.'s Epistle surreptitiously printed. . . . . ib.
The author's exceptions to T. H.'s book Be Give. . . . 252
' valediction defended.] . . . . ib.
An Answer to his Animadversions upon my Reply; — Number I. 253
[Difference between diversion and determination.] . . , ib.
CONTENTS. 201
Page
Resolution proveth election and liberty. .... 254
[T. H.'s objections answered.] ..... 256
What is necessary. ....... 257
An Answer to his Animadversions upon the Reply ; — Number II. 259
Chance is from accidental concurrence, not from ignorance. . . ib.
[Suarez. . . . . . . . . ib.
Epictetus.] . . . . . . . .261
An Answer to the Animadversions upon Number III. . 262
Exact definitions not frequent. . . . . . ib.
What liberty is. . . . . . . . ib.
What is spontaneity. ....... 263
What is necessity. ....... 264
Necessity of being and acting distinguished. . . . ib.
[T. H. confoundeth liberty and will. .... 265
His presumptuous rejection of received terms of art.] , . ib.
Necessity upon supposition, what it is. . . . . . 266
Man is not a passive instrument, as the sword in his hand. . . 268
[Of contingent and free causes.] ..... 269
The instance in ambs-ace hath lost T. H. his game. . . . 270
[T. H. confoundeth absolute and hypothetical necessity.] . .271
T. H. his will is no more than the bias of a bowl. . . . ib.
[His absurd presumption.] ...... 272
St. Austin more to be credited than T. H. . . . . 273
To give liberty to two, and limit to one, is a contradiction. . . ib.
[He who is free to act, is much more free to will.] . . . 274
According to T. H. his principles all persuasions are vain. . . 275
[Upon his principles] we can blame no man justly. . . . ib.
A lame comparison. ....... 276
T. H. maketh himself no better than a wooden top. . . . 277
An Answer to his Animadversions upon Number IV. . 278
[Liberty of exercise and of specification.] . . . . ib.
T. H. his deep skill iji logic. ..... 279
His silly definitions. . . . . . . ib.
Meditation little worth without making use of other men's experience. . 281
Terms of art are ungrateful to rude persons. .... 282
[Of Luther and Melancthon, and the Schoolmen.] . . ib.
Castigations upon the Animadversions ; — Number V. . 283
202
CONTENTS.
Page
Castigations upon the Animadversions ; — Number VI. . 283
[Scripture proof, that men have power of election.] . . . ib.
Freedom to do if one will, without freedom to will, a vain distinction. . 284;
And maketh T. H. a degree worse than the Stoics. . . . 287
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number VII. . 288
[How the will followeth the judgment of reason. . . . ib.
The will and the understanding explained.] . . . . ib,
*^ Judicium practice practicum" ex-plained. .... 289
How the object is, and how it is not, the cause of seeing. . .291
Castigations of his Animadversions ; — Number VIII. . 292
[All T. H.'s contention is about terms, not things.] . . . ib.
Spontaneity. . . . . . . . .293
Conformity signifieth agreeableness as well as likeness. . . . ib.
AiiTo/jLaTa, what they are. ...... 294
A true will may be changed. . . . . . .296
[T. H.'s contradictions.] . . . . . . . ib.
Voluntariness doth not depend on the judgment of others. . . 297
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number IX. . 300
1 Kings iii. 11. [explained.] . . . . . . ib.
Election, of more than one. . . . . . . ib.
Acts V. 4. — " Was it not in thy power" — explained. . . .301
Castigations upon the Animadversions; — Number X. . 302
Out of hatred to true liberty T. H. makes God hypocritical. . . ib.
God's secret and revealed will not contrary ; and why. . . , 304
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XI. . 305
[T. H.'s most ridiculous presumption.] ..... 306
Occult virtue or influence. . . . , . . ib.
[T. H. reduced to an absurdity.] ...... 307
Castigations upon the Animadversions ; — Number XII. . 308
It is blasphemy to say, that God is the cause of sin. . . . ib.
Or to say, that sin is efficaciously decreed by God. . . . ib.
God's permission no naked permission. . ... 310
The difference between general and special influence. . . .311
[Case of David and Uriah. , .... 312
The true question between T. H. and the author. . . , .313
The Jews might recover their former estate.] .... 314
CONTENTS.
203
Page
God may oblige Himself. . . . . . .315
God cannot do any unrighteous thing. . . . . . ib.
[T. H.'s irrelevant instance of the brute beasts.] . , • .317
Jt is just to afflict innocent persons for their own good. . . .318
Sin is properly irregularity. . . • • . . ib.
God no cause of irregularity. . ..... 319
[Castigations upon the Animadversions;] — Number XIII. 320
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XIV. . ib.
Laws may be unjust. . . .... 321
Impossibilities made by ourselves may be justly imposed, [but] not impos-
sibilities in themselves. . .... 322
Proper punishment is ever vindictive in part. .... 324
Yet further of unjust laws. . . .... 325
The authority of the Scriptures not dependent on the printer. . . 327
[How they are a law to us. ..... 328
Their Divine authority. . . . . . ib.
The law of nature coincident with them. . . . ib.
Their antiquity. . ...... 329
Catholic consent for them. ...... 330
T. H. his standard of religious truth is the civil magistrate. . . ib.
Law of conquest. ] . . . . . .331
T. H. a fit catechist for disloyal and unnatural persons. . . . ib.
[Not all lawgivers elective. ...... 332
• A just law justly executed a cause of justice.] .... 333
Mankind never without laws. ...... 334
Never lawful for private men ordinarily to kill one another. , . 335
T. H. attorney- general for the brute beasts. .... 339
Seen and unseen necessity. ...... 341
If all things be absolutely necessary, admonitions are all vain. . . 343
A litter of absurdities. . ...... 344
What is 'morally good.' ...... 345
Rewards of brutes and men differ. ..... 347
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XV. . 348
[T. H.'s impertinencies.] . ..... ib.
What it is to honour God. . ..... 350
What are devils in his judgment. . . . . .351
[The attributes of God not all included in His omnipotence. ] . , 352
God doth not hinder privately what He commands openly. . . ib.
His opinion destroyeth the truth of God. . . . . ib.
And His goodness. ....... 353
And His justice. . ...... 354
And [His] omnipotence, [by] making [Him] the cause of sin. . . 355
Aright Hobbist cannot praise God. ..... 356
204
CONTENTS.
Page
Nor hear the Word or receive the Sacrament worthily. . . . 357
Nor vow as he ought. . ...... 358
Nor repent of his misdeeds. . . . . . . ib.
What repentance is. . . . . . . . 359 "
Man's concurrence with God's grace. ..... 360
Confidence in prayer, and the efficacy of it. .... 362
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XVI. . 363
T. H. still mistaketh necessity upon supposition. . . . 364
There is more in contingency than ignorance. .... 365
[T. H.'s definition of contingents. . . . . . ib.
Indetermination of causes.] ...... 366
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XVII. . ib.
[The opinion of necessity taketh away the nature of sin.] . . ib.
Sin in the world before the civil law. . . . . • 368
[The true nature of sin.] . ..... 369
To command impossibilities is unjust. . . . . . ib.
[T. H.'s instance of a civil judge.] ..... 370
Yet further against his silly distinction, — free to do if he will, not free to will.371
Ofmonsters. . . ..... 372
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XVIII. . 373
[Lipsius.] . . . ..... ib.
What is said to be " in Deo," and what " extra Deum." . . . 374
[Free SLcts oi God extra Deum ; — Creation and Government.] . . 375
To will and do, in God, the same thing.— He willeth not all He could will. 376
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XIX. . 377
T. H. makes the will to be compelled. . . . , . ib.
[What is properly compulsion.] 378
Motus primo primi, and antipathies. • . . . . 379
To search too boldly into the nature of God is a fault. . . . 380
But the greater fault is negligence. . . . , . ib.
T. H. his liberty, omnipotence in show, in deed nothing. . . 381
He dare not refer himself to his own witnesses. .... 382
Terms of art. . . ..... ib
A contradiction. . . .... 386
Castigations of the Animadversions ;— Number XX. . 387
Election and compulsion inconsistent. . . . . ib.
[T. H.'s instance of a stone falling.] . . . ^ . ib.
There are mixed actions. • . . , . 388
CONTENTS. 205
Page
[Election of one out of more, inconsistent with determination to one.] . 389
Rational will. . . ..... ib.
Passive obedience. . . ..... 390
Compulsion, what it is. . . . . . ,391
Fear of hurt doth not abrogate a law. ..... 392
Natural agents act determinately ; . . . . . 393
Not voluntarily. . . ..... ib.
[The more reason, the more liberty. ..... 394
True liberty, a freedom from necessity as well as from compulsion.] . 395
T. H. maketh God the cause of sin. ..... 396
Six witnesses for universal necessity answered. .... 397
[Elicit and imperate acts of the will.] ..... 399
Mental terms. . . ..... ib.
Metaphorical drawing. . ..... 400
Castigations of the Animadversions; — Number XXI. . ib.
Paradoxes, what they are. . ..... ib.
[T.H.'s subtlety, — that everything is a cause of everything.] . . 402
Whether a feather make a diamond yield. . . . . ib.
Or a falling drop move the whole world. .... 404
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXII. . 405
Power of objects concerneth the moral philosopher. . . . ib.
Still he seeketh to obtrude hypothetical necessity for absolute, , , ib.
Hearing and speaking all one with T. H. . . . . . 406
There are other motions than local. . . . , , 407
Spirits moved as well as bodies. . , . . , , ib.
Both bodies and spirits move themselves, , . . , 408
Quality infused by God. . . . . . . ib.
[T. H.'s reiterated paradoxes.] ..... 409
Castigations of the Animadversions ; Number XXIII. . 410
The imderstanding and will two powers of the reasonable soul. . . ib.
[Election doth not necessarily follow the last judgment.] . .411
Man's willing is not like a falling stone, , , , . ib.
Absolute necessity admitteth no contraiy supposition. . . .412
A man may will contrary to the dictate of reason. . . . ib.
An erroneous conscience obligeth first to reform it, then to follow it. . 413
Reason is the true root of liberty. . . . . . ib.
Actions may be equally circumstantiated. . . . , ,414
Passions often prevail against reason, . . . . .415
Man was created to be lord of the creatures. .... 416
How the understanding giveth to objects their proper weight, . .417
206
CONTENTS.
Page
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXIV. . 418
Blasphemy in the abstract and in the concrete differ much. . . ib.
A man may knoAv a truth certainly, yet not know the manner. . .419
The doctrine of liberty an ancient truth. .... 420
Liberty to will more reconcileable with prescience than liberty to do. . 421
How the will of God is the necessity of all things. . . . 422
What it is to permit only and to permit barely. . . .423
[Universals nothing but words, according to T. H.] . . . 424
Eternity is no successive duration. . . . . . ib.
[T. H.'s show of confidence.] ...... 425
"VMiy God is said to be justice itself, &c. . . . . . ib.
God is indivisible. ....... 426
God is eternity itself. ....... 427
[Eternity a " nunc jytowi."] . . , . . . ib.
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXV. . 428
What a judge judgeth to be indeliberate, is impertinent. . . ib.
And his assertion false. . . . . . . ib.
A man cannot predeliberate perfectly of contingent events. . . 429
[Spontaneity. . . . . . . . ib.
Liberty.] ........ 430
Endeavour is not of the essence of liberty. . . . . ib.
There may be impediments before deliberation be done. . .431
And liberty when it is ended. . . . . . ib.
[Secret sympathies and antipathies. . . . . . ib.
Habits facilitate actions.] ..... 432
Some undeliberated actions may be punishable. . . . ib.
Virtual deliberation. ...... 433
Children not punishable with death. .... 434
[Private and public justice.] ..... 435
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXVI. . ib.
He knoweth no reason but imagination. . . . . ib.
[And this upon the grovmd of imagination.] . . . 436
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXVII. . 438
The faculty of willing is the will. . . . . . ib.
Of concupiscence. ....... 439
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXVIII. . 440
Of the intellectual and sensitive appetite. . . . . . ib.
Not the same thing. . . . . . , . ib.
His deliberation is no deliberation. . . . . .441
His liberty no true liberty. ...... 442
CONTENTS.
207
Page
Castigations of the Animadversions; — Number XXIX. . 443
His definition of liberty. . . . . . . ib.
Analogical matter, ....... 445
By his definition a stone is free to ascend. .... 446
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXX. . 447
Beginning of motion from the mover. ..... ib.
The same faculty ^^'illeth or nilleth. ..... 448
[Matter and power indifferent to contrary forms.] . . . ib.
Other causes concur with the will. . . . . . ib.
Necessary causes do not always act necessarily. . . . 449
[The will not a necessary cause of its particular acts. . . . 450
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXXI and
Number XXXII .451
Two sorts of sufficiency. . . . . . . ib.
[A sufficient cause not a necessary cause. ..... 453
T. H.'s mistakes.] ....... 455
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXXIII. . 456
Our conceptions are not the touchstone of truth. . . . . ib.
His gross mistakes about eternity. ..... 460
[Of spontaneity.] . . . . . . . ib.
What is his deliberation. . . . . . .461
Man is free to will, or he is not free to do. . . . .462
He maketh a stone as free to ascend as descend. . . . ib.
A hawk, saith he, is free to fly when her wings are plucked. . . 463
A beginning of being and acting. ..... 464
His answer to some demands. . . . . . . ib.
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXXIV. . 466
[T. H.'s boasts and blunders. . . . . . . ib.
Four sorts of actions. ....... 467
1. The acts of free agents.] . . . , . . ib.
Free to do if he will, yet not free to will, is against law and logic. . ib.
2. [Concerning mixed actions.] ..... 468
A necessary effect requires all necessary causes. . • . ib.
3. [The individual acts of brute beasts not antecedently necessitated. . 469
4. The natural acts of inanimate creatures necessary.] . . . 470
His instance of ambs-ace. . . . . . .471
His other instance of raining or not raining to-morrow. . . . 473
God's decree considered act[ive]ly and passively. . . . 476
God knows all future possibilities. . . . . .477
208
CONTENTS.
Page
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXXV. . 478
His argument to prove universal necessity answered. . . . ib.
Possible and impossible all one with T. H. . • . . 479
Remote causes are not together mth the elFect. .... 480
Nor doth all time make one instant. . . . . .481
Castigations upon the Animadversions; — Number XXXVI. 482
T. H. admitteth no absurdities but impossibilities. . . . ib.
Castigations of the Animadversions ; — Number XXXVII. 483
[Little harm in the publication of T. H.'s arguments.] . . . ib.
Abuses do not flow essentially from good doctrines, as [they do] from
universal necessity. ....... 484
Castigations of the Animadversions upon the Postscript ; —
Number XXXVIII. . . . .485
Solid reasons work soonest upon solid judgments. . . . ib.
Three sorts of men. ....... 486
The doctrine of liberty maketh no man careless or thankless. . 487
God hath no faculties. . . . . . . ib.
God is incomprehensible. ...... 489
Yet, so far as we can, we are obliged to search after Him. . . ib.
To admit that God is infinite, is enough to confute T. H. . . 490
Tophet . . . . . . . . .491
True religion consisteth not in obedience to princes. . . . ib.
Active and passive obedience. . . . . " . . 498
Universal practice against him. ...... 499
The just power of princes. . . . . . . ib.
He confesseth that ecclesiastical persons have a privilege above himself. . 500
[The primitive Christians obeyed God rather than man. . . . 502
T. H.'s wise principles. . . . . . . ib.
His postscript.] ........ 503
AN ANSWER
TO
MR. HOBBES HIS UpoXeyofiei^a:
AND FIRST
TO
HIS EPISTLE TO THE READER.
Christian Reader, thou hast here the testimony of Mr. Mr.Hobbes
Hobbes, that " the questions concerning necessity, freedom, of the q^ues^
and chance," are " clearly discussed" between him and me,
in that little volume which he hath lately published*. If
they be, it were strange ; whilst we agree not much better
about the terms of the controversy, than the builders of [Gen. xi.
Babel did understand one another^s language. A necessity ^
upon supposition (which admits a possibility of the contrary)
is mistaken for an absolute and true necessity. A freedom
from compulsion is confounded with a freedom from necessi-
tation. Mere spontaneity usurpeth the place of true liberty.
No chance is acknowledged, but what is made chance by our
ignorance or nescience, — because we know not the right
causes of it. I desire to retain the proper terms of the
Schools ; Mr. Hobbes flies to the common conceptions of the
vulgar; a way seldom trodden but by false prophets and
seditious orators. He preferreth their terms as more intelli-
gible ; I esteem them much more obscure and confused. In
such intricate questions, vulgar brains are as uncapable of the
* [Epistle to the Reader, prefixed which the whole of Bramhall's Defence
to " The Questions concerning Liberty, (Disc. i. Pt. iii.), viz. all the three
Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated tracts contained in it, was reprinted,
and debated between Dr. Bramhall with Hobbes' " Animadversions " upon
Bishop of Derry and Thomas Hobbes each number successively.]
of Malmesbury," 4to. Lond. 1656. — in
BRAMHALL. p
210
EPISTLE TO THE READER.
Part things^ as of the terms. But thus it behoved him to prevari-
— ^H: — Gate, that he might not seem to swim against an universal
stream; nor directly to oppose the general current of the
Christian world. There was an odd fantastic person in our
times^ one Thomas Leaver who would needs publish a logic
in our mother^s tongue. You need not doubt but that the
public good was pretended. And because the received terms
of art seemed to him too abstruse^ he translated them into
English; styling a subject an inholder, an accident an in-
beer, a proposition a shewsay^ an affirmative proposition a
yeasay, a negative proposition a nay say, the subject of the
proposition the foreset, the predicate the backset,, the conver-
sion the turning of the foreset into the backset and the back-
set into the foreset. Let Mr. Hobbes himself be judge, whe-
ther the common logical notions or this new gibberish were
less intelligible.
Haec a se non multum abludit imago
Mr. Hobbes But, reader, dost thou desire to see the question discussed
pi'L'iefmed clearly to thy satisfaction ? Observe but Mr. Hobbes his prac-
Jjy^'^P*"^*^" tics, and compare them with his principles, and there needs
no more. He teacheth, that all causes and all events are
absolutely necessary ; yet, if any man cross him, he frets and
fumes and talks his pleasure ; —
" Jussit quod splendida bills'*."
Doth any man in his right wits use to be angry with
causes that act necessarily? He might as well be angry
with the sun, because it doth not rise an hour sooner; or
with the moon, because it is not always full for his pleasure.
He commands his servant to do thus to as much purpose, if
he be necessitated to do otherwise, as Canutus commanded
the waves of the sea to flow no higher^. He punisheth him,
if he transgress his commands, with as much justice, if he
have no dominion over his own actions, as Xerxes com-
^ [" The Arte of Reason, rightly than those quoted in the text : e. g. a
termed V^itcraft, teaching a perfect definition is a " say-what," a category
way to argue and dispute: Made by is a " storehouse," a mood is a " seat,"
Raphe Lever:" 8vo. Lond. 1573: — in &c.]
four books, pp. 233, with " A note to ^ [Horat., Sat., II. ill. 320.]
understand the meaning of neue de- [Id., ibid., 141.]
vised Termes" subjoined. Bramhall's « [See Sharon Turner, Hist, of An-
recollection of the book is substantially glo- Saxons, bk. vi. c. 11. vol. ii. pp.
accurate. The other " new devised 342 — 344. 8vo. edit. ; from Matt, West-
terms" are if possible more ludicrous mon., Henry of Huntingdon, &c.]
EPISTLE TO THE READER.
211
raanded so many stripes to be given to the Hellespont for Discourse
breaking doAvn his bridge^. He exhorts him, and reprehends — — —
him ; he might as well exhort the fire to burn_, or reprehend
it for burning of his clothes. He is as timorous in a thunder
or a storm, as cautelous and deliberative in doubtful causes,
as if he believed that all things in the world were contingent,
and nothing necessary. Sometimes he chideth himself; —
" how ill advised was I, to do thus or so !" — O that I had
thought better upon it !" or " had done otherwise Yet
all this while he believeth, that it was absolutely necessary
for him to do what he did, and impossible for him to have
done otherwise. Thus his own practice doth sufficiently con-
fute his tenets. He will tell us, that he is timorous and soli-
citous because he knows not how the causes will determine.
To what purpose ? Whether their determination be known
or unknown, he cannot alter it with his endeavours. He
will tell us, that deliberation must concur to the production
of the effect. Let it be so ; but if it do concur necessarily,
why is he so solicitous and so much perplexed? Let him
sleep or wake, take care or take no care, the necessary causes
must do their Avork.
Yet from our collision some light hath proceeded towards Freedom
the elucidation of this question ; and much more might have not to win
arisen, if Mr. Hobbes had been pleased to retain the ancient
734 School terms ; for want of which his discourse is still ambi-
guous and confused. As here he tells thee, that we " both
maintain, that men are free to do as they will, and to for-
bear as they will^.'^ My charity leads me to take him in the
best sense, only of free acts, and then with dependence upon
the First Cause, That man who knows not his idiotisms,
would think the cause was yielded in these words, whereas in
truth they signify nothing. His meaning is, he is as free to
do and forbear, as he is free to call back yesterday. He may
call until his heart ache, but it will never come. He saith, a
man is free to " do^^ if he will, but he is not free to "will" if
he will^. If he be not free to will, then he is not free to do.
Without the concm-rence of all necessary causes it is impos-
sible that the effect should be produced. But the concur-
f [Herod., vii. 35.] a, p. 209, Epist. to Reader.]
^ [Questions &c., as quoted in note [Ibid.]
p 2
212
EPISTLE TO THE READER.
Part rence of the will is necessary to the production of all free or
— voluntary acts. And if the will be necessitated to nill^ as it
may be^ then the act is impossible; and then he saith no
more in effect but this — a man is free to do if he wiU that
which is impossible for him to do. By his doctrine^ all the
powers and faculties of a man are as much necessitated and
determined to one, by the natural influence of extrinsecal
causes, as the will. And therefore, upon his own grounds, a
man is as free to will as to do.
The points wherein he saith we disagree are set down
loosely in hke manner. What our tenets are, the reader
shall know more truly and distinctly by comparing our writ-
ings together, than by this false dim light which he holds
out unto him.
He is pleased, if not ironically, yet certainly more for his
own glory than out of any respect to me, to name me a
" learned school divine^;" an honour which I vouchsafe not
to myself. My life hath been too practical to attend so
much to those speculative studies. It may be, the School-
men have started many superfluous questions, and some
of dangerous consequence; but yet I say, the weightier
ecclesiastical controversies will never be understood and
stated distinctly without the help of their necessary distinc-
tions'^.
Reader, I shall not in this rejoinder abuse thy patience
with the needless repetition of those things which thou hast
seen already, nor quest at every lark which he springs ; but
wheresoever he hath put any new weight into the scale,
either in his answers or objections, I shall not omit it in due
place.
i [Questions &c., Epist. to Reader.] c. vii ; above in vol. iii. pp. 567, 5(58,
^ [Compare the Vindic. of Grotius note a, Disc. iii. Pt. ii.]
and Episcop. Divines against Baxter,
AN ADVERTISEMENT" FROM THE AUTHOR
TO THE READER.
MARCH 11, 1658. STILO NOVO.
Christian Reader, by tlie slowness of this edition, and
by the errors of the press, which do ordinarily happen to
authors that are absent, thou may est judge of the difficulties
and remoras which we meet withal in such occasions. The
greatest part of the errata are ob^dous to an intelligent
reader ; I intreat thee to correct them with thy pen. Some
of the chiefest (which did seem to alter or obscure the sense)
I have collected, and appointed them to be set down at the
foot of this advertisement; so many as I could observe in
once reading over the copies cursorily, for I have had no
more time since I received them.
Be pleased further to take notice, that yesterday came to
my hands a copy of Mr. Serjeant's treatise called Schism
Dispatched^, written against Doctor Hammond and myself, it
being the first time that I have viewed it. I wish I had had a
graver adversary in this cause, who had consulted more with
his own judgment and experience, and less with passion and
prejudice. The contention is not equal, between an ancient
doctor and a young prevaricator, whose office is to make
freshmen laugh and gape'^. When Mr. Serjeant hath wea-
ried himself twenty or thirty years longer in the study of
theology*^, he will grow less impetuous and censorious.
* [The Castigations were first printed
in 1657, as appears by a title-page to
the tract, which to half the impression
forms the only title, and which bears
this date. The work of printing the
book however lasted until 1658 ; when
four leaves were added to the remain-
ing copies ; two before the original
title-page, containing a new title-page,
dated 1658, as follows — Castigations of
Mr. Hobbes his last Animadv. in the
case concerning Liberty and Univ. Ne-
cessity, witli an Appendix concerning
the Catching of Leviathan or the Great
Whale, — the other leaf being blank ;
two after the Answ. to the UpoXeySfxeua,
containing the above Advertisement
and a Table of Errata. In other re-
spects, the several copies of this the
original edition, one or two trifling cor-
rections excepted, are identically the
same.]
'* [Schism Dispatch't, or, A Re-
joynder to the Replies of Dr. Ham-
mond and the Ld. of Derry, by S. W.
8vo. n. p. 1657. See above in vol. ii.
Preface, and pp. 358. note j, 363. note
a ; and vol. i. p. xxviii.]
[See above in vol. ii. pp. 356. note
b, 358. note j. J
214
ADVERTISEMENT.
Part but more judicious and discreet ; and of so much more value
— in the eyes of others as he setteth a less value upon himself.
Now I have a copy, if God bless me with life and health, I
shall endeavour in a short time to let the world see, that my
religion is as much better than his, as my charity is greater.
r3.3
DISCOURSE II.
CASTIGATIONS
OF
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS,
[first printed in LONDON, A.D. 1657 — 1658.]
AN ANSWER TO HIS RELATION OF THE OCCASION OF
THE CONTROVERSY.
1. Here is nothing of moment to advantage his cause. An- Eleven
other man would say, here is nothing alleged by him which is fakes in a
true. Whereas he saith, that the " question disputed among ^co^clrn'
the old philosophers^' was. — whether all things that come the
to pass proceed from necessity, or some from chance^/ — it sophers.]
was as well debated among the old philosophers, whether
all things come to pass by chance, and nothing proceed from
necessity, — and likewise, — whether some events proceed
from necessity, and some come to pass by chance, — as that
which he mentions, — "whether all CAcnts proceed from ne-
cessity, or some'' come to pass "by chance." That is the
first error.
2. His second error is, that he opposeth "chance" to "neces-
sity^ as if all things came to pass by necessity, which come
not to pass by chance : whereas those ancient philosophers
(of whom he speaks) did oppose contingency to necessity,
and not chance alone. Chance is but one branch of contin-
gency. Free acts are done contingently, but not by chance.
3. Thirdly, he is mistaken in this also, that he saith, those
ancient philosophers did never " draw into argument the al-
mighty power of the Deity c." For we find in TuUy^, and in
* [Questions &c., Occas. of Controv., = [Ibid.]
p. 1.] [Cic, De Divin., lib. i. cc. 55, 56.1
^ [Ibid.]
216 CASTIGATIONS OF
Part Ckn^sippus (as he is alleged by Eusebius®), that one of the
'- — main grounds of the Stoics was the prescience of God ; and
that the predictions of their oracles and prophets could not
be certain, unless all things came to pass by inevitable
necessity.
4. Fourthly, he erreth in this, that liberty is a " third way
of bringing things to pass, distinct from necessity and con-
tingency For Hberty is subordinate to contingency. They
defined contingents to be those things which might either
come to pass or not come to pass; that is, either freely or
casually: and in all their questions of contingency, hberty
was principally understood.
5. His fifth error is, that "free will is a thing that was
never mentioned among them?.'^ I believe it was never
mentioned by them in English, by the name of " free will
but he may find " avre^ovaiov" and " irpoaipeaLvJ' Let him
read Aristotle alone ; and he shall find not only this free
elective power of the will, but also the diflPerence between
voluntary or spontaneous (which is all the liberty he admit-
teth), and free or that which is elected upon dehberation^. 75
Hear Calvin, — " Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen
extititj Grcecos vero non puduit arrogantius usurpare vocabu-
lum, siquidem ' avre^ovacov' dixerunt '\''
[Concern- 6. Sixthly, he erreth yet more grossly in saying, that " free
pifmUhe ^^'^ never mentioned by Christians in the beginning
Christians.] Christianity," but " for some ages [past] " brought in
by the doctors of the Roman Church^." Whereas it is
undeniably true, that sundry ancient Fathers have written
whole treatises expressly of free will^ ; that there is scarcely
one Father that doth not mention it ; and sundry of the first
^ [Chrysipp,, ap. Euseb.,] De Prae- de Lib, Arb.), St. Chrysostom (Ora-
par. Evang., lib. vi. c. 11. [p. 287. fol. tiones V. de Provid. et Fato), St. Au-
Paris. 1628.] gustin (De Lib. Arb., lib. iii?, and De
* [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1. " dis- Gratia et Lib. Arb.), St. Prosper (Epist.
tinct from necessity and chance."] de Grat. et Lib. Arb. ad Ruffinum), St.
6 [Ibid.] Anselm (Lib. de Concord. Gratiae et Lib.
^ [Aristot.,] Ethic, lib. III. cc. iii, Arb.,andDial.deLib. Arb.), St. Bernard
iv, V. (Tractat. de Grat. et Lib. Arb.) ; and of
' [Calvin,] Instit., [lib.] II. c. ii. Fathers who have treated the subject
sect. 4. [Op. torn. ix. p. 62. ed. Amst.] incidentally, Origen (De Princip., lib.
[Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.] iii.), Eusebius (Praep. Evang., lib.
^ [Compare the list given by Bellar- vi.), St. John Damascene (De Fide
mine in c. 1. bk. iii. of his Treatise De Orthod., lib. ii. c. 2-5, sq.), Boethius
Grat. et Lib. Arb. : viz. St. Basil (Serm. (De Consolat. Philosoph., lib. v.), &c.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
217
heretics, as Simon Magus™, the Manichees, the Marcionites, Discourse
&c.", and their followers, have been condemned for maintain- — ~
ing absolute necessity against free will.
7. His seventh error is, that " St. Paul never useth the [Concern-
term of free will, nor did hold any doctrine equivalents^ to it^. pfuLj"
Hear himself; — " Am I not an Apostle ? am I not free ? .
have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as
the other Apostles ? . . or I only and Barnabas, have not
we power to forbear working V St. Paul did those things
freely upon his own election, which he was not necessitated
to do ; and did forbear those things freely, which he was not
necessitated to forbear. This doctrine is " equivalent^' to ours,
of the freedom of the will from necessitation. Take another
place, wherein you have both the name and the thing; —
" Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having
no necessity, but hath power over his own will.'' The words
in the original are a plain description of the old " avTe^ovaLov"
(which name Calvin did so much dislike) or free will; —
" i^ovalav Be €-)(€l irepX rov Ihiov 6eKrjfjbaT0<^.'' Here is not
only freedom, but power and dominion. Mr. Hobbes
teacheth us, that a man is free to do, but not free to will.
St. Paul teacheth us, that a man " hath power over his own
will." Then he is free to will ; then his will is not extrinse-
cally predetermined.
8. Eighthly, he wrongs the doctors of the Roman Church, [Concem-
as if they exempted the will of man from the dominion of ^ors^of the
God's willP." They maintain, that the freedom of the will of Se"'^" ,
. Church.]
man is expressly from the will of God, Who made it free.
They teach, that God can suspend the act of the will, can
determine the will, can change the will, doth dispose of all
the acts of the will, can do anything but compel the will,
which implieth a contradiction q.
9. Ninthly (to let us see what a profound clerk he is in
ecclesiastical controversies), Mr. Hobbes thinks he hath hit
the nail on the head, of the difference between the Church of
" [See Vincent of LerinSjCommonit, 17. C, D), and for the Marcionites,
p. 313. 4to. Bremae 1688. — " Quis ante Irenaeus, Adv. Haeres., lib. i. c. 29 (p.
Simonem Magum . . auctorem malo- 104. ed. Grabe).]
rum, id est, scelerum, impietatum, fla- " [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.]
gitiorumque nostrorum,ausus estdicere ^ [Ibid. pp. 1, 2.]
Creatorem Deum?"] i [See Bellarm,, De Gratia et Lib.
" [See for the Manichees, Aug. Lib. Arb., lib. iv, cc. 14 — 16; Op. torn. iii.
de Haeres., c. xlvi. (Op. torn. viii. p. pp. 740 — 753.]
218
CASTIGATIONS OF
p II T Rome and us concerning free will^ in this disputation''. JuvSt
'■ — as the blind senator in Juvenal made a large encomium of the
goodly turbot which lay before Caesar, but (as ill luck would
have it) turned himself the quite contrary way : —
" . . . At illi dextra jacebat"
"Bellua^ . . . ."
The controversy lies on the other side ; not about the free-
dom of the will in natural or civil actions, which is our
question, but (if it be not a logomachy) about the power of
free will in moral and supernatural actions without the
assistance of grace.
[Concern- 10. In the tenth place, he misinforms his readers, that
formed ^ " this Opinion^' (of freedom from necessitation and deter-
Churches.] jQ^nation to one) " was cast out by the Reformed Churches
instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others*." Where have the
Reformed Churches, or any of them, in their public confes-
sions, cast out this freedom from necessitation whereof we
write ? Indeed Luther" was once against it, and so was
Melancthon^ ; but they grew wiser, and retracted whatsoever
they had written against it^. And so would Mr. Hobbes do
likewise, if he were well advised. Either he did know of
Luther's retraction, and then it was not ingenuously done to
conceal it ; or (which I rather believe) he did not know of it,
and then he is but meanly versed in the doctrine and affairs
of the Protestants.
[Concern- 11. Lastly, he accuseth "Arminius^^ to have been a re-
mfnius.'] storer or " reducer" of the Romish doctrine of free wilP by
a postliminium. I do not think that ever he read one word
of Arminius in his life, or knoweth distinctly one opinion
that Arminius held. It was such deep controvertists as him-
^ [Qu., Occ. of Controv., pp. 1, 2.] Arb., as it stands in the first edition of
" [Juv., iv. 120, 121.] the book, 12mo. 1521: and Bellarm.,
t [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 2.] De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iv. c. 5, Op.
" [See the Assert. Omn. Art. D. M. torn. iii. pp. 718, 719.]
Lutheri a Leone X. Damnat, art. 36 ; y [By Luther, in his Liber de] Visitat.
inter Opera M. Lutheri, torn. ii. pp. 310. Saxon., [viz. his Apolog. pro Confess,
b, &c. fol. Jense, 1564; — and the Aug., A.D. 1538, Artie, de Lib. Arb. ;
Quaestio de Viribus et Voluntate Ho- Op. torn. iv. p. 248]. — [By Melanch-
minis sine gratia, dispiitata Wirtem- thon, in his] Loci Commun., [artt. De
bergae Anno 1516, Conclus. ii. Coroll. Lib. Arbit. etde Caussa Peccati,] edit.
1 ; ibid. torn. i. p. 1, a; — and the cele- poster, [scil. 12mo. 1546. — The book
brated tract De Servo Arbitrio, 8vo. was first published in 1521, and the
Witemb. 1526.] first article of those just referred to was
^ [See his Annot. on the Epist. to almost wliolly rewritten for the later
tlie Romans, c. viii. (p. 50. 8vo. 1523) ; edition.]
and hi? Loci Communes, art. de Lib. « [Qu. Occ. of Controv., p. 2.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
219
self that accused the Church of England of Arminianism, for Discourse
holding those truths which they ever professed before — ^
Arminius was born. If Arminius were alive, Mr. Hobbes,
out of conscience, ought to ask him forgiveness. Let him
speak for himself: — " De libero hominis arbitrio ita sentio/^
&c. ; "in statu vero lapsus" &c. — " This is my sentence of free
:^37 will, that man . . . fallen can neither think, nor will, nor do
that which is truly good, of himself and from himself; but
that it is needful that he be regenerated and renewed in his
understanding, will, affections, and all his powers, from God,
in Christ, by the Holy Ghost, to understand, esteem, con-
sider, will, and do aright, that which is truly good^.^' It was
not the speculative doctrine of Arminius, but the seditious
tenets of Mr. Hobbes, and such like, which opened a large
window to ovir troubles.
How is it possible to pack up more errors together in so
narrow a compass ? If I were worthy to advise Mr. Hobbes,
he should never have more to do with these old philosophers
(except it were to weed them for some obsolete opinions, —
Chrysippus used to sa}^, ' he sometimes wanted opinions but
never wanted arguments^'), but to stand upon his own
bottom, and make himself both party, juror, and judge in
his own cause.
CONCERNING THE STATING OF THE QUESTION.
The right stating of the question is commonly the midway The con-
to the determination of the difference ; and he himself con- of a wnfui
fesseth, that I have done that more than once : savinsr that he dinner con-
^ ^ o cerneth not
thinketh I have done it over cautiously, — " with as much this ques-
caution as^^ I would draw up " a lease Abundant caution
* Declar. Sententiae Arminii ad Ord.
Hollandiae, [pp. 121, 122. inter Op.
Jac. Armmii, Lugd. Bat. 4to. 1629. —
" De libera arbitrio hominis ita sentio ;
hominem in primo statu creationis suas
ejuscemodi notitia, sanctitate, iisque
viribus instructum fuisse, ut verum
bonum intelligere, aestimare, consi-
derare, velle, et perficere valuerit, pvout
quidem ei mandatum erat ; sed hoc
tamen non nisi cum auxilio gratias Dei :
in statu vero lapsus et peccafi, e,r seipso
et a seipso, quod quidem vere bonum est,
neque cogitare, neque velle, aut facere
posse ; sed vecesse esse ut a Deo in
Christo per Spiritum Sanctum Ipsius re-
generetur et renove.tur in intellectu, affec-
tionibus sive voluntate, omnibiisqiie viri-
bus, ad id quod vere bonum est recte
intelligendiim, cBstimandum, consideran-
dum, volenditm, et faciendum."'\
b [Diog. Laert., vii. 179.]
^' [Qu., State of Quest., p. 3.]
220
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part was never thought hurtful until now. Doth not the truth
— require as much regard as " a lease ?" On the other side, I
accuse him to have stated it too carelessly, loosely, and con-
fusedly. He saith, he understands not these words, " the
conversion of a sinner concerns not the question^.^^ I do
really beheve him. But in concluding, that whatsoever he
doth not understand is unintelligible, he doth but abuse
himself and his readers. Let him study better what is the
different power of the will in natural or ci\'il actions, which is
the subject of our discourse, and moral or supernatural acts,
which concerns not this question ; and the necessity of add-
ing these words will clearly appear to him.
A wilful Such another pitiful piece is his other exception, against
cavil. these words, "without their own concurrence^;" which, he
saith, are " unsignificant, unless" I "mean that the events
themselves should concur to their own production s." Either
these words were " unsignificant," or he was blind, or worse
than blind, when he transcribed them. My words were
these, " whether all agents and all events be predetermined^ :"
he fraudulently leaves out these words, "all agents," and
makes me to state the question thus, — " whether all events
be predetermined without their own concurrence * whereas
those words — " without their own concurrence" — had no
reference at all to "all events" but to "all agents ;" which
words he hath omitted.
Difference The state of the question being agreed upon, it were vanity
natinS and mere beating of the air in me, to weary myself and the
moral effi- reader with the serious examination of all his extravasrant
cacy. ^
and impertinent fancies : as this, — " whether there be a moral
efficacy which is not naturaP ;" — which is so far from being
the question between us, that no man makes any question of
it, except one, who hath got a blow upon his head with a mill-
sail. Natural causes produce their effects by a true real in-
fluence, which implies an absolute determination to one : as
a father begets a son, or fire produceth fire. Moral causes
have no natural influence into the effect, but move or induce
[Qu., State of Quest., p. 3.—" Not (? [Ibid.]
intelligible, is, first, that 'the conver- *> ^D^fejice,] Numb. iii. [above, p.32.]
sion,' " &c. — from the Defence, Numb. • [Qu., State of Quest, p. 2.]
iii. above p. 32, Disc. i. Pt. iii.] i* [Ibid., p. 3.J
' [Ibid., from the Defence, ibid.]
MR. IIOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
221
some other cause without themselves to produce it : as when Discourse
a preacher persuadeth his hearers to give alms; here is no
absolute necessitation of hearers, nor anything that is opposite
to true liberty.
Such another question is that which follows, — " whether
the object of the sight be the cause of seeing^/' — meaning (if
he mean aright) the subjective cause : or, — how the under-
standing" doth "propose the object to the will™;" — which
though it be bhnd, as philosophers agree, yet not so blind as
he that will not see, but is ready to follow the good advice of
the intellect. I may not desert that which is generally ap-
proved, to satisfy the fantastic humour of a single conceited
person. No man would take exceptions at these phrases,
"the will willetli," "the understanding understandeth"," the
former term expressing the faculty, the latter the elicit act,
but one who is resolved to pick quarrels with the whole world.
" To permit a thing willingly to be done" by another*', that Not to will
is evil, not for the eviFs sake which is permitted, but for that of abnega-
good's sake which is to be drawn out of it, is not to will it Jjvren^wiii-
positively, nor to determine it to evil by a natural influence; ing and
w^hich whosoever do maintain, do undeniably make God the
author of sin. Between positive willing, and nilling, there is
a mean of abnegation, that is, not to will.
738 That " the will" doth " determine itself p," is a truth not to
be doubted of. What different degrees of aid or assistance
the will doth stand in need of in different acts, natural, moral,
supernatural; where a general assistance is sufficient, and
where a special assistance is necessary^; is altogether imper-
tinent to this present controversy, or to the right stating of
this question.
In the last place, he repeateth his old distinction, between His distinc-
a man^s freedom " to do" those things which are " in his [wren^free
power," if he " will," and the freedom " to will" what he i« ^^'^
_ _ free to do,
will^^; which he illustrateth (for similitudes prove nothing) confuted,
by a comparison drawn from the natural appetite to the
. rational appetite ; — " will is appetite," but " it is one ques-
tion, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite ; and
' [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.— ° [Ibid.]
" Cause thai it is seeji."] v [Ibid.]
[Ibid.] <i [Ibid.]
" [Ibid.] [Ibid.]
222
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part another" question^ " ^yhethe^ he be free to have an appetite'/'
— iii — " In the former," he saith, he " agreeth with" me, that a man
is "free to do what he wilP," "In the latter," Ije saith, he
" dissents" fi'om me, that a man is not "free to will"." And
(as if he had nttered some profound mystery) he addeth in a
triumphing manner, that "if" I "have not been able to dis-
tinguish between those two questions," I "have not done
well to meddle with either ;" and " if" I " have understood
them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is fi^ee to do if
he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with" my
" readers ''."
Yet let us have good words. " Homini homo quid prastat^'"
— " what difference is there between man and man ?" That
so many wits before Mr. Hobbes in all ages should beat their
brains about this question all their lives long, and never meet
with this distinction, which strikes the question dead. What
should hinder him from crpng out " evpnjKa, evprjKa' — " I
have found it, I have found it^?" But stay a little; the
second thoughts are M'iser ; and the more I look upon this
distinction, the less I like it. It seemeth like the log in the
fable, wliich terrified the poor frogs with the noise it made at
the first falling of it into the water, but afterwards they in-
sulted over it, and took their turns to leap upon it. Some take
it to be pure nonsense; — "whether a man be free in such things
as be within his power^;" that is, whether he be free wherein
he is free, or that be within his power which is in his power.
I have formerly shewed^, and shall demonstrate further as
there is occasion, that this distinction is contradictory and
destructive to his own grounds; according to which all the
other powers and faculties of a man are determined to one
by an extrinsecal flux of natui'al causes, equally with the will ;
and therefore a man is no more necessitated to will or choose
what he will do, than to do what he wills. Secondly, I have
shewed'^, that this distinction is vain and unuseful, and doth
not hold off so much as one blow from Mr. Hobbes and his
« [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.]
(locetur ne suaviter quideiii wivi posse
secund. Epicuri decreta, c. xi ; Op.
Moral., torn, v, p. 311. ed. Wyttenb.]
t [Ibid.]
" [Ibid.]
^ [Ibid.]
" [Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.]
> [Terent., Eun., II. ii. 1.]
' [Archimedes, ap. Plut., Disput.qua
[Defence, Numb. iii. above, p. 30.]
' [Ibid., p. 32.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSION'S.
223
bleeding cause. All those gross absm-dities which do neces- Discourse
sarily foUoAv the ineA"itable determiuation of all actions and — —
events by extrinsecal causes, do fall much more hea^-ily and
insupportably upon the exti-insecal determination of the will.
So he sticks deeper by means of this distinction in the same
mire. All the gi'oimd of justice that he can find in punish-
ments, is this ; that though men's actions be necessary, yet
they do them willingly^. Now if the will be ii-resistibly de-
termined to all its individual acts, then there is no more jus-
tice to punish a man for willing necessarily than for doing
necessai'ily. Thii'dly, I have shewed already^ in part, that
this distinction is contraiy to the sense of the whole world,
who take the will to be much more fi'ee than the perform-
ance : which may be thus enlai'ged. — Though a man
were thi-ust into the deepest dungeon of Eui'ope, yet iu
despite of all the second causes he may will his own
liberty. Let the causes heap a conglomeration of diseases
upon a man, more than Herod had ; yet he may will his [Acts xiL
own health. Though a man be withheld fi-om his fi'iend ^^'^
by seas and moimtains, yet he may will his presence. He
that hath not so much as a cracked groat towai'ds the pay-
ment of his debts, may yet will the satisfaction of his creditors.
Xnd though some of these may seem but pendulous wishes
of impossibilities, and not so compatible ^vith a serious de-
hberation, yet they do plainly shew the fi'eedom of the will.
^•'In great things"^ (said the poet) ''it is sufficient to have
willed^" that is, to have done what is in our power. So we
say, " God accepteth the will,^' that which we can, for the
deed,^^ that which we cannot. ^' If there be first a willing 2 Cor. viii.
mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath" '^that is,
to will', ^' and not according to that he hath not" (that is,
'39 to perform) . And yet more plainly, — '*' To will is present Rom.vii. is.
with me, but how to perform that which is good, that find I
not.'^ Yet saith T. H., '' a man is fi-ee to do what he wills/''
but not ''to ^^-ill'' what he will do-.
To come yet a little neai-er to T. H. For since he refuseth ^H..iy
all human authority, I must stick to Scripnu'e. It is called
[See above in the Defence, T. H.,
Numb. xiv. p. 85.]
* [Defence, Xumb. iii. above p. 31.]
^ '•• Iu n:agiiis et voluisse sat est.'
Propert-, Eleg., II. x. 6.J
^ [Qu.. St..te o; Quest., p. 4. J
224
CASTIGATIONS OF
P A^R T a man^s " own will/' and his " own voluntary will/' If it be de-
'- — termined irresistibly by outward causes, it is rather their
Lev i 3 • V ti J
and xix. 5. own will" than his " own will." Nay, to let him see, that
the very name of "free wilF' itself is not such a stranger in
Ezravii.i3. Scripture as he imagineth, it is called a man's " own free
will." How often do we read in the books of Moses, Ezra,
and the Psalms, of "free will offerings." This free will is
Phiiem. 14. opposed not Only to compulsion, but also to necessity; — "not
of necessity but willingly;" — and is inconsistent with extrin-
secal determination to one, with which election of this or that
Gen. xiii.9. indifferently is incompatible. " Is not the whole land before
thee ?" said Abraham to Lot ; " if thou wilt take the left hand,
then I will go to the right ; or if thou depart to the right
[2 Sam. hand, then I will go to the left." God said to David, "I
xxiv. 12.] .
offer thee three things, choose one of them ;" and to Solomon,
n Kings " because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked long
[Mark vi. life," or " richcs." And Herod to his daughter, " Ask of me
22 1 .
[Matt. whatsoever thou wilt." And Pilate to the Jews, " Whether of
xxvu. 21.] ^i^g twain will ye that I release unto you ?" And St. Paul
[ I Cor. iv. unto the Corinthians, " What will ye ? shall I come unto you
^^'^ with a rod, or in love ?" Both were in their choice. Yet
T. H . doth tell us, that all these were free to do this or that
indifferently, if they would, but not free to will. To choose
and to elect, is, of all others, the most proper act of the will.
But all these were free to choose and elect this or that indif-
ferently, or else all this were mere mockery. And therefore
they were free to will. The Scripture knoweth no extrinsecal
determiners of the will, but itself. So it is said of Eli's sons,
1 Sam. ii. " Give flesh to roast for the priest, for he will not have sodden
flesh of thee, but raw," and " if thou wilt not give it, I will
take it by force."
15, [16.]
17— [19.]
" Sic volo, sic jubeo ; stat pro ratione voluntas''."
Here was more will than necessity. So it is said of the
Luke xii. rich man in the Gospel ; " What shall I do ? . . this I will
do, I will pull down my barns and build greater, and there
will I bestow all my fruits and my goods ; and I will say to
my soul, . . take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry." Both
his purse and person were under the command of his will.
[Juv. vi. 223. " Hoc volo, sic jubeo, s?7" &c.]
MR. HOBBES* AXIMADVERSIOXS.
225
So St. James saith, " Go to now, ye that say, To-day or to- Discourse
morrow we will go into such a city, and continue there a year, — —
and buy, and sell, and get gain; whereas ye know not what _!p5j^" ^ '
shall be to-moiTow," &c. ; " for that ye ought to say. If the
Lord will, we shall live, and do this or that." The defect was
not in theii' will to resolve, but in their power to perform. So
T. H. his necessity was their liberty, and their liberty was his
necessity. Lastly, the Scnptures teach us, that it is in the
power of a man to choose his o^m will for the future : — " All Josh. i. itj,
that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever ^^''^
thou sendest us, we will go : as we hearkened unto IMoses in
all things, so will we hearken unto thee." So saith St.
Paul; — "What I do, that I will do;" — and in another place, 2C0r.xi.ii.
"I do rejoice, and I will rejoice f — and, " They that will be f^ini/vL'
rich." TThen Christ inquired of His disciples, "Will ye also ^j^^^n vi
go away," according to T. H. his principles. He should have ^'-l
said, ' [Must ye also go away/
TTe have -s-iewed his distinction, but we have not answered The sen<u-
his comparison. " Will is an appetite :" and " it is one tionai ap-
question, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite, and Sfffirent."^
another, whether he be free to have an appetite." Com-
parisons are but a poor kind of reasoning at the best, which
may illustrate something, but prove nothing. And of all
comparisons this is one of the worst ; which is drawn from the
sensual appetite to the rational appetite. The rational appe-
tite and the sensual appetite are even as like one to another
as an apple and an oyster. The one is a natural agent, the
other is a fr'ee agent. The one acts necessarily, the other
acts contingently (I take the word largely). The one is de-
termined to one, the other is not determined to one. The
one hath under God a dominion over itself, and its own acts ;
the other hath no dominion over itself, or its own acts. Even
the will itself, when it acts after a natural manner (which is
but rarely, in some extraordinaiy cases, as in the appetite of
the chiefest good, being fuUy revealed, or in a panical terror,
which admitteth no deliberation), acts not freely but neces-
sarily. How much more must agents merely natural, which
have neither reason to deliberate, nor dominion or liberty to
elect, act necessarily and detemiinately ? So, to answer a
40 comparison with a comparison, his argument is just such
BR.\MH.\LI.. O
226
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part another as this; — The galley-slave, which is chained to the
— oar, is a man, as well as the pilot that sits at the stern ; there-
fore the galley-slave hath as much dominion in the ship as
the pilot, and is as free to turn it hither and thither. So
falls this dreadful engine all in pieces, which should have
battered down the fort of liberty.
His gentle reprehension, — that ^^if" I "have not been
able to distinguish between these two questions," I "have
not done well to meddle with either, and if" I "have un-
derstood them," I "have dealt uningenuously and fraudu-
lently,"— would better become me, who defend liberty, than
him, who supposeth an irresistible necessity of all events. If
he think I have not done well, yet, according to his own
grounds, he may rather blame the causes that do necessitate
me, than blame me, who am irresistibly necessitated to do
what I do. Fraud and deceit have no place in necessary
agents, who can do no otherwise than they do. He might as
well accuse the sea to have dealt fraudulently with him, be-
cause he mistook the tide, and could not pass over the ford
at a high water, as he purposed. Such is the power of truth,
that it comes to light many times when it is not sought for.
He doth see in part already, that I understand the vanity
of his distinction ; and shall see it better yet before this trea-
tise be ended. Yet, if I would be so courteous as to forgive
him all this, his distinction would not prejudice me. The
places of Scripture alleged by me in my former Defence, do
not only prove that a man is free to do if he will, but much
more, that a man is free to choose and to elect ; that is
as much as to say, to " will," and determine itself.
AN ANSW^ER TO HIS FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENTS IN
THIS QUESTION.
Mr. Hobbes It is a certain rule, " contraries being placed one besides
' another, do appear much more clearly." He who desires to
satisfy his judgment in this controversy, must compare our
writings one with another without partiality, the arguments
and answers and pretended absurdities on both sides. But
T. H. seeketh to ingratiate himself and his cause before-
hand ; and if it be possible, to anticipate and pre-occupate
MR. HOBBES' AXTMADVERSIONS.
the judgrnents of his readers, with a flourish or prcEludium, Discourse
under the specious name of "fountains of ai'guments^'*' So, '■
before a serious wai", cities used to personate their adverse
paitT, and feign mock-combats and skii'mishes, to encoui'age
their fiiends ; wherein (you may be sui'e) theii' own side shall
conquer : players make their little puppets prate and act
what they please, and stand or fall as they lend them mo-
tion. THiich brings to my mind, the lion's answer in the
fable, when the picture of a man beating a lion was produced
to him, — K a lion had made this picture, he would have
made the lion above and the man beneath^.''' It is a suffi-
cient answer to this prologue, that Mr. Hobbes (that is, an
adversary) made it.
. . Mhil est,
Quin male narrando possit depravarier'."'
TVliat had he to do to lU'ge arguments for me? or to give
solutions for me ? or to press the inconveniences and absur-
dities which flow from fatal desriny on my behalf? I gave
him no commission. I need none of his help. Yet, by this
personated conflict, he hoped to have stolen an easy victory,
"without either blood or sweat.'^
I ^ill not tii'e out myself and the reader with the super-
fluous repetition of those things, which we shall meet with
again much more opportunely in theii' proper places. Some
authors are like those people, who measuring all others by
themselves, believe nothing is well understood until it be re-
peated over and over again, —
" Qui nihil alios credunt intelligere, nisi idem dictum sit centies"^."
But whatsoever is new in this preface, if it have but any
one grain of weight, I will not fail to examine and answer it,
I either here or there.
I
' And, first, I cannot choose but wonder at his confidence ; His pre-
that a single person, who never took degree in schools that I *"™P^^°"'
have heard of (except it were by chance in ^Malmesbuiy),
should so much slight, not only all the scholars of this pre-
it sent age, but ail " the fathers, schoolmen, and old pliiloso-
» [Qu., p. 5. "The Foimtains of ^ [•■ Nisi illos tuo ex ingenio judi-
Arguments in this Question.' ] cas, Ut nil credas intelligere, nisi idem
^ [Avieni Fab. xxiv.] dictum sit centies." Id.^ Heautontim.,
' [Terent,, Phonn., IV. iv. 15, 16.] V. i. 7. 8.]
Q 2
228
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part phers^/' whicli I dare say lie liath not studied much; and
— forget himself so far, as to deny all their authorities at once,
if they give not him satisfaction ; to make his private and
crazy judgment to be the standard and seal of truth, and
himself an universal dictator among scholars — to plant and
to pull up, to reform and new modulate, or rather turn upside 741
down, theology, philosophy, morality, and all other arts and
sciences, which he is pleased to favour so much as not to era-
dicate them, or pluck them up root and branch j — as if he was
one of ^sop^s fellows, who could do all things and say all
things. He is not the first man in the world who hath lost
himself by grasping and engrossing too much. As the Athenians
used to say of Metiochus ; — " Metiochus is captain, Metiochus
is surveyor, Metiochus bakes the bread, Metiochus grinds
the corn, Metiochus doth all; an evil year to Metiochus?/'
He mentioneth the Scriptures indeed ; but his meaning is,
to be the sole interpreter of them himself, without any re-
spect to the perpetual and universal tradition of the Catholic
Church, or the sense of all ancient expositors. Well, for
once, I will forbear all the advantage which I have from the
authority of councils, fathers, schoolmen, and philosophers ;
and meet him singly at his own weapon ; yet, with this pro-
testation, that if he value his own single judgment above all
theirs, he comes within the compass of Solomon's censure, —
[Prov xxvi. " Seest thou a man wise in his own eyes ; there is more hope
of a fool than of him.''
The attri- He telleth us, that ^' the attributes of God" are oblations
God argu- • • givcu Only for honour," but no sufficient premisses to in-
mentative. ^^^^^ convince falsehood^i." Let them be "oblations,"
or sacrifices of praise, if he will ; but are they not likewise
truths? Hath not God given the same attributes to Him-
self every where in Holy Scripture? Doth God stand in
need of a lie, to uphold His honour? It is true, they are
not perfectly conceivable by mortal man. The goodness,
and justice, and mercy, and truth of God are transcendent
above the goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of
o [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 5.] " S' oiVc^^erot."] Plut., [Polit. Prae-
P [" Mtjt/oxos juei/ yap aTpar-qycl, cept., c. 15. torn. iv. p. 173 ; Op. Moral.
" Mtjtioxos Se ras odovs, Mrjrioxos 5' ed. Wyttenb.]
" aprous i-KOTrra, Mrirloxos 5e t' a\(piTa, ^ [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 5.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
229
men, and of a quite different nature from them. As St. Aus- Discourse
tin said, — " God is good without quality, great without quan
tity, a Creator without indigence, everywhere without place,
eternal without time""." But yet we do understand these at-
tributes so far, as to remove from God all contrary imperfec-
tions. He that is good, or goodness itself, cannot be the
author of evil. He that is true, or truth itself, cannot lie or
dissemble. He that is merciful, or mercy itself, cannot be
guilty of tyranny or cruel. He that is just, or justice itself,
cannot do unjust actions. And thus far the attributes of
God are argumentative. " That be far from thee to slay the Gen. xviii.
righteous with the wicked ; . . shall not the Judge of all the
earth do right
I come now to his texts of Scripture ; and, first, to those His texts
which he saith do "make for^" him. To which I answer, tilr?cit^ed
first, in general, that there is not one of them all pertinent Sfiy?
to the present question. They concern not true liberty from
extrinsecal necessity, but the power of free will in moral and
supernatural acts ; wherein we acknowledge, that the will of
man hath not power to determine itself aright, without the
assistance of grace. His arguments tend rather to prove,
that God is the author of sin, or that He saves men without
their own endeavours, than to disprove true liberty. Se-
condly, I answer, that though his allegations were pertinent,
yet they come all short of his conclusion. He should prove,
that all acts of fi'ee agents are necessitated antecedently and
extrinsecally ; and he endeavoureth only to prove, that some
particular acts of some particular persons were not free from
necessity : which thesis we do not simply disapprove, though
we dislike his instances. God may and doth sometimes ex-
traordinarily determine the will of man to one ; but when it
is so determined, the act may be voluntary, not free : so he
concludeth not contradictorily.
Concerning his places in particular. To his first place, aii his ar-
guments
^ [Au<r.,DeTnn.,lib. V. c. 1. § 2; Op. tempore sempiternum, sine ulla Scripture
torn. viii. p. 833. B, C. " Intelligamus mutatione mutabiliafacientem,nihilque answered.
Deum quantum possumus, sine quali- patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat,
late bonum, sine quantitate magnum, etsi nondum potest invenire omnino
sine indigentia Creatorem, sine situ Quid sit, pie tamen caveat quantum
praesidentem" (editt. before Bened. potest aliquid de Eo sentire Quod non
" praesentem"), " sine habitu omnia con- sit."]
tinentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine « [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 5.]
230
CASTIGATIONS Of
^111 ^ ^^^^ answer, that we ought to distinguish between
[Gen xiv action of Joseph^s brethren, which was evil, and the pas-
5.] sion of Joseph, which was good. God willed and predefined
the sufferings of Joseph, and disposed them to His own glory
and the good of His Church. " God sent^^ Joseph "before;"
— how ? dispositively, ^' to preserve life.'' But He willed not
nor predefined the action of his brethren, otherwise than
permissively, or at the most occasionally — by doing good,
which they made an occasion of doing evil, — or in respect of
the order of their evil act. The very same answer serveth to
Acts ii. 23, and Acts iv. 27, 28.
[Of God's To his instances of God's hardening the heart", Exod. vii.
thelSartj 3, and Deut. ii. 30, and to Rom. ix. 16, he hath had a large
answer in my former Defence'^.
[Of Shi- To Shimei's cursing of David^, 2 Sam. xvi. 10, I answer
ing David.] three ways. First, that God is often said to do or will those
things, which He doth only will to permit, and dispose. All
Job i. 21. that was acted against Job, is ascribed to God ; — " The Lord
hath taken away — yet it is as clear as the noon-day sun,
that God's concurrence in the determination of Job's suffer-
ings, in respect of Satan, was only permissive. Secondly,
God was the cause of Shimei's cursing David occasionally,
by afflicting David for his sins, which exposed him to Shi-
[Exod. mei's curses. So we say, ' occasion makes a thief,' and, " gifts
Ecdesfcn blind the eyes of the wise." Thirdly, God was the cause of
XX. 29.] Shimei's cursing David, not as the author of that evil, but as
the author of the order in evil, that is, by restraining Shi-
mei's malice from breaking out at other times and in an-
other manner, and letting him loose to vent his vindictive
thoughts at that time in that manner. So he who shuts all
the doors and windows in a chamber and leaves only one
open, is in some sort the cause why a desperate person throws
himself down headlong from that window rather than from
another. In the same sense, the cause of Rehoboam's obsti-
1 Kings nacy^ is said to be "from the Lord." God is not obliged to
confer prudence and other favours upon undeserving persons.
Ezek. iii. So likewise God is said to "lay a stumblinar block before"
20. ^
t [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 5.] 69, &c.]
" [Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 7.] y [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 6.}
* [Defence] Numb. xii. [above pp. ^ [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
231
a wicked person. And therefore tliis note thence, — that the Discourse
sins of the wicked are not the cause of their punishment^, ~
— is a mere collusion. The order in evil is God^s, the sins are
their own.
AVhat he objecteth out of Job xii. 14, &c.^, and like- [Jobxii.
wise out of Isaiah x. 6^, concerning the King of Assyria,
deserveth no answer. God may freely and justly withdraw
His protection and His other graces and favours from His
creatures, and leave them to be afflicted for their offences by
evil agents and instruments, and dispose the sins of others to
be their punishments, without necessitating them to acts
morally evil. Job is as far from disputing our question in
that place, as these places by him alleged are from making
God the author of e\i\ by a physical determination.
The " Prophet Jeremy saith, ' O Lord, I know that the Jerem.x.23.
way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh
to direct his steps Most true : man is not secured from
danger by his own wisdom and care, but by God^s providence
and protection ; not preserved from all sin and utter destruc-
tion by the power of his own free wiU, but by the special
grace of God; which doth freely prevent us, pursue us, ex-
cite us, assist us, operate in us, co-operate with us, by perma-
nent habits, by transient motions, sufficiently, effectually,
according to His good pleasure. Whose grace is the only foun-
tain of salvation. If we fancied an all-sufficient or indepen-
dent power to ourselves, this text were to the purpose ; now
it signifies nothing.
"Our Saviour saith% ^No man can come unto Me except John vi. 44.
the Father which hath sent Me draw him.^ ''Scis tu si?nu-
Jare cupressum, quid hoc^" — " He knows how to paint a cypress
tree, but what is that^^ to the question of liberty and neces-
sity ? Tlie coming unto Christ is a supernatural action, and
requireth the preventing or preparing grace of God, which is
called His " Father's di-awing.^' But this " drawing'^ is not
such a physical determination of the will, as to destroy liberty
in the very act of conversion ; but an inward calling in an
a [Ibid. — " Note here, God layes the [Ibid.]
stumbling-block, yet he that falleth, <= [Ibid.]
dyeth in his sin; which shewes, that ^ [Ibid.]
God's justice in killing dejiendeth not « [Ibid. J
on the sin onely."] ' [Horat., A. P., 19, 20.]
232
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part Opportune time^ a persuading of the hearty an enlightening
'■ — of the mind^ an inspii'ing of the seed of good desires, yet
withal leaving to the will its natural freedom to elect, and
will actually, and to consent to the calling of God, that is, to
determine itself by the power of grace.
[1 Cor. iv. To 1 Cor. iv. 7.^ I answer, whether we understand the text
of saving grace or of graces freely given, both ways it is the
grace of God that makes the discrimination. But all the
debate is of the manner how it is made, whether morally by
persuasion, or physically by determination of the will to one
and destroying the liberty of it ; of which this text is silent.
[1 Cor. xii. The next place, 1 Cor. xii. 6^, is understood of those mira-
^'^ culous graces freely given, such as the gift of tongues, of
healing, of prophespng, &c. ; and if it were understood of
saving grace, yet it did not at all exclude our co-operation.
Phil. ii. The same Apostle who teacheth us, that " it is God Who
worketh in us both to will and to do of His good pleasure,^^
in the same place exhortetli us to " work out our own salva-
tion with fear and trembUng.'^ God worketh in us both the
will and the deed, not by physical determination of the will,
not by destroying the nature of His creature, but sweetly,
morally, by illumination, persuasion, and inspiration.
[How we We are said to be " the workmanship of God created in
workman- Christ Jcsus uuto good works because "without Christ we
Eph ^ii 10 nothing.^^ No man can have the actual will to believe 743
[John XV. and to be converted, but by the preventing grace of God.
Our endeavours are in vain, except He help them ; and none
at all, except He excite them. God^s calling, and illumina-
tion, and inspiration, is not in our power ; and we are
brought by His grace as it were from nothing to a new being
in Christ ; in which respect a regenerated Christian is called
[2 Cor. V, "a new creature. Metaphors do not hold in all things.
li.T^^f' When David prayed, "Create in me anew heart, O Lord^^^
[Ps. h. 10.] j^js meaning was not, that his heart should be annihilated,
and a new substance created, but to have his heart purged
and cleansed.
[Texts at- The main bodv of his forces is dispersed, vet his reserve
tnbuting " L ' ^
Ihe will to
workTto ^ P- ^ [" Create in me a cleayi heart, O
Qq({-\ ^ [ll)id.] God; and renew a right spiiit within
■■' ' [Ihid.] me."]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
233
remains untouched ; even "all the places, that make God the Discourse
giver of all graces," and "wherein men are said to be dead in '■ — -
sin ; for by all these^' (saith he) " it is manifest, that although
a man may live holily if he will, yet to will is the work of
God, and not eligible by man^." Let him reduce his
argument into what form he will, there is more in the
conclusion than in the premisses ; namely, these words,
" and not eligible by man.^^ Who ever argued from the
position of the principal cause to the removal of all second
agents and means ? It is most true, that all grace is from
God ; but it is most false, that God hath not given man a will
to receive it freely. This is plain boys^ play, to jump over the
backs of all second causes. As all grace is from God, so the
elective power to assent to the motions of grace is from God
Hkewise. To shew him the weakness of his consequence, he
argueth thus, — ' All light is from the sun, therefore, though
a man may use it if he will open his eyes, yet to open his
eyes is the work of God, and not eligible by man.'
It is usual in Scripture, to call an habitual sinner a " dead'' How sin-
man j but it is a weak argument, w hich is drawn from a me- ^^[^ ^^J^^
taphor, beyond the scope of him that useth it ; and if it be ^ead.
insisted on too much, involves men in palpable contradictions.
As, not to step aside from the same metaphor, " this thy Luke xv.32.
brother was dead and is alive again, and was lost and is
found." If he was but " lost," then he w^as not absolutely
" dead if he was absolutely " dead," then he was more than
"lost." So in another place, "Awake thou that sleepest, Eph. v. i4.
and arise from the dead.'' To " sleep" and to be " dead"
are inconsistent; but sleep is an image of death. So is idle-
ness;— ''Hie situs est Vaccia" — "Here lieth Vaccia," was
written upon an idle person's door. So is old age ; — " He Rom. iv. 19.
considered not his own body now dead, . . . nor the dead-
ness of Sarah's womb." So is habitual sin ; — " And you hath Eph. ii. 1.
he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins." In
sum, wheresoever there is no appearance of life (as in the
trees in winter), there is an unage of death. To leave me-
taphors, this ' death in sin' is not a natural, but a spiritual
death; and therefore no utter extinction of the natural
powers and faculties of a man. Such are the understanding
• [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 7.]
234
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part and the will ; whicli, though they were much weakened by the
— — fall of Adana^ yet they were not^ they are not, utterly extinct,
either by original or actual sin ; but, being excited, and as it
were enlived by preventing grace, they may and do become
subservient to grace; the understanding being illuminated
by those rays of heavenly light, and the will enabled to con-
sent as freely to the motions of grace in supernatural acts, as
it did formerly to the dictates of reason in natural and civil
acts. So, every way, T. H. is gone. First, the will is able
and free, without preventing grace, to determine itself in
natural and civil acts ; which is enough to prove my inten-
tion, against the universal necessity of all events. Secondly,
the will, being excited and assisted by grace, hath power to
put in practice its natm-al freedom in supernatural acts ; as,
to consent to the motions of grace and to reject the sugges-
tions of the flesh and the devil ; without any physical deter-
mination of itself without itself. Even as the dead body of
Abraham, and the dead womb of Sarah, being as it were new
quickened by God, did truly beget Isaac ; so, even in the act of
conversion itself, the will is free from physical determi-
nation.
Man is That physical determination of all causes and events what-
to wnuhan socver to one by an outward flux of natural causes, which
to do. rjy jj maintains, doth as much necessitate all the actions of
free agents as their wills, or more : because volition is an
inward immediate act of the will, but all other acts of a free
agent are external and mediate acts of the will, over which
the will hath not so absolute a dominion as over the volition ;
whence it followeth irrefragably, that if there be no freedom
to will, much less is there a freedom to do. He saith, " a
man may live holily if he will, but to will is the work of God, 744
and not eligible by man.^^ Can a man then " live holily^^
without the grace of God ? or is not a holy life the work of
God as much as a sanctified will ? If he cannot shew this,
let him never mention this vain distinction any more, of
freedom to do without freedom to will. May not a man be
so bold to put him himself in mind of that "jargon"" which
he objected to the Schoolmen, unless perhaps he thinks non-
sense is more intelligible in English than in Latin.
" [See above in the Defence, T. H,, Numb, iv, p. 34,]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
235
Hitherto I have traced T. H. his steps_, though he be wan- Discourse
dered quite out of the lists, or rather, in plain terms, fled —
away from his cause, to take sanctuary under the sacred name
of God^s grace, which will afford no shelter for his error. Our
question was not about the concurrence of grace and free will
in the conversion of a sinner, but merely about the liberty or
necessity of all natural and civil events. AVhen he hath
acquitted himself like a man in the former cause, then he is
free to undertake the second.
The next collection is of such places of Scripture as say His second
there is election ; of which T. H. is pleased to affirm, that do^confiu?
they "make equally^^ for him and me°. I do not blame him, if ^i^swerabiy
he desire, that all places which maintain election, and that
all natural and civil events, should quite be sequestered from
this controversy. For it is not possible to reconcile these
places with fatal necessity. All choice or election is of more
than one ; but there can be no choice of more than one, where
there is an extrinsecal determination of all particular events
with all their circumstances, inevitably, irresistibly, to one, by
a flux of natural causes. So they leave no manner of election
at all ; no more freedom to choose a man^s actions, than to
choose his will. But all these places, and many more, prove ex-
pressly, that a man is free, not only to do it if he will, but to
will. The reason is evident ; — because to choose is to will,
the proper elicit immediate act of the will ; and to choose one
thing before another, is nothing else but to will one thing
before another. But all these places say, that a man is free
to choose, that is, to will one thing before another. " Choose [Deut.xxx.
life,^^ saith one place ; " choose whom je will serve,'^ saith a xxi^'i's ^
second place : " choose one of three/^ saith a third place : ^
^ ^ XXIV. 12.]
and so of the rest. But I have pressed these places forraerlyP ;
and shall do further, if there be occasion.
His third sort of texts are those, which "seem to make" for t. h., [in
me against him^. But I am at age to choose and urge mine sort^of ^
own arguments for myself, and cannot want w^eapons in this J^^J^'j;jjg/'^*^
cause. Therefore he may forbear such a thankless office, the Scrip.
He telleth us of a " great apparent contradiction " between then giveth
the first sort of texts and the last ; but "being both Scripture P^^'^^'*
" [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 7.] [above, pp. 37 — 56, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
^ Defence, Numbers vi, vii, viii, ix. i [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 8.]
236
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part
HI.
God's pre-
science
doth not
necessitate.
Yet is in-
fallible.
[Of Jo-
seph's
brethren.]
they may and must be ^econciled^^^ This is first to wound the
credit of the Scriptures, and then to give them a plaster.
The supposed contradiction is in his own fancy. Let him take
them according to the analogy of faith_, in that sense wherein
the Church hath ever taken them, and there is no show ^
of contradiction. " The Scripture consists not in the words, %
but in the sense, not in the outside but in the marrow
He demands, " whether the selling of Joseph did follow
infallibly and inevitably upon the permission^^ of God^ I
answer, — if we consider God^s permission alone, neither " in-
evitably^^ nor "infallibly;" if we consider His permission
jointly with His prescience, then " infallibly" but not " in-
evitably." Foreknowledge doth no more necessitate events
to come to pass, than after-knowledge. God^s prescience did
no more make Judas his treason inevitable to him, than my
remembrance now of what was done yesterday, did make it
inevitable then to him that did it.
He urgeth further, — so the prescience of God " might have
been frustrated by the liberty of human will"." I answer,
nothing less. The natures and essences of all things come
to pass, because they were foreknown by God, Whose know-
ledge was the directive cause of them. But the acts and
operations of free agents are therefore foreknown, because
they will come to pass^. If anything should come to pass
otherwise, God had foreknown from eternity that it should
have come to pass otherwise : because His infinite under-
standing doth encompass all times and all events in the in-
stant of eternity; and, consequently, he beholds all things
past, present, and to come, as present. And, therefore, 745
leaving those forms of speech which are accommodated to us
and our capacities, to speak properly, there is neither fore-
knowledge nor after-knowledge in God, Who neither knows
one thing after another nor one thing by deduction from
another.
He asks, whether " the treachery and fratricide of J oseph's
' [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 8.]
* [" Nec putemus in verbis Scriptu-
rarum esse Evangelium, sed in sensu ;
non in superficie sed in medulla."
Hieron., In Epist. ad Galatas, c. 1 ;
Op. torn. iv. P. i. p. 230.]
^ [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 9. J
" [Ibid.]
X [" Non enim ex eo quod Deus scit
futurum aliquid, idcirco futurum est ;
sed quia futurum est, Deus novit."
Ilieron., in Comment, ad Hierem. c.
xxvi. Op. tom. iv. p. 653.]
MR. HOBBES* AXIM ADVERSTOXS.
,237
brethren'' were ^^no sin^^." I answer, yes; and therefore it was Discolrse
not from God positively^ but permissively, and dispositively : —
" Ye thought evil against me ; but God meant it unto good, Gen. i. 20.
to save much people alive/^ But (he urgeth) " Joseph said,
* Be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me [Gen. xiv.
hither/ ought not a man to be ^grieved' and 'angry with^'^
himself^ for sinning^ Yes ; but penitent sinners, such as
Joseph^s brethren were, have great cause of joy and comfort,
when they understand that God hath disposed their sin to
His gloiy, their own good, and the benefit of others.
He demands further, " Doth God barely permit corporal [How God
motions, and neither will them nor nill them or '^how is of corpora?
God the cause of the motion," and the cause of '"'the law, yet
not of the irregulai-ity^ ?" It were a much readier way to
tell us at once directly, that either there is no sin in the
world or that God is the author of sin, than to be continually
beating the bush after this manner. But I answer, — all
corporal motion in general is from God, not only permissively,
but also causally ; that is, by a general influence, but not by
a special influence. The specifical determination of this good
general power to evil, is from the free agent, who thereby
doth become the cause of the irregularity. There is no con-
trariety between motion in general and the law, but between
the actual and determinate abuse of this good locomotive
power and the law.
He demands, ^' whether the necessity of hardness of heart''^ Hardness
be not "as easily derived from God^s permission ; that is, from derived
His withholdinor His grace, as fr'om His positive decree" V ^^^^
, ^ permission.
This question is proposed in a confused blundering manner,
without declaring distinctly what grace he meaneth. I answer,
two ways. First, we are to distinguish between a necessity of
consequence or an infallibility, and a necessity of consequent
or a causal necessity. Supposing, but not granting, that
hardness of heart is as infallibly derived fr-om the one as from
the other, yet not so causally nor so culpably in respect of
God ; ^'ho is not obliged in justice to give His free grace to
His creature, but He is obliged, by the rule of His own jus-
^ [Qu., Fount. ofArg.,p. 9.— Com- p. 162.]
pare Bellarmine's arguments upon the z [Qu., Fount, of Arg,, p. 9.]
same text, De Amiss. Gratia et Statu ■ [Ibid.]
Peccati, lib. ii. c. II : Op. torn. iii. ^ [Ibid.]
238
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part tice, not to determine His own creature to evil and then
punish him for the same evil. Secondly^ I answer^ that even
this supposed necessity of infallibility can no way be imputed
to God ; Who never forsakes His creature by withholding
His grace from him^ until His creature have first forsaken
Him ; Who never forsakes His creature so far, but that he
may by prayers and using good endeavours obtain the aid of
God's grace, either to prevent or remove hardness of heart.
When God created man, He made him in such a condition,
that he did not need special exciting grace to the determination
of his will to supernatural good. And to all that are within
the pale of His Church He gives sufficient grace to prevent
hardness of heart, if they will. If man have lost his primo-
genious power, if he will not make use of those supplies of
grace which God^s mercy doth afford him, that is his own
fault. But still here is no physical determination to evil,
here is no antecedent extrinsecal determination of any man
to hardness of heart, here is nothing but that which doth
consist with true liberty.
God's hand Lastly, he saith, we make God only to permit evil, and
evn*aS^"^ to will good actions "conditionally and consequently, — if man
tions. ^jjj them;" so we "ascribe nothing at all to God in the causa-
tion of any action, good or bad*^.^^ He erreth throughout.
God is the total cause of all natures and all essences. In evil
actions, God is cause of the power to act, of the order in
acting, of the occasion, and of the disposition thereof to good.
In good actions freely done. He is the author and original of
liberty. He enableth by general influence, He concurreth by
special assistance and co-operation to the performance of
them, and He disposeth of them to good. He doth not will
that merely upon condition, which Himself hath prescribed,
nor consequently which He Himself hath antecedently or-
dained and instituted.
God's re- Now, having cleared all his exceptions, it remaineth next
Ind^mr^^' to examine how he reconcileth the first and the third sort of
not'coiT-"^ texts. 'The will of God' (saith he) 'sometimes signifieth746
trary. the word of God, or the commandments of God, that is. His
revealed will, or the signs or significations of His will. Some-
times it signifieth an internal act of God, that is, His counsel
[Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 9.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
239
and decree. By His revealed will God would have all men Discourse
to be saved, but by His internal will, He would not. By His — — —
revealed will He would have ' gathered' J erusalem, not by His [Luke xiii.
inward will. So, when God saith, ' What could I have done fiti. v. 4.]
more to My \dneyard V that is to be understood outwardly, in
respect of His revealed will : — what directions, what laws,
what threatenings could have been used more ? And when
He saith, 'it came not into My mind,' the sense is, 'to com- [jerera.xix.
mand it^.' This I take to be the scope and sum of what he ss.]""^^"'
saith. Thus far he is right, that he distinguisheth between the
signifj4ng will of God, and His good x^leasure ; for which he
isbeholding to the Schools^ : and that he makes the revealed will
of God to be the rule of all our actions ; and that many things
happen against the revealed will of God, but nothing against
His good pleasure. But herein he erreth grossly, that he
maketh the revealed will of God and His internal will to be
contrary one to another; as if God did say one thing and
mean another, or command one thing and necessitate men to
do another ; which is the grossest dissimulation in the world.
" Odi illos seu claustra erebi, quicunque loquuntur
" Ore aliud, taci toque aliud sub pectore condunt^"
He saith, " it is not Christian to think, if God had a pur-
pose to save all men, that any could be damned, because it
were a sign of want of power to effect what He would It is
true, if God had an absolute purpose to work all men's salva-
tion irresistibly, against their wills, or without themselves.
But God hath no such absolute will to save all men. He
loves His creatures well, but His own justice better ; and He
that made men without themselves, will not save them with-
out themselves. He co-operates with all His creatures, ac-
cording to their distinct natures which He hath given them :
with necessary agents necessarily, with free agents freely.
God hath given men liberty to assent to saving truth ; tliey
abuse it. He hath proposed a condition under which they
may be saved; they reject it. So He willeth their salvation
by an antecedent will, and their damnation by a consequent
[Qu., Fount, of Arg., pp. 10, 11.] 'AtSao irv\T](riv,^^Os x' eTepov fxhv KevOri
* [" Voluntas signi — Voluntas be- eVi (ppealu, &A\o Se eiTTTj." Homer.,
neplaciti." See e. g. Thorn. Aquin. Iliad., ix. 312, 313.]
Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xx. art. 11.] 8: [Qvu Fount, of Arg., p. 10.]
240
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part will : wliicli two wills in God, or within the Di^dne essence,
III
'- — are no way distinct ; for they are the same with the Divine
essence ; but they are distinguished only in order to the
things willed of God. Neither is there the least contradic-
tion between them. The one shews us what God would
have us to do ; the other is what God Himself will do. The
one looks upon man as he was created by God, or as he should
have been or might have been without his own fault ; the
other looks upon man as he is with all circumstances. The
one regards only the order of the causes and means designed
b}^ God for our salvation ; the other regards also the applica-
tion or misapplication of these means by ourselves.
In answering to these words, Say not thou it is through
the Lord I fall away, say not thou He hath caused me to
err," he distinguisheth between "say not" and "think not^;"
as if it were unlawful to say so, but not unlawful to think so.
[Eccies. X. " Curse not thy king" (saith Solomon), " no, not in thy
thought ;" much less thy God. Thought is free from man,
but not from God. It is not "honourable" (saith he) "to
say so^ ;" no more is it to think so. " It is not lawful" (saith
he), "to say that any action can be done, which God hath
purposed shall not be done^;" that is, in his language, which
shall not actually come to pass in due time. Our Saviour
[Matt. xxvi. was of another mind; — " Thinkest thou, that I cannot now
^^'^ pi'ay to My Father, and He shall presently give Me more than
twelve legions of angels?" He knew some things can be
done, which never will be done,
[inconve- Next he proceedeth to touch those inconveniences which
the"doc°^^ flo"^ from the opinion of universal necessity, but very gently
un?v^ersai Sparingly. "Arts, and arms, and books, and consulta-
"ecessUy^^^tions, and medicines," &c., are not superfluous, though all
away all events be necessary, because " the means are equally neces-
ing^weih" sitated with the events" Suppose it were so, so much the
worse. This must needs utterly destroy all care and solici-
tude of free agents. He is a madman, that mil vex, and
trouble himself, and take care, and consult, about things that
are either absolutely necessary, or absolutely impossible ; as
about the rising of the sun, or about the draining of the sea
h [Qu., Fount, of Avg., p. 11.] ^ [Ibid., p. 12.]
' [Ibid., pp. 11,12.] 1 [Ibid., pp. 12, 13.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
241
747 with a sieve. Yet such are all events, and all the means to Discourse
effect them, in his opinion ; either as absolutely necessary — —
as the rising of the sun, or as absolutely impossible as
the draining of the ocean with a sieve. What need he take
care for a medicine or a physician, who knows, that if he must
recover, and if a medicine or a physician be a necessary
means for his recovery, the causes will infallibly provide him
one, and it may be a better medicine or a better physician
than he should have used ? If a man may recover or
not recover, both means and care to use means do well ; but
if a man must recover or not recover, that is, if the end and
the means be both predetermined, the means may be neces-
sary, but all care and solicitude is altogether vain and super-
fluous.
But he telleth the reader, that this absurdity followeth as That which
much from my opinion as from his. For, as I believe that shall be,
" what is, is, and what hath been, hath been," so I " hold fXcy.
this for a certain truth, that what shall be, shall be and
therefore the argument holds as strongly against me as
against him ; — " if I shall recover, I need not this unsavoury
potion ; if I shall not recover, it will do me no good
In all my life I never heard a weaker or sillier sophism,
urged in earnest, by a rational man. That which is, is ne-
cessary to be, upon supposition that it is ; that which hath
been, is necessary to have been, upon supposition that it hath
been ; so that which shall be, shall be necessarily, that is, in-
fallibly, upon supposition that it shall be. And the event
cannot be supposed, except it be supposed that the free agent
shall determine itself in such manner, and except all neces-
sary means be likewise supposed. Such a necessity upon
supposition is very consistent with true liberty; but T. H. his
necessity is of another nature, — an antecedent extrinsecal
necessitation and determination to one ; — which is altogether
inconsistent with election and true liberty. According to
my opinion we say, ' That which may be, may be, but that
which may be, may not be.' According to his opinion we
say, ' That w4iich must be, must be, but that which must be,
cannot be otherwise.'' According to my opinion, I am free,
either to w^alk abroad or to stay within doors ; whethersoever
[Qn., Fount, of Arg., p. 12.]
BUANril AI.I.. I,
242
CASTIGATIONS OF
P A^R T I do, this is true, that which shall be, shall be. But if T
— walk abroad (as I may do), then my stay within doors sliall
not be. And, on the other side, if I stay within doors (as I
may do likewise), then my walking abroad shall not be.
The event hath yet no determinate certainty in the causes,
for they are not yet determined. The agent may determine
itself otherwise, the event may come otherwise to pass, even
until the last moment before the production. And when the
event is actually produced, and is without its causes, it hath
a determinate certainty, not antecedent, not from extrinsecal
determination, not absolute, but merely hypothetical or upon
supposition ; the not distinguishing aright of which two dif-
ferent kinds of necessity makes the reader and us all this
trouble.
T. H. his It follows, — " Laws are not superfluous, because by the
tha/nT^"' punishment of one or a few unjust men they are the cause
man is just- of iustice in a srreat many".^^ This answer hath been taken
ly punished o j
but for away already"; and shall be further refelled, if it be further
migluhave prcssed. But he willingly declineth the main scope of ray
shunned, argument; which reflected more upon the injustice than
upon the superfluity of human laws, if his opinion were true.
Those laws are unjust, which punish men for not doing that
which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for
doing that which was impossible for them to leave undone.
But upon supposition of T. H. his opinion, of the absolute
necessity of all events, all human laws do punish men for not
doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do,
and for doing that which was antecedently impossible for
them to leave undone. Here we have " confitentem rmm^^
our adversary's confession, within a very few lines ; — " It is
true, that seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the
name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes
that might have been left undone p.'^ This is the first in-
genuous confession we have had from T. H. I hope we shall
have more. From whence it followeth, first, that there
neither is nor can be any crime deserving punishment in the
world, that is to say, no such criminal thing as sin ; for
" [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 13.] 92, 93. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
° [Defence] Numb. xiv. [above, pp. p [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 13.]
MR. IIOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
243
iiotliiiig by his doctrine was ever done that could "have been Discoursf.
left undone." Secondly, it followeth hence, that no punish -
ment is just, because nothing can be left undone that is done;
and that all men are innocent, and there is no such thing as
r48 a delinquent in the world. How saith he, then, that the laws
are " the cause of justice in many," by punishing " one or a
few unjust men ?" Upon his principles, the laws and judges
themselves are unjust to punish any men. If this be not a
contradiction, I have lost my aim.
And if punishments are not just, then neither are rewards ^
just. Thus, by his doctrine, we have lost the two great pil- of punish-
lars or preservatives of all well-ordered societies, as Lycurgus [^Jlf/cUgood
called them^, the two hinges whereupon the commonwealth is gfj,^ ^'^'^^
turned, reward and punishment. Yet St. Peter doth teach
us, that "kings" and "governors" are sent from God, "for iPet. ii.j4.
the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that
do weU."
The last inconvenience which he mentions (of those that No proper
were urged by me), is this ; — God in justice cannot punish a m"en't'but
man with eternal torments for doing that which never was in
his power to leave undone. To which, admitting (as you have
heard) that " there can be no punishment but for crimes that
might have been left undone," he gives two answers.
The first is this — " Instead of punishment if he had said
affliction, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for
sin ? doth He not afflict those creatures that cannot sin ? and
sometimes those that can sin, yet not for sin ; as Job and the
blind man in the Gospel^?" This is still worser and worser.
He told us even now, that nothing which is dishonourable
ought to be attributed to God* ; and can there be anything
in the world more dishonourable than to say, that God doth
torment poor innocent creatures in Hell fire, without any fault
of theirs, without any relation to sin, merely to shew His
dominion over them ? The Scripture teacheth us clear other-
wise ; — that " a man complains for the punishment of his Lam.iii. 39.
sins." Sin and punishment are knit together with adaman-
tine bonds. He phrases it, "for the manifestation of His
' [See the tract of Plutarch agamst ^ [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 13.]
Colotes, Op Moral., torn. v. p. 396. ed. ' [ Ihid., p. 11.1
Wyttenb.l
244 CASTIGATIONS OF
p A^H T power^." If it were true^ it was the greatest manifestation^'
'■ — of cruelty and tyranny that is imaginable.
I confess, that chastisements inflicted after the sin is for-
given, are not properly punishments ; because they proceed
^' apatre castigante, non a judice v 'mdicante^' — '^from a father
correcting, not from a judge revenging/' Yet even these
2 Sam. xii. chastisements are grounded upon sin : — The Lord hath put
away thy sin ; thou shalt not die : howbeit, because by this
deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the
Lord to blaspheme, the child that is born unto thee, shall
surely die.'' But what place have such chastisements as
David's were in Hell ? Is any man bettered by his sufferings
there ? What place have probations and trials of men's
graces (such as Job's were) in Hell, where there are no graces
to be tried ? Job's trial, and David's chastisements, and the
poor man's blindness, were the greatest blessings that ever
2 Cor. iv. befel them : " for their light afflictions, which were but for a
moment, did work out unto them a far more excellent and
eternal w^eight of glory." But the pains of Hell are heavy,
and endless, and work out nothing but torment. In a word,
these afflictions we now treat of are downright punishments.
Matt. XXV. So the Holy Ghost styles them; — ^^everlasting punishment."
Jobxxxvii. He doth not "afflict the children of men willingly;" except it
Lam iii 33 ^^^^^ — " Fools are afflicted because of their transgres-
Ps.cvii. 17. sion." The "afflictions^" (as he calleth them) of "those creatures
that cannot sin," that is, brute beasts, are altogether of another
nature. They were created for the use of man, they were
Gen. ix. 3. given for the sustenance of men ; — " every moving thing that
liveth shall be meat for you ; even as the green herb, have I
given you all things." But the tormenting even of the brute
creatures needlessly, for the pleasing of our sensual appetites
or the satisfaction of our humour, is not only unchristian but
Prov. xii. inhuman. " A righteous man regardeth the hfe of his beast,
but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." God hath
made two covenants with man, none with the beasts.
Why God He saith, it is "no more cruelty" to afflict a man with endless
make^man to^^^^snt " for sin," than without sin, when He " might without
impecca- trouble have kept him from sinning y." Is it not great pity.
[Qu., Fount. ot'Arg.,p. 13.]
- [Ibid.]
y [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
245
that T. H. was not of God Almighty's council when He Discourse
ordered the world ? that he might have ad^ised Him to have
made man impeccable, which He might have done without
any trouble ; or that otherwise his fall, and consequently his
punishment, might be justly imputed to God Himself. It
was well enacted in the laws of the twelve tables, " Ad Divos
adeunto caste, pietatem adhibento, qui secus faxit Deus Ipse
vindex erit^^' — oiu' " addresses to God'^ ought to be pure''
and devout ; " they who do otherwise," will find " God Him-
self the revenger." Doth T. H. believe St. Jude, that God
hath reserved the angels that kept not their first estate, ^^^^ ^•
7*^9 in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of
the great day ?" God could by His absolute power have kept
them in theii* first estate, yet He would not. By His absolute
power. He can do all things which do not imply imperfection
or contradiction : but by His ordinate power He cannot
change llis decrees, nor alter what He hath ordained. Acts
of grace may be fi'ee, but punishments must be always just.
That king who doth not pardon a wilful traitor, is not equally
guilty of mm-der with him that hangs up an innocent sub-
ject. Then to answer fully to his question, why God suff'ered
man to sin, having power to withhold him. To preserve that
order and coui'se which He had established in the world, and
to di'aw a greater good out of evil, for the fiuther manifesta-
tion of His own glory. Fii'st, the manifestation of His power ;
as St. Austin saith, — He that created all things very good,
and did foreknow that e\-il would arise from good, knew like-
wise, that it appertained rather to His most almighty goodness
to draw good out of evil, than not to suffer evil^." Secondly,
the manifestation of His providence ; in suffering man, whom
He had endowed with the fi-eedom of will and power, sufficient
to resist and overcome Satan, either to conquer or yield at his
own choice. Thirdly, the manifestation of His justice and
mercy ; by punishing some out of the corrupted mass justly,
and sa^ing others out of His mere mercy. If T. H. thinks
* [Cic, De Leg., ii. 8.] bonis exoritura esse prsescivit, et scivit
* [Aug., De Corrept. et Gratia, c. X. magis ad Suani omnipotentissiniam
§27; Op. torn. X. pp. 764-. G, 76.j. A. bonitatem pertinere, etiam de nialis
" Quapropter saluberrime contitemur, bene facere, quam mala esse non sinere,
quod rectissime credimus, Deum sic ordinasse angelorum et hominum
Dominumque rerum omnium, quia vitam," &:c.]
freavit omnia bona valde, et mala ex
246
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part
III.
Punish-
ments of
the damn-
ed are
eternal.
Matt. XXV.
41, 46,—
Mark ix.44,
45 ; — Jude
6, 7.
God's pre-
science
proveth in-
fallibility,
not neces-
sity.
vainly, that the only '^'^ manifestation" of God's ''power" is a
sufficient ground for the punishment of man in Hell fire, with-
out their own faults or crimes, how much better may good
Christians conclude, that the greater manifestation of God's
power, and providence, and justice, and mercy, is a sufficient
ground for the punishment of men with the like torments,
for their own crimes.
His second answer is set down by way of interrogation, —
" AVhat infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall
be . . eternally in torments, and never die^ ?" Even the autho-
rity of our Saviour and the Holy Scriptures, which call it
an " everlasting fire," an " eternal fire,'' a " fire that is not
quenched," " everlasting punishment," " everlasting chains,"
the " worm that never dieth, and the fire that goetli not
out ;" — " Go ye cvirsed into everlasting fire, prepared for the
devil and his angels." " The Bishop" hath the testimony of
the Atlianasian Creed ; — that " they who have done good, shall
go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil, into ever-
lasting fire." He hath the testimony of the universal Church
of all ages, except a few Origenists''. If T. H. have no more
than his own single private authority to oppose against all
these, he is a bold man. They who question everlasting tor-
ments, will not stick to question everlasting life. To his de-
mand about the " second death I answer, this is the second
death, if he could see wood for trees.
In the next place, he urgeth, how that '' iuconveniencies" fol-
low from our opinion. First, that man's libert}^ to will " quite
takes away the prescience of God ;" for if man have it in
his power to will or not to will, it cannot be certainly fore-
known what he will will^. The second, that God's pre-
science doth take aw^ay liberty, by making all events necessary
from eternity ; for it is impossible that that should not come
to pass, or come to pass otherwise than it was foreknown,
which God foreknoweth shall come to pass and if it be im-
possible that it should not come to pass, then it is "necessary"
that it should come to pass^. This is too severe ; first, to
make us take prescience quite away, and yet, with the same
TQu., Fomit. of Arg., p. 13.] ^ [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 13.]
" [See Mosheim's Ch. Hist., bk. II. e [ ibid., p. 14.]
Pt. ii. c. 3. § 9; and the authorities f [ibid.j
there quoted.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
247
breathy to argue against us from prescience. But^ for once^ I Discourse
will give him a clear solution to botli his pretended demon — — -
strations ; and let him see, that there is no necessity, that
men must either turn blocks without liberty, or sacrilegious,
to rob God of His prescience. But I give him it upon a con-
dition,— that hereafter, before he take away either prescience
or liberty, he will first take away this answer, and not
repeat us the same thing over and over again, to no purpose.
To the first inconvenience 1 answer, that a thing may be
said to be foreknown two ways^ : either as it is in its causes,
before it be produced ; and so, I confess, that if the free agent
have it in his power to will or not to will, there is no deter-
minate truth of future contingents, that is, in their causes,
and consequently no prescience or foreknowledge in that re-
spect : or else a thing may be said to be foreknown, as it is
or shall be in itself, in the nature of things, after it is pro-
duced ; and thus every particular event that shall be until
the end of the world, is foreknown, or, to speak more pro-
750perly, is known to God from all eternity. For, in God^s
knowledge, there is neither before nor after, past nor to come.
Those things which are past or to come to us, are always pre-
sent to God ; "Wliose infinite understanding (that is. Himself)
doth encompass all times and events in one instant of eter-
nity, and so doth prevent or anticipate all difi'erences of time.
Time is the measure of all our acts ; but God^s knowledge,
being infinite, is not measured but by eternity : so that wliich
is a prescience, or a before-hand knowledge^ (as he callethit),
tons, is a present intuition with God. And therefore, as my
present beholding of a man casting himself down headlong
from some precipice, whilst he is in the act of casting himself
do^vn, is not the cause of his precipitation, nor doth any way
necessitate him to precipitate himself, yet, upon supposition
that I do see him precipitate himself, it is necessarily (that is,
infallibly) true, that he doth precipitate himself, but not
necessarily true by any antecedent and extrinsecal determina-
tion of him to do that act, nor so necessarily true as to
exclude his freedom or liberty in the act ; even so God^s
knowledge of future contingents, being a present intuition or
? [See Thoni. Aquin., Siimm., P. li [See Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 9.]
Prima, Qu. xiv. art. 13, Respondeo,]
248
C.4STIGATI0NS OF
Part beholding of them by reason of His infinite intellect, doth
— i^i — not at all determine free agents, nor necessitate contingent
events, but only infers an infallibility, that is, as we use to
call it, a hypothetical necessity, or a necessity upon supposi-
tion, which doth consist with true liberty.
Much of this is confessed by Mr. Hobbes himself : — " that
the foreknowledge of God should be the cause of anything,
cannot be truly said ; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and
knowledge dependeth on the existence of things known, and
not they on it^^^
I desire to know, whether God do His own works ad extra
(as the creation and destruction of the world) freely or neces-
sarily ? as, whether He was necessitated to create the world
precisely at such a time, in such a manner ? Certainly God
foreknoweth His own works, as much as He foreknoweth the
determinate acts of free agents ; yet His foreknowledge of
His own works ad extra, doth not necessitate Himself. If
he say, that God Himself determineth His own acts ad extra,
so I say doth the free agent also ; with this difference, that
God is infinite and independent upon any other, but the free
agent is finite and dependent upon God, both for his being
and for his acting. Then, if God^s freedom in His own works
ad extra doth not take away His prescience, neither doth the
liberty of free agents take it away.
To his second inconvenience , — that " it is impossible that
that which is foreknown by God should not come to pass, or
come to pass otherwise than it is foreknown," — I answer,
that God^s foreknowledge is not such an act as T. H. ima-
gineth ; that is, an act that is expired, or an act that is done
and past ; but it is always in doing, an eternal act, a present
act, a present intuition; and consequently doth no more make
the agent unfree, or the contrary event impossible, until it be
actually produced, than my knowing that such a man stabbed
himself upon such a day, made it then unpossible for him to
have forborne stabbing of himself, or my seeing a man eat in
present, made it unpossible for him, before he did eat, to have
forborne eating. God is the total cause of all natures and
essences, but He is not the total cause of all their acts and
operations. Neither did He create His creatures to be idle,
i [Sec above in the Defence, T. H., Numb. xi. pp. 58, 59.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
249
but that tliey should each of them exercise such acts as are Discourse
agreeable to then' respective natures ; necessary agents, ne- ' —
cessary acts ; free agents, free acts. And until the free agent
have determined itself, that is, until the last moment before
production, the contrary act is not made unpossible; and
then, only upon supposition. He that precipitated himself,
until the very moment that he did precipitate himself, might
have withheld himself ; and if he had withheld himself, then
I had not seen him precipitate himself, but withhold himself.
His frequent invectives against unsignificant words are but [t. h.'s in-
like the complaints of that old beldame Harpaste in Seneca, I|ainst un-
who still cried out against the darkness of the room, and ^""(jj ^""^
desired to be brought into another chamber, little believing
that her own blindness was the true cause of it^. What
Suarez^ saith, as I know neither what nor where, so neither
doth it concern either me or the cause.
His last assault against liberty in his " Fountains of Argu- [His confu-
ments" is this; — "Certainlv to will is impossible without tween wiii-
thinking on what a man willeth, but it is in no man^s elec- {^fn^^na ]
tion what he shall at any named time hereafter think on^.''
A man might well conjecture by this very reason, that his
751 "fountain^^ was very near drpng up. This argument is le-
vied rather against the memory, or against the understand-
ing, than against the will : and may serve as well against
freedom to do, as against freedom to will ; which is contrary
to his principles. It is as impossible to do without thinking
on what a man doth, as it is to will without thinking on
what he willeth but " it is in no man^s election what he
shall at any named time hereafter think on;^^ therefore a
man is not free to choose what he will do. I know not what
this word "to think" signifies with him, but I know what
other authors make it to signify, — to use reason, to under-
stand, to know; and they define a "thought" to be "the
understanding actually employed or busied about some ob-
ject"." Hath not he spun us a fair thi'ead? He undertaketh
to shew a defect in the will, and he allegeth a defect in the
^ [L. A. Senec, Epist. oO ; Op. p. patus." This seems to be borrowed
262. Paris, 1607.] from Aristotle, De Anima, III. iv, v. ;
' [Cited by Hobbes in Qu., Fount, of but through what intermediate channel,
Arg., p. It; but without a reference.] does not appear. See however Gas-
^ [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 15.] sendi, Syntagm. Philosoph., Pars II.
[" Intellectu": actu circa res occu- Sect. iii. Membr. Poster, lib. ix. c. 1.]
250
CASTIGATIONS OF
understanding. Is a man therefore not free to go to his
dinner, because perhaps he thinks not on it just at dinner
time? Let the free agent be free to will or nill, and to
choose which part he will, without necessitation or determi-
nation to one, when he doth think on it ; and we shall not
want true liberty.
AN ANSW^ER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE EPISTLE
TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE.
It was no 'passion^ but a sad tmth, to call the opinion of
fatal destiny " blasphemous ° which maketh God to be di-
rectly the author of sin, which is a degree worse than athe-
ism; and " desperate which taketh away all care and soli-
citude, and thrusts man headlong, without fear or wit, upon
rocks and precipices; and " destructive which turneth all
governments, Divine and human, off from their hinges ; the
practical consequences whereof do utterly ruin all societies.
Neither am I guilty (that I know of yet) so much as of one
"uncivil wordP,^^ either against Mr. Hobbes his person, or his
parts. He is over unequal and indulgent to himself; who
dare assume the boldness to introduce such insolent and pa-
radoxical opinions into the world, and will not allow other
men the liberty to welcome them as they deserve. I wish he
himself in his Animadversions, and his parasitical publisher of
his former treatise, had observed the same temper and mode-
ration : particularly^ towards the lights of the schools, whom
he slighteth and vilifieth every where, as a company of pe-
dantic dunces who understood not themselves, yet held the
world in awe under contribution by their fustian "jargon,^^
until "a third Cato dropped down from heaven 'J,'^ to stand
up for the vindication of Christian liberty from scholastic ty-
ranny, and Stoical necessity from natural and moral liberty.
But this is certain ; if these poor despised Schoolmen were
necessitated by antecedent and extrinsecal causes to speak
such gibberish and nonsense, and the Christian world to re-
ceive it and applaud it, they cannot be justly blamed. And
" [Epistle to the Marquis of New- i' [Qii., Animadv. upon the Bishop's
castle, prefixed to the Defence, above Epist. to niy Lord of Newcastle, p. 17. J
p. 17 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] <i [Jnv., ii. 10.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
251
if that great assertor were necessitated in like manner, he Discourse
cannot justly be praised ; any more than we praise a conduit '- —
for spouting out water, when the cock is turned.
AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP S
EPISTLE TO THE READER.
I am well contented to believe, that the copy of T. H. his [T. H. s
treatise was surreptitiously gained from him^ Yet he ac- repUtiousiy
knowledgeth, that he shewed it to two; and if my intelli- i"""^^"*-^
gence out of France^ did not fail, to many more. I am well
pleased to believe, that he was not the author* of that lewd
Epistle, which was prefixed before it ; but rather some young
braggadocio, one of his disciples, who wanted all other means
to requite his master for his new acquired light, but servile
flattery : whom he styleth the " great author — the repairer
of oui' breaches — the assertor of our reputation, who hath
performed more in a few sheets than is comprehended " in
all the voluminous works of the priests and ministers yea,
as if that expression were too modest, in all " the libraries of
the priests, Jesuits, and ministers,^^ or in "the catechisms and
confessions of a thousand assemblies ".^^ On the other side,
he belcheth out reproaches against the poor clergy, as if they
were a pack of fools and knaves. For their folly, he sticks
not to style " the black coats, generally taken, a sort of ig-
norant tinkers &c. And for their knavery, he saith, they
make the Scriptm-es (which he setteth forth in as graceless a
dress as he can imagine) " the decoys of the people,^^ to ad-
vance themselves " to promotions, leisure, and luxuiT-'.^' And
so he concludeth, that this little treatise of Mr. Hobbes " will
cast an eternal blemish on all the cornered caps of the priests
and Jesuits, and all the black and white caps of the" minis-
ters^. Herein I cannot acquit Mr. Hobbes, that being in
' [As Hobbes asserts, Qu., Animadv. " [From the Epistle prefixed to the
upon the Bishop's Epistle to the Reader, first edition of Hobbes' original answer,
p. 19.] witli which the present editor has not
* [This treatise, and apparently tlie succeeded in meeting. It is reprinted
Defence also, were both written in Hoi- in Molesworth's edition of Hobbes*
land; see above, pp. 2I-, 213. notesb, a.] Works. See vol. iv. pp. 235 — 237.]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. x [ Ibid., p. 23-5.]
Epist. to the Reader, p. If). See above > l lbid., p. 232.]
p. 20, note f.j' » Hbid., p. 238. "i
252
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^rt London at the same time when this ridiculous Epistle was
printed and published % he did not for his own cause, sooner
or later, procure it to be suppressed.
Concerning myself, I can safely say, that I was so far from 752
"intending^^ my defence ^"for the press^/^ that since it was
perfected, and one only copy transcribed for the Marquis of
Newcastle and himself, it hath scarcely ever beheld the sun.
Questions may be ventilated, and truth cleared from mis-
takes, privately between particular persons, as w^ell or better
than publicly in print.
[The au- As touching my exceptions to his book De Cive, he saith,
ceptiom'to did indeed intend to have answered them, as finding them
book Z)e neither political nor theological, nor that" I "alleged any rea-
Cive.'] sons by which they were to be justified'^." The inference would
have holden more strongly the contrary way ; — that because
they were neither theological nor political, and destitute of
reasons to support them, they were fitter to be despised than
to be answered. But why did he then " intend to answer
them," and thought himself so much concerned in it ?
Surely he hath forgotten himself : for there was never a one
of those exceptions which was not backed with several rea-
sons. But concerning them and his Leviathan, I* shall be
sparing to speak more in present. Peradventure I may re-
serve two or three chapters, one to shew him his theological
errors, another how destructive his political errors are to all
societies, a third of his contradictions; out of all which, if
my leism-e serve me, I may chance to gather a posy, and
present it to him*^.
He chargeth me to say, that there were " two of our own
Chm'ch answering" his Le^iathan^. It may be so : but it is
more than I know. I said, " one of our own Church, and
one stranger^."
[The au- In the conclusion of my Epistle to the Reader, I used this
thor's vale-
diction de-
fended.] a [Shortly after the publication of Epist. to the Reader, pp. 19, 20.]
the Leviathan, that is, in the latter " [Ibid., p. 20.]
part of 1651, Hobbes returned home ^ [See the Catching of Leviathan,
from Paris, and continued to reside in Disc. iii. Pt. iii ; at the end of this
England thenceforward. See his Life volume.]
in the Biogr. Brit. His Letter on Li- « [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's,
berty and Necessity was published in Epist. to the Reader, p. 20.]
1G54.] f [Defence, Epist. to the Reader,
" [Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. above p. 20 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
253
innocent form of valediction, " So God bless uss a form of Liscourse
all others most usual for shutting up our Epistles, — " So God — —
bless us/' or " So God bless you/' or " So I commit you to
God/' or " commend you to the protection of the highest
Majesty." But it seemeth, he, misapprehending it to be a
prayer for protection or deliverance from his opinions, styles
ray well-meant prayer, a buffoonly abusing of the name of
God to calumny^." How? Am I charged with "buffoonery,"
and "calumny," and "abusing" of the holy name of God?
And all this for saying " God bless us ?" Is this a fit man
to reprehend others for incivility ? Did he learn this high
strain of courtesy at Malmesbury? I confess, I do not dis-
like a little toothless jesting, when the subject will bear it.
" Ridiculum acri
" Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res*."
But I do not like jesting with edge-tools, nor jesting with
God Almighty; much less, "buflPoonly abusing" of the holy
" name of God to calumny." He need not fear any such re-
viling terms from me ; but if his cause meet now and then
with an innocent jerk for it, ^' sciat responsum, non dictum
esseT He that knoweth not the way to the sea, must get a
river to be his guide.
AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON MY REPLY;
NUMBER I.
I said I was " diverted from reading his Defence by busi- [Difference
between
diversion
and deter-
mination.]
ness'^ : hence he inferreth, that " the will is not free ; for dfveiSi
nothing is free that can be diverted by anything but itself ^" ^"^^
I deny this proposition, and he will prove it at the Greek
Calends. There is a great difference between diversion and
determination. Diversion is but an occasional suspension of
the exercise of liberty ; but physical determination to one is
a compulsion of the will, so far as the will is capable of com-
pulsion, that is, necessitation. The will doth choose its own
diversion, but there is no choice in necessitation. And there-
[Ibid.] k [Defence, Numb. i. above p. 24.
[Qu., Animadv. upon the Bp's. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
Epist. to the Reader, p. 20.] i [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p.
> [Horat., Sat., I. x. 14, 15.] 2,5.]"
254
CASTTGATIONS OF
P A^^R T fore necessitation to one is opposite to liberty, but diversion
— — '- — is not, nor moral efficacy.
Resolution Out of liis verv first words — " I had once resolved/' &c. —
proveth _ *^
election 1 Urged two arguments against nim.
andhbtity. YiY^t, all resolution presupposeth deliberation; so much
is acknowledged by himself, — that ^'^to resolve is to will
after deliberation"^'^ (he knoweth no difference between will-
ing and electing) : — but all deliberation of that which is
inevitably determined without ourselves (as all events are
determined^ according to his opinion) is vain ; as, it is vain
for a condemned person to deliberate whether he should
be executed, it is vain for a man to deliberate whether he
should grow in stature, or whether he should breathe.
The only thing questionable in this argument is the truth
of the assumption, — whether it be vain to deliberate of
that which is already inevitably determined : to which he
answereth not one syllable in terminis, but runs away with
a false scent, altogether wide from the purpose; — ^' A man" 753
(saith he) "may deliberate of what he shall do, whether
the thing be [im] possible or not, in case he know not of
the impossibility, though he cannot deliberate what another
shall do to him ;" and therefore my three instances " are im-
pertinent, because the question is not what they shall do, but
what they shall suffer^." And here he vapoureth marvel-
lously, supposing that he hath me at a huge advantage.
Such are commonly all his advantages : much good may
they do him. First, he erreth grossly in affirming, that all
deliberation is only of what a man will do. or not do ; and not
at all of what a man will suflPer, or not suffer. Deliberation
is as well about evil to be eschewed, as about good to be
pursued. Men deliberate equally of their doings and of
their sufferings, if they be not inevitably determined ; but if
they be, then neither of the one nor of the other. A martyr
or a confessor may deliberate, what torments he will suffer
for his religion. Many of those acts whereabout we do usu-
ally deliberate, are mixed motions, partly active and partly
passive ; as all our senses. Secondly, it is a shame for him
to distinguish betwen actions and sufferings in this cause,
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. " [Ibid.]
25.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
255
when all the actions of all the free agents in the world, by Discourse
his doctrine, are mere sufferings. A free agent is but like a — II: —
bullet rammed up into the barrel by the outward causes, and
fired off by the outward causes ; the will serves for no use
but to be a touch-hole; and the poor agent hath no more
aim or understanding of what he doth, than the arrow which
is forced out of the bow towards the mark, without any sense
or concurrence in itself. A condemned person may be
reprieved, and deliberate about that; but the sentence of
the causes produceth a necessity from eternity ° (as he phras^
eth it), never to be interrupted or altered. Thirdly, he erreth
in this also, that he afiirmeth all my three instances to be
only of passions or sufferings. Growing up in stature is a
vegetative act. Respiration is a sensitive act, or an act of the
moving and animal faculty. Some question there hath been,
whether respiration were a natural motion, or a voluntary
motion, or a mixed motion ; but all conclude, that it is an
act or motion which is performed whilst we sleep, when we
are incapable of deliberation. Lastly, to say that a man may
deliberate of a thing that is not possible, if " he know not of
the impossibility,^' will not advantage his cause the value of
a rush. For, supposing an universal necessity of all events
from eternity, there can be no such case ; seeing all men
know, that upon this supposition all acts and events are
either antecedently and absolutely necessary, or antecedently
and absolutely impossible ; both which are equally uncapable
of deliberation. So the ^impertinence' will prove to be in
his answer, not in my instances.
My second argument out of his own words was this. —
To resolve a man's self, is to determine his own will ; and
if a man determine his own will, then he is free from outward
necessity. But T. H. confesseth, that a man may resolve him-
self : — " I resolved once," &c. ; and yet further, — ^' To resolve
is to will after deliberation." Now ^'^to will after delibera-
tion," is to elect ; but that he hateth the very term of elect-
ing or choosing, as being utterly destructive to his new-mo-
delled fabric of universal necessity. And for that very reason,
he confounds and blunders together the natural, sensitive,
and intellectual, appetites. Either the will determineth itself
° [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
256
CASTIGATIONS OF
P J jj ^ resolution ; or both will, and deliberation, and resolu-
'■ — tion, are pre-determined by a necessary flux of natural causes.
If the will determine itself in its resolution, then we have
true liberty to will or nill. If both the will, and the deli-
beration, and the resolution, be pre-determined by outward
causes, then it is not the resolution of the will itself, nor of
the agent, but of the outward causes ; then it was as much
determined, that is to say, resolved, before the deliberation,
as after; because the deliberation itself, and the whole event
of it, particularly the last resolution, was outwardly pre-
determined from eternit}^
[T. H.'s To this he answereth nothing ; but, according to his usual
answeS/] manner, he maketh three objections. First, "No man can
determine his own will, for the will is an appetite," and ^ it is
not in man's power to have an appetite when he willP.' This
argument would much better become the kitchen than the
schools : — to argue from the lesser to the greater negatively,
which is against all rules of logic. Just thus, — a brute beast
cannot make a categorical syllogism, therefore a man cannot
make one. So here, — the sensitive appetite hath no domi-
nion over its own acts, therefore neither hath the rational
appetite any dominion over its own acts. Yet this is the
only pillar that supporteth his main distinction, which must
uphold his castle in the air from tumbling down about his 7 34
ears. But be what it will be, it hath been sufficiently an-
swered already q.
His second objection hath so little solidity in it, that it is
ridiculous; — "Over whatsoever things there is dominion,
those things are not free but over a man's actions there is
" the dominion of his wilP." What a medius terminus hath he
light upon. This which he urgeth against liberty, is the very
essence of liberty. If a man's actions were imder the domi-
nion of another man's will, or under the dominion of his ex-
trinsecal causes, then they were not free indeed ; but for a
man's own actions to be in his own power, or in the power
or under the dominion of his own will, that is that wliich
makes them free.
•* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. the Question, [above pp. 225, 22f).]
25.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p.
1 In the Answer to the Stating of 26.]
MH. IIOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS,
257
Thirdly, he objects, If a man determine himself, the Discourse
question will yet remain, what determined him to determine
himself If he speak properly, in his own sense of physical
determination, by outward causes, he speaketh plain non-
sense : for if he was so determined by another, then he did
not determine himself. But if he mean only this — what did
concur with the will in the determination of itself,' — I an-
swer, that a friend by persuasion might concur morally, and
the understanding by representing might concur intrinse-
cally, but it hath been demonstrated to him over and over,
that neither of these concurrences is inconsistent with true
liberty from necessitation and physical determination to one.
Something I say afterwards which doth not please him,
which he calleth "a talking to" myself "at random*." My
aim in present is only to answer his exceptions, a little more
punctually than he hath done mine ; not at aU to call him
to an account for his omissions. That part I leave to the
reader^s own observation.
He telleth me plainly, that I " neither understand" him, What is
" nor what the word 'necessary^ signifieth, if" I "think" he '
"holds no other necessity, than that which is expressed in
that old foolish rule^ ' whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily
so as it is".^ " If I understand him not, I cannot help it ;
I understand him as well as I can, and wish that he under-
stood himself a little better, to make him speak more signifi-
cantly. Let us see where the fault lies, that he is no better
understood. First, he defineth what is necessary ; — " that is
necessary, which is impossible to be otherwise ;" — whence he
inferreth, that "necessary, possible, and impossible, have no
signification in reference to the time past, or time present,
but only the time to come"^." I think all men will conde-
scend to him thus far, that possibility hath only reference to
"the time to come." But for necessity, and impossibility,
he overshooteth himself beyond all aim. If a house do actu-
ally burn in present, it is "necessary," that is, infallible,
that that house do bum in present, and "impossible," that
it do not burn. If a man was slain yesterday, it is " neces-
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. " [Ibid.]
p. 26.] « [Ibid.]
t [Ibid.]
BRAMHALL. g
258
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part sary/' tliat he is slain to-day, and " impossible/^ that he
-iii should not be slain. His own definition doth sufficiently
confute him, — that is necessary which is impossible to be
otherwise;" — but it is " impossible/' that that which is
doing in present, or which was done yesterday, should " be
otherwise/' How hang these things together ? Or this that
he telle th us, that his "'necessary' is a necessary from all
eternity y," which with him is an everlasting succession 2.
And yet he telleth us, that necessary signifieth nothing in
reference to the time past ; then how is it " necessary from all
eternity?" And here he thrusteth out for rotten a great
many of old scholastic terms, as "empty words ^/' as, "ne-
cessary when it is," or, " absolutely and hypothetically neces-
sary," and, " sensus compositus et divisus/' and, " the domi-
nion of the will," and, " the determining of itself." I must
put him in mind again of the good old woman in Seneca,
who complained of the darkness of the room, when the de-
fect was in her own eyesight I wonder not that he is out
of love with distinctions, more than I wonder why a bung-
ling workman regards not a square or a plumb; but if he
understood these distinctions a little better, he would not
trouble his reader with " that which shall be, shall be/' and
a bundle of such like impertinencies.
He acknowledgeth, that "' my Lord of Newcastle's desire,
and" my "intreaty, were enough to produce a will in" him
"to write" his "answer^." If they were enough, then he
was not necessitated, nor physically predetermined, to write
it. We had no more power than to persuade, no natural
influence upon his will ; and so he was, for us, not only free
to write, but free to will also. But " perhaps there were other
imaginations of" his "own that contributed their part^." Let
it be so ; yet that was no extrinsecal or absolute determination
of his will. And so far was our request from producing his 755
consent, "as necessarily as the fire burneth^," that it did
not, it could not, produce it at all, by any natural causal
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. [" Whether " they ** were enough,"
p. 26.] &c., " without concurrent causes, I am
^ [See above in the Defence, T. H. not sure;" but they " did somewhat."
Numb. xxiv. p. 154.] Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]
" [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. i. p. [Ibid.]
26.] e [Ibid., p. 27.]
^' [Sec above p. 249. note k.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
259
influence and efficacy. The sufficiency, and efficiency, and Discourse
productive power, was in his will itself ; which he will not be — —
brought to understand.
AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE REPLY ;
NUMBER II.
Here is nothing of moment to detain the reader. Pie Chance is
saith, "Whosoever chanceth to read Suarez his Opuscula, jentai con-
shall find the greatest part, if not all, that" I " have urged in ^orfmrn'
this question^." Said I not truly, give innovators " line ignorance,
enough, and they will confute themselves^?" "Whosoever
chanceth," &c. — and why chanceih By his doctrine, it
was as necessary for him that readeth to read, as it is for the
fire to burn*^. Doth the fire sometimes burn by ^chance?'
He will say, that where the certain causes are not known, we
attribute events to chanced But he sticks still in the same
mire, without hope ever to be freed. Who knoweth the
certain reason, why the needle touched with the loadstone
pointeth always towards the north ? Doth it therefore point
by ' chance How many thousands are ignorant of the true
causes of comets, and earthquakes, and eclipses? Do they
therefore attribute them to ' chance V Chance never hatli
place, but where the causes concur accidentally to produce
some efi'ect, which might have been produced otherwise.
Though a man strive to " expel" these common notions "with
a fork, yet now and then they will return^." And though I
could not "surprise'" him, yet the truth can. Thus, Penelope
like^", he hath undone that in the dark, which he hath been
weaving all this while in the light. It were more ingenuous
to say, it was a slip of his pen.
It is indifferent to me, whether the greatest part of what I [Suarez.]
urge in this question, or all that I urge, or perhaps more than
I urge, be contained in Suarez his Opuscula. So the trutli
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ii. Numb. xx. p. 132, &c.]
p. 28.] ^ [" Naturam expellas furca, tameii
* [Defence, Numb. i. above p. 24, usque recurret." Horat., Epis>t., 1.
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] x. 24.]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. ' [See above in tbe Defence, T. II.
27 : and see above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]
Numb. XX., p. 132.] [Odyss., ii. 93—110.]
' [See above in the Defence, T. II.
260
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^rt may prevail, I care not who have the honour of the achieve-
— ment. But Suarez understood himself better than to con-
found two such different questions ; namely, that of the
necessity or liberty of all events, natural and civil, which is
our question, with the concurrence of grace and free w^ill in
moral and supernatural acts, which he saith is the subject of
Suarez his discourse in that place ^. In all my life, that I do
remember, I never read one line of Suarez his Opuscula, nor
any of his works the sixteen years last past. I wish he had
been versed in his greater w^orks, as well as in his Opuscula,
that he might not be so averse from the Schools. " Ignoti nulla
aipido." Then he would have known the terms and argu-
ments used in the Schools as well as others. It is no blemish
to make advantage of other men's pains and experience.
[Ps. xix. 2. Dies diei eructat verbum, et nox nocti indicat scientiam/'
^ But Mr. Hobbes, trusting over much to his own particular
abilities, presumeth to stand upon his own bottom, without any
Eccies. iv. dread of Solomon's ^'^ Vm soli" — " Wo to him that is alone
Pr'ov. xxii. when he falleth.'' He scrupleth not to " remove the ancient
jerem landmarks which his fathers had set,'' nor to " stumble from
xviii. 15. the ancient paths, to walk in a way that was never cast up."
It were mere folly to expect either a known ground or a
received term from him. Other men are contented to learn
to write after a copy, but he will be printed a philosopher and
a divine of the first edition by himself ; and, Icarus like, find
out a new way with his waxen wings which mortals never
knew, though he perish in the attempt °. Such undigested
fancies may please for a while, during the distemper and
green-sickness fit of this present age ; as maids infected with
that malady, prefer chalk or coals in a corner before healthful
food in their father's housed ; but when time hath cured their
malady, and experience opened their eyes, they will abominate
their former errors, and those who were their misleaders.
" [" Suarez his Opuscula, where he sq. — &c.]
wTiteth of free will and of the concourse p Ex Plutarchi Polit, ad Trajan.,
of God with man's will," Qu.,Animadv. [c. iv; Op. Moral., toni. iv. p. 148. ed.
upon Numb, ii, p. 28. Suarez' Opus- "NVyttenb. — " Kai yap at KiTToxraiXldovi,
cula Theologica, containing (among Kal oi vavnwvTfs aXfu-vpiSas Kal Toiavra
other tracts) Lib. III. de Concursu, ^pw/u-ara SLWKovanroWaKLs, cTra oXlyov
Motione, et Auxilio Dei, were pub- vanpov e^eirrvcrau Kal a-rrfo-Tpdcprjcrav'
lished at Lyons, 4to. 1600,] oOVo) 5^ fcal oi Stj/jloi Sik rpvcpr/u nal
o [Ovid., Metam., lib. viii. vv. 184, v^piu,'' k. t. A.]
Mil. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
261
He had slighted whatsoever I produced as common and Discourse
trivial, " having nothing new in it, either from Scripture or — — ^
reason, which" he " had not often heard I replied only, I^^P^^*^^^"^*
that then I might " expect a more mature answer," and ad-
vised him, under the similitude of Epictetus his sheep,
rather to shew his reading in his works than to glory of if.
And where I said, that " great recruits of reasons and autho-
rities did offer themselves®" to me in this cause, he threat-
enetli, " before" he " have done with me, to make it appear to
be very bragging, and nothing else;" adding, that " it is not
likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and
wool," because he was " not acquainted with paying of tithes ^"
I could not suspect, that a poor similitude out of Epictetus
should make him so passionate. But " tariff e monies, et fumi- [Ps. cxiiv.
yubunf' — " touch the high mountains, and they will fume and ^'^
smoke." It seemeth strange to me, that he should be so
75() ignorant in Epictetus (a Stoic, one of his principal friends, of
so great fame, that his earthen lamp was preserved as a relic,
and sold for three thousand drachmas", whom even Lucian,
that great scoffer, calleth an "admirable old man^"), as to
say, that " it is not Kkely, that Epictetus should take a me-
taphor from lamb and wool." He meaneth, from sheep. To
inform him better, let him hear his words ; — " For sheep do
not bring their grass to their shepherd, to shew him how
much they have eaten ; but, concocting their meat inwardly,
do bring forth wool and milk^." This might be pardoned;
but his scoffing at payment of " tithes," and particularly
" lamb and wool," being an institution of God Himself, and
established by the laws of our own realm, cannot be excused.
I appeal to aU those who have read anything upon this sub-
ject, whether I might not have added many more reasons,
and produced the authority of the Christian world against
him in this cause of liberty, with the suffrages of the Fathers
[In the Defence, T. H. Numb. ii. terhus. Amst. 1743.]
above p. 2G.] » t^? Oavixaar^ ^Kuvcp yepovTi."
r [Defence, Numb. ii. above p. 26.] Id. ibid.]
s [Epist. to the Marq. of Newcastle, ^ Encheirid., c. xlvi. [§ 2 ; p. 222.
prefixed to tlie Defence, above p. 17.] ed. Schwtigh. — 'Enel Kal to. npo^ara ov
^ [Q.U., Animadv. upon Numb. ii. x^P'^(>^ <p4povTa iroip.4aiu eVtSet/cj/yei
P- 28.] Trdcroi^ ^(payev aWa, ttju vojxrtv ^aw
" [Lucian., Dial. adv. Indoctum, 7rei//a//Ta, epta e^w (pepei koi ydKa." j
c. xiii; Op. torn. iii. p. 111. ed. Hems-
262
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part in all successive ages. But I remember that of our Saviour,
" Cast not your pearls before swine, lest they trample them
Matt. vii. 6. , - . ,^ ' *^ ^
under their feet."
AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON NUMBER III.
ExaoHie- He is displeased, that I do not " set down the definitions" of
not fre- necessity, spontaneity, and liberty," without which (he saith)
quent. their difference cannot possibly appear \" Yet formerly % and
again in this very chapter, he confesseth, that the question
is truly and clearly stated by me ; — " The question which
the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down ver-
batim, and allowed^." What a trifling humour is this !
Many things are not capable of perfect definition; as (to
pass by all others) accidents, and modes, or such terms as
signify the manner of being. And in such things as are
capable of definition, yet essentials (whereof a definition must
consist, — ^'opLafjLo^ iarc tt)? ovaia^ yvcopia/jLo<;^'') are neither so
obvious nor so useful to common capacities. I believe, that
all the perfect definitions which T. H. hath made in his life in
philosophy or theology, may be written in one little ring ;
whereof I shall be bold henceforth, now and then as I find
occasion, to put him in mind. Nay, even in mathematics,
which by reason of their abstraction from matter are less
subject to error, he can miss the cushion as well as his neigh-
bours, and be contented sometimes to acknowledge it; not
because those errors are greater or so great as his errors in
philosophy or theology, but because their conviction is more
easy, and more evident. And therefore for the most part a
plain description must serve the turn ; sometimes from the
etymological unfolding of the name, sometimes by the re-
moving of what is opposite or contrary, sometimes by a peri-
phrastical circumlocution, sometimes by instances and ex-
amples. And thus, by his own confession, the question is
cleared between us.
What li- Yet, to satisfy him, I will describe them more formally.
To begin with liberty. Liberty is a power of the will (or free
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]
p. 35.] <^ [See Aristot., Analyt. Poster., II.
" [Ibid., Stat, of Quest, p. 3.] vii. I.]
^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
263
agent), to choose or to refuse this or that indifferently after Discourse
deliberation, free from all antecedent and extrinsecal deter- —
mination to one^. Election is the proper act of the will ; and
without indiflferency or indetermination, and deliberation,
there can be no election, which is a " consultative appetition^."
And they, and they only, are free agents, who, supposing all
things to be present that are requisite to action, can never-
theless either act or forbear to act, at their own choice^ : which
description hath already been explained^, and shall be further
in due place.
Secondly, voluntary or spontaneous is that, which hath its What is
beginning from an inward principle (that is, the will), with ne?ty.^
some knowledge of the end^. Such are the acts of children,
fools, and madmen, whilst they want the use of reason ; and
the sudden acts of passionate persons, whensoever the vio-
lence of their passion doth prevent all deliberation. Such
are many actions of brute beasts ; as the spider's making of
her webs to catch flies, the bird's building of her nest
therein to lay her eggs ; both which proceed " from an inward
principle with some knowledge of the end." So then this is
the diff'erence between that which is free, and that which is
voluntary or spontaneous ; — that every free act is also a volun-
tary or spontaneous act, but every voluntary or spontaneous
act is not a free act. The reason is evident ; — because no
act is free, except it be done upon deliberation ; but many
voluntary or spontaneous acts are done without all delibera-
tion, as the acts of brute beasts, fools, children, madmen,
and some acts of passionate persons. Secondly, there is no
757 liberty but where there is a possibility towards more than
one, and freedom to choose this or that indifferently. But
in all those other kinds of voluntary or spontaneous acts,
there is an antecedent determination to one, and no in-
differency of election. So spontaneity is an appetite of some
object, proceeding either from the rational or sensitive will,
either antecedently determined or not determined to one,
d [See Thorn. Aquin., Summ., P. agendum, potest agere et non agere."
Prima,^Qu. Ixxxiii. art. L] Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii.
' [""Qj/Tos Se Tov npoaipeTou fiou- c. 7; Op. torn. iii. p. 663. B.]
\€vTov opeKTov," K. T. A. Aiistot., s [Above ill the Defence, Numb.
Ethic, III. V. 19.] xxxii. p. 173. note y.]
' [" Ilia est potentia libera, i[ux, ^ [Thoni. Aquin., Summ., Prim,
omnibus positis quae requiruntur ad Secund., Qu. vi. art. 1. llespondeo.]
264
CASTIGATIONS OF
What is
necessity.
either upon deliberation or without deliberation, either with
election or without election.
The last term is necessity. He himself hath defined " neces-
sary/' to be "that which is impossible to be otherwise'. ''
Here is a definition without either matter or form, genus or
differentia^ without any thing in it that is essential, or so
much as positive, a very periphrase or circumlocution, and
(which is worst) not convertible or reciprocal with the thing
defined. Many things may be " necessary" respectively,
which are not " impossible to be otherwise as to let blood
in a pleurisy. A horse is necessary for a long voyage ; yet
it is not impossible for a man to perform it on foot. And,
on the other side, many things are " impossible to be other-
wise,'' which are not "necessary" in that sense wherein we
take necessity in this question : as that which is necessary
upon science or prescience, and that which is necessary
upon condition or supposition. As, if Thomas write, then
he lives ; yet neither his writing nor his living is absolutely
necessary. So, " whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so
as it isj," or " impossible to be otherwise." None of these
necessities have any place in this controversy. None of these
sorts of necessity are opposite to true liberty. By the way,
T. H. calls this rule — "Whatsoever is, when it is, is neces-
sarily so as it is," — an "old foolish rule'^" (yet it is delivered
by Aristotle, and received ever since in the world), upon his
own authority, without ever examining it, or understanding
it. Satis pro imperio.^^ So then necessity (as it is proper
to this question) I conceive may be thus fitly described, —
necessity is a manner or propriety of being or of acting,
whereby that which is, or acteth, cannot possibly but be and
act, nor be or act otherwise than it doth, by reason of an
antecedent, extrinsecal, and inevitable determination to one.
Necessity I say, of being or of acting, because there is a double ne-
and acting ccssity, " in essendo et in operando^,^ and both considerable
gulshed. cause. That which is necessarily, may act freely,
as God Almighty without Himself ; and that which is freely
' [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb,
p. 2(;.]
j [Aristot.,] De Interpret, lib.
cap. ult. [in versione Argyropyli.-
ix. § 1 k ed. Bekker.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, i
p. 2fi.]
^ [Sec Thorn. Aquin., in Sentent.
P. I. Dist. xliii. Qu. ii. art. 1.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
265
or contingently^ as fire kindled by the help of a tinderbox, Discoukse
or by the stumbling of a horse upon the pavement of a '-
street, may act and burn necessarily. Here he may see, if
he please, how necessity and will or spontaneity may meet
together; — because that which is antecedently and extrin-
secally determined to one, may agree well enough with my
appetite, or the appetite of another; — but necessity and
liberty can never meet together ; because that which is ante-
cedently and extrinsecally determined to one, cannot possibly
be fi'ee, that is, undetermined to one, nor capable of election,
which must be inter phira, nor a fit subject for deliberation.
He lu'geth, that, " seeing'' I say necessity and spontaneity i t. h. con-
may meet together," he " may say that necessity and will may fn3ertv^ud
stand together He doth but betray his own ignorance, ^^"^^^-^
and intolerable boldness, to censiu'e all the world for that
Avhich he never read nor miderstood. We all say in like
manner, that necessity and will may stand together for
will and spontaneity are the same thing. But necessity and
liberty can never stand together. If he will shut his eyes
against the hght, he may stumble as often as he pleaseth.
He saith, he " doth not fear that it will be thought too hot [His pre-
for^^ his " fingers^ to shew the vanity of such words as these, rej>c/ion"of
intellectual appetite, conformity of the appetite to the object, [eJms^*^
rational will, elective power of the rational will, reason is of art.]
the root of hberty, reason representeth to the will°."
Reader, behold once more the unpai-alleled presumption of
this man. Words and terms are not by natm-e, but by im-
position. And who are fit to impose terms of ai't but artists,
Avho understand the art ? Thus were all these terms im-
posed. Again, " verborum id nummorum'^ — " words are as
money is the most cui'rent is the best. This was the
current language of all schools of learning, which we learned
from our tutors and professors : but a private man starceth
up, not bred in the Schools, who opposeth his own authority
to the authority of the whole world, and cries down the
current coin, that is, the generally received terms of ai't.
W here is his commission ? What is liis reason ? Because
he doth not understand them, he guesseth, that they did not
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Isiirub. iii. " [Ibid., pp. 35, 3G.]
p. 3o.J
266
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part Understand themselves. Is his private understanding (which
'■ — is filled up to the brim with prejudice and presumption) fit
to be the public standard and seal of other men's capacities ?
They who will understand School terms, must learn and
study them ; which he never did. Those things that are ex-
cellent and rare, are always difficult °. He who shall affirm,
that all the famous divines and philosophers in the world for
so many succeeding ages did speak nonsense, deserveth to be
contemned. His respect to weak capacities must not serve
his turn. " Nulla sunt occulfiores insidice, quam h(B quce latent
in sbnulatione officii^.'' If he could shew any author before
himself, wherein these terms were not used, or wherein his
new terms were used, it were something. There is no art
in the world which hath not proper terms ; which none
understand but they who understand that art.
But " cui bono ^ ?" If we should be so mad to quit all re-
ceived school terms and distinctions, and lose all the ad-
vantage which we might reap by the labours and experience
of so many great wits, what advantage would this be to him ?
None at all at long running. Whatsoever be the terms, the
state of the question must be the same. And those veiy
reasons, which comdnce him now in the old language of the
Schools, would convince him hkewise in the new language
which he desireth to introduce, after it was formed and gene-
rally understood. All the benefit that he could make of it,
would be only a little time, between the suppression of the
one and the introduction of the other, wherein he might
juggle, and play hocus pocus under the cloak of homonomies,
and ambiguous expressions. And that is the reason why he
is so great a friend to definitions, and so great an enemy to
distinctions.
Necessity Whereas I affirmed, that necessity of supposition may con-
posTuoiif' sist with true liberty he objecteth, that all necessity is upon
what It IS. supposition; as, "the fire burneth necessarily, . .upon supposition
that the ordinary course of nature be not hindered by God
[Dan. iv. (for the fire burnt not tlie three children in the furnace^^), and
27.J
° ["Tlepl 5e rh xaAeTrcirepoj/ aei koI [Id., Pro Milone, c. xii. — "Illud
rexfV y'lverat Kol ap^r-t]." Aristot., Cassianum, Cui bono fuerit."]
Ethic, II. ii. 10.] ^ [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 33;
'' TuU., [as quoted by St. Augustin, Disc. i. Pt iii.]
but without a reference.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
267
upon " supposition that fuel be put unto it^'' His supposition Discol-rsk
— ^' if the ordinary course of nature be not hindered^^ — is — — —
impertinent, and destructive to his own grounds. For though
it be true, that those things which are impossible to the
second causes, as to make " a camel go thi'ough the eye of a Mark x.
needle," are " all possible with God f yet, upon his opinion,
that all things are necessary from eternity, God hath tied
His own hands, and nothing is possible to God, which is not
absolutely necessary and impossible to be otherwise. His
other instance — of putting fuel" to the fire — is a necessary
supposition to the continuance or duration of the fire, but
not to the acting or burning of the fire. So long as there is
fire, it doth and must burn. T\'hen all requisites to action
are present, the will is free still to choose or refuse. ^Mien
all things requisite to action are present to the fire, it cannot
choose but burn, and cannot do otherwise. Thirdly, I
answer, that there is a two-fold necessity upon supposition ;
the one a necessity upon an antecedent extrinsecal supposi-
tion. This cannot consist with liberty, because it implieth
an antecedent determination, and the thing supposed was
never in the power of the agent. The other is a necessity
upon a consequent supposition, where the thing supposed is
in the power of the free agent, or depends upon something,
or supposeth something, that is in his power ; tliis is very
well consistent with true hberty. As, for example, if T. H.
do run, then it is necessary that he moves. This necessity
is no impediment at all to liberty, because the thing supposed,
that is, to run or not to run, is in the power of the free
agent. If a man^s will be determined antecedently by ex-
trinsecal causes to choose such a woman for his wife, and her
will to choose him for a husband, then it is necessaiy that
they elect one another. This necessity is upon an antecedent
supposition, and is utterly destructive to liberty, because the
determination of the extrinsecal causes is not in the power
of the free agent. Lastly, T. H. his two instances of the fire
are altogether impertinent. For, first, the fire is a natiu-al
necessary agent ; and therefore no supposition, antecedent or
consequent, can make it free. Secondly, God's hindering
the ordinary com-se of natm-e is an antecedent supposition ;
* [Qu., Aniinadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 36.]
268
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part and if the fire were a free a<?ent, it were sufficient to destroy
111. . & ^
the liberty thereof, as to that act.
He saith_, that " it seemeth" I " understand not^ what these
words — ' free^ and ' contingent^ — mean because I " put 7 56
causes among those things that operate freely*/^ What doth
the man mean ? Are not fi'ee agents " causes ?" If they be
not, how do they act ? I understand these words — " free^' and
" contingent/^ — as they ought to be understood ; and as the
world hath understood them for two thousand years. As for
his new nicknaming of free and contingent agents, I heed
it not.
He hath " shewed/^ that this liberty, whereof we treat, is
common to brute beasts and inanimate creatures with man",
as well as he could shew it, or can shew it, or ever will be
able to shew it ; that is, just as much as he hath shewed,"
that the sea burneth. If it were not for this confounding of
terms, and a company of trifling homonymies, he would have
nothing to say or do.
]\ian is not " When a man" (saith he) " doth any thing freely, many
fnstrument, Other concurrent agents work necessarily ; as [when] the man
^o^j j„ moveth the sword freely, the sword woundeth necessarily''." A
his hand. fj.gg agent may have concurrent agents, but his instance in a
sword is very impertinent, which is but an instrument, yea,
a passive instrument ; and though it have an aptitude in
itself, from the sharpness and the weight thereof, yet the de-
termination of the action, and the efficacy or causation, ought
to be ascribed to the principal agent. The sword did not
wound, but the man wounded with the sword. Admit the
sword may be said in some sense to concur actively to the
cutting, certainly it concurs only passively to the motion.
But he would make us believe that the man is no more
active than his sword, and hath no more power to suspend or
deny his concurrence than the sword, because a man doth " not
move himself," or at least, not move himself " originally y."
I have heard of some who held an opinion, that the soul of
man was but like the winding up of a watch, and when the
string was run out, the man died, and there the soul deter-
* [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. iii. " [Ibid., p. 37-]
p. 36.] y [Ibid.]
" [Ibid., pp. Gfi, 37.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
269
rained ; but I had not thought before this, that any man had Discourse
raade the body also to be like a clock, or a jack, or a puppet '-
in a play, to have the original of his motion from without
itself, so as to make a man in his animal motion to be as
mere a passive instrument as the sword in his hand. If by
" originally" he do understand independently, so as to
suppose that a man hath his locomotive faculty from himself
and not from God, we all affirm, that the original of a man's
locomotive facultv is from God, '^^in Whom we live, and move. Acts xviii.
and have our being." But if he understand ^' originally,"
not in relation to the faculty, but to the act of moving (as he
must mean unless he mean nonsense), then we affirm, that a
man doth ^'^move himself originally," and desire not to
" taste" of his paradoxical " knowledge of motion." It is
folly to dispute with such men, and not rather to leave them
to their own phantastical chimeras; who deny all principles
and rules of art, whom an adversary cannot drive into greater
absurdities than they do willingly plunge themselves into.
Thus they do on purpose put out the lights, and leave men
to fence in the dark ; and then it is all one, whether a man
have skill at his weapon or not.
That he would have contingency to depend upon our know- [Of con-
ledge, or rather our ignorance, and not upon the accidental and free
concurrence of causes ; that he confoundeth free causes, ^^^^^^•'^
which have power to suspend or deny their concurrence, with
contingent causes, which admit only a possibility to concur
or not concur, rather out of impotence than power ; that he
maketh free causes, which are principal causes, to be guided
by inferior and instrumental causes ; as if a man should say,
that a man is guided by the sword in his hand, and not the
sword by the man^ ; — deserves no other answer but contempt
or pity, that a man should so poison his intellectuals, and
entangle himself in his own errors.
Such another mistake is his argument to prove, that con-
tingent causes could not have concurred otherwise than they
did; I know not whether more pedantical or ridiculous. " For
I conceive not" (saith he), "how, when this runneth this way
and that another, they can be said to concur, that is, run
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 37.]
270
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part together Wheresoever there are divided parties^ as in a
— ^H: — court, or a camp, or a corporation, he who " concurreth"
with one party, doth thereby desert the other.
The in- Concerning his instance of the necessity of casting ambs-
ambs-ace acc^, if he Can shew, that the caster was antecedently neces-
Tt^nl^his sitated to cast, so that he could not possibly have denied his
game. concurrence, and to cast so soon, so that he could not possibly
have suspended his concurrence, and to cast just with so much
force, so that he could not possibly have used more force or 760
less force, and to cast into that table and that very individual
place (it may be whilst he winked, or looked another way), —
I say, if he can shew that all these contingent accidents were
absolutely predetermined, and that it was not at all in the
caster's power to have done otherwise than he did, then he
hath brought contingency under the jurisdiction of fate. But
if he fail in any one of these (all men see that he must fail in
all of these), then I may have leave to tell him, that his cast-
ing of ambs-ace hath lost him his game.
But now, reader, I desire thee to observe his answer, and
to see him plainly yield the cause. Though the subject
— " ambs-ace" — be mean and contemptible, yet it yieldeth
thee light enough to see what notorious triflers these are.
Thus he saith, — The suspending of the caster's concur-
rence, or altering of his force, and the like accidents, serve
not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace, otherwise
than by making a necessity of deux-ace, or some other
cast that shall be thrown^." This is ingenuously answered;
I ask no more of him. He confesseth, that the caster might
have suspended his concurrence, or have altered his force, or
the accidents might have fallen out otherwise than they did ;
and that if these alterations had happened, as they might
have happened, then there had been as great a " necessity of
deux-ace or some other cast,'' as there was of ambs-ace.
Where he saith, that the alteration of the accidents " serveth
not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace, otherwise than
by making a necessity of deux-ace or some other cast," he
confesseth, that by making " a necessity of deux-ace or some
other cast," they might serve to take away the necessity of
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. [Ibid.]
p. 37.] - [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
271
ambs-ace." What is now become of his antecedent determi- Discourse
nation of all things to one " from eternity^ and of the ab — —
solute impossibility that any event should come to pass other-
wise than it doth ? If this be all his necessity, it is no more
than a necessity upon supposition, where the thing supposed
was in the agent^s power ; and where, the contrary determina-
tion by the agent being supposed, the event must necessarily
have been otherwise. And so he is come unwittingly under
the protection of that " old foolish rule%" which even now he
renounced, — "whatsoever is, when it is, is necessary so as it is."
I said most truly, that " that is not the question which he [T. H. con-
. . - foundeth
maketh to be the question \ For although at some times he absolute
assent to the right stating of the question, yet at other theticaf ne-
times, like a man that doth not understand himself, he cessity.]
varieth quite from it : and in the place of an absolute ante-
cedent necessity, he introduceth a consequent hypothetical
necessity ; as we have seen even now in the case of " ambs-
ace;" and where he argueth from prescience and where he
reasoneth thus, that which shall be, shall be^ ; as if the man-
ner how it should be, were not material : and where he
maketh "deliberation and persuasion'" to determine the
will. All these do amount to no more than a necessity upon
supposition. The question is as much or more of the liberty
of doing what we will, as willing what we will. But he
makes it to be only of willing.
He proceedeth like another Jehu ; — " He that cannot un- T. H. his
derstand the difference between free to do if he will, and free more\han
to will, is not fit to hear this controversy disputed, much less a^^owT
to be a writer in it^." Certainly I think he meaneth him-
self, for he neither understandeth what ' free' is, nor what
the ^ wilP is. A bowl hath as much free will as he, the bowl
is as much an agent as he ; neither of them according to his
opinion do "move themselves originally ^" The bias is as
much to the bowl, as his will is to him. The bias is deter-
mined to the one, so is his will. The bowl doth not bias
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i.
p. 26.]
s [See above p. 264. note j.]
^ [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 30.
Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
[Qu., Fount, of Arg., pp. 14, 15.]
" [Ibid., p. 12.]
i [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. i.
pp. 26, 27.]
k [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
p. 38.]
1 [Ibid., p. 37.]
272 CASTIGATIONS OF
Part itself, no more hath he the government of his own will, but the
— outward causes. It is not the fault of the bowl, if it have
too much bias, or too little bias, but his fault that biassed it ;
so, if he choose evil, it is not his fault, but the causes, which
biassed him over much, or over little, or on the wrong side.
And this is all his "freedom;" a determinate propension to one
side, without any possibility to incline the other way : as a
man that is nailed to a post, is free to lay his ear to it. Then
as Diogenes called a displumed cock "Plato's man," a "living
creature with two feet without feathers"*," so I may call a
bowl Mr. Hobbes his free agent.
[His ab- And yet he glorieth in this silly distinction, and hugs him-
sumption.] self for the invention of it : — " It is true, very few have
learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will, nor do
they find it much in books"." Yea, when I call " shepherds,
poets, pastors, doctors, and all mankind to bear witness for
liberty, he answereth, that "neither the Bishop, nor they, 7G1
ever thought on this question p." If he make much of his
own invention, I do not blame him ; the infant will not live
long before it be hissed out of the world. In all my life I
never saw a little empty boat bear so great a sail, as if he
meant to tow the world after him ; but when the sun is at
the lowest, it makes the longest shadows. Take notice (by
the way), that his freedom is such a freedom, as none of man-
kind, from the shepherd to the doctor, ever dreamed of be-
fore himself. This vain unprofitable distinction, which wounds
himself and his cause more than his adversary, and leaves
him open to the blows of every one that will vouchsafe to
assault him, which contradicts both the truth and itself, hath
been twice taken away already ^ in a voider'" (whither I refer
the reader), and ought not, like twice sodden coleworts, to
have been served up again in triumph so quickly, upon his
single authority, and before this treatise be ended. I shall
meet with it again to some purpose. I wonder whether he
do never cast away a thought upon the poor woman that was
^ [Diog. Laert., vi. 40.] i See Stating of the Question,
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. [above, p. 221 ;] and Answ. to [Ani-
p. 40.] madv.] Numb. i. [above, p. 258.J
° [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31. [Viz. "a basket in which broken
note k ; from St. Augustin.] meat is carried away from the table."
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, iii. Johnson.]
p. 40.]
MR. IIOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
273
drowned by mischance, whose dead body, Avhilst her neigh- Discourse
hours sought for down the river, her husband, who knew her — —
conditions better than they, advised them to seek up the
river ; for all her life long she loved to be contrary to all
otliers, and he presumed she would swim against the stream
being dead. Is it not hard, that he, who will not allow to
other men any dominion over themselves or their own acts,
will himself needs usurp an universal empire over the wills
and understandings of all other men ?
"Is it not freedom enough" (saith he), "unless a man's St. Austin
will have power over his Avill, and that his will must have aedlted^^
another power within it, to do voluntary acts^?" His error thanT. H.
proceedeth from the confounding of voluntas and volitio, the
faculty of the will, and the act of willing. Not long after
he reiterateth his mistake, taxing me for saying that "oui* wills
are in our power;" adding, that "through ignorance" I detect
the same fault in St. Austin*." If he mean my " ignorance"
to mistake St. Austin, let St. Austin himself be judge ; — ■
" Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset nisi esset in nostra
potestatej" &c. — "Therefore our will should not be our will,
unless it were in our power; because it is in our power, it is free
to us, for that is not free to us w hich is not in our power"," &c.
K he mean that it is an error in St. Austin, he sheweth his
insolence and vain glory. If this be an error in him, it» is an
error in all the rest of the Fathers ; I will not bate him one of
them in this cause. Mr. Cahdn (whom he citeth sometimes in
this treatise) professeth, that he will not differ a syllable from
St. Austin^ ; I do not say, in this question of natural neces-
sity or liberty, which no man then doubted of, but even in
that higher question of the concurrence of grace with free
■will. So here is neither error in St. Austin, nor ignorance
in me.
"Whereas I demanded thus, — " If whatsoever a man doth To give
and willeth be predetermined to one precisely and ine\itably, two, and
to what purpose is that power" whereof T. H. speaketh, to do o,'^js''a
con trad ic-
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. libera est nobis ; non enim est nobis tion.
P- 38.] liberum, quod in potestate non habe-
^ [Ibid., p. 40.] mus." See above. Defence Numb. iii.
" [Aug.,] De Lib. Arbit, lib. iii. c. p. 31. note j, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
3. [§8 ; Op. torn. i. p. 613. F. " Yo- x [Instit!, lib. II. c. iii. § 8. Op.
hintas igitur nostrA," &:c., " in nostra torn. ix. p. 73. a.]
potestate : porro quia est in potestate
BKAMH.\LL. rp
274
CASTIGATIONS OF
^ni^^ if he will^ and not to do if he will; which is never deduced
^ — into act indifferently^ and in utramque xx^rtem, and conse-
quently frustraneous^ ? He answereth, that ^'^all those things
may be brought to pass_, which God hath from eternity pre-
determined^/^ In good time ; he might as well say, that
God hath given man a liberty to both parts, to do or not to
do, to choose or to refuse, and yet hath limited him punctu-
ally and precisely to one part ; which is a pure contradiction,
— to give him choice of two, and yet restrain him to one.
He addeth, that though "the will be necessitated,'^ yet
"the doing what we will is liberty^." Yes, it is the liberty of
a bowl, it is his mock liberty, but it is no wise man^s liberty,
where all deliberation is vain, and all election is impossible.
[He who is I argued thus, — " If a man be free to act, he is much
is much ' more free to will, because, ^ quod efficit tale, illud magis est
to Willi] ^ ^«/e^ . ' to which he answereth with an ignorant jeer, — " As
if he should say, if I make him angry, then I am more
angry^." Pardon me, I wiU free him from this fear; I see
nothing in him that should move a man to anger, but rather
to pity. That canon holdeth only in causis per se, such
causes as by nature or the intention of the free agent are
properly ordained to produce that effect; such as his out-
ward causes are supposed by him to be in the determination
of the will ; and therefore my instance was proper : not in
causis per accidens, where the effect is not produced natu-
rally, or intentionally, but accidentally ; as in his ridiculous
instance.
My last argument which he vouchsafeth to take notice of, 7
was this ; — " If the will be determined, then the writing is
determined ; and then he ought not to say, he may write,
but, he must write^.^' His answer is, — " It foUoweth that he
must write, but it foUoweth not that I ought to say, he must
write; unless he would have me say more than I know, as
he himself doth^.^' What poor crotchets are these, unworthy
of a man that hath anything of reality in him ! as if my
argument did regard the saying of it, and not the thing it-
y [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 30.] ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 39.]
p. 38.] d [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.]
* [Ibid.] e [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
" [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.] p. 39.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
275
self. If it follow precisely that he must write, then he hath Discourse
no freedom in utramque partem, either to write or not to — ^
write; then he is no more free to do, than to will; both
which are contrary to his assertion.
I demanded, if a man^s will be determined without his
will, " why we do ask him, whether he will do such a thing
or not^?" His answer is, "because we desire to knows."
But he wholly mistaketli the scope of the question. The
emphasis lieth not in the word " we," but in the word " his ;"
how it is " Ids will." For if his will be " determined by
natural causes without his will," then it is the will of the
causes, rather than his own will.
I demanded further, " why we do represent reasons to According
men, why we do intreat them'^." He answereth, " because h°is prind-
we think to make them have the will thev have not'." Pltlf'L,..
So he teacheth us, first, that the will is determined by a ne- are vain,
cessary influence of natural causes ; and then prateth of
changing the will by advice and moral persuasions. Let him
ad^dse the clock to strike sooner or later than it is deter-
mined by the weight of the plumb and motion of the wheels ;
let him dissuade the plants from gro\ving; and see how
much it availeth. He saith, the will doth will " as necessarily
as the fire burneth^'." Then let him intreat the fire to leave
burning at his request. But thus it falleth out with them,
who cannot, or will not, distinguish between natural and
moral efficacy.
I asked then, why do we blame free agents ; since no man [Upon his
blameth fire for burning cities, nor accuseth poison for de- we c?n^^^"'
stroying men^ First, he returneth an answer, — " We blame nlaiTJJsUy
them because they do not please us""." ^liy? May a man
blame every thing that doth not please his humour ? Then
I do not wonder why T. H. is so apt to blame others without
cause. So the scholar may blame his master for correcting
him deservedly for his good. So he who hath a -vdcious sto-
mach may blame healthful food. So a lethargical person
may blame his best friend for endeavouring to save his life.
' [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.] p. 39.]
( [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. ^ [Ibid., p. 36.]
p. 39.] ' [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 32.]
^ [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, iii, p. 39.]
T 2
276
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Pa^rt And now^ ha^ang shot his bolt, he begins to examine the
'- — case j — " Whether blaming be any more than sapng the
thing blamed is ill or imperfect^." Yes_, moral blame is much
more ; it is an imputation of a fault. If a man be born blind
or with one eye, we do not blame him for it ; but if a man
have lost his sight by his intemperance, we blame him
justly He enquii-eth, "May not we say, a lame horse is
lameP Yes, but you cannot blame the horse for it, if he
was lamed by another without his own fault. " May not a
man say, one is a fool or a knave (saith he), "if he be so,
though he could not help it^?" If he made himself a sot,
we may blame him; though if he be a stark sot, we lose our
labour. But if he were born a natural idiot, it were both
injui'ious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he
learn, that a man may be " a knave,^^ and " cannot help it
Or that knavery is imposed ine^-itably upon a man without
his own fault ? If a man put fire to his neighbour's house,
it is the fault of the man, not of the fire. He hath confessed
formerly, that "a man ought not to be punished but for
crimes'" the reason is the very same, that he should not be
blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave
undone; no more than a servant whom his master hath
chained to a pillar, ought to be blamed for not waiting at his
elbow. No chain is stronger than the chain of fatal destiny
is supposed to be.
That piece of eloquence which he thinks^ I borrowed from
Tully, was in truth taken immediately out of St. Austin*,
who applieth it most properly to this case now in question.
A lame He urgeth, that a man might "as well say, that no man
son.'^ halteth which cannot choose but halt," as say, that no man
siuneth in those things which he cannot shun ; " for Avhat is
sin but halting" ?" This is not the first time that he hath
contradicted himself. Before, he told us, that " there can be
no punishment but for crimes that might have been left un-
° [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. [Ibid.]
p. 39.] ' [Ibid., Fount, of Arg., p. 13. See
o [See Aristot., Ethic, III. vii. 15. above p. 242, note q.]
" Ovd^ls yap h.v ovuSlaeie Tv(pk(f (pvaei s [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
^ e/f v6(Tov T) eK 7rA7J775s, b.Wa fxaXXov p. 40.]
4Xir,aai' rcf 8' e'| oluocpXuy'ias rj dXXrjs * [See above p. 31. note k.]
OLKoXaaias ttus eVtTt/x7}(rat."] " [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. iii.
p [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 41.]
p. 39.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
277
done'';" now lie telletli us_, that a man may sin, who cannot Discourse
choose but sin : then sin is not a punishable crime. He — Li: —
763 might even as well say, that there is no such thing as sin in
the Avorld ; or if there be, that God is the author of it.
Reader, whosoever thou art, if thou reverence God, eschew
such doctrines. His comparison of "halting" is frivolous
and impertinent. Halting is not against the eternal mle of
God^s justice, as sinning is. Neither doth a man choose his
halting freely, as he doth his sinning.
In the conclusion of his Animadversions upon Numb. iii. T. H. mak-
there is notliing that is new, but that he is pleased to play no bet^r^'*
with a "wooden top^\" He calleth ray argument from Zeno's J^^^Jq^j^j^
cudgelling of his man, " a wooden argument^." Let him top.
choose, whether I shall call his a Avooden, or a boyish, compa-
rison. I did never meet with a more unfortunate instancer
than he is. He should produce an instance of natural agents,
and he produceth an instance of voluntary agents. Such are
the boys that whip his " wooden top." He should produce
an instance of a iiatm'al determination (so he affirmeth that
the will is determined) ; and he produceth an instance of a
violent determination, for such is the motion of his top. I
hope he doth not mean, that the will is compelled. H' he do,
he may string it up with the rest of his contradictions. Hath
not he brought his hogs to a fair market? when God hath
created him a free man, a noble creature, to make himself
like a wooden top ! Deserveth not he to be moved, as the
top is, with a whip, until he confess his error, and acknow-
ledge his own liberty ? If this wooden top should chance to
hit T. H. on the shins, I desire to know whom he would
accuse. The top ? That were as mad a part, as it is in the
dog to run after the stone and bite it, never looldng at the
man who did throw it. What then? Should he accuse the
boys that whipped the top ? No, that were equally ludibri-
ous, seeing the boys are as much necessitated, and (to use his
own phi'ase) as much " lashed %" to what they do by the causes,
as the top is by the boys. So he may sit down patiently,
and at last think upon his liberty which he had abandoned ;
* [See above p. 242, note q.j Numb. xiii. p. 82.]
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. » [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, iii,
p. 41.] p. 41.]
* [Sec above in the Dtfencc, T. H.
278 CASTIGA.TIONS OF
Part and if the causes will give him leave^ get a plantain leaf to
— heal his broken shin.
Such an unruly thing as this top, which he fancieth, is he
himself, sometimes dictating errors, sometimes writing para-
doxes, sometimes justling out metaphysics, sometimes wound-
ing the mathematics; and, in a word, troubling the world,
and disordering all things, logic, philosophy, theology, with
his extravagant conceits. And yet he is offended, that men
will go about to keep possession of their ancient principles
against his upstart innovations ; and is ready to implead
them (with that quarrelsome Roman), because they would
not receive his weapon fairly with their whole bodies^. It
were a much more Christian contemplation, to elevate his
thoughts from this wooden top'^ to the organical body of a
man, wherein he may find God a hundred times; from the
external form or figure of the one, which affords it only an
aptitude to move and turn, to the internal and substantial
form of the other, which is the subordinate beginning of
animal motion ; from the turning of his top, which is so
swift that it prevents the discovery of the sharpest eye-sight,
and seemeth to stand stock still, to the eternity of God,
where motion and rest do meet together, or all motion is
swallowed up into rest ; lastly, from these boys, who hold the
top up by their continued lashings, to the infinite power of
an Almighty God, Who is both the procreating and conserv-
ing dause of all our life, being, and motion, and to magnify
Him for His wonderful works, wherein He hath manifested
to the world His own power and wisdom.
AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON NUMBER IV.
'LLiberty These Animadversions will produce no great trouble either
and^oTspe- to me or the reader. I did demonstrate in this section the
ciflcation.] difference between liberty of exercise or contradiction, and
liberty of specification or contrariety. He only takes notice
of it, and calls it "jargon*^;" and so without one word more,
sliaketh hands and withdraweth himself.
^ [Cic, Pro Rose. Amer., c. xii. [Qu,, Animadv. upon Numb. iv.
" Caius Fiinbvia . . diem Seaevolae p. 47; and see above in the Defence,
dixit, . . . quod non totum telum cor- T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.]
pore recepisset." j
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
279
I said it was a rule in art, that homonymous words, or Discourse
words of a double or doubtful signification, ought first to be — —
distinguished, that disputants may understand one another deep skill
rightly, and not beat the air to no purpose^. I shewed out ^"
of the Scriptures, that the word liberty or freedom was such
an ambiguous word, and shewed further what this liberty is,
whereof we dispute, — a liberty from necessitation or deter-
mination to one by extrinsecal causes^. He confesseth, that
this is the question ; adding, that he under standeth not how
such a liberty can be^ Then what remained but to go to
r6 4 our proofs? Yet here he raiseth a storm of words upon the
by, and "foameth out his own disgrace/' He denieth, that [Jude 13.]
there is any such rule of art ; — " I am sure" (saith he), " not
in the art of reason, which men call logic ^/^ And all logi-
cians are sure of the contrary, who give not only one but
many such rules, in treating of simple terms, of complex
terms, of fallacies. They teach, that an ambiguous term be-
fore it be distinguished signifieth nothing ; that it cannot be
placed in any predicament; that it cannot be defined nor
divided : and they give this general rule, Distinctio vocis
amhigu(B prima sit in omni rerum consider atione." Either
this mxan never read one word of logic in his life, or it is
most strange how pride hath defaced all logical notions out
of his mind.
He telleth us, that the signification of an ambiguous word His sjUy
may be rendered perspicuous by a definition J\'' But logicians
teach us better, — that it cannot be defined before it be distin-
guished. How should a man define he knoweth not what ?
Suppose I should ask him the definition of a degree, can he
or any man define a degree before they know what degree is
to be defined ? whether a degree in the heavens, or a degree
in the schools, or a degree of consanguinity, or a degree of
comparison? He may as well define a crab before he know
whether it be a crab-fish or a crab-fruit. The definition and
the thing defined are the same thing ; but ambiguous words
have several significations, which cannot be of the same
thing.
^ [Defence, Numb. iv. above p. SI, p. 46.]
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] 9 [Ibid.]
^ [Ibid.] h [Qvi., Animadv. upon Numb. iv.
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 46.]
380
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part His definition of liberty is this, — " Liberty is the absence
'- — of external impediments to motion^." Before I have done,
I shall make him out of love with his definitions. " Liberty
is an absence — if liberty be an absence/' then liberty is
nothing; for "an absence'^ is nothing in the nature of
things but a mere privation : — " an absence of impediments
—impediments may take away the liberty of execution, not
the liberty of election; there may be true liberty where
there are impediments and there may be no impediments
yet without liberty: — "an absence of outward impediments;" —
and why of " outward impediments may not inward impe-
diments withhold a man from acting freely as well as out-
ward ? may not a fit of sickness keep a man at home, as well
as a shower of rain? a man may be free, and act freely,
notwithstanding impediments ; many impediments are vinci-
ble ; a man may go out of his house though there be a great
log laid at his door : — lastly, " an absence of impediments to
motions;" — election is the most proper intrinsecal act of
liberty, which may be vrithout local motion. I durst not
style my poor description by the name of a definition. Yet
it set down the right nature of liberty, and shewed what was
the difference between us. His definition hath nothing to
do with liberty, and cometh not near our question by twenty
furlongs. Our controversy is, whether the will be antece-
dently determined by extrinsecal causes : we have nothing
to do with " impediraents of motion."
But to let him see the vanity of his definitions, I will de-
monstrate out of them, that the most necessary agents are
free agents, and the most free agents necessary agents ; that
the will is free, and necessity is liberty. First, when a stone
falleth from a steeple to the ground, or when a fire burn-
eth, there is " an absence of all external impediments to mo-
tion ;" yet, by his own confession, these are not free, nor so
much as voluntary, but natural necessary actions. The stone
falleth necessarily, not freely. The fire burneth necessarily,
not freely. So his definition fitteth a necessary agent as well
as a free agent. On the other side, he defineth " necessary" to
be " that which is impossible to be otherwise^" But, by his
; and in tlio Defence, T. II, 1 [^^n-, Animadv. upon Numb, i.
Nuinb. xx,\iii, above p, 175. J p, 2().]
MR. HOBBES* ANIMADVERSIONS.
281
doctrine, it is "impossible^' for any free or voluntary agent Discourse
"to be otherwise than it is, or act otherwise than it doth. —
Therefore, by his definition, all free and voluntary agents are
necessary agents. Secondly, if " an absence of external im-
pediments to motion" be a true definition of liberty, then
the will is free ; for the will hath no " external impediment to
motion." External impediments may hinder action, not elec-
tion, which is the proper act of the will. Lastly, by his defi-
nition, liberty itself is necessity, and necessity is liberty ; as
is made evident thus. The " absence of outward impedi-
ments to motion" is the definition which he giveth of liberty,
and therefore must be reciprocal or convertible w ith liberty
itself. But necessity is much more " an absence of outward
impediments to motion. '' For if there were any impediments
65 that could hinder the production of the eff*ect, there could be
no necessity. Thus he confoundeth all things with his defi-
nitions; free agents with necessary agents, and necessary
agents with free agents; necessity itself with liberty, and
liberty with necessity. And now learning is well reformed.
He is displeased at me for calling him a "particular man,"
as if (saith he) I or any other was an universal man ; and he
conceiveth that I "mean a private man"^." I mean as I write ;
a particular man is not opposed to an universal man, but to
mankind: though he maketh his "city^" to be a kind of uni-
versal man. iSly meaning was, " a particular man," that is,
not a Church, not a council, not so much as a company of
men, but one single man, and it may be a handful of his
• seduced disciples. There is neither a Church, nor a council,
nor a company of men, but they may justly challenge more
respect than one single man.
Here he boasteth of his constant meditations ; — that he Meditation
hath "done almost nothing else but to meditate upon this and withou?^^^
other natural questions Still he forgetteth Epictetus his JJ'sg^'offther
rule, that " the sheep should not brag how much it hath men's ex-
eaten p." If he had " meditated" to any great purpose, we
should have found it in his w^orks. For my part, I do neither
believe, that he had so much spare time from other employ-
ments to bestow upon his " meditations ;" nor that private
[Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. iv. " [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. iv.
P- p. 47.]
" [Viz. in bis Treatise De Cive, tit. P [Sec above p. 2G1, note y.]
Imper., c. vi. § 9, p. .57.]
282
CASTIGATIONS OF
meditation, without making use of the studies and experience
of other men, is so ready a way to attain to perfection in such
hidden learning. If he had spent all his time in meditating
how to become a good physician, and had never read a line
of Hippocrates or Galen, or any other learned author, the
meanest of which had more knowledge than he is able to
attain unto with all his meditation^^ during his whole life,
what would it have availed him ? " Facile est inventis
adder e — it is much easier to top a stately edifice, than to
build it up from the very foundation. Lastly, I do not be-
lieve, that he was capable of " meditation^^ upon those high
subjects ; which he never understood, as appeareth plainly by
his writings. How should a blind man judge of colours ?
Yet he will not give over, until he have had another fling
against School-terms ; because he findeth it easier to cen-
sure, than either to confute or understand. He hath been
answered formerly?, and shall receive a further answer in
due place. For the present, I shall only put him in mind of
two sayings : the one of Scaliger, — " Voces didacticae rudibus
iyigeniis acerbce, delicatis ridiculce sunV — " Terms of art de-
vised for instruction are unpleasant to palates not exercised
in them, and ridiculous to nice and delicate ears." There is
a double perspicuity, the one vulgar, to common people, the
other more intellectual, to artists. " In vulgar appellations"
(saith Aristotle) we are to speak as the common people, but
in terms of art we are to follow the most approved artists^."
He asketh, " with what patience" I "can hear Martin Luther
and Philip Melancthon speak" against School theology' :
whereof he giveth some instances, but without citing the
places ; so he must receive an answer without perusing of
them. If they have condemned all Schoolmen and School
learning, it is for him to defend them, not for me. For if
they did so, I should not much value their judgment in that
particular. But I do not believe that any who made so great
use of School learning, did condemn all Schoolmen in general.
q [Above in the Answ. to the ITpo- tis atque Ciceronianis etiam ridiculae." ]
XeyS/aeya, p. 209; and below Castig. ^ Tojiic., lib. II. c. ii. § 9. ["Ta?s
upon Animadv., Numb. xi. p. 306, &c.] iuL€u ovojxacrlaiSTa TrpdyfiaTa Trpocrayopfv-
^ [Jul. Scalig., Exercit. de Subtili- reoy KaOdrrep oi ttoWoI, iroTa Se tw//
tate ad Cardan., Exercit. ccclix. c. 2. irpay/xdrwu eVri Toiavra ov roiavra,
p. 1097. Francof. 1G07. — " Mutiianda) ovk^ti Trpocr€KT4ou to7s iro\\o7s."]
sunt quotidianae voces ad usuni abstru- * [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv.
sarum intellectionum ; quae rudibus in- ])p. 1-7, 48.]
choatisque ingeniis acerbae sunt, delica-
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
283
Luther stinted his accusation to under three hundred years ^. Discourse
It may well be, that in that time some Schoolmen in some '-
questions were too licentious. But T. H. condemneth not
only the men but the learning, all their grounds, all their
terms ; and more particularly, in this very question of the
liberty of the will, he censureth and contemneth all Fathers,
philosophers, and classic writers. I trow, Martin Luther
and Philip Melancthon did not so.
He pleadeth, that he doth not call all School learning
jargon, but . . that which they say in defence of untruths ; and
especially in the maintenance of free will"".^^ I believe he
hath read very little School learning, either upon that subject,
or any other ; if he have, we find very little fruit of it in his
writings. But if that be his quarrel against the Schoolmen,
— for maintaining of freedom of will from antecedent and
extrinsecal necessitation in natural acts, — if he will stand to
authorities, I am contented to join issue with him, that not
only all the Schoolmen, but all Fathers, philosophers, and
classic writers, were propugners of this freedom or liberty of
will; and particularly his two witnesses, whose words he
766 citeth in this place, Luther and Melancthon ; whereof the
former saith, that he and his party speak ^^un discreetly y,'^ and
the other (that is, Melancthon) calleth his opinion of univer-
sal necessity, a "Manichean opinion,^^ and a "horrible lie^."
CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER V.
In this fifth section there are no Animadversions, and so
there is no need of Castigations.
CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER VI.
There is no occasion offered to make any long stay upon [Scripture
this subject. I produced three places of Scripture to prove, men have
power of
" [Luther., in Condemn. Libr. M. de Lib. Arb., Op. torn. iv. p. 248.] election.]
Lutheri per Univ. Paris., tit. De Phi- ^ [Melancthon., Loci Theolog., Art.
losophia et Theol. Scholastica, art. vi. ; de Lib, Arb., 2nd edit. 151-5, Op. torn.
Op. toni. ii. p. 426. b. Jenae 1566.] i. p. 167. a. fol. Witeb. 1601.—" Hasc
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. Manichaea imaginatio horribile menda-
P- 47.] cium est."]
y [Apolog. pro Confess. Aug., Art.
284
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part that men have liberty or power of election^. He answered,
— that men are necessitated^ they choose by antecedent causes'^.
I took away this answer three ways^. First, by reason. To
this he is silent. Secondly, by instances. Thirdly, by the
texts themselves. To this he rejoineth ; — that these texts and
instances " do only prove, that a man is free to do if he will,
whicF^ he " denieth not but they do ^' not prove, that he
is free to will:" and in the second instance, *^the senior of the
mess chooseth what he hath an appetite to, but he chooseth
not his appetite^." This is all he answereth.
Freedom to This distinction hath been already sufficiently refuted^ as
will, with- contradictory to his own grounds, which do as much neces-
domTo ' sitate a man to do as to will ; secondly, as unprofitable, the
will a vain ncccssitv of willinsT beinof much more subiect and obnoxious
distinction. - t> a J
to all those blows, and all those absurdities, which flow from
fatal destiny, than the necessity of doing ; thirdly, as con-
trary to the sense and meaning of the whole world ; fourthly,
as contrary to the Scriptures ; lastly, I have demonstrated
the unreasonableness of his comparison . between the intel-
lectual and sensitive appetite, both as it is a comparison, —
TheoJogia Symbolica non est argumentativaj — as also as it is
an inference from the lesser to the greater negatively.
Now I add, that " that gloss is accursed, which doth cor-
rupt the text as this gloss of his doth, — that a man is free
to do if he will, but not free to ^vill. Election is that very
thing which he saith is not free, that is, the appetite : and it
is thus defined, " Electio est appetitus rei prceconsideratce'* —
" Election is an appetite of something that hath been prede-
liberated of But the texts alleged do demonstrate, that
to choose or elect is free, and undetermined to one. There-
fore they do demonstrate, that it is not free only to do, but
much more to will or to choose. It is in the huslDand's
Numb. choice, either to establish the vow of his wife/^ or to " make
[13!]'^ it void." Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise.
" [Above in the Defence, Numb. vi. " Answer to the Stating of the
pp. 37, 38; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] Quest., [above p. 221 ; and to the]
" [Ibid., T. H. Numb. vi. above p. Fount, of Arg., [above p. 234 ;] and
38.] Castig., Numbers i. iii. [above pp. 257,
^ [Ibid., Defence, Numb. vi. above 274; and] Defence, Numb. iii. [above
pp. 38—41.] pp. 30—32, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
d [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vi. ' [See Thorn. Aquin., Summ,, Prim,
p. 54.] Sccund., Qu. xiii. art. 2.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
285
Agaiiij " Choose ye this day whom ye will serve, whether the Discourse
Gods of your fathers, or the Gods of the Amorites;" and, "I ^—
Josh XX iv
offer thee three things, choose the which of them I shall do.'^ 15.— 2Sam.
Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification. And in all
these places here is a liberty of election, — to will, to desire, to
choose their own appetite. Secondly, the same is demon-
strated from the definition of free will, — to be " a free powder
of choosing one thing before another, or accepting or reject-
ing the same thing indifferently, given to the intellectual
nature for the glory of God, in order to some end^." But
all these texts by me alleged, and many more,, do attribute
unto the will a " power of choosing one thing before an-
other,^^ or of " accepting or rejecting the same thing indif-
ferently.^^ Therefore all these texts do demonstrate, that the
will of man is free, not only to do if he will, but to will, that
is, to choose or to elect. Wheresoever, whensoever, and
howsoever the will acteth, it is volition ; but election is the
proper formal act of the will, as it is free. And it is alto-
gether impossible there should be any election, without a
freedom to will. The will employeth the understanding to
consider of the most convenient means to attain some desired
end. The understanding doth return its judgment, which is
like a bill presented to the king by the two houses. The will
is free, either to suspend its act or deny its approbation, with
" La volonte s'avisera" — " The will wdll advise better,^^ or else
to consent, with La volonte le veut" — " The will appro veth
it which consent to the judgment of the understanding is
properly election, as it were the conclusion of a practical
syllogism, an intellective appetite or an appetitive intel-
lect^." If a great prince should offer to his poor subject
three distinct gifts and bid him take his choice ^f them,
ha\dng underhand given away two of them before to another
from him, were it not an abuse, and a mere mockery ? God
5 [" Liberum arbitrium est libera Etbic, VI. ii. 5. — BovkeySfxeOa ov
potestas, ex his quce ad finem aliquem Trcpi tcDv reXcDi/ aXXa irepl rCjv irphs to.
conducunt, unum pres aliis eligendi, aut tcAtj" . , 64jX€V0L reXos ri, rh ircos Kol
unum et idem acceptandi vel pro arhitrio Sih tIvcoi/ ^aTai aKoirovcn' Koi 5ia ttXhS-
respnendi/intelligenti naturcB ad magnam voov /ihv (paivo/JLevov yii/eaOai, 5ia tluos
Dei gluriam attrihutaJ" Bellarm., De paara koX KaKXiaTa^iria-Koirovac hi ^vhs
Gratia et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 2; Op. S' iiriT^XovpiiPov, ttSs Sia rovrou farai,
torn. iii. p. 650. D.] Ka.K€7uo Sia rli/os, ews au tXQwo'iv eVi rh
^ [" Alb ^ opcKTiKhs vovs 7] TTpoalpc- irpwTov airiou, '6 iv Trj (up4a€i ^axo.r6v
(Tis fj 6p€^is Siauor]TiKT]y Aristot., eariv.'' Id., ibid., IIL iii. IL]
286
CASTIGATIONS OF
P R T offered Da^dd in like manner his choice of three things ; —
[Tsam — " ^ ^^^^ ^^^^ three things, choose which of them I shall do.'*
xxiv. 12.] Did God openly offer to Da^id the free choice of three things,
and had secretly determined that two of them should never
be ? Far be this from God. Especially to do it so seriously, 7
Deut. XXX. and with such solemn protestations ; as, " I call heaven and
earth this day to record against you, that I have set before
you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose
life, that both thou and thy seed may live." Can any man who
[Matt. xiii. hath but SO much reverential fear of God, as " a grain of
31, 32.]
mustard seed, which is the least of seeds," harbour such an
unworthy thought in his breast ? — that Truth itself should be
guilty of such gross dissimulation. It is a decided cause in
law, that he who hath granted to another liberty of election,
cannot before his election dispose of that which he hath granted
away to another. He who hath a right to elect, if he choose
an unworthy person, by the sentence of the law forfeits his
right to elect for that turn. Why so, if he was necessitated
without his will to choose as he did ? We say truly, consent
taketh away error. That man is not wronged, who consents
to liis own wrong. How so, if his consent be against or
without his own will? If the will be not free but neces-
sitated, then nothing is unlawful. " That which is not lawful
by the law, necessity maketh lawful.'^ In case not only of
absolute, but even of extreme necessity, meum and tuum
ceaseth, and that which otherwise had been plain theft, be-
cometh just. He who necessitateth all events, taketh sin
out of the world.
One of my instances was in the election of the king of the
Romans^; to which he answereth as formerly, that *^the
electors are free to name whom they will, but not free to
wilP." If they be " not free to -^iU," then they are not free to
elect ; for election is the proper formal act of the will : and
then the electors are no electors. There is one contradiction.
Neither are they free to name whom they will indifferently,
if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name
one. Possibility of more than one, and a precise determination
to one (that is, may name, and 7nust name), are likewise con-
* [Defence, Numb. vi. above pp. 39, [Qu., Animaclv. upon Numb. vi.
40 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 54.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
287
tradictories in adjecto. This is not all. We see by the Golden Discourse
Bull', what care there is to bring the electors together to ^—
Frankfort, and to secure them there. Every one of them
must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. John, that
" according to his faith which he oweth to God and the
Roman empire, to the best of his discretion and understand-
ing, he will choose" — " volo eligere'' — with the help of God,
a king of the Romans, that is fit for it, and give his voice and
vote without all pact, stipend, price, or promise"^." And if
they do not accord actually within thirty days, they are
thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they
have made their election^. If it was antecedently determined
by extrinsecal causes who should be chosen and no other,
what needed all this trouble and charge to so many great
princes, when they might as well have stayed at home, and
have set seven ordinary burghers to have drawn lots for it ?
Do men use to swear to choose that, w^hich (it may be) is
not in their power to choose, and to refuse that, which (it
may be) is not in ' their power to refuse ? The belly is a
vehement orator ; but if it be absolutely determined whom
they must choose, and when, they might as well give them
Moselle wine, and the best meat the country aflPords, as bread
and water. Here we have expressly " volo eligere'' — I will
choose which is as much as to say, " volo velle" — " I will
will;" which phrase T. H." esteemeth an absurd speech,
but Julius Scaliger thought otherwise, — " Dicimus et vere et
ex omnium gentium consensu, volo velle^." The very words,
" cum adjutorio Dei" — " with the help of God," might teach
them, that God is neither the total cause, nor the de-
termining cause, of man^s election. Lastly, this distinction And
makcth T. H. worse than the Stoics themselves ; for the x.^n^^a
Stoics, toarether with their fate, did also maintain the free- degree
^ c> } worse than
dom of the will ; and as we find in many authors, both the stoics,
theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the
will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoics
" substracted some causes, and subjected others to neces-
sity: and among those which they would not have to be
' Bulla Caroli IV. [A.D. 1356. « [Qu., State of the Quest., p. 4.]
See Goldast,, Constit. Imp., torn. i. ° [Exoteric. Exereit. de Subtilitate
p. 355.] ad Hievon. Cardan.,] Exereit. cecvii.
^ [Ibid.] [c. 25. p. 970. Fraucof. 1GU7.]
288
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part Under necessity, they placed the will of man ; lest it should
■ — seem not to hje free, if it were subjected to necessity p."
Chrysippus made two sorts of causes; principal causes, j
which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of J
man ; and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did only excite "
and allure. These (said he) do awaken the mind of man, but
being awakened it can move of itself ; w^hich he setteth forth
by the comparison of a whirligig, and a roller cast down a
steep place, which have the beginning of their motion from
without themselves, but their progress from their own form 768
and volubility^. So T. H. is worse than a Stoic in this
respect, and extendeth fatal necessity further than they
did. I have done wdth this distinction for this time. I say
nothing of the bird, but the egg is bad.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER VII.
[How the In these Animadversions there is nothing contained which
eth^he^^^ is material, either for necessity or against liberty ; but passion
ofl-eSon*] animosity. Where it is said, that " the will doth perpetually
follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judg-
ment of right reason ;" he excepteth, that I am " mistaken, . .
for the will followeth as well the judgment of an erroneous as
of a true reasoning First, his exception is improper. It is
the judgment of reason, not of reasonm^. Secondly, it is
impertinent. The only question here is, whether the will do
follow the last judgment of reason, not whether the reason be
right or not. Thirdly, it is false. Whilst the will doth follow
the erroneous judgment of reason, yet it followeth it as the
judgment of right reason. When the judgment of reason is
erroneous, the will followeth it only de facto ; but when it is
right, it followeth it both de facto and dejure.
[The will His sccoud exception is, that I make the understanding to
under-^ ^c an effect of the wiU^" Good words. I said not the under-
expiainld.] standing, but " the act of the understanding V' that is, the de-
liberation or judgment of the understanding ; which is so far
p Aug., De Civit. Dei, lib. v. c. 10. p. 58.]
[§ 1 ; Op. torn. vii. p. 124. F.] s [Ibid.]
1 Apnd Gelliiim, [vi. 2.] t [Defence, Numb. ni. above p. 42;
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
289
truly said to proceed from tlie will, because the will employetli Discourse
tlie understanding to deliberate and judge. How the under- '■
standing raoveth the will and the will moveth the understand-
ing mutually, is a superfluous question ; seeing they do not
differ really, but rationally. The understanding is the
essence of the soul as it knoweth, the will the same essence
of the soul as it extendeth itself to enjoy the thing known.
Neither am I obliged to read lectures. It is sufficient to
know, that the will is moved to the specification of its act
only by the understanding, or (which is all one) by the ob-
ject known and represented. But the will is moved, and
doth move the understanding to the exercise of its act, by
itself ; except only in that motion which is called ^'motus primb
primus'^ that is, the motion of the will towards the last end,
which it is not in the power of the will to will or not to will, as
its other motions are, but requireth the excitation of the First
Cause. The will moveth both the understanding and itself
effectively. The understanding moveth the will objectively, —
by making those things to be actually known which were only
potentially intelligible ; as the light of the sun maketh those
things actually visible, which before did lie hid in darkness^.
If he will not understand those things, which all old divines judicium
and philosophers do assent unto (choosinsr rather to be „
" blind leader of the blind,^^ than a follower of them who see), |^P\^j"^|^.'-
nor the " command of the will,'^ nor the difference between i4.]
" naturaF^ and " moral efficacy if he understand not what
is "the judgment of the understanding practically practical/^
he must learn, and not adventure to censure before he knows
what he censures. What he is not able to confute, he should
not dare to slight. I do not justify all the questions, nor all
the expressions, of all Schoolmen; but this I will say, there is
often more profound sense and learning in one of these ob-
sciu-e phrases which he censures as "jargon^" and unintelli-
gible, than in one of his whole treatises ; and particularly, in
this which he sHghteth more than any of the rest in a domi-
neering manner ; that is, " the judgment of the understanding
" [" Motus primo primus est, qui ante omnem rationis considerationein
repente insurgit" (Alexand. Alens., in nobis insurgit."]
Sumnia Theol., P. II. Qu. cix. memb. ' [See Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secuud.
2.); or as Vazquez explains it (In Qu. ix. artt. 1 — 4.]
Prim. Secund. D. Thomse, Disp. cvi. * [See above p. 278. note c]
num. 1.), "qui subito et inopinanter
BKAMHALL. tt
290
CASTIGATIONS OF
T practically practical/^ ^^A countryman" (saith he) ''will
acknowledge there is judgment in men, but will as soon say,
the judgment of the judgment, as the judgment of the under-
standing ^.^ Then shall " countrymen" be judges of terms
of art, who understand not any one term of any art ; much
less the things intended by those terms, and the faculties of
the soul with their proper acts ? But such a silly judge is
fittest for T. H. I will not cite a Schoolman, but contain
myself within the bounds of philosophy. Philosophers do
define the understanding by its subject, proper acts, and ob-
jects, to be " a faculty of the soul, understanding, knowing,
and judging, things intelligible \" If to " judge" of its object
be the proper act of the understanding, then there must
needs be a '''judgment of the understanding." Every sense
judgeth of its proper object; as the sight, of coloui's, the
hearing, of sounds. Shall we grant judgment to the senses,
and deny judgment to the understanding? Now this judg-
ment is either contemplative or practical. Contemplative is 769
when the understanding aimeth only at knowledge, what is
true and what is false, without thought of any external action.
Practical judgment is when the understanding doth not only
judge what is true and what is false, but also what is good
and what is e\al, what is to be pursued and what is to be
shunned^. So we have " the practical judgment of the under-
standing." Yet fai'ther, when the understanding hath given
such a practical judgment, it is not necessary that the will ,
shall follow it : but it may suspend its consent, and not elect ;
it may put the understanding upon a new deliberation, and
require a new judgment. In this case the judgment of the
understanding is practical, because it intends not merely
contemplation, what is true and what is false, but also action,
what is to be pursued and what is to be shunned ; but yet it
is not " practically practical," because it takes not eflPect, by
reason of the dissent of the will. But whensoever the mil
shall give its free consent to the practical judgment of the
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. vii. a [*'Tr)s ©ewpTjTtKrjs Stoi/ota? Kot
p. 59.] npaKTiKTis /u-V^e irotr/Tt/cTjy rh €v koi
' Th fidpiov rrjs \pvxvs ^ yivdxTKei KaKws TaXrjOfs icfn Koi »|/eG5os* toGto
T6 7} y\ivxh <ppou€7," and again, ^ yap iam iravTh^ SiavorjriKOu epyov, tou
diayoflrai Kal viroKayL^aufi 7) ypvx'fJi" Se irpaKTiKOv /col Siauor^TLKOu 7) dArjfleia
are Aristotle's definitions of voCs. — De S/ioXdyws exovcra ttJ ope|6i rfj opdij."
Anima, III. iv. 1, 4.] Aristot., Ethic, VI.' ii. 3.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
291
understanding, and the sentence of reason is approved by the Discourse
acceptation of the will; then the judgment of the under —
standing becomes " practically practical/^ Then the election
is made ; -Nvhich philosophers do therefore call " a consultative
appetition^/^ Not that the will can elect contrary to the
judgment of reason ; but that the will may suspend its con-
sent, and requii'e a new deliberation, and a new judgment,
and give consent to the later So we have this seeming
piece of nonsense, "judicium inteUectus practice practicwn^'^
not only translated but explained in English^, consonantly to
the most received opinions of classical authors. If he have
anything to say against it, let him bring arguments, not
reproaches ; and remember how Memnon gave a railing
soldier a good blow with his lance, saying, " I hired thee to
fight, and not to rail^.^^
The absurdity which he imputeth to me in natural philo- How tiie
sophy, — that "it is ridiculous to say, that the object of the ancfhow it
sight is the cause of seeing," which maketh him " sorry that" cause'o?^
he " had the ill fortune to be engaged with" me " in a dispute of seeing,
this kindV^ — is altogether impertinent and groundless. The
cause of seeing is either the cause of the exercise of seeing or
the cause of the specification of the act of seeing. The object
is the cause of the specification, why we see this or that, and
not the cause of the exercise. He that should affirm, that
the object doth not concur in the causation of sight (espe-
cially going upon those gi'ounds that I do, that the manner
of nsion is not by sending out beams from the eye to the
object, but by receiving the species from the object to the
eye), were in an error indeed. For in sending out the species
there is action, and in the reception of them passion. But
he that should affirm, that the object is the cause of the
exercise of sight, or that it is that which maketh that which
is "facultate asjiectabile" to be actu aspectabile" or that it is
[""Oi/Tos Seroi) irpoaipcTov fiovkev- Op. vol. I. torn. ii. p. 610. E. ed. Bened.
•^ov opcKTov ruv e^' •^/xti/, koL t) — And see also Thorn. Aquin., De Veri-
-irpoa'ipea-is JivcfT/ ov \ c v r ikt) tate, Qu. xxii. art. xv. Respond.]
opf^LS tUv i(f Tjfuu." Aristot., <^ [" If practice practician had been
Ethic., III. V. 19.] sense, he might have made a shift to
" [" Est vero ratio data voluntati ut put it into English." Qu., Animadv.
instniat illam, non destruat : . . si upon Numb, vii, p. 59.]
horum quodlibet'' (scil, vel malum vel e Plut., [Apophthegm. Reg., &'c. ;
bonum) " prohibente ratione voluntas Op. Moral, tom. i. p. 48-5. ed. Wyttenb.]
non posset, voluntas jam non esset" f [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. vii.
S. Bernard., De Lib. Arb,, c. ii, § 4, p. .59.]
u 2
292
CASTIGATIONS OF
P R T that which judgeth of the colour or light, or (to come home to
'- — the scope of the place) that the object doth necessitate or deter-
mine the faculty of sight or the sensitive soul to the exercise
of seeing, were in a greater error. Among manj^ answers
which I gave to that objection — that the dictate of the under-
standing doth determine the will, — this was one, that supposing
it did determine it, yet it was not naturally but morally, not
as an efficient by physical influence into the will, but by pro-
posing and representing the object ; which is not my single
opinion, but the received judgment of the best Schoolmen
And in this sense, and this sense only, I said truh^, that the
understanding doth no more by proposing the object de-
termine and necessitate the will to will, than the object of sight
doth determine and necessitate the sensitive soul to the actual
exercise of seeing ; whereas all men know, that the sensitive
agent (notwithstanding any efficacy that is in the object) may
shut his eyes, or turn his face another way. So that which I
said was both true, and pertinent to the question : but his
exception is altogether impertinent ; and if it be understood
according to the proper sense and scope of the place, untrue.
And this is the only philosophical notion which hitherto I
have found in his Animadversions.
CASTIGATIONS OF HIS ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER VIII.
[All T.H.'s Whosoever desireth to be secui-e from T. H. his arguments,
i?about°" may hold himself close to the question, where he will find no
th'in'gs gi'eat cause of fear. All his contention is about terms.
Whatsoever there was in this section which came home to
the principal question, is omitted ; and nothing minded, but
the meaning or signification of ^' voluntary" or spontaneous" 770
acts, &c., w^hich were well enough understood before by all
scholars, until he arose up (like another Davus in the comedy'*)
to trouble all things. So he acts his part like those fond
musicians, who spent so much time in tuning of their instru-
ments, that there was none left to spare for their music.
Which are free, which are voluntary, or spontaneous, and
which are necessary agents, I have set down at large, Numb,
iii* ; whither (to prevent further trouble) I refer the reader :
* [Aquin., Summ., Prim. Second., ^ [Terent., Andria.]
Qu. ix. art. 1.] ' [Above, pp. 262— 268.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
293
and am ready to make it good by the joint testimonies of a Discourse
hundred classic authors^ that this hath been the common '- —
and current language of scholars for many ages. If he could
produce but one author, Stoic or Christian, before himself,
who in the ventilation of this question did ever define liberty
as he doth, it were some satisfaction. Zeno, one of the
fairest flowers in the Stoics^ garland, used to boast, that he
sometimes wanted opinions but never wanted arguments
He is not so lucky ; never wanting opinions, ever wanting
proofs. Hitherto we have found no demonstrations, either
from the cause or from the eflPect ; few topical arguments, or
authorities that are pertinent to the question, except it be of
" countrymen^^ and " common people with one comparison.
But to come to the Animadversions themselves. He Sponta-
chargeth me, ^^or rather the Schoolmen," for "bringing in this "^^*^*
strange word, ' spontaneous,^ merely to shift off the difficulty
of maintaining^^ our "tenet of free-wiir.^^ If spontaneous
and voluntary be the same thing, as we affirm, and use them
both indifferently, I would gladly know, how the one can be
a subterfuge more than the other ? or why we may not use a
word that is equipollent to his own word ? But to cure him
of his suspicion. I answer, that the same thing, and the
same term of spontaneous, both in Greek and Latin, in the
same sense that we take it, as it is distinguished from free,
and just as we define it, was used by philosophers a thousand
years before either I or any Schoolmen were born; as we
find in Aristotle, — " That is spontaneous^' (or " voluntary" — ■
"to €Kovaiov'), "whose beginning is in itself, with knowledge
of the end,'' or, "knowing every thing wherein the action
doth consist"^." And the same author, in the very next
chapter, makes the very same difference between that which
is voluntary, and that which is free or eligible", that we do.
His second exception is against these words, — "Spontaneity Conformity
signifieth.
^ [Diog. Laert., vii. 179; of Chry- And a little above, § 18. — "IlepliroivTa
sippus, not Zeno, the pupil, not the S^y tovto. ttjs ayvoias ovcrjs, 4v ols rj
master.] Trpa^is, 6 tovtwv ri ayvoi](Tas, &ko}v
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. So/cet ireirpax^vai, koI ^dXiara eV rois
p. 69.] Kvpiwr6.rois' KvpicvraraS^ cJuai
[Aristot.,] Ethic, lib. III. c. ii. So/ceT, iy oTs r] irpa^is koI ov eVe/ca."]
[§ 20. — ""OvTos S' aKova-iov rod ^'la " [Id., ibid., c. iv. § 16, 17. — " 5'
Koi 8i' &yvoiav, rh eKOvcriov 5(^|€iei/ &»/ kKovcnov ov irav TrpoaiperSy' .. dipa
(Ivai, ov 7) ap XV avr ^ € 15 6t i ye rh iTpofiefiovXiVfxevov, rj yhp
TO /taO' ^KaffTa iv ols 7} irpa^is." npoa'ipta-is fxcrii. \6yov Kai Stayalas."^
294
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part consists iu a conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or
sensitive, to the object^;" which words (saith he) do signify,
agreeable- . .
ness as well that Spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to
ab 1 enebs. object, which to^^ him "soundeth as if^^ I '^had said, that
the appetite is like the object, which is as proper as if" I ^'had
said that the hunger is like the meat;" and then he con-
cludes triumphantly, " If this be his meaning, as it is the
meaning of the words, he is a very fine philosopherp/' All
his philosophy consists in words. If there had been an im-
propriety in the phrase (as there is none), this exception had
been below an Athenian sophister ; I had almost said (saving
the rigorous acception of the word, as it was used afterwards),
an Athenian sycophant. Conformity signifies not only such
a likeness of feature as he imagineth, but also a convenience,
[Gen.xxvii. accommodation, and agreeableness. So the " savoury meat^'
which Rebecca made for her husband, was conform to his
14.]
[Dan. i. appetite. So Daniel and his fellows conformed their appe-
^^'^ tites to their pulse and water. Thus TuUy saith, " Ego me
conformo ad ejus voluntatem^-^' — "I conform myself to his will.''^
Where there is an agreeableness, there is a conformity ; as,
to conform oneself to another man's humour, or to his council,
or to his commands. He "resolveth to have no more to do
with spontaneity'.^^ I thought that it had not been himself,
but the causes, that "resolved" him without his own -vvill.
But whether it be himself or the causes, I think, if he hold
his resolution, and include liberty therein for company, it will
not be much amiss for him.
Here he readeth us a profound lecture; — "that the common
what they pgQp;[g^ whosc arbitration dependeth the signification of
words in common use, among the Latins and Greeks, did
call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no
cause, spontaneous and avToybara^ and in the conclusion of
his lecture, according to his custom, he forgetteth not him-
self;— "the Bishop, understanding nothing of this, might, if it
pleased him, have called it jargon*.^^ What pity is it, that
he hath not his Gnatho" about him, to ease him of this trouble
" [Defence,] Numb. iii. [above p. [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii.
28.] p. 70.]
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. viii. * [Ibid.]
p. 70.] ♦ [Ibid., p. 71.]
'1 [Cic, Ad Famil., lib. i. Epist. 8.] " [Terent., Eunuch.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
295
of stroking his own head? Here is a lecture, able to Discourse
make all the blacksmiths and watchmakers in a city gape ■
and wonder, to see their workmanship so highly advanced.
Thus he vapoureth still, when he lights upon the blind
side of an equivocal word. For my part, I not only
"might have called" it, but do still call it, mere "jargon,'^
and no better.
77] To pass by peccadillos; first, he telleth us, how '^^the
common people did call all actions spontaneous, and avro-
fULTa," &c. How doth he know what " the common people^^
called them ? The books which we have, are the books of
scholars, not of the common people. Secondly, he saith,
that " the signification of all words dependeth upon the
arbitration of the common people.^^ Surely he meaneth only
at Athens, where it is observed, that wise men did speak,
and fools did judge. But neither at Athens, nor at any
other place, were " the common people" either the perfecters
or ^ arbitrators^ of language, who neither speak regularly nor
properly, much less in words that are borrowed from learned
languages. Thirdly, he supposeth, that these words — liberty,
necessity, and spontaneity — are " words in common use
which in truth are terms of art. There is as much difi'erence
between that liberty and necessity which ordinary people
speak of, and the liberty and necessity intended in this ques-
tion (whereof we are agreed), as there is between the point-
ing out of a man with one's finger and a logical demonstra-
tion, or between a habit in a tailor^s shop and a habit in
logic or ethics. Fourthly, he confoundeth spontaneity and
chance, comprehending them both under the name of "ra
avTOfiara.^' I confess, that to auro/iarov, in poets and ora-
tors, is a word of very ambiguous signification; sometimes
signifying a necessary, sometimes a voluntary or sponta-
neous, sometimes a casual, sometimes an artificial, agent or
event. Such equivocal words are his delight. But as they
are terms of art, all these words are exactly distinguished,
and defined, and limited to their proper and certain signifi-
cation. That which is voluntary or spontaneous, is called
"to UovaLovf as we see plainly in Aristotle: that which
is freely elected, is called " to irpoaLperov/' and that which is
by chance, is called to avrofxarov; as he may see in the
296
CASTIGATIONS OF
P A^^R T places cited in the margenf^, where all tliese words are exactly
'— distinguished and defined. Fifthly, he saith, " the Latins
and Greeks did call all actions and motions, whereof they did
perceive no cause, avTOfxara which, according to Aristotle
and other philosophers, doth signify things done by chance.
And in his reason — "whereof they did perceive no cause —
he is mistaken on both sides. For, first, the causes of many
things are apparent, which yet are said to be done by
chance ; as when a tile falleth down accidentally from a
house, and breaketh a man's head : and, on the other side,
many things whereof the causes were not known, as the ebb-
ing and flowing of the sea, were not said to be done by
chance. I shall not need for the present to make any fur-
ther enquiry into his extravagant interpretations of words,
which he maketh gratis upon his own head and authority, and
which no man admitteth but himself. " Rectum est index sui
A true will et obliquiy" Sixthly, he saith, "not every appetite, but the
changed, last, is esteemed the will,'^ when men do "judge of the regu-
larity or irregularity of one another's actions ^^.'^ I do acknow-
ledge, that " de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est
ratio. If it do not appear outwardly to be his will, man
cannot judge of it as his will. But if it did appear to be his
will, first or last, though he change it over and over, it was
his will, and is judged by God to have been his will, and
may be justly judged so by man, so far as it did appear to
have been his will by his words and actions. If he mean his
last will and testament, that indeed taketh place and not the
former; yet the former will was truly his will, until it was
revoked. But of this, and of his ' deliberation,' I shall have
cause to speak more hereafter.
[T. H.'s I come now to his contradictions. His first contradiction
is this, — all voluntary acts are deliberate, some voluntary
acts are not deliberate^. The former part of his contradic-
tion is proved out of these words, — "Voluntary pre-supposes
^ [Aristot.,] Ethic, lib. III. cc. i, y ^hdu Ka\ ahrh koX rh KajXTtv-
ii ; lib. III. cc. iii, iv. — Physic. [Au- Xov yivwaKo/xei/." Aristot , De Anima,
scult.,] lib. ir. c. vi. ["Tbjuei/ airh tu- I. v. 20.]
XV^ ""Sj/ ctTrb TavTOfiaTov, rovro S' ov ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, viii,
7ra// airh tvxV^' (pauephu '6ti p. 71.]
Tois airKuis ''iviKarov yivofj.ivois,'6rav fXT} a [Defence, Numb. viii. above p.
ToO (TufxfiduTos eVeKa 761/77x01 ou e^w rh 47 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
oXriov^TOTi: a.TTO TavTOfidrov Atyofxti/."]
MR. IIOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
297
some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some considera- Discourse
tion and meditation of what is likely to follow both upon the — ^
doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of The
second part is proved as plainly : — When a man hath time
to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never anything
appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the
action follows his opinions of the goodness or harm of it ;
these actions I call voluntary, &c. : because these actions
that follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary;
772 and here, where there is one only appetite, that one is the
lasf^." To this he answereth, "Voluntary presupposes deli-
beration, when the judgment whether the action be volun-
tary or not, is not in the actor, but in the judge, who regard-
eth not the will of the actor where there is nothing to be
accused in the action of deliberate malice, yet knoweth, that
though there be but one appetite, the same is truly will for
the time, and the action, if it follow, a voluntarj^ action^." To
which term doth he answer ? Of what term doth he distin-
guish ? Some have been observed to have lost the benefit of
their clergy at their deaths, because they despised it in their
lives. It is no marvel, if he receive no help from any dis-
tinction now, who hath ever been an enemy to distinctions,
and a friend to confusion. If his answer have any sense at Voiuntari-
all, this must be it, — that an indeliberate act may be in not depend
truth and in the judgment of the agent himself a voluntary j^udgment
act, yet in the common or public judgment of other men it of others,
may be esteemed and pass for an involuntary and unpunish-
able act. But, first, neither the question nor his assertion
was, what is to be judged a voluntary act by men, who nei-
ther know the heart of man, nor are able to judge of his will ;
but what is a voluntary act in itself, and what is the essence
and definition of a voluntary act. I argue thus ; — that which
is essentially a voluntary act, cannot by anything that is ex-
trinsecal and subsequent, and which perhaps may never be,
be made no voluntary act ; but the judgment of other men
is extrinsecal and subsequent to the act, and may perhaps
never be. How many thoughts of every man every day pass
[fn the Defence, T. H.] Numb. 160.]
viii. [above p. 45.] ^ Ammadv. upon Kuuib. viii.
[Ibid.,] Numb. xxv. [above p. p. 71.]
298
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part uuknown, unjudged, whether they were regular or irregular.
— '—TT^ Secondly, God Almisrhtv, Who is the only " Searcher of
[Rom. vin. * ^ to . > J
27, &c.] hearts/^ is the proper and only judge of the will. If the act
be truly voluntary, He judgeth it to be tmly voluntary, whe-
ther it be for the agent^s advantage or disadvantage. Man
cannot judge what acts are voluntary and what are not, be-
cause he doth not know the heart. If one perform outward
obedience to the law against his will, man judgeth it to be
willing obedience, and cannot do otherwise. If a man do an
evil act, man must needs judge it to be a voluntary act ; and
indeed so much more voluntary, by how much it was less
deliberated of, because the will is less curbed, and must have
less reluct ation. How much doth he err, who prefers the
judgment of man before the judgment of God ! Thirdly,
according to T. H. his principles, all acts of free agents what-
soever are voluntary, and cannot possibly but be voluntary ;
for so he teacheth; — "that a man is free to do if he wiU,
but he is not free to will.^^ Would he have men judge that
to be unvoluntary, which cannot possibly but be voluntary ?
" If he will,^^ with him, is a necessary supposition. Lastly,
judges do esteem rash unadvised acts not to be so irregular
or so punishable as other acts, not because they are less
voluntary (for they are more voluntary), but because the
carefullest man breathing cannot arm himself sufficiently
against all occasions, but that he may be surprised by sud-
den passion. But if, after the first fit of passion, he had time
and means to cool his heat, and to deliberate of his duty,
before the fact committed, and yet he continued obstinate,
the law looks upon him without pity, not only as a willing
but as a wilful off'ender, though there was no malice nor inve-
terate hatred in the case, but perhaps a quarrel upon some
punctilio of honour. But for persons uncapable of delibera-
tion, as natural fools, madmen, and children before they
have use of reason, though there may be hatred and maHce,
as experience hath taught us, yet the law doth not punish
them in the same nature, because it supposeth them uncapa-
ble of deliberation, and unable to consider seriously and suf-
ficiently, either of their duty which they owe to God and
man, or of the dangers which they incur by that act, and
because it is not their fault that they are uncapable. So the
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
299
judgment of man is no safeguard to him from his contradic- Discourse
tion. For judges go upon our grounds, which deny all liberty '.
and power of election to such as have not sufficient use of
reason without their own fault. But he goeth upon contrary
grounds to us, and to the law, holding fools, madmen, chil-
dren, yea, even brute beasts, to be capable of deliberation
and election, and thereupon supposing all voluntary acts to
be deliberated. In vain doth he seek shelter under our prac-
773 tice, who is an enemy to those principles, whereupon our
practice is grounded.
His second contradiction, which he relateth amiss, is this ;
— All spontaneity is an inconsiderate proceeding, — this is
plainly set down by himself, By spontaneity is meant in-
considerate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it^ —
to which this is contradictory, — Some spontaneity is not an
inconsiderate proceeding, — affirmed by him hkewise, When
a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandize,^^
&c., " he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is
sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous From
whence I ai'gue thus, — All giving merchandize for money is
a spontaneous act, but all giring of merchandize for money is
not an inconsiderate act, therefore all spontaneous acts are
not inconsiderate acts^. To this he answereth nothing.
His third contradiction is this, that " having undertaken
to prove, that children before they have the use of reason do
deliberate and elect, yet" he "saith by and by after, '^that a
child may be so young as to do what he doth without all de-
liberation^.^ " I acknowledge this to be no contradiction as
it is here proposed. The acts of reason, as deliberation, do
not come to a child in an instant but by degrees. A child is
fit to deliberate of his childish sports, or whether he should
cry or not, before he can dehberate of matters of greater
moment. But if the contradiction be proposed, as I proposed
it, and always intended it, of young suckling children soon
after their birth, I see not how he can excuse his contradic-
tion. For they have spontaneity the first hour ; and yet, by
his confession, they are " too young to deliberate'." But if
' [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
xxxiii. [above p. 175.] h [Ibid.]
f [Ibid.,] Nunib.viii. [above p. 45.] * [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb.
« [Defence, Numb. viii. above p. 48 ; viii. [above p. 46.]
300
CASTIGATIONS OP
Part deliberation were no more than he maketh it, a demurring
— upon what they should do/' out of sensitive " hope'' to suck
the breast, and sensitive "fear of some strange figure^/' or,
as he calleth it elsewhere, " an alternate appetite to do or
acquit an action V they may deliberate well enough.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER IX.
1 Kings iii. To that placc by me alleged, — " Because thou hast asked
piainedj ^^^^ thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life," &c., — he
answereth thus, — " How doth he know (understanding power
properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to ask long
life? no doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary; yet
it was possible that God might have hindered him ; for
though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing that
he should choose, it doth not follow that He did not also
give him the act of election""." It is no new thing with
him to confound the act and the object, choice and the thing
Election, chosen, election, which is always of more than one, and the
thaii one. thing elected, which is precisely one. I doubt not but
Solomon had his power to elect from God ; I doubt not but
the grace of God did excite Solomon, and assist him in his
election to choose well. But that Solomon was necessitated
by God to ask wisdom, and not to ask long life, or riches, or
the life of his enemy, is clearly against the text. First,
Verse 5. " God said to Solomon, ask what I shall give thee." If God
had predetermined precisely what Solomon must ask and
what he must have, and what he must not ask and what he
must not have, it was not only a superfluous, but a ludicrous
thing, to bid him ask what gift he would have from God.
Verses 6, 7. Then followeth Solomon's deliberation, to enable him to
^' ^' choose what was most fit for him. If God had determined
what He would give, and what Solomon must ask, how ridi-
culous had it been for him to deliberate of what God had
Verse 10. donc. Thirdly, it is said, " The speech pleased the Lord,
that Solomon had asked this thing." There is no doubt but
k [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. viii.
above p. 46.]
1 [Ibid.,] Numb. xxvi. [above p.
164.]
"' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ix.
l)p. 74, 75.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
301
all the works of God do please Him. " God saw all that He Discourse
made, and it was very good.^' But what had Solomon done ^
to please God, if God did necessitate Solomon irresistibly to ]
do what he did ? Then follow the words alleged by me, —
Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for Verse ii.
thyself long life," &c.; — which words, if this opinion of univer-
sal necessity were true, can bear no other sense but this, — Be-
cause thou hast done this which was inevitably imposed upon
thee to do, and hast not done that which was altogether im-
possible for thee to have done. As if a master should first
bind his servant hand and foot, head and heels together, and
chain him fast to a post, and then tell him, Because thou
hast stayed here, and didst not run away.
He urgeth, " that Solomon knew nothing to the contrary,"
but that it was in his power to have done otherwise". If
774 Solomon, the wisest of men, did not know it, there is little
probability that T. H. should know it. But he must know,
that it is not Solomon who speaketh these words, but God;
I hope he will not suspect God Almighty either of ignorance
or of nescience. Lastly, we see what a corollary God gave
Solomon for asking well, above that which he did ask;
riches and honour." No man deserveth either reward or
punishment for doing that which it was not in his power to
leave undone.
I urged these words of St. Peter, — " After it was sold, was Acts v. 4.
it not in thine own power ^ ?" — to shew that power which a ~t i^^thy
man hath over his own actions. He answereth, that "the power?"—
^ explained.
word *^ power' signifieth no more than right, not a real
natural, but a civil power, made by a covenant," or " a right to
do with his own what he pleased?." I answer, the word
"power" doth not, cannot, signify any such "right to do
with his own as he pleased," in this place. For that which
St. Peter complaineth of, was Ananias his unjust and sacrile-
gious detention of part of that, which he had devoted to God,
when it was in his power to have offered the whole, that is,
to have performed his vow. If sacrilege be right, then this
was right ; if that which he had purloined sacrilegiously were
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ix. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
p. 75.] p [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ix.
° [Defence, Numb. ix. above p. 55 ; p. 75.]
302
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part his own, then this was his own ; if Ananias had been
-iH: — necessitated by external causes to hold back that part of the
price, it had been no more sacrilege, than if thieves had
robbed him of it before he could offer it. The reason is thus
made evident; — If it was in the power of Ananias to have
done that which he did not do, and to have offered that ac-
cording to his vow, which he did detain contrary to his vow,
then all actions and events are not necessitated, and it is in
men's power to do otherwise than they do; but St. Peter
saith, it was in Ananias his power to have offered that which
he did not offer, &c.
cal
CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER X.
Out of My reason against universal necessity in this section was
tmruberty ^ — necessitate all men to all the individual actions
make's God ^^^^^ ^^^3^ ^^^f inevitably, and to expostulate with them, and
hypocriti- chidc them, and reprehend them, for doing of those very
things which they were necessitated to do, is a counterfeited
hypocritical exaggeration ; but according to T. H. his doc-
trine, God doth necessitate all men inevitably to do all the
individual actions which they do, and yet expostulates with
them, and chides them, and reprehends them, for doing of
those very things which He did necessitate them inevitably
to do. This assumption, which only can be questioned, is
proved by the expostulations and objurgations and reprehen-
sions themselves contained in Holy Scripture. Therefore,
according to his opinion, God Himself is guilty of counter-
feited hypocritical exaggerations.
It were more ingenuous to confess, that this is not to be
answered, than to bustle and keep a coil, and twist new errors
with old, and tax others ignorantly of ignorance, and say
nothing to the purpose.
His first answer is, generally, that I " would have men be-
lieve, that because" he holds necessity, therefore he denies
liberty^.'' A dangerous accusation, to accuse him of a matter
of truth. But he saith, he "holds as much that there is true
liberty, as" I '*do, or more^" Yea, such a liberty, as children,
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. [Ibid.]
p. 77.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
303
and fools, and madmen, and brute beasts^, and rivers*, have; Discourse
a liberty that consists in negation, or nothing. He saith — —
indeed, that he holds a liberty from outward impediments"
but it is not true : for external causes are external impedi-
ments ; and if he say truly, all other causes are hindered
from all other actions than what they do, by external causes.
But true liberty from necessitation and determination to one,
he doth not acknowledge; and without acknowledging that, he
doth acknowledge nothing. I wonder to which of my proposi-
tions, or to what term in them, this answer is accommodated.
His second answer is particular, to the expostulations
themselves ; — that "these words spoken by God to Adam, —
' Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that [Gen. iii.
thou shouldest not eat ?' — do convince Adam, that notwith-
standing that God had placed him in the garden a means to
keep him perpetually from dying, in case he should accom-
modate his will to obedience of God's commandment con-
cerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, yet Adam
was not so much master of his own will, as to do it^." What
ridiculous or rather deplorable stuff is this ! How should it
be expected, that Adam should be " master of his own will,^'
if God did necessitate his will without his will, and deter-
mine him inevitably to what he did ! If his doctrine were
true, this doth not "convince" Adam, but God Almighty,
775 Who did first necessitate his will, and then chide him for
that which was God^s own act. Can any man be so blind as not
to see the absurdity of this doctrine? — that God did "place in
the garden a means to keep man perpetually from dying,"
and yet did deprive him of it inevitably without his own
fault. And this is all that he answereth to the other places ;
as that to Eve, " Why hast thou done this?" — and to Cain, [Gen. iii.
"Why art thou wroth ?" — and, "Why will ye die, O ye house _Ezek. '
of Israel?"
I urged this argument further; — "Doth God reprehend man
for doing that, which He had antecedently determined that
he must do^ ?" He answereth, " no^" How ? "no ?" Are
* [See above in the Defence, T. H. pp. 77, 78.]
Nunnb. viii. above pp. 45, 46.] y [Defence, Numb. x. above p. 56 ;
t [Ibid., Numb. xxix. above p. 166.] Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
" [Ibid.,Numb. xxxiii. abovep.l75.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x.
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. p. 78.]
304
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part not these 'reprehensions V Or doth not he maintain, that
God had determined man antecedently to do what he did ?
Yes; but he saith, ''God convince th man and instructeth him,
that though immortaUty was so easy to be obtained, as that it
might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only
tree, yet he could not obtain if' thereby*. If God would only
have "convinced" man, certainly He would have convinced him
by fitter and juster means than hypocritical exaggerations.
But how doth he say, that ''immortality was so easy to be
obtained," which by his doctrine was altogether impossible
to be obtained by man by that means ? It is neither so
easy, nor possible, to oppose and frustrate the decrees of an
infinite God.
I shall reserve his errors in theology for a fitter place.
Whosoever would trouble himself with his contradictions,
might find more than enough. Here he telleth us, that "the
dependance of the actions on the will is that which properly
and truly is called liberty^ elsewhere he told us, that rivers
are free agents, and that a river hath true liberty which, if
my ignorance do not mislead me, have no wills.
God's That God hath a secret and revealed will, no man denieth.
reveded^ To Say that these wills are opposite one to another, all good
will not jjien do detest : because, as I said formerly (which he taketh
contrary ; . ^
and why. no noticc of), they " concern several persons^." The secret
will of God is what He will do Himself ; the revealed will is
[Gen.xxii.] that which He would have us to do. He objecteth, — " God
commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet His will was he
[Jonah iii.] should not do it Jonah, by God's command, denounced the
destruction of Nineveh, yet "it was God's will it should not be
destroyed^." Doth not he see, that the person is varied in
both these instances ? God would prove Abraham's faith by
his readiness to sacrifice his son upon His command. He
did it. He would have Nineveh prepared for repentance by
J onah's denunciations of His judgments ; His will was accom-
plished. But it was not God's will, that Isaac should be
sacrificed, or Nineveh destroyed. All denunciations of God's
judgments are understood with exception. He who fancieth
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numh. x. xxix. above p. 166.]
P- 78.] o [Defence, Numb. x. above p. 56.]
[Ibid.] e [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x.
« [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. pp. 78, 79.]
MR. HOBBES* ANIMADVERSIONS.
305
any contradiction in these two instances^ understancleth little Discourse
of the rules of contradictions. There is great difference be-
tween that which God will have done by others, and what
He will do Himself. There was just reason for what Abra-
ham did, and what Jonah did ; but there can be no reason
for God to contradict Himself. If God had reprehended
Abraham or Jonah for what they did in obedience to His
own commands, and punished them for it, and justified it by
His omnipotence, which is T. H. his inexcusable error (as I
have shewed him already^, and shall shew him further in due
place, if there be occasion), this had been something to his
purpose ; now, all that he saith, is wholly impertinent.
Likewise, whereas he saith, that the expostulation of man
against God will be equally just or unjust, whether the ne-
cessity of all things be granted or denied, because God could
have made man impeccable and did not^/' — he doth but
betray his own weakness and presumption, to talk of any
^^just expostulation with God" in any case. I have shewed
him already, what a vain recrimination this is, and given
him just reason, why God Almighty did not make man
impeccable^.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XI.
In these Animadversions is contained, first, a repetition of
my argument : to which he answereth nothing but this, —
that "liberty is to choose what we will, not to choose our
will," which he saith " no inculcation is sufficient to make"
me ''^take notice of ^" I know not what he calleth "taking
notice." I have confuted it over and over again, both in my
Defence j formerly, and now in these Castigations^ ; and
shewed it to be a vain, silly, unprofitable, false, contradictory,
distinction. What he would have me to do more for it, I
understand not ; but I observe, that he never mentioneth
* [Defence, Numb. xii. above pp. p. 86.]
64, &c.] j [Number iii. ; above pp. 30—32.]
« [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. x. [Answ. to Stat, of Quest., above
P- 79.] p. 221. — Answ. to Animadv. Numb. iii.
^ [Answ. to] Fount, of Arg., in fine. above p. 274. — Castig. of Animadv.
[above pp. 244—246.] Numb. vi. above p. 284.]
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi.
BRAMHALL. v
306
CASTIGATIONS OF
p^A^R T this distinction but he is presently up upon his tiptoes. He 776
— will find by degrees, how little ground he hath for it.
[T. H.'s Then he proceedeth to my reply, to which he giveth two
cuious\jre- answers. First, ^^that if you take away these words from it,
sumption.] f j^^^^-^g^gg of approbation — practical knowledge — heavenly
bodies act upon sublunary things, not only by their motion,
but also by an occult virtue (which we call influence) — moral
efficacy — general influence — special influence — infuse some-
thing into the will — the will is moved — the will is induced to
will — the will suspends its own acts •/ which are all nonsense,
unworthy of a man, nay, if a beast could speak, unworthy of
a beast There is a hundred times more sense in these
phrases, than there is in his great Leviathan put all together.
He who dare abuse and so much vilify many of the ancient
Fathers, and all the lights of the Schools, for so many suc-
cessive ages, and all philosophers, natural and moral, who
have written any thing, as to style them all, without excep-
tion, "beasts,^^ and worse than beasts, deserves no other
answer but contempt of his ignorant presumption, or pity of
his bold blindness. He saith, this maladj^ happened to us by
having our " natures depraved by doctrine '''.^^ We say, his
malady happened to him, because his nature was never
polished with " doctrine," but he would needs be a master in
all arts before he had been a scholar in any art. The true
reason why he slighteth these words is because he under-
standeth very little of them ; and what he doth understand,
he is not able to answer. So it fareth with him, as with one
that hath a politic deafness, who seemeth not to hear what
he knoweth not how to answer ; as I could shew him by
many and many instances, but that I dare not tell him, that
any thing is " too hot for his fingers
Occult vir- I said, that " the heavenly bodies do act upon sublunary
fluent J."' things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an oc-
cult virtue, which we call influence Against the matter he ex-
cepteth not, but against the expression, — "an occult virtue," —
whereas I should have said, " I know not how p." If he alone
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xi. ° [Defence, Nunab. xi. above p. 60;
p. 86.] Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
m [Ibid.] P [Qu., Animadv. \ipon Numb. xi.
" [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. p. 86.]
p. 35.]
I
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
307
be so happy as to know distinct^ the causes of all acts, it is Discourse
well for him ; but if this be nothing but bold presumption, it — — —
is so much the worse. I have good ground for the thing
itself ; — " Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the j obxxxviii.
Pleiades If he be so much more skilful than all other
men about the influences of the stars, I desire to know of
him a natural reason of that peculiar virtue which the moon
hath of moistening, and Saturn of cooling, and Mercury of
raising "winds, &c. I fear, when all is done, he will prove to
be but one of ^sop's companions, who pretended to know all
things, and did know nothing .
I argued from his principles, that if God by special in- [T. H. rc-
fluence did necessitate the second causes to operate as they an absur-
did, and if they, being thus determined, did necessitate man ^^^y-^
inevitably, unresistibly, by an essential subordination of
causes, to do whatsoever he did, then one of these two ab-
surdities must follow, — either that there is no such thing as
sin in the world, or that God is more guilty of it than man^,
as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer who
iliakes it and winds it up than from the watch itself'". To
this he answereth only this, that my "consequence is no
stronger, than if out of this — that a man is lame necessarily
— one should infer, that either he is not lame, or that his
lameness proceeded necessarily from the will of God^^^ And
is it possible, that he doth not see, that this influence followeth
clearly and necessarily from his principles ? If he doth not,
I will help his eyesight. All actions and accidents and events
whatsoever do proceed from the will of God, as the principal
cause, determining them to be what they are by a natural
necessary subordination of causes, — this is the principle ; I
assume that which no man can deny, — but the lameness of
this man (whom he mentioneth) is an accident or event;
therefore this lameness (upon his principles) is " from the will
of God," &c.
•J [" Kal rls av eVrj Toirov Suco-f/Sc- (paiuea-dai.'^ Euseb., Praep. Evang.,
(TTcpos &A\os, Tov Twv '6\cov d^hv, . . Kb. vi. c. 6 ; p. 251. B, C. fol. Paris.
67rcii/a7/c€s iK^LaC6fXivov t6v^€ fxkv ovk 1028.]
fdfXovTa d(re)36ti/," . . k. t. A.. " 'fls [Defence, Numb. xi. above p. 6-1;
^rjS' fv\6y(A}s iiri/j.^fX(p€(T6ai rois ttA-tj/z- Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
IxiKovcLW d\\' ^Tot /xTjSe a,uaprrifxara * [Qu,, Aniimadv. upon Numb. xi.
toGt' (hai riyeladat, Ta>v kukuv p. 87.]
airivTuiv ttojtjttjv dvai rhu Oehu airo-
X 2
308
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part
III. CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER XII.
In this section, he behaveth himself as the hound by Nilus,
clrinketh and runneth, as if he were afraid to make any stay* ;
quite omitting the whole contexture and frame of my dis-
course, only catching here and there at some phrase, or odd
ends of broken sentences. The authority of St. Paul was
formerly his palladium, the fate of his opinion of fate, or his
sevenfold shield, which he bore up against all assailants. And
now to desert it, as the ostrich doth her eggs in the sand, and
" leave it to the judgment of the reader, to think of the same as 777
he pleaseth"," seemeth strange. That man usually is in some
great distress, who quitteth his buckler. I desire but the
judicious reader, upon the by, to compare my former Defence
with his trifling exceptions ; and I do not fear his verdict.
It is bias- He saith, "it is blasphemy to say that God can sin"".^' So
say^That^ blasphemy also to say, that God is the author or cause of
Suse of^^ any sin. This he himself saith (at least implicitly) ; and this
sin. he cannot but saj^, so long as he maintaineth an universal
antecedent necessity of all things flowing from God by a
necessary flux of second causes. He who teacheth, that all
men are determined to sin antecedently without their own
concurrence, irresistibly beyond their own power to prevent
it, and efficaciously to the production of sin ; he who teacheth,
that it is the antecedent will of God, that men should sin and
must sin ; he who maketh God to be not only the cause of the
act and of the law, but likewise of the irregularity or devia-
tion, and of that very anomy wherein the being of sin (so far
as sin hath a being) doth consist ; — maketh God to be the
principal cause and author of sin : but T. H. doth all this.
Or to say, He saith, "it is no blasphemy to say, that God hath so
efficacious- oi'dered the world, that sin may necessarily be committed^.''
{y^^^^reed That is true in a right sense ; if he understand only a neces-
sity of infallibility upon God^s prescience, or a necessity of
supposition upon God^s permission. But what trifling and
mincing of the matter is this ! Let him cough out, and shew
us the bottom of his opinion, which he cannot deny : — that God
* [Plin., Nat. Hist, viii. 61. "Cer- " [Qu,, Animadv. upon Numb. xii.
turn est" (canes) "juxta Nilum amnem p. 107.]
currentes lambere, ne crocodilorum * [Ibid., p. 105.]
aviditati occasionem prajbeant."] ^ [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
309
hath so ordered the world, that sin must of necessity be com- Discourse
mitted, and ineWtably be committed ; that it is beyond the — ~
power of man to help it or hinder it ; and that by virtue of
God^s omnipotent will and eternal decree. This is that which
we abominate.
Yet he telleth us, that " it cannot be said that God is the
author of sin, because not he that necessitateth an action,
but he who doth command or warrant it, is the author
First, I take tliat for granted which he admitteth — that by
his opinion God necessitateth men to sinful actions, — which
is a blasphemy as well as the other. Secondly, his latter
part of his assertion is most false, — that he only who com-
mandeth or warranteth sin, is the author of it. He who acteth
sin, he who necessitateth to sin, he who first brings sin into
the world, is much more the author of it than the bare
commander of it. They make God to be the proper and
predominant cause of sin, by an essential subordination of
the sin of man to the will of God ; and in essential subordi-
nates always, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect.
If there had never been any positive commandment or law
given, yet sin had still been sin, as being contrary to the
eternal law of justice in God Himself. If a heathen prince
should command a Christian to sacrifice to idols or devils,
and he should do it, not the commander only, but he who
commits the idolatry, is the cause of the sin. His instance,
in the act of ^' the Israelites robbing the Egyptians of their [Exod. xii.
jewels^^^ is impertinent. For it was no robbery nor sin, God, ^'
Who is the lord pai'amouut of heaven and eai^th, having first
justly transferred the right from the Egyptians to the Israel-
ites ; and, in probability, to make them some competent
satisfaction for all that work and drudgery which they had
done for the Egyptians without payment. This is certain ; —
if God necessitate the agent to sin, either the act necessitated
IS no sin, or God is the principal cause of it. Let him choose
whether of these two absui'dities, this Scylla or that Charybdis,
he wiU fall into.
The reason which he gives of God's objurgation, — "to con-
vince men that their wills were not in their own power, but
« [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xii. * Tlbid., p. 106.1
pp. 105. 106.]
310
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part in God^s power b/' — is senseless, and mucli rather proveth
— the contrary, — that because they were chidden, therefore
their wills were in their own power. And if their wills
had not been in their own power, most certainly God would
not have reprehended them for that which was not their own
fault.
God's per- He saith, that " by interpreting hardening to be a permission
iTakirpe^ God," I attribute no more to God in such actions, than" I
mission. "might attribute to any of PharaoVs servants, the not per-
suading their master c," &c. As if "PharaoFs servants" had
the same power over their master that God Almighty had,
to hinder him, and stop him in his evil courses ; as if
" PharaoVs servants" were able to give or withhold grace ; 77
as if " Pharaoh's servants" had Divine power, to draw good
out of evil, and dispose of sin to the advancement of God's
glory and the good of His Church ; as if a humble petition
or * persuasion' of a servant, and a physical determination of
the will by a necessary flux of natural causes, were the same
thing. He who seeth a water break over its banks, and
suff'ers it to run out of its due channel, that he may draw it
by furrows into his meadows, to render them more fruitful, is
not a mere nor idle suff'erer. His absurdities drop as thick
[Judg. XV. as Sampson's enemies, heaps upon heaps."
He objecteth, that I " compare this permission of God to the
indulgence of a parent, who by his patience encourageth his
son to become more rebellious, which indulgence is a sin^."
Arguments taken from a parable or similitude, are of force
no further than they pertain to the end of the parable, or that
[Matt. XX. resemblance for which things are compared. The labourer's
^ penny doth not prove an equality of glory in Heaven. Nor
f i.uke xvi. our Saviour's commendation of the unjust steward justify his
cheating of his master. Christ proveth the readiness of God
[Luke to do justice to His servants, upon their constant prayers, by
xvm. 1 8.] ^ gii^^iiitude taken from an unjust judge. So here, the end of
the similitude was only to shew, that goodness may accident-
ally render evil natures more obdurate and presumptuous.
Neither was there any ^ sinful indulgence' either intended or
[ 1 Sam. ii. intimated in my words, like that of Eli to his sons, but only
2.-3— 25. ]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. ^ [Ibid.]
p. 10().] [Ibid.]
AIR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
311
patience and innocence^ gentleness of a tender father, such Discourse
as God Himself doth vouchsafe to own ; — " Despisest thou the
riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, 4^5™'
not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repen-
tance? but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasui-est
up unto thyself wrath/^
He urgeth, that whether it be called an antecedent or a
consequent will, an operative or a permissive will, it is enough
for the necessity of the thing, that the heart of Pharaoh should
be hardened^/' An antecedent will is without prevision of
sin, a consequent will is upon prevision of sin. Is it all one,
whether God do harden men^s hearts for sin or without sin,
for his fault or without his fault ? An operative will pro-
duceth an absolute necessity, an antecedent necessity ; a per-
missive wiU inferreth no more at the highest but a consequent
necessity upon supposition, which may consist with true
liberty ; as hath been made clear to him over and over.
He " desires the reader to take notice, that if " I "blame^^ The differ-
him " for speaking of God as a necessitating cause, and as it t^^een^ge-
were a principal agent in causing of all actions,"! ^^may with as "p^^lat"'^
good reason blame^^ myself " for making" him ^^an accessary by influence,
concurrence And here he vapours ; — " Let men hold what
they will contrary to the truth ; if they write much, the truth
will fall into their pens^." I desire the reader,^^ likewise,
"to take notice,^^ and observe what silly cavils he brings
commonly for exceptions, and how vainly he puffeth up him-
self, like the frog in the fable, with his abortive conceptions.
Where did I ever use the word " accessary,^^ or any tbing in
that sense ? " Mala mens malus animus." If he knew the
difference between general and special influence, he would be
ashamed to infer a particular guilt from a general concurrence.
A general and special influence is no "nonsense^.^^ A prince
giveth commission to a judge, thereby enabling him to de-
termine criminal and capital causes; that is a general in-
fluence of power. By vii'tue of this commission he heareth
causes ; and abusing this general power, taketh bribes, giveth
unjust sentences, and pimisheth innocent persons. Is the
« [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. » [Ibid.]
P- 107.] h ribid., Animadv. upon Numb. vii.
' [Ibid.] p. 59.]
312
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part princc that gave him the commission and judiciary power,
— accessary to his fault? Nothing less; but the judge abuseth
his commission/ and misappUeth his just power. But if the
prince had given him a special commission, like that of
iKingsxxi. Jezebel, "Proclaim a fast, set Naboth on high, and let two
[9J 10. j^gj^ q£ -iivitness against him, saying. Thou didst
blaspheme God and the king, and stone him that he die," —
this had been special influence indeed ; and the prince had
not only been an accessary, but a principal, in the murder.
By which we may see, how God concurreth to the doing of
evil by a general, not by a special influence.
I exemplified this distinction of general and special in-
fluence to him, in the earth ; which concurreth to the nou-
rishment of all plants by a general influence, but that one
plant converteth this nourishment to healthful food, another
to poison ; that is, not from the general influence of the
earth, but from the special quality of the root : but quite
contrary both to my words and to my sense, he misapplieth
it to the operative and permissive will of God, without head
or foot : — " It seemeth" (saith he), " that he thinketh that 779
God doth will . . but permissively, that the hemlock should
poison a man, but operatively, that the wheat should nourish
him\" Risum teneatis amici^
[Case of I cleared this likewise to him in his instance of the mur-
UiTah f der of Uriah ; shewing him, that David's power was from
God, but the misapplication of that power was from David
himself. "As if" (saith he) " there were a power that were
not the power to do some particular act, or a power to kill
- and yet to kill nobody in particular^." He might even as
well say, — as if there were a commission or a power given by
the prince to hear and determine causes in general, or to
arraign and try malefactors in general, and not to sentence
this man and hang that man in particular. Every general
commission or power doth justify particular acts, whilst they
who are empowered do pursue their commission, and not
abuse their power; but if they abuse their power, neither
will their general power justify their particular misdeeds,
' [Q.U., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii.
pp. 107, 108.] p. 108.]
[Horat., A. P., '>.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
313
nor theii' particular faults render the piince accessary, who Discourse
gave them their general power.
In his impertinent instance of " the Divine right of Bishops
to ordain ministers which he bringeth in by the head and
shoulders, he sheweth nothing but his ignorance and his
teeth. Every man who hath an undoubted right to do some
act, hath not presently a right to exercise it promiscuously,
when and where and upon whom he will, without any respect
to those who had a precedent right before himself. Let him
inquire farther into the difference between an actual and
habitual power; and it wiU save him the further labour of
inquiring, and me of informing him. " Qui pauca considerat
facile pronunciatr
He demandeth, ^^Did not God foreknow, that Uriah in
particular should be murdered by David in particular? and
what God foreknoweth shall come to pass°.^^ Yes, God doth
know in eternity; for with God, properly, there is neither
fore-knowledge nor after-knowledge, neither past nor to
come, but aU things present always. Or if he wiU have us
speak after the manner of men ; — God did foreknow, that
Da^id should kill Uriah with the sword of the children of
Ammon; and God did likewise foreknow, that T. H. should
maintain this paradox so dishonourable to His majesty, that
God did necessitate Da^dd to kill Uriah; but knowledge,
of what kind soever it be, taketh away no man^s liberty.
Uriah might have gone to his own house upon Da^id^s
entreaty; and then Darid had not killed Uriah upon any
necessitation fi'om God^s fore -knowledge. Uriah might have
killed David ; and then God had foreknown that, not this.
But this objection hath been formerly fully answered" : whi-
ther I refer the reader.
He chargeth me to say, that the case agitated between [The true
us is, whether God^s irresistible power or man^s sin be the between
cause- why He punisheth one man more than another T. H. and
-11 theauthor.]
whereas "the case agitated between us is, whether a man
can now choose what shall be his wlQ anon?.^^ There are
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. ments, [above pp. 246 — 249.]
108.] P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii.
" [Ibid.] p. 109.]
° [Answ. to] Fountains of Argu-
314
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part several cases or questions between us. First, the general or
— — main question ; whicli is already stated by consent, — whether
the will of man be free from extrinsecal determination to one
antecedently^; — and not, as it is here proposed by him
fondly and ambiguously, "whether a man can now choose
what shall be his -will anon/^ For, first, a man is not certain,
James iv. that he shall live so long to be able to choose his will. And
13 14
' ' although he were certain to live so long, yet succeeding
time may make such a change of aflPairSj that he may have
just reason to choose otherwise.
" Quemquam posse putas mores narrare futuros ?
" Die mihi, si fias tu leo, qualis ens'"."
But besides the main general question, there are likewise
many particular subordinate questions ; as this in this sec-
tion,— w^hether this opinion of universal necessity do not
make all punishment to be unjust, because, if a man be
necessitated antecedently and unavoidably to do what he
doth, he is punished without his own fault, and consequently
unjustly. To escape this argument, he is driven to seek
shelter under the omnipotence of God : — " Power irresis-
tible justifieth all actions really and properly, in whomso-
ever it be found and, "when God afflicted Job, He did
object no sin to him that " which He doth is justified by
His doing it*.^^ So the present dispute was, whether man's
sin, or God's omnipotence, were the just ground of punish-
ment. This was all I said, and more than I said. But he
can set down nothing without either mistaking it or con-
founding it. God's power is not the rule of His justice, but
His will ; not because His will maketh that to be just, which
otherwise was unjust, but because He can will nothing but 780
that which is just. But he addeth not one grain of weight
more in these Animadversions about this subject to what he
had formerly said ; all which hath been fully and clearly
satisfied in my former Defence*, to which he hath replied
nothing.
("The Jews That which I said of the Jews — that " it was in their own
might reco-
ver their
former es- q j-g^^ ^^^^^^ ^-^^ Answ. to the above p. 65.]
State of the Quest., p. 219.] * [Defence,] Numb. xii. [above pp.
r [Martial., Epigr., XII. xciv. 3, 4.] 75, &c. ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
* [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xii.
315
power by their concurrence with God's grace to prevent Discourse
those judgments^ and to recover their former estate^/' — is so - — —~ —
true^ and so plainly affirmed by St. Paul, that no man but 23,
himself durst have cavilled against it. But he who knows
no liberty but from outward impediments, no general power
of motion without a necessitation to kill Uriah, no grace but
that which is irresistible ; who hath never heard of the con-
currence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner ;
it is no marvel if he think, that God will save men without
themselves, as well as He made them without themselves.
I said, God "may oblige Himself freely to His creature ''.^^ God may
Who ever doubted of it before himY ? What doth he think of Himfeif.
God^s promise to Abraham — I will " be the God of thee and [Gen. xvii.
of thy seed after thee Or of the legal covenant — " Do this [Luke x.
and thou shalt live Or of the evangelical covenant — " He xviH.^^]'
that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved But he ^v'-
saith, " He that can oblige, can also release w hen he will, and
he that can release himself when he wdll, is not obliged'^." Is
not this comfortable doctrine, and suitable to the truth and
majesty of Almighty God, "in Whom there is no variable- James i. 17.
ness nor shadow of turning Nothing is impossible to
God^s absolute power ; but according to His ordinate power,
which is disposed by His will. He cannot change His own
decrees, nor go from His promise. If God^s decrees were
changeable, what would become of his universal necessity?
But he shooteth at random, not much regarding, so it fit his
present humour, whether it make for his cause or against it.
But now I am to expect a heavy charge; hitherto he hath God cannot
been but in jest; — that I am "driven to words ill becoming^^ unrtght-
me "to speak of God Almighty, for" I "make Him unable to ^^"^ ^^^"o-
do that which hath been within the ordinary power of man to
do*." How is this ? I said, " God cannot ' destroy the risrhte- [Gen.xviii.
ous with the wicked,^ which nevertheless is a thing done
ordinarily by armies^." The great "mountain hath brought
forth a little mouse^." Might not I say, that God cannot
" [Defence,] Numb. xii. [above p.
77 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
X [Ibid.]
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii.
p. 109.]
^ [Ibid.]
a [Ibid., p. 110.]
^ [Ibid. ; from the Defence, Numb,
xii. above p. 78.]
[" Parturiunt montes, nascetur ri-
diculus mus." Horat., A. P., 139.]
316
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part sin, though men can do it ? Why might not I say, that God
— cannot do unrighteous things, or God cannot be unrighteous
(which is the same thing in effect), as well as the Scripture
Tit. i. 2.— saith, God cannot lie," God "cannot repent," God "cannot
xxiii. 19 deny Himself," and, " God is not unrighteous to forget your
is^'^eb. works?" As if he should say, If God could break His
vi. 10. promise, God could be unrighteous, but He cannot be un-
righteous. Yea, the Lord doth submit Himself, as it
Micah vi. were, to a trial upon this point ; — " The Lord hath a con-
^' troversy with His people, and He will plead with Israel."
[Ezek. And He doth challenge them upon this very point ; — " Hear
xvni. 25.] ^Q^^ Q j^Q^gg of Israel, is not My way equal? are not your
ways unequal ?" — And in the same chapter He protesteth, —
[vv. 2—4.] "As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any
more to use this proverb in Israel, . . the fathers have eaten
sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge ;" but,
"the soul that sinneth shall die." And Abraham saith the
same that I say (though he deny it), by way of interrogation
Gen. xviii. indeed, but with much more vehemency ; — " Wilt Thou also
' ' destroy the righteous with the wicked ?" &c. ; " that be far
from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with
the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked;
that be far from Thee ; shall not the Judge of all the earth
do right?" Neither can he except, because it is not said.
Canst Thou ? but, " Wilt Thou ?" for we speak of the ordi-
nate power of God, which is ordered by His will.
That which he saith of an army^^ weigheth less than
nothing. For, first, that destruction which an army maketh,
is not like that destruction whereof Abraham speaketh,
which feU upon Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Apostle
Ju(le7. calleth "the vengeance of eternal fire." The destruction
made by an army may be a punishment to some, a chastise-
ment or a blessing to others. Jeremy the prophet was in-
volved with the rest of the Jews in the same Babylonian
captivity ; but the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was
an express punishment for sin. Thirdly, an army acteth by
way of public justice, regarding the justice of the cause, not
of particular persons ; for it is not possible in the height of
war to do justice according to the particular merits of single 781
^ [Qu., Aniinadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSTONS.
317
persons. But after this necessity is over, and particular jus- Discourse
tice can take place, then no man ought to suffer but accord- '
ing to his guilt ; then it is no more lawful to " destroy the
righteous with the wicked." Necessity may justify the suf-
ferings of innocent persons in some cases ; but no necessity
can warrant the punishment of innocent persons. Innocen-
tium lachrymcB diluvio periculosiores."
Whether they did well or ill for the manner of the act,
who put out their bodily eyes because they supposed them
to be an impediment to the eye of the soul, is not pertinent
to our purpose, yet was apt enough to prove my intention, —
that bodily blindness may sometimes be a benefit.
His instance, in "brute beasts, which are afflicted, yet can- [t.^h.'s^
not sin^," is extravagant. I did not go about to prove, that instance of
universal necessity doth take away afflictions : it rather ren- beasts!]*^
dereth them unavoidable. But I did demonstrate (and he
hath not been able to make any show of an answer to it),
that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments ; which
is against the universal notion and common belief of the
whole world. Brute beasts are not capable of punishment :
they are not knocked down out of -vdndictive justice for faults
committed, but for future use and benefit. I said there was "a
vast difference between the light and momentary pangs" of
brute beasts, "and the intolerable and endless pains of HelF."
Sui-e enough, Dionysius the tyrant, seeing an ox knocked
down at one blow, said to his friends, " what a folly it is to
quit so fair a command for fear of dying, which lasts no
longer a space"." He himself, when his wits are calmer, doth
acknowledge as much as I, and somewhat more : — " Per-
haps" (saith he), "if the death of a sinner were an eternal
life in extreme misery, a man might, as far as Job hath
done, expostulate with God Almighty, not accusing him of
injustice," &c., "but of little tenderness and love to man-
kind^." But now he is pleased to give another judgment of
it; — "As if the length or greatness of the pain made any
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii.
p. 110.]
[Defence, Numb. xii. above p. 79 ;
Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
K Plut., [Apophthegm. Reg. &c. ;
Op. Moral., tom. i. p. 488. ed. Wyt-
tenb.]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. x.
[p. 79.]
318
CASTIGATIOXS OF
sons for
their own
good.
^m^ difference of the justice or injustice of inflicting it^'^ Yes,
' — veiy much. According to the measure of the fault ought to
be the number of the stripes. K the punishment exceed
It is just to the offence^ it is unjust. On the other side, it is not only an
cent per-
' act of justice, but of favour and grace, to inflict temporary-
pains for a greater good. Otherwise a master could not
justly correct his scholai'; otherwise a chirurgeon might not
lance an impostume, or put a man to pain to cure him of the
stone. If God afiiict a man with a momentary sickness, and
maketh this sickness a means to fit him for an eternal weight
of gloiy, he hath no cause to complain of injustice.
He is angry, that I would make men believe, that" he
" holds all things to be just, that are done by them who have
power enough to avoid pimishment^'." He doth me wrong. I
said no such thing. If he be guilty of this imputation, either
directly or by consequence, let him look to it. He hath
errors enough which are evident. I did indeed confute this
tenet of his, that " ii-resistible power is the inile of justice^ of
which he is pleased to take no notice in his Animadversions.
But whereas he doth now restrain this privilege to that
power alone which is absolutely u-resistible, he forgetteth
himself over much, having foiTaerly extended it to all sove-
reigns and supreme councils, within their own dominions : —
" It is manifest therefore, that in eveiy commonwealth there
is some one man or council which hath," &c., " a sovereign
and absolute power, to be limited by the strength of the
commonwealth and by no other thing™." What? Neither
by the law of God, nor natui^e, nor nations, nor the munici-
pal laws of the land, nor by any other thing but his " power"
and strength ?" Good doctrine ! " Hunc tu Ro/nane caveto^"
Lastly, to make his presumption complete, he endeavoureth
to prove, that God "is not only the author of the law," — which
is most true ; — and " the cause of the act," — which is partly
true, because He is the only fountain of power, — but that
He is "the cause of the irregularity," that is, in "plain Eng-
lish**" (which he dehghteth in), the sin itself;— "I think"
Sin is pro-
perly irre-
gularity.
i [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. xii.
pp. 110, 111.]
^ [Ibid., p. 111.]
' [Defence, Numb. xii. above pp.
75. &c. ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
" Lib. de Give, tit. Imper., c. vi.
num. 18. [p. 70.]
n [Horat., Sat., I. iv. 85.]
o [See above in the Defence, T. H.
Xumb. xxiv. p. 1-55.]
MR. IIOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
319
(saith he), " there is no man but understands/^ &c., " that Discourse
where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimili — —
tude, regularity or irregularity, that is between them, is made
in and by the things themselves that are compared; the
Bishop therefore, that denies God to be the cause of the irre-
gularity, denies Him to be the cause both of the law and of
the actionP/^ This is that which he himself calleth "blas-
phemy^'^ elsewhere, — that God is the author or cause of sin.
782 Sin is nothing but the irregularity of the act. So St. John
defineth it in express terms, "97 aixapria iarlv rj avo^la^' — "sin [1 John iii.
is an anomy,'' or "an irregularity," or "a transgression of
the law." For "sin is nothing else but a declination from the
rule," that is, an irregularity. Another definition of sin is
this, — " Sin is that which is thought, or said, or done against
the eternal law^." Still you see, the formal reason of sin
doth consist in the contrariety to the law, that is, the irregu-
larity. Others define sin to be " a want of rectitude, or a
privation of conformity to the rule* that is, irregularity.
An irregular action is sin materially ; irregularity is sin for-
mally. Others define sin to be " a free transgression of the
commandment"." Every one of these definitions demon-
strate, that Mr. Hobbes maketh God to be properly the
cause of sin.
But let us weigh his argument. " He who is the cause of God no
the law, and the cause of the action, is the cause of the irre- reguLrity!"
gularity ; but God is the cause of the law, and the cause of the
action." I deny his assumption. God indeed is "the cause of
the law," but God is not the total or adequate " cause of the
action." Nay, God is not at all "the cause of the action" qua
talis — as it is irregular, but the free agent. To use our
former instance of an unjust judge : the prince is the author
or cause of the law, and the prince is the cause of the judi-
ciary action of the judge in general, because the judge de-
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. peccatum nisi declinare ac recedere a
p. 111.] reguldr]
" [Ibid., p. 105. See above p. 308. * [See above p. 80. note a.]
note X,] * [" Carentia rectitudinis sive priva-
[" Peccatum est transgressiolegis." tio conformitatis ad regulam." Bel-
Aug., De Cons. Evang., lib. ii. c. 4. (§ larm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Pec-
13; Op. tom. iii. P. ii. p. 3 1 ) ; quoted by cati, lib. v. c. 3 ; Op. tom. iii. p. 359. A. ]
Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat. et Statu " [" Libera transgressio praecepti."
Peccati, lib. i. c. 1 ; Op. tom. iii. p. 71. Id,, ibid., lib. v. c. 17 ; ibid. p. 411.
A ; wbo adds, — " Nihil est enim aliud C]
320
CASTIGATIONS OF
^jj'*' riveth all his power of judicature from the prince ; but the
" prince is not the cause of the irregularity^ or repugnance, or
non-conformity, or contrariety, which is between the judge's
actions and the law, but the judge himself ; who by his own
fault did abuse and misapply that good general power, which
was committed and entrusted to him by the prince ; he is
the only cause of the anomy or irregularity. Or as a scri-
vener, that teacheth one to write, and sets him a copy, is
both the cause of the rule and of the action or writing, and
yet not the cause of the irregularity or deviation from the
rule. Sin is a defect, or deviation, or irregularity. No de-
fect, no deviation, no irregularity, can proceed from God.
But herein doth consist T. H. his error, that he distin-
guisheth not between an essential and an accidental subordi-
nation, or between a good general power and the determina-
tion or misapplication of this general power to evil. What
times are we fallen into ! to see it publicly maintained, that
God is the cause of all irregularity, or deviation from His
own rules.
[CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;]
NUMBER XIII.
Here is no need of Castigations, there being no Animad-
versions.
CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XIV.
In the beginning he repeateth his empty objections, from
what shall be, shall be,^^ and from " foreknowledge," and
that " a man cannot choose to-day for to-morrow and
thence concludeth [nemine consentiente) , that my deductions
are irrational and fallacious, and that he " need make no fur-
ther answer'^." As if he should say, I sent forth two or
three light horsemen to vapour, who were soundly beaten
back, and made their defence with their heels, therefore I
need not answer the charge of the main battle. He told me,
that I did not understand" him, if I thought he " held no
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 138.]
MR. HOBBES' AXIMADVERSIOXS.
321
other necessity, than tliat which is contained in tliat old foohsh
rule, — whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is^ V
But I see, when all is done, he must sit down and be con-
tented to make his best of that "old foolish rule for "pre-
science,^^ and " what shall be, shall be,^^ do imply no more.
In the next place, he chargeth me with three great "absur-
dities: the first, that" I "say, a law may be unjust; the second,
that a law may be tyrannical; the third, that"' I "say, it is an
unjust law which prescribes things impossible in themselves
to be done^^' A grievous accusation. These absui'dities
are " at age," let them even " answer for themselves."
He saith, "Civil laws are made by every man that is subject
to them, because every one of tliem consented to the placing
of the legislative power*."
I deny his consequence. Indeed, in causes that are
naturally, necessarily, and essentially subordinate, the cause
of the cause is always the cause of the effect ; as he that
planteth a Wneyard, is the cause of the vine. But in causes
that are accidentally or contingently subordinate (as the
people electing, the law-giver elected, and the law made,
are), the cause of the cause is not always the cause of the
effect ; as he that planteth a vineyai'd, is not the cause of the
drunkenness. The king's commission maketli a judge, but
it is not the cause of his unrighteous judgment. Two cities
'83 in Italy, contending about their bounds, chose the people of
Rome to be their arbitrators ; they gave either city a small
pittance, and reserved all the rest to themselves, — " Quod in
medio est, pojmlo Romano adjudicetur^.^^ The two cities did
not so much like their arbitrators at the first, as they detested
the arbitrament at the last ; and though they had contracted
a necessity of compliance by theii' credulous submission, yet
this did not free that unconscionable arbitrament fi'om pal-
pable injustice ; no, nor 3'et so much as from palpable in-
yivy : for though a man is not injured, who is willing to be
injured {"volenti non fit injirria^''), yet he who doth choose
an arbitrator, doth not choose his unjust arbitrament ; nor
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. b [Cic, De Offic, i. 10.]
26.] c [" BXaTTTerai /xej/ oZv tis eKU-v Kal
* [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. to fiSiK-a Tratrxf a5i/fe<To» S' ovSh
Y
fls fKuv." Aristot., Ethic, V. xi. 6.]
322
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part he that chooseth a law-sriver, choose his tyrannical law.
Ill o ^ .
'■ — Though he have obliged himself to passive obedience, yet his
obligation doth not render either the injurious arbitrament
of the one, or the tyrannical law of the other, to be just. So
the main ground of his error is a gross fallacy, which every
sophister in the University is able to discover.
I answer, secondly, that though every subject had actually
consented, as well to the laws, as to the law-giver, yea,
though the law were made by the whole collective body of
the people in theii' own persons, yet, if it be contrary' to the
law of God or nature, it is still an unjust law. The people
cannot give that power to their prince, which they have not
themselves.
Thu'dly, many laws are made by those who are not duly
invested with legislative power ; which are therefore unjust
laws.
Fourthly, many laws are made to bind foreigners, who ex-
ercise commerce with subjects ; which, if they be contraiy
to the pacts and capitulations of the confederate nations, are
unjust laws. Foreigners never consented to the placing of
the legislative power.
Fifthly, no human poAver whatsoever, judiciary or legisla-
tive, civil or sacred, is exempted from excesses, and possibility
of doing or making unjust acts.
Lastly, the people cannot confer more power upon their
law-giver than God Himself doth confer ; neither is their
election a greater privilege from injustice, than God^s own
disposition : but they, who have been placed in sovereign
power by God Himself, have both made unjust laws, and pre-
scribed unjust acts to their subjects,
impossibi- I said, Those laws were unjust, which prescribed things
by our- impossible in themselves'^." Against this he excepteth^ —
be^jStiy^^ " Oii^y contradictions are impossible in themselves, all other
[but^fnot ^^'^ possible in themselves, as to raise the dead, to
impossibi- change the course of natui-e but never any "tp-ant did bind
them-" a rtian to contradictions, or make a law, commanding him to
selves. ^Yie same action, or to be and not to be in
the same place at the same moment of time^."
^ [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 88; « [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] pp. 133, 134.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
323
I answer, tliat tyrants may command, and by their depu- Discocrse
ties have commanded, contradictory acts ; as for the same '-
subjects to appear before several judges in several places at
the same time, and to do several duties inconsistent one with
another, which imply a conti'adiction ; and have punished
subjects for disobedience in such cases.
Secondly, I answer, that when we say, ^ Law-makers ought
to command things possible,^ it ought to be understood of
things possible to their subjects, upon whom they impose
their commands ; not of such things as are possible to God
Almighty. To make a law, that subjects sliould raise the
dead, or change the course of nature (which he reckons as
things possible in themselves), is as unjust a law as a law
that should enjoin them contradictions, and the act as impos-
sible to the subject.
Thirdly, these words — "impossible in themselves,^^ — which
he layeth hold now, have a quite contrary sense to that which
he imagineth, and are warranted by great authors. Some
things are impossible to us by our own defaults ; as for a
man to hold the liquor firmly without shedding, who hath
contracted the palsy by his own intemperance f. These im-
possibilities may justly be forbidden and punished, when we
have had power and lost it by our own fault. Secondly,
there are other impossibilities in themselves, such as proceed
not from oiu' own faults, which never were in our power ; as
those which proceed from the antecedent determination of
extrinsecal causes. To enjoin these by law, and to punish a
man for not obeying, is unjust and tyrannical.
Whereas I called " just laws" the ordinances of right
reason^," he saith, "it is an error that hath cost many
thousands of men their Hves^." His reason is, "If laws be
en'oneous shall they not be obeyed ? shall we rather rebel V
I answer, neither the one nor the other. We are not to obey
them activelv, because " we ouo'ht to obey God rather than Acts v. 29.
1 Peter ii.
man." Yet may we not rebel ; — " Submit yourselves to 13.
every ordinance of man, for the Lord^s sake." Passive obe-
dience is a mean between active obedience and rebellion. To
' [See Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15.] h [Qu., Animadv. upon Xumb. xiv.
« [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 88 ; p. 134.1
Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
Y 2
324
CASTIGATIONS OF
^iii^^ "just laws/' which are ''^the ordinances of right reason,"
— active obedience is due. To unjust laws^ which are ' the
ordinances of reason erring/ passive obedience is due. AVho
shall hope to escape exception_, when this innocent definition
is quarrelled at ? I wish his own principles were half so loyal.
Proper He saith^ I " take punishment for a kind of revenge^ and
raenT^s therefore can never agree with" him_, ^^who takes it for nothing
dictive"in ^^^^ ^ Correction^ or for an example'/' &c. I take
part. punishment in the same sense, that all authors, both sacred
and civil, Divines and philosophers, lawyers, and generally
all classic wi'iters, have ever taken it : that is, for " an evil of
passion, which is inflicted for an evil of action'^." So, to pass
by other authors, as slighted by him, the Holy Scripture doth
Lam. iii. always take it: as, — "Wherefore doth a living man corn-
Job xxxi. plain ? for the punishment of his sins /' — and, — " This is a
heinous crime, yea, it is an iniquity to be punished by the
Ezraix. 13. judges /' — and, — " Thou hast punished us less than our ini-
quities deserved." Yea, punishment doth not only presuppose
sin, but the measure of punishment, the degree of sin : —
Heb. X. 28. " He that despiseth Moses' law, died without mercy ; of how
much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who
hath trampled under foot the Son of God ?" The judge was
Deut.xxv. commanded to cause the offender "to be beaten according
to the fault." This truth we learned from the ferulas and
rods, which we smarted under when we were boys ; and from
the gibbets, and axes, and wheels, which are prepared for
offenders. " Omnis pmna, sijusta est, peccati p(Bna est^J^
That the punishment of dehnquents hath other ends also,
there is no doubt. " Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est,
sed ne peccetur'^r Punishment respects the delinquent in the
first place, either to amend him, or to prevent his doing of
more mischief ; secondly, it regardeth the party suffering, to
repair his honour, or preserve him from contempt, or secure
him for the time to come ; lastly, it respects other persons,
that the suffering of a few may be exemplary, and an admo-
' [Qu,, Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. Gentium, lib. VIII. c. iii. § 4.]
p. 134.] 1 [Aug., De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 18.
k [" Malum passionis quod infligitur § 51; and Retract., lib. i. c, 9. § 5:
propter malum actionis." Grotius, De Op. torn. i. pp. 631. B, and 14. E.]
Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. II. c. xx. § 1 ; m [Senec., De Ira, lib. i. c. 16; Op.
and Puffendorf, De Jure Naturae et p. 547 : from Plato, Protag., c. xxxix.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
325
nition to many. But herein lies his error^ — that " punish- discourse
ment'^ is ^^for nothing else but for correction or example.^^ —
" God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down 2 Peter ii. 4.
into Hell," — that was no "correction;" and at the Last J udg-
ment, — "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire," — there is neither [Matt. xxv.
"correction" nor " example :" but in both instances there is
"punishment." Whence it is apparent, that some punish-
ment, especially Divine, doth look only at the satisfaction of
justice.
I gave five instances of " unjust laws :" Pharaoh's law, to Yet further
drown the Israelitish children ; Nebucliadnezzar^s law, to laws.
cast them who would not commit idolatry into the fiery Sani'iii!
furnace ; Darius his law, that whosoever prayed to God for ^^^t^j'^i^jf
thirtv days should be cast into the den of lions : Ahasuerosh 12, 13.—
1 • / T 1 T • 1 • 11 11 Johnix.22.]
his law, to destroy the Jewish nation root and branch ; the
Pharisees' law, to excommunicate all those who confessed
Christ". To all these he answereth nothing in particular, but
in general, he giveth this answer, — that " they were just laws
in relation to their subjects, because all laws made by him to
whom the people have given the legislative power, are the
acts of every one of that people, and no man can do injustice
to himself; but they were unjust actions in relation to God*'."
He " fearetli the Bishop will think this discourse too subtle p."
Nay, rather, "the Bishop" thinketh it too flat and dull.
"... Dii te Damasippe Deaeque
"Tale ob consilium donent tonsore^."
I have answered his reason before; — that it is a sophistical
fallacy, flowing from the accidental subordination of the
causes. A man may will the lawgiver, and yet not will the
law. That is one reply to his distinction.
Secondly, I reply, that when the people did " give " them
"the legislative power," they gave a kingly power, to preserve
and protect their subjects; thej^ meant not a power to drown
them, to burn them, to cast them to the lions, to root them
out from the earth by the means of unjust, bloody, tyrannical
huvs, made on purpose to be pitfalls to catch subjects. Hear
himself; — 'No man can transfer or lay down his right to
n [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 89 ; p [Ibid.]
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] 1 [Herat., Sat., II. iii. 16, 17. " Te-
° [Q,u., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. rum ob consilium," &c.]
p. 1:35.]
326
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part save liimself from deaths wounds, and imprisonment If
'■ — the right be not transferred in such cases, then the law is
groundless and unjust, and made without the consent of the
subject. They did not give, they did not intend to give, they
could not give them a Divine power, or rather a power para-
mount above God, — to command idolatry, to forbid all prayer
and invocation of God's holy name ; and, therefore, though
such laws do not warrant rebellion, because it is better to die
innocent than to live nocent, yet that hindereth not but
such laws are unjust both towards God and towards man.
Thirdly, if these laws had been '^just in relation to the
subjects,'^ then the subjects had been bound to obey them
actively ; but they were not bound to obey them actively ;
Exod. i, 17. yea, they were bound not to obey them. "The midwives
feared God, and did not as the king of Egypt commanded
Dan.iii. 18. them." The three children answered, "Be it known unto
thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship
thy golden image, which thou hast set up.'' The parents of
Moses are commended for their faith in saving Moses con-
Heb. xi.23. trary to "the king's commandment."
Fourthly, subjects have given to their sovereigns as well
judiciary as legislative power over themselves; but their
judiciary poiver doth not justify their unjust acts or sentences,
iKingsxxi. even towards their subjects. Elias accused Ahab of murder;
2 Kings vi. Elisha called his son Joram the "son of a murderer."
?2 Sam xxi ^^^^'^ injustice towards the Gibeonites did draw the guilt of
^ 14.] blood upon his house; and the Lord was not satisfied, until
the Gibeonites had received satisfaction. He himself styleth
David's act towards Uriah " murder ^" Certainly, " murder"
is not just, either towards God, or towards man. Therefore
neither doth the legislative power justify their unjust laws.
Fifthly, of all law-givers, those who are placed freely by the
people, have the least pretence to such an absolute and
universal resignation of all the property and interest of the
subject. For it is to be presumed, that the people who did
choose them had more regard to their own good than to the
good of their law-giver, and did look principally at the pro-
tection of their own persons, and the preservation of their
'' Leviath., Pt. i. c. 14. [pp. 65, 66. * [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii.
fol. Lond. 1651.] p. 108.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
327
own rights, and did contract accordingly. As we see in the Discourse
most nourishing monarchies of the world, as that of the — —
Medes and Persians; they had their fundamental laws, which
were not in the single power of the present law-giver to Dan. vi. 8.
alter or violate by a new law or command, without injustice.
If a pupil shall choose a tutor or guardian for himself, he
investeth him with all his power, he obligeth himself to make
good all his acts. Nevertheless he may wrong his pupil, or
do him injustice. There is only this difference, that a pupil
may implead his guardian and recover his right against him,
but from a sovereign law-giver there lies no appeal but only
to God ; otherwise there would be endless appeals, which
both nature and policy doth abhor, as in the instance of the
Roman arbitrament formerly mentioned. An arbitrary power
is the highest of all powers. Judges must proceed according to
law ; arbitrators are tied to no law, but their own reason, and
their ow^n consciences. Yet all the world will say, that the
Romans dealt fraudulently and unjustly with the two parties.
Lastly, the Holy Scriptures do everywhere brand wicked
laws as infamous, as "the statutes of Omri,^^ and " the Mich. vi.i6.
statutes of Israel and styleth them expressly unjust laws, ^u.^^ia^
or "unrighteous decrees." ^' ^•
He asketh, " to whom the Bible is a law^ ?" The Bible is The autho-
not a law, but the positive laws of God are contained in the scriptures
Bible. Doth he think the law of God is no law without his de-
pendent on
suffrage ? He might have been one of Tiberius his council, the printer,
when it was proposed to the Senate whether they should
admit Christ to be a God or not".
He saith, I "know that it is not a law to all the world
Not de facto indeed. How^ should it ? when the world is so
full of atheists, that make no more account of their souls than
of so many handfuls of salt, to keep their bodies from stinking.
But de jure — by right, it is a law, and ought to be a law, to all
the world. The heathens, and particularly the Stoics them-
selves, did speak with much more reverence of ^ the Holy Books/
of which to suspect a falsehood, they held to be a heinous and
detestable crime ^. And the first argument for necessity they
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 136.]
P- 136.] X Amnionius, in [Section. Ildani
" [Euseh., Hist. Eccl., lib. ii. c. 2.] Aristotelis] lib. de Interpret, [pp. 93. b,
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. 91. a. Venet. lol6: s];eaking of the
328
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part produced from the authority of those books, because they
HI said that '^God did know all things_, and dispose all things^/'
[How they He askcth, " how the Bible came to be a law to us ? did
ui. f Grod speak it viva voce to us ? have we seen the miracles ? 786
have we any other assurance than the words of the Prophets,
and the authority of the Church ?" And so he concludeth,
that "it is the legislative power of the Commonwealth/^ w^here-
soever it is placed, which "makes the Bible a law in England^.''
[Exod.xxi. If a man digged a pit, and covered it not again, so that an
ox or an ass fell into it, he was obliged by the Mosaical law
to make satisfaction for the damage. I know not whether
he do this on purpose to weaken the authority of Holy
Scriptui'e, or not. Let God and his own conscience be his
triers. But I am sure he hath digged a pit for an ox or an
ass without covering it again ; and if they chance to stumble
blindfold into it, their blood will be required at his hands.
If a Turk had said so much of the Alcoran at Constantinople,
he w^ere in some danger.
[Their Di- If it were mthin the compass of the present controversy, I
rity.] should esteem it no difficult task to demonstrate perspicuously,
that the Holy Scriptures can be no other than the Word of
God Himself ; by their antiquity, by their harmony, by their
efficacy, by the sanctity and sublimity of their matter, such
as could not have entered into the thoughts of man without
the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, by the plainness of their
style, so full of majesty, by the light of prophetical predic-
tions, by the testimony of the blessed martyrs, by a multitude
of miracles, by the simplicity of the penmen and promulgers,
poor fishermen and shepherds, w^ho did draw the world after
their oaten reeds, and, lastly, by the judgments of God that
have fallen upon such tyrants and others as have gone about
to suppress or profane the sacred oracles. But this is one of
those things, " de quibus nefas est dubitare which he that
calleth into question, deserveth to be answered otherwise than
with arguments^.
[The law But that which is sufficient to confute him is the law of
coincident nature ; which is the same in a great part with the positive
with them.] , « . , , „
iro\v<rroixoirwi/ deiwy fuepyciwi/ irpay- ^ [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. xiv.
/LiaT€toi." But Bramhall's gloss upon the p. 1 36.]
passage is very forced and far-fetched. J " [Aristot., Topic, I. xi. 8.]
y [Id., ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS. 329
law of Godj recorded in Holy Scriptures. All the ten Com- Discouusi
mandments^ in respect of their substantials, are acknowledged —
by all men to be branches of the law of nature. I hope he
will not say, that these laws of nature were made by our
suffrages : though he be as likely to say such an absurdity as
any man living; for he saith, "the law of nature is the assent
itself which all men give to the means of their preservation^."
Every law is a rule of our actions; a mere "assent" is no rule.
A law commandeth or forbiddeth, an " assent" doth neither.
But to shew him his vanity : since he delighteth so much in
definitions, let him satisfy himself out of the definition of the
law of nature; — "The law of nature is the prescription of
right reason, whereby, through that light which nature hath
placed in us, we know some things to be done because they
are honest, and other things to be shunned because they are
dishonest^." He had forgotten what he had twice cited and
approved out of Cicero^, concerning the law of nature; which
Philo calls "the law that cannot lie, not mortal, made by
mortals, not without life, or written in paper or columns
without life, but that which cannot be corrupted, written by
the immortal God in our understandings^."
Secondly, if this which he saith did deserve any considera- [Their an-
tion, it was before the Bible was admitted, or assented unto,
or received as the Word of God. But the Bible hath been
assented unto and received in England sixteen hundred years.
A fair prescription. And in all that time, I do not find any
larw to authorize it, or to underprop heaven from falling with
a bulrush. This is undeniable, that for so many successive
ages we have received it as the law of God Himself, not de-
pending upon our assents, or the authority of our law makers.
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. quoted by Hobbes (Qu., Aiiimadv. upon
P- 137.] Numb. iii. p. 40, and upon Numb, xiv.
<= [" Lex naturalis . . specialiter dici- p. 140). See below, p. 335. note 1 : and
tur de dictamine seu judicio nostrse ra- Cic, De Republ. lib. iii, as quoted by
tionis, quo per lumen nobis ab icterna Laetantius, Divin. Instit, lib. vi. e. 8.
lege impressum, aliqua esse bona seu pp. 525, 526. Oxon. lt)84.]
naturae nostrae consentanea certo cog- e [Philo Judseus, Liber Quod Omnis
noscentes statuimus ea agi debere, aut Probus Liber, Op. torn. ii. p. 452. ed.
cognoscentes esse mala, seu naturae Mangey. — " N(^^os Se a\p€v5^s 6 opOhs
nostrae dissentanea minimeque congrua, \6yos, ovx vTrh tou Selt/os ^ rod de7vos,
statuimus debere vitari." Ileginaldus, dyriTod cpdaprhs, eV x«/3Tt5tots fj (rrr/Aais,
Praxis Fori Pcenitentialis, lib. xiii. &xpuxos a\pvxois, aAA' vir' aOaudrov
tractat. 2. in prooemio ; torn. i. p. SIL </)u(rews &<peapTos iu aeaydrcf} Siayoia
a. fol. Mogmit. I(il7.] rvwudds."]
^ [Cic, Pro Milonc, cc. iv, xi, ;
tiquity.]
330
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part Thirdly, we have not only a national tradition of onr own
III '
[Catholic ^^^^'^^ Divine authority of Holy Scriptui'e, but
consent for (which is of much more moment) we have the perpetual
them.] constant universal tradition of the Cathohc Church of Christ,
ever since Christ Himself did tread upon the face of the
earth. This is so clear a proof of the universal reception of
the Bible for the genuine Word of God, that there cannot
justly be any more doubt made of it, than whether there ever
was a William the Conqueror or not.
[T. H. his But this is his opinion, — that '^true religion in every country
lehslous is that which the sovereign magistrate doth admit and en-
truth IS the ^Qii^f/ J could -svish his deceived followers would think upon
civil magis- ^
trate.] what rock he drives them. For if this opinion be true, then
that which is true religion to-day, may be false religion to-
morrow, and change as often as the chief governor or go- 787
vernors change their opinions; then that which is true re-
ligion in one country, is false religion in another countrj^,
because the governors are of different opinions ; then all the
religions of the world. Christian, Jewish, Turkish, Heathenish,
are true religions in their own countries ; and if the governor
will allow no religion, then atheism is the true religion. Then
the blessed Apostles were very unwise to suffer for their
[Acts V. conscience, because they would ^^obey God rather than man
then the blessed martyrs were ill ad\ased, to suffer such tor-
ments for a false religion, which was not warranted, or in-
deed which was forbidden, by the sovereign magistrates.
And so I have heard from a gentleman of quality^, well
deserving credit, that Mr. Hobbes and he talking of self-
preservation, he pressed Mr. Hobbes with this argument
drawn from holy martyrs, to which Mr. Hobbes gave answer,
" they were all fools. This bolt was soon shot : but the
primitive Chm-ch had a more venerable esteem of the holy
martj^rs, whose sufferings they called palms, their prison a
paradise, and their death-day their birthday of their glory,
to whose memory they builded Churches, and instituted
' [See below in the Catching of the in 1654 (at the end of Bray's Memoirs
Leviatlian, c. iii. pp. 895, 896 (fol. of Evelyn, pp. US, 151, 156. 4to. ed.).
edit.), Disc. iii. Pt. iii.] A presentation copy of the Castigations
« Mr. R. H. [Possibly Mr. Richard " for Mr. Harding" exists in a private
Harding, mentioned in the Queen of library.]
Bohemia's letters to Secretary Nicholas
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
331
festivals, whose monuments God Himself did honour with Discourse
frequent miracles.
He asketh, "why the Bible should not be canonical in Con-
stantinople as well as in other places/' if it were not as he
saith^? His question is apocryphal, and deserveth no other
answer, but another question — why a ship, being placed in a
stream, is more apt to fall down the stream than to ascend
up against the stream. It is no marvel, if the world be apt
to follow a sensual religion, which is agreeable to their own
appetites; but that any should embrace a religion, which
sui'passeth their o^ti understandings, and teacheth them to
deny themselves, and to sail against the stream of their own
natural corruptions, this is the mere goodness of God.
He saith, that "a conqueror makes no laws over the con- [Law of
quered by virtue of his power and conquest, but by vii-tue of '^"^"^"^^^•^
their assent'." Most vainly urged, like all the rest. Unjust
conquerors gain no right, but just conquerors gain all right.
" Omnia dat, qui justa negat^.'' Just conquerors do not use
to ask the assent of those, whom they have conquered in
lawful war, but to command obedience. See but what a
pretty liberty he hath found out for conquered persons ; —
they may choose whether they will obey or die.
" Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem V
What is this to the purpose, to prove that conquerors make
laws by the assent of those whom they have conquered?
Nothing at all. And yet even thus much is not true upon his
principle. Conquered persons are not free to live or die indif-
ferently, according to his principles ; but they are necessitated
either to the one or the other, to live slaves or die captives.
He hath found out a much like assent of children, to the T. H. a nt
laws of theii' ancestors, without which he would make us for^dhiovai
believe that the laws do not bind : — "AYhen children come to '^•^^ly""''^-
tural per-
strength enough to do mischief, and to judgment^^ that they
are preserved from mischief " by fear of the sword that doth
protect them, in the very act of receiving protection, and not
renouncing it, they oblige themselves to the laws of their
protectors™.'^ And here he inserteth further some of his
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. ' "g ? ^n., ii. 3'54.]
P- 136.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
1 [Ibid., pp. 136, 137.] p. 137.]
^ [Lucan., Pharsal., i. 3i9.]
332
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part peculiar errors; as this, — that "parents who are not subject
'- — to others, may lawfully take away the lives of their children/'
and magistrates take away the lives of their subjects, without
any fault or crime, "if they do but doubt of their obedience"."
Here is comfortable doctrine for children, — that their parents
may knock out their brains lawfully ; and for subjects, — that
their sovereigns may lawfully hang them up or behead them
without any oflPence committed, " if they do but doubt of their
obedience and for sovereigns, — that their subjects are
quitted of their allegiance to them, so soon as they but re-
ceive actual protection from another; and for all men, — if
they do receive protection from a Tark, or a heathen, or
whomsoever, they are obliged to his Turkish, heathenish,
idolatrous, sacrilegious, or impious laws°. Can such opinions
as these live in the world? Surely no longer than men re-
cover their right wits. Demades threatened Phocion, that
the Athenians would destroy him, when they fall into their
mad fits. And thee, Demades (said Phocion), when they
return to their right minds i^.
He saith, that I "would have the judge to condemn no man
for a crime that is necessitated; as if" (saith he) "the judge
could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that
had anteceded both visible and invisible"^." If all acts be 788
necessary, it is an easy thing for the judge to know what acts
are necessary. I say more, that no crime can be necessitated ;
for if it be necessitated, it is no crime. And so much all
judges know firmly, or else they are not fit to be judges.
Surely he supposeth there are, or have been, or may be, some
Stoical judges in the world. He is mistaken ; no Stoic was
ever fit to be a judge, either capital or civil. And in truth.
Stoical principles do overthrow both all judges and judgments.
[Not all He denieth that he "ever said, that all magistrates at first
e^ec^^rf w^^® elective ^" Perhaps not in so many words ; but he hath
told us again and again, that no law can be unjust, because
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
p. 137.1
" [See below in the Catching of the
Leviathan, c. iii. pp. 879, 880 (fol.
edit.), Disc. iii. Pt. iii.]
[Pint., in Vita Pliocion., torn. iv. p.
184. ed. Bryant; Apophth. Reg. &c.,
Phoc. num. vi, Op. Moral, torn. i. p.
523, cd. Wyttenb. — For "Demades"
in the text should be read " Demos-
thenes."]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
p. 137.]
[Ibid.]
MR. IIOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
333
every subject clioosetli his law in choosing his law-giver*. Discourse
If every law-giver be elective^ then every sovereign magis ^ —
trate is elective, for every sovereign magistrate is a law-giver.
And he hath justified the laws of the kings of Egypt, of As-
syria, of Persia, upon this ground, because they were " made
by him, to whom the people had given the legislative power*."
He addeth, that "it appears that" I "am of opinion that a
law ma}^ be made to command the will"." Nothing less, if he
speaks of the law of man. My argument was drawn from
the lesser to the greater ; thus, — If that law be unjust, which
commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to
do, then that law is likewise unjust, which commands him to
will that which is impossible for him to will^. He seeth I
condemn them both, but much more the latter. Yet, upon
his principles, he who commandeth a man to do impossibi-
lities, commandeth him to will impossibilities ; because with-
out willing them he cannot do them. My argument is ad
honiinem, and goes upon his own grounds, — that " though the
action be necessitated, nevertheless the will to break the law
maketh the action unjust ^.^^ And yet he maintaineth, that
the wiU is as much or more necessitated than the action,
because he maketh a man free to do if he will, but not free
to wiU. If a man ought not to be punished for a necessitated
act, then neither ought he to be punished for a necessitated
will.
I said truly, that " a just law justly executed," is " a cause [A just law
of justice He inferreth, that he hath "shewed that all laws Stecfa"
are just, and all just laws are justly executed;" and hereupon he j^y^tj^e^]
concludeth, that I "confess that all" I "reply unto here is
true^." Do I "confess," that "all laws are just ?" No, I have
demonstrated the contrary. Or do I believe, that " all just
laws are justly executed ?" It may be so in Plato's Common-
wealth, or in Sir Thomas Morels Utopia, or in my Lord
Verulam's Atlantis ; but among us mortals, it is rather to be
wished, than to be hoped for. He who builds partly upon
» [See above in the Defence, T. H. 91 ; Disc. i. Pt, iii.]
Numb. xiv. p. 85.] y [See in the Defence, T. H. Numb.
* [Qu., Aniraadv. upon Numb. xiv. xiv. above p. 85.]
p. 1S5.]^ 2 [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 92.]
" [Ibid., p. 138.] a [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
* [Defence, Numb, xiv. above p. p. 138.]
334
CASTIGATIONS OF
P T his own principles and partly upon his adversary's, is not very
'■ — likely to lay a good foundation.
He accuseth me of charging him falsely, for saying, that
God having commanded one thing openly plots another thing
secretly," which he calleth one of my "ugly phrases^." I did not
charge him for sajdng that God did so, but " that He might do
so without injustice^." Whether the charge be true or false,
let his own words bear witness ; — " That which God does, is
made just by His doing ; just, I say, in Him, not always just
in us by the example ; for a man that shall command a thing
openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he
punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust
I wish him a better memory.
Mankind I said there was never any time when mankind was without
ouUaws!*^^ governors, laws, and societies e. He answereth, that "it is very
likely to be true, that since the creation there never was a time
in which mankind was totally without society and confess-
eth further, that "there was paternal government in Adam^"
But he addeth, that "in those places where there are civil wars,
there is neither law, nor commonwealth, nor society^." Why
then doth he teach the contrary with so much confidence, —
that "it cannot be denied, but that the natural state of men,
before they entered into society, was a war of all men against
all men^^?^^ Why doth he say here, that "where there is no
law_, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust and
that "by the right of nature we destroy (without being unjust)
all that is noxious, both beasts and men'." Where there was
"paternal government" from the beginning, there were laws,
there were societies, there was no " war of all men against all
men.'^ Then the natural state of men was never without
society. Doth he call a civil war the natural state of men?
Neither was Adam alone such a governor, but all heads of 789
families. Neither the whole world, nor the tenth part of the
world, was ever since the creation without society. The
^ [Q.U., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. s [Ibid.]
p. 139.] ^ De Give, c. i. num. 12. [p. 9.—
^ [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 93 ; " Negari non potest, quin status ho-
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] minum naturalis, antequam in socie-
[In the Defence, T. H,] Numb. tatem coiretur, bellum fuerit; neque
xii. [above p. 65.] hoc simpliciter, sed bellum omnium in
6 [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 95.] omnes."]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. ' [Above in the Defence, T. H,
p. 139.J Numb. xiv. p. 86.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
335
world was long without war. What need had they to war one Discourse
upon another, who had the sharing of the whole world among — —
them ? And when there was war, it was not civil war : and
when and where there are civil wars, yet there are laws,
though not so well executed, and a commonwealth, though
much troubled and disordered. For him to make the natural
and primogenious state of mankind to be " a war of all men
against all men," to be lawless without government, bar-
barous without societies or civility, wherein it was lawful for
any man to kill another as freely as a wolf or a tiger, and to
enjoy whatsoever they could by force without further care or
conscience, reflects too much, not only upon the honour of
mankind, but likewise upon the honour of God Himself, the
Creator of mankind.
He chargeth me to say, that there never was a time when Never law-
it was lawful ordinarily" (those were my words) ^^for private vate^men'
men to kill one another for their own preservation^." I say to^j^^^J^olf^,
the same still, in that sense wherein I said it then ; and I another,
think all the world may say the same with me, except him-
self. In cases extraordinary, as when a man is assaulted by
thieves or murderers, I said expressly then, and I say the
same now, that it is lawful to kill another in his own defence,
' cum moderamine inculpates tutelce f and this is all which the
laws of God or nature do allow : which Cicero in his defence
of Milo pleadeth for, as the words following do abundantly
testify, — Ut si vita nostra in aliquas insidias, si in vim, in
tela aut latronum aut inimicorum, incidisset, omnis honesta
ratio esset expediendce salutis — and again, — "Hoc et ratio
doctis, et necessitas barbaris, et mos ge^itibus, et feris natura
ipsa prcBScripjsit, ut omnem semper vim qudcunque ope possent,
a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent^" I wonder he
was not ashamed to cite this place so directly against him-
self. He saith the same words in general that I say, but in
a quite contrary sense, — that by the law of nature any man
may kill another without scruple, " if he do but suspect him,"
or " if he may be noisome to him," as freely as man might
pluck up a weed or any herb, because it draws the nourish-
ment another way ; and this ordinarily^ though the other do
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. ' [Cic, Pro Milon.,cc. iv, xi ; cited
p. 140.] by Hobbes, Qu., ibid.]
336
CASTIGATIONS Or
Part not offer to assault him, and thousrli his own life be in no
III
'- — manner of peril"'. This he maketh to be the first, and to be
the natural, state of mankind, before they had entered into
any pacts one with another. In this sense I did deny, and
do still deny, that it either is, or ever was, ordinarily lawful
for one private man to kill another : though he plead his own
preservation and well-being never so much, and although
T. H. telleth us here, without either reason or authority,
that ^*^it seemeth to^' him, that God doth account such kill-
ing no sin" — an excellent casuist ! All creatures forbear to
prey upon their own kind, except in case of extreme hunger.
" Parcit
" Cognatis maculis similis fera, Quando leoni
" Fortior eripuit vitam leo ? Quo nemore vinquam
" Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?
" Indica tygris agit valida cum tygride pacem
" Perpetuam. Sjsvis inter se convenit ursis°."
And were mankind only made to murder one another pro-
miscuously ? That is, to be worse than wild beasts, or savage
cannibals.
We beheld him even now more bold than welcome with
the Holy Scriptures, saving only that he abstained from the
imputation of "jargon." Now he jests with " the pulpitP as
well he may, considering what small benefit he hath received
from it. Then he laughs at " cases of conscience not in
his sleeve, or through his fingers, although God Almighty
was more careful in stating the cases of blood-guiltiness
punctually ; but he loves a distinction worse than man-
slaughter: — "After the man is killed" (saith he), "the
Bishop shall be judge, whether the necessity was invincible,
or the danger extreme, as being a case of conscience 'i." If
he had writ this defence of wilful murder, as Demosthenes
did the praise of Helen or Erasmus the commendation of
folly % only to try his wit, it had been too much to jest
with the blood of man ; but to do it in earnest, contrary to
the law of God and nature, without any authority, sacred or 790
[Above in the Defence, T. H. ^ [Ibid.]
Numb. xiv. pp. 85, 86.] ^ [^Jsocrates was the author of tlie
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. 'EAe'j/Tjs 'EyKd^/bLiou.]
p. 140.] ^ [Mcopias 'Ey Kdfiiou, seu StultitiiB
° [Juv., Sat., XV. 159 — 164.] Laus, is the title of a satirical tract of
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xiv, Erasmus, published by him in 1521,
p. 140.] with a dedication to Sir Thomas More.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
337
profane, without reason, nay, without common sense, is his Discourse
own pecuHar privilege. — —
And yet, before he leave this subject, he must needs be
fumbling once more upon the old string, — that in the natu-
ral state of man every man might lawfully kill any man
whom he suspected, or who might be noisome to him ; and
so, taking this for granted, he concludeth, that he might
lj lawfully resign it up into the hands of the magistrate*. I
[! was the more sparing in confuting this point, because it is so
1 absurd, that the very repetition of it is a sufficient confuta-
I tion ; it being an opinion so barbarous, and so brutish, fitter
for a bloody cannibal, one of the African anthropophagi,
than one who hath borne the name of Christian, or been a
member of any civil society; such an opinion, as, if it had
not all laws of God and man against it, yet the horrid conse-
quences of it, if it were once entertained, would chase it out
of the world, with the propugner of it. I would not cast
away one text of Scripture upon it, but that he admitteth
that proof, and rejecteth all ^' human authority".^^
My first reason is demonstrative ; — because all killing of
men by private men was forbidden to all mankind by the
positive law of God, presently after the flood, before there
were ever any such pacts as he imagineth in the world.
" Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be Gen. ix. 6.
shed ; for in the image of God made He man." That which
he makes lawful in the natural state of man, and only prohi-
bited by covenant between man and man, was declared un-
lawful by the positive law of God to Noah and his posterity,
from whom all the cities and societies and commonwealths
( i in the world are descended.
Secondly, this law of God was no new law then, but a de-
claration of the law of nature, which was imprinted in the
heart of man from the beginning; as appeareth evidently by
the reason annexed to the law, — For in the image of God
made He man'' (either in the family of Adam was the natural
state of man, or there never was any natural state of man in
the world) ; before any such commonwealths as he imagineth
could be gathered, or any such pacts or covenants made.
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xiv, « [Ibid.,] Fount, of Arg., [p. 5.]
p. 140.]
BRAMHALL. 2
338
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part Yet even then the killing of those whom they judged noi-
'■ — some to them by private persons, was not only esteemed an
ordinary sin, but was a crying sin; for which we have the
Gen. iv. 10. testimony of God Himself to Cain, — ''What hast thou done?
the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto IMe from the
ground."
Thirdly, private men never resigned up into the hands of
the sovereign magistrate the power of defending their own
lives in case of extreme necessity, though it were with the
death of the assailant ; for that power they hold still. Let
him not confound two different powers together. This
power which he challengeth, affirming that the people did
resign it to the magistrate, which we deny with detestation,
is " a right to destroy whatsoever a man think eth can annoy
him" (they are his own words in this place), or "a general
power of killing their enemies;" that is, of killing whom-
soever they will, for all men by their doctrine are their ene-
mies, seeing he maketh it "a war of all men against all
men." Now if private men had once such a right and did
resign it up into the hand of the sovereign magistrate, then
the sovereign magistrate may use the same right still, and
kill whomsoever he thinketh may annoy him, without sin :
[1 Sam. but this he cannot do. Saul sinned in killing the Gibeon-
—2 Sam. ites, and the priests. " Wherefore wilt thou si7i against in-
1 Sam. tx. ^ocent blood ?" David sinned in killing Uriah. It is said
xi~i£liT] ^^a^asseh, that " he filled Jerusalem with innocent blood,
2 icings which the Lord would not pardon." Ahab is styled a mur-
frKings derer, — Hast thou killed," &c.
XXI. 19.] Lastly, the exaggerations of this sin in Holy Scripture,
and the incredible ways which God useth to find it' out, and
those blind blows and ghastly horrors of conscience which
do ordinarily accompany it, do proclaim to all the world, that
there is more in it than an offence against mutual pacts and
Prov. covenants between man and man. ''He that doth ^dolence
Deut" xix!^ *o the blood of any person, shall flee to the pit, let no man
Exod^xxi. ^^^y ^i^-'' The wilful murderer must be pulled out of the
Gen ix 6 ^^^^ refuge ; yea, God^s altar must yield him no protection.
[Numb.' ■ This sin is a defacing of the image of God; "it defileth" a
XXXV. 33.]
" [Quos diri conscia facti Mens ha- Juv., Sat., xiii. 193, 194.]
bet attonitos et surdo verhere caedit."
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
339
whole "land;'^ and proceedeth from the special instigation of Discourse
the devil^ who " was a murderer from the beginning/^ O ^^tt—
how heavy (said one) is the weight of innocent blood ! How 44.
much do all authors_, sacred and civil, inveigh against the
shedding of innocent blood ! Some have apprehended a
91 fishes head in the platter for the head of him they had mur-
dered. Others, after a horrid murder, had been observed to
have their hands continually upon their daggers This opi-
nion of his takes away all difference between nocent and in-
nocent blood. This inward guilt, these fears of vengeance,
and the extraordinary providence of God in the discovery of
murders, do proclaim aloud, that there is more in bloodguilt-
iness than the breach of mutual pacts between man and man.
In the next place, he maketh us an elaborate discourse of T. H. at-
a lion, and a bear, and an ox% as if he stood probationer for ge^nerai for
the place of attorney- general of the brutes. This is evident, U^eas^s."*^
— he hath deserved better of them, than either of his God, or
of his religion, or of the human nature.
In the first place, he acquitteth the beasts from the domi-
nion of man% and denieth that they owe him any subjection.
He that shall use T. H. his books as the countryman did his
prognostication, write down every thing contrary, — fair for
foul, and foul for fair, true for false, and false for trae, — if
he could get but a good wager upon each opinion, would
have advantage enough. I hope he doth not understand it
of a poHtical " dominion or subjection, but only that the
other creatures were designed by God for the use and service
of men ; in the same sense that Virgil saith,
" Sic vos non vobis vellera fertis oves.
" Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves*"."
When God had created man, male and female, after His
own image. He gave them His benediction ; " Subdue the Gen. i. 28.
earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over
the fowls of the air, and over every living thing that moveth
upon the earth.^^ And this very dominion was a part of the
" image of God,^^ wherein man was created. Therefore God [Gen. i. 27.]
y [As is asserted of Richard III, ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
after the murder of the two young pp. 141, 142.]
princes: see Holinshead, Chron., vol. » [Ibid., p. 142.]
iii. p. 735.] b [Virgil, in Donatus' Life, c. xvii.J
z 2
340
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part brought all tlie creatures to man as to their lord and master
— ^ — under Himself, to " give them names/^ which is a sign and
Gen. 1 • proof of dominion. Therefore said the kingly prophet,
Psai. viii. " Thou madcst him^^ (man) to have dominion over the
6 FT 1
* works of Thy hands ; Thou hast put all things in subjection
under his feet, all sheep and oxen," &c. Here is but a harsh]
beginning of his attorneyship.
Secondly, he maintaineth, that the lion hath as much]
right, or, as he calleth it, " liberty," to eat the man, as the'
man hath to eat the ox^. I hope he will not deny, that the
Creator of all things had right to the donation of His own
Gen. ix. 3. Creatures. Man hath God's deed of gift : — " Every moving
thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green
herb have I given you all things." Can he shew such an-
other grant for the lions to devour men? When God said,
[Gen.ix.6.] '^'^Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed, for in the image of God made He man," — was it in-
tended only, that his blood should be preserved for the lions ?
or do not their teeth deface God's image as much as man's
weapons? But "the lion had liberty to eat man long be-
fore <^." He is mistaken. The creatures did bear a more awful
respect to the image of God in man before his fall ; but man's
rebellion to God was punished with the rebellion of the crea-
tures to him. He saith, " it was impossible for most men to
have" God's "license" to use the creatures for their suste-
nance^. Why so ? As if all the world were not then com-
prised in the family of Noah : or as if the commandments
and dispensations of God were not then delivered from father
to son by tradition, as they were long after by writing. He
asketh, how I would have been offended if he should have
spoken of man as Phny doth, — " than whom there is no liv-
ing creature more wretched or more proud ^" Not half so
much as now. Pliny taxeth only the faults of men ; he vili-
fieth not theii' human nature. " Most wretched ;" — what is
that but an argument of the immortality of the soul ? God
would never have created the most noble of His creatures for
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
p. 141]
[Ibid.]
* [Ibid.]
' [" Nec miserius quidquam homine
aut superbius." Plin., Nat. Hist., lib.
ii. c. 5 ; quoted by T. H., Qu., ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
341
the most wretched being. " Or more proud ;" — that is, than Discourse
some men. " Cormptio optimi pessima" — " the best things, — ^
being corrupted, turn the worst/^
But he acknowledgeth " two advantages which man hath
above other creatures, his tongue and his hand?.^^ Is it pos-
sible, that any man who beheveth that he hath an immortal
soul, or that reason and understanding are any thing but
empty names, should so far forget himself and his thankful-
ness to God, as to prefer his tongue and his hands before an
immortal soul and reason? Then we may well change the
definition of a man which those old dunces the philosophers
left us, ^man is a reasonable creature,^ into this new one,
' man is a prating thing with two hands.' How much more
was the human nature beholden to Tully, a heathen, who
92 said, that man dilfered from other creatures in reason and
speech^ ; or to 0^-id, who styleth man,
" Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altae'."
If he have no better luck in defending his Le\4athan, he will
have no great cause to boast of his " making men " exam-
ples^^'
And now it seemeth he hath played his masterpiece ; for
in the rest of his Animadversions in this section we find a low
ebb of matter. Concerning consultations, he saith nothing
but this, that my wi'iting ^'^was caused physically, antece-
dently, extrinsecally,'^ by his answer^ In good time. By which
I see right well, that he understandeth not what a physical
cause is. Did he think his answer was so mathematical to
compel or necessitate me to write ? Ts o, I confess I deter-
mined myself. And his answer was but a slender occasion ;
which would have had little weight with me, but for a wiser Prov. xxvi.
man's advice, to prevent his over- weening opinion of his own swef afooi
abihties. And then followeth his old dish of twice-sodden f'^S.^.^'^i"?
to his folly,
coleworts, about free,'' and " necessary," and contingent," lest he be
and " free to do if he will°^ which we have had often enough own con-
ah-eady. "^^^'"^
His distinction between "seen" and "unseen necessity"," seen and
unseen
B [Qii., ibid.] xxxA-iii. p. 348.] necessity.
[Cic, De Offic, i. 16. " Ratio et 1 [Ibid., Animadv. upon Ximib. xiv.
oratio."] p. MS.]
> [Ovid., Metam., i. 76.] [Ibid.]
[Qu.. Animadv. upon Xumb. ° [Ibid., p. 141.]
342
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part deserveth more consideration. The meaning is, that seen
— — necessity doth take away consultation, but unseen necessity
doth not take away consultation, or human endeavours.
Unseen necessity is of two sorts. Either it is altogether
unseen and unknown, either what it is, or that it is ; such a
necessity doth not take away consultation, or human endea-
vours. Suppose an office were privately disposed ; yet he
who knoweth nothing of the disposition of it, may be as solici-
tous and industrious to obtain it as though it were not dis-
posed at all. But the necessity which he laboureth to intro-
duce, is no such unseen unknown necessity. For though he
know not what the causes have determined particularly, or
what the necessity is, yet he believeth, that he knoweth in
general, that the causes are determined from eternity, and
that there is an absolute necessity.
The second sort of unseen necessity is that, which is unseen
in particular what it is, but it is not unknown in general
that it is. And this kind of unseen necessity doth take away
all consultation, and endeavours, and the use of means, as
much as if it were seen in particular. As, supposing that the
Cardinals have elected a Pope in private, but the declaration
of the person who is elected is kept secret ; here is a neces-
sity, the Papacy is full ; and this necessity is unseen in par-
ticular, whilst no man knoweth who it is ; yet, forasmuch as
it is known that it is, it taketli away all endeavours and con-
sultations as much as if the Pope were publicly enthroned.
Or suppose a jury have given in a privy verdict ; no man know-
eth what it is until the next court-day, yet it is knoAvn gene-
rally that the jurors are agreed and the verdict is given in :
here is an unseen necessity; yet he who should use any
further consultations or make further applications in the
case, were a fool. So, though the particular determination
of the causes be not known to us what it is, yet, if we know
that the causes are particularly determined from eternity, we
know that no consultation or endeavour of ours can alter
them.
But it may be further objected, that, though they cannot
alter them, yet they may help to accomplish them. It was
Acts xxvii. necessary, that all who sailed with St. Paul should be saved
22. an 31. shipwrcck ; yet St. Paul told them, that " except^' the
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
343
shipmen " did abide in the ship, they could not be saved/^ Discourse
So, though the event be necessarily determined, yet consul —
tation or the like means may be necessary to the determina-
tion of it. I answer, the question is not, whether the means
be necessary to the end ; for that is agreed upon by all par-
ties ; but the question is, to whom the ordering of the means
which are necessary to the production of the event, doth pro-
perly belong, whether to the First Cause or to the free agent.
If it belong to the free agent under God (as we say it doth),
then it concerneth him to use consultations and all good
endeavours, as requisite means to obtain the desired end.
But if the disposition of the means belong solely and wholly
to God (as he saith it doth), and if God have ordered all
means, as well as ends and events, particularly and precisely,
then it were not only a thankless and superfluous office to
consult what were the fittest means to obtain an end, when
God hath determined what must be the only means, and no
other ; but also a sauciness, and a kind of tempting of God,
for a man to intrude himself into the execution of God Al-
93 mighty's decrees ; whereas he ought rather to cast away all
care and all thought on his part, and resign himself up
wholly to the disposition of the second causes, which act
nothing but by the special determination of God.
Concerning admonition he saith less than of consultation. If all things
"The reason'^ (saith he), " why we admonish men-*^ of under- uTteiy^ne-
standing rather than " children/' fools, and madmen, is ^onUions^
because they are more capable of " the good and evil conse- ^'^ all
quences of their actions," and have more " experience," and
their passions are more conform to their " admonitors « that
is to say, moderate and staid. And then, after his brag-
gadocio manner, he concludeth, — " There be therefore reasons
under heaven which the Bishop knows not of p." My one
reason — " because they have the use of reason, and true
liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which
children, fools, and madmen have not" — includeth more
than all his three reasons put together. What is it that
weigheth the good and evil consequences of our actions?
Reason. What is it that preserveth us from being trans-
ported with our passions ? Reason. And what is experienced
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. Hi, 145.] p [Ibid., p. 115.]
344
CASTIGATIONS OF
Par t of good and evil? Reason improved by observation. So we
'■ — have gained nothing by the change of my reason, but three
cracked groats for one good shilhng.
But he hath omitted the principal part of my answer, that
is, the "liberty and dominion over their actions,^^ which men
of understanding have much more than " children, fools, or
madmen /' without which all his capableness of " good and
evil consequences,^^ all his " experience" of good and evil, all
his calmness and moderation, do signify just nothing. Let a
man have as much capacity as Solomon, as much experience
as Kestor, as much moderation as Socrates ; j'^et, if he have
no power to dispose of himself, nor to order his own actions,
but be hurried away by the second causes inevitabty, irre-
sistibly, wdthout his own will, it is to as much purpose to
admonish him, as when Icarus had his wings melted by the
sun, and was tumbling down headlong into the sea*i, to
have admonished him to take heed of drowning. A season-
able admonition may do much good ; but that is upon our
principles, not upon his. If all events, with all their circum-
stances, and the certain means to effect them, were precisely
determined from eternity, it were high presumption in us to
interpose without special warrant. Those means which we
judge most convenient, are often not looked upon by God
[2 Cor. iv. Almighty ; Who doth use to bring light out of darkness, and
jx. 6.— restore sight by clay and spittle, and preserve men from
xlf^t&c] pei'ishing by perishing. No paragraph escapeth him without
some supererogatory absurdities. As here, that a man may
" deliberate" without " the use of reason," that brute
" beasts" may dehberate, that madness or frenzy is " strength
of passion ^"
A litter of He insisteth lonsrer upon moral praise and dispraise, or
absurdities. , , t i ^ •
moral goodness or badness ; but speedeth worse, entangung
himself in twenty errors, as these which follow. — " Meta-
physical goodness is but an idle term" — that is good where-
with a man is "pleased" — " good is not of absolute significa-
tion to all men" — " nothing is good or evil but in regard of
the action proceeding from it, and the person to whom it
doth good or hurt" — " Satan is evil to us, but good to God" —
1 [Ovid., Metam., viii. 223 sq.—
Hygin., Fab. xl.— &c.]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
p. 145.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
345
" if there were laws among beasts, a horse would be as Discourse
morally good as man^^ — " the difterence between natm-al and — —
moral goodness, proceedeth from the" (civil) "law" — "the
law is all the right reason that we have" — " we make it right
reason by our approbation" — all " actions of subjects, if they
be conformable to the law of the land, are morally good" —
" moral praise is from obedience to the law, moral dispraise
is from disobedience to the law" — "to say a thing is good, is
to say. It is as I, or another, or the state would have it" —
" that is good to every man which is so far good as he can
see" — "all the real good, which we call honest and morally
virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to the law" — the law
is "the infallible rule of moral goodness" — our particular
reason is not " right reason" — ' the reason of oui' governor,
whom we have set over ourselves, is right reason' — " his laws,
whatsoever they be, are in the place of right reason to us" —
" as in play moraUty consisteth in not renouncing the trump,
so all our morality consisteth in not disobeying the law^" Is
not here a hopeful htter of young errors, to be all formed out
of three penfuls of ink ? as if he had been dreaming lately in
Error's den. One Anticyra will not aflPord hellebore enough
to cure him perfectly*. I was apt to flatter myself awhile,
that by " the law" he understood the law of right reason ; but
I found it too e\ident, that by right reason he understands
the arbitrary edicts of an elective governor. I could not
choose but call to mind that of our laureat poet, —
" God help the man so wrapt in Error's endless train"!"
(94 The reader might well have expected matter of more edifi- What is
cation upon this subject: as, wherein the formal reason ofg^d/^^^
goodness doth consist, in convenience, or in the obtaining of
all due perfections ; as Hkewise, the distinction of good, either
subjectively, into the goods of the mind, the goods of the
body, and the goods of fortune^, or formally, into bonum
honestum, utiles et deleciahiW, or, honestly good, profitably
good, and delightfully good. That which is honestly good,
is desirable in itself, and as it is such. That which is profit-
ably good, is that which is to be desired as conducing to the
* [Ibid., pp. 145 — 117.] ^ ["'A7a0a7repi4'uxT?»' — irept (rcDjua —
* [Hor., A. P., 300.] e/crcis." See Aristot., Ethic, I. viii. 2.]
[Spenser, Faery Queen, Canto i. [" Ka\hi/—(Tvixfpfpov — rjSv." See
stanza 18.] Aristot., Ethic, II. iii. 7.]
346
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part obtaining of some other good. Thirdly, delightfully good is
— that pleasure, which doth arise from the obtaining of the
other goods desired. But he hath quite cashiered the two
former sorts of good, that which is honestly good, and that
which is profitably good ; and acknowledgeth only that which
is delightfully good, or that which pleaseth him or me: so
as, if our humours differ, goodness must differ ; and as our
humours change, goodness must change ; as the chamelion
changeth her colours. Many things are good that please
not us, and many things please us that are not good. Thus
he hath left no real good in the world, but only that which is
relatively good. Thus he hath made the devil himself to
become good, and (which is yet worse) " good to God.^^ Thus
he hath made horses to be as capable of moral goodness as
men, if they had but only " laws." I wonder why he should
stick at that. Laws are but commands, and commands may
be intimated to horses, as we might see in Bankes his horse,
which we might call (upon his principles) an honest, virtuous,
and morally good, horse. There is a woe denounced against
isai. T. 20. them who " call evil good and good e\iV This is not
all; he confesseth, that lawmakers are men, and may err,
and think that law good for the people which is not^;"
yet with the same breath he telleth us, that there is no other
" right reason" but their " law," which " is the infallible
rule of moral goodness^." So right reason and erring
reason, a fallible rule and an infallible rule, are all one
with him. What ? No other rule but this one Lesbian rule,
the arbitrary dictates of a governor ? ^Miat is become of the
eternal law, or the rule of justice in God Himself? What
is become of the Divine positive law recorded in Holy
Scriptures? 'VMiat is become of the law of nature, im-
printed naturally in the heart of every man by the finger of
God Himself? WTiat is become of the law of nations, that
is, those principles which have been commonly and univer-
sally received as laws by all nations in all ages, or at least the
most prudent, pious, and civil nations ? What is become of
that synteresis'' or noble light of the soul, which God hath
z [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. Fathers, and from them by the Latin (e.g.
p. 146.] S.Jerom, Comment, in Ezek.cap.i., who
a [Ibid., p. 147.] explains it by " scintilla conscientiae"),
l^vvT-nprjffis, corrupted by the to signify that power, by which the
Schoolmen into " synderesis," is the human reason instinctively apprehends
word employed by some of the Greek the principles of moral truth.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
347
given mankind to preserve them from vices ? Are they all Discourse
gone ? all vanished ? and is no rule remaining but only the — —
arbitrary edicts of a mortal law-giver, who may command us
to turn Turks or Pagans to-morrow, who by his own confes-
sion " may err" in his law-giving ? Then, not only "poAver
absolutely iiTesistible doth justify Avhatsoever it doth," but
also the power of mortal man may justify the violation of the
laws of the immortal God. But I have shewed him suffi-
ciently, that there are unjust laws, not only towards God, but
likewise towards men; that unjust laws do not acquit our
active obedience to them from damnable sin ; that it is not
only lawful but necessary to disobey them; that God Himself Exod.i. 21.
hath approved such disobedience, and rewarded it. To con-
clude, it is not the pleasing of him or me, or some private
benefit that may redound from thence to him or me, that
makes anything to be truly good, but the meeting of all per-
fection in it whereof that thing is capable. " Bonum ex
integrd causa, malum ex quolibet defectu^' — all requisite per-
fections must concur to make a thing good, but one only
defect makes it evil.^^ Nothing is morally good, nothing is
praiseworthy, but that which is truly honest and virtuous.
And, on the other side, nothing is morally bad, nothing is
dispraise worthy, but that which is dishonest and vicious.
To wrangle everlastingly, whether those encouragements Rewards of
which are given to setting dogs and coyducks and the like be men differ,
rewards*^, were a childish fighting with shadows ; seeing it is
confessed, that they are not recompenses of honest and vir-
tuous actions, to which the laws did appoint rewards. S^vine,
that run by a determinate instinct of natui'e to succour their
fellows of the same herd in distress, do not desire a civical
crown, like him who saved the life of a citizen ; nor the
spiders, whose fancies are fitted by natm^e to the weaving of
their webs, deserve the like commendation with Arachne,
795 who attained to her rare arts of weaving by assiduous
industry There is a great diff'erence between natural
qualities and moral virtues. Where nature hath bestowed
excellent gifts, the chief praise redoundeth to the God of
nature. And where the brutes have attained to any such
* [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xiv. ^ [Ovid., Metani., vi. 129 — 145.]
pp. 148, 149.]
348
CASTIGATIONS OF
P A^R T rare or beneficial qualities by the instruction of man, the
'- — chief praise redoundeth unto him that taught them. The
harp was not crowned in the Olympian games, but the
harper ; nor the horses, but the charioteer. And though the
encouragements of men and brutes be sometimes the same
thing materially, yet they are not the same thing formally.
But where he confoundeth a necessity of specification with
a necessity of exercise, and affirmeth that the bees and
spiders are necessitated by nature as well as to all their " in-
dividual actions'^ as to their several kinds of works^, it de-
serveth no answer but to be slighted. His opinion doth
require that he should say, that they are determined to their
individual actions by the second causes and circumstances
(though it be untrue) ; but to say they are determined by
nature to each individual act, admitteth no defence.
In the last paragraph, I am beholden to him, that he
would instruct me^ ; but I am of his mind, that it would be
too great a labour for him. For I approve none of his new-
fangled principles, and think he might have spent his time
better in meditating" upon somewhat else, that had been more
proper for him. I see, that where the inferior faculty doth
end, the superior doth begin : as, where the vegetative doth
end, there the sensitive doth begin, comprehending all that
the vegetative doth and much more ; so, where the sensitive
ends, the intellectual begins. And should I confine the in-
tellectual soul, which is inorganical, immaterial, impassible,
separable, within the bounds of the sensitive, or to the power
and proceedings thereof, when I see the understanding doth
correct the sense, as about the greatness of the sun ? Sense
hath nothing to do with universals, but reason hath. Even
in memory, which he mentioneth, the intellectual remem-
brance is another manner of thing than the sensitive memory.
But this belongs not to this question ; and therefore I pass
by it, and leave him to the censure of others.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XV.
[T. H.'s In this section he chargeth me first with a double breach
impeiti-
nencies.] e ^Qy,^ Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. ' [Ibid.]
p. 140.]
MR. HOBBES' AN'IMADVERSIOXS.
349
of promise ; vet tliere is no promise, and if thev had been Discourse
promises, both ai'e accomphshed. One of my promises was, '- —
that "I -svould not leave one grain of his matter unweighed/^
yet I leave these words unanswered, — " oui* Sa\-iour bids us
pray, 'Thy will,' not oiu- will 'be done,' and by example
teacheth us the same, for He prayed thus — ' Father, if it be [Luke xxii.
Thy will, let this cup pass?/ '' First, this was no promise,
but mine o\^ti private resolution, which I might lawfully
change at any time upon better grounds. Secondly, it had
been an easy thing to omit two lines in a whole discourse uu-
■^-illingly. Thii'dly, the intent was only to omit nothing that
was material ; but this was merely impeitinent. Lastly,
without any more to do, it was fully answered in my Defence
in these words ; — " In the last place he lu'geth, that in our
prayers we are bound to submit our wills to God's will ; who
ever made a doubt of this ? we must submit to the preceptive
will of God or His commandments, we must submit to the
effective will of God, when He declares His pleasure by the
event, or otherwise ; but we deny, and deny again, that God
wills ad extra necessarily, or that it is His pleasiu'e that all
second causes should act necessarily at all times; which is the
question, and that which he allegeth to the contraiy comes
not near it^." Where were his eyes? That inference — " AVhich
seemeth at least to imply that our prayers cannot change the
will of God" — is now first added ; and if it had been there
formerly, is answered abundantly in the same section.
The second breach of promise is this ; that I said, Here
is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any
addition or the least variation from the original;" but I
'' have added these words — ' Yes, I have seen those silHest of
creatm'es, and seeing theii' rare works, I have seen enough to
confute all the boldfaced atheists of this age, and theii' hellish
blasphemies V " What a stir is here about two lines, which
contain neither ai'gimient, nor answer, nor authority, nor
any thing material ! 1 did not apply these words to him,
nor gave the least intimation of any such thing. If he be
wronged, he wi'ongeth himself. I am as much offended with
e [Ibid., Animadv. upon Xumb. xv. i [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Xumb. xv.
P- 158.] p. 158 ; from the Defence, Numb. viii.
h [Defence, Xumb. x^^ above p. 109. above p. 52.]
Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
350
CASTIGATIONS OP
Part the theists of this age, as with the atheists; who are convinced
'■ — that there is a God, and profess it, yet never do Him any
service or worship, not so much as ''ante focum sifrigus erit"
Rom. i. 21. — by a warm fire's side in a winter's day ; '' who, when they 796
know God, do not glorify Him as God." But to deal clearly
with him ; — I profess I do not know, either when any such
words were added, or that any such words were added ;
neither ever had I any other copy but that original which
was sent to the press, and that copy which was transcribed
for him and sent to him at the first. If the amanuensis did
omit two lines, either in the margent (which is most likely by
what he saith) or otherwise, I could not help it. My asseve-
ration (for it was no promise) was true, — that I sent the
original itself^, as it had lain long by me without any
variation.
When he is afraid to be hard put to it, then he layeth in
the other scale, — to counterbalance those new reasons which
are brought against him, — either " prescience," or, '' What
shall be, shall be," or, "A man cannot determine to-day,
what his will shall be to-morrow^ :" — all which are imperti-
nent to the question, and have been abundantly answered in
these Castigations. His instance of a debtor, who intended
first to pay his creditor, then thought to defer it, and lastly
resolved to do it for fear of imprisonment™, is remote from
the question. The determination of the debtor is not ante-
cedent, but concomitant, not extrinsecal, — by the creditor,
who perhaps never thought on it, — but intrinsecal, — by the
dictate of his own reason ; which he calleth " thoughts '"j"
lest he should seem to attribute any thing to reason. What
are thoughts," but '' intellectus actu circa res occupatus°''
— '' the understanding actually employed about something ?"
If he hold no other necessity but this, which no man op-
poseth, why doth he trouble the world with his debtor and
creditor about nothing ?
What it is I did not accuse him for making all piety to consist in the
God. estimation of the judgment ; he stiU mistaketh ; but I did
^ [i. e. to the press. Hobbes affirms, ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xv.
that the words in question were not in pp. 158, 159.]
the copy of the Defence sent to himself [Ibid., p. 159.]
(in 1645), nor in "the body of the copy " [Ibid.]
sent to the press" (in 1655), but "onely ° [See above p. 249. note n.]
in the margent" of the latter.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
351
and do accuse him for placing all the inward piety of the Discourse
heart in the estimation of the judgment. So he saith ex —
pressly, — that " to honour any thing is nothing else but to
think it to be of great power P." If it were "nothing else/^ the
devil honours God as much as the best Christian ; for he be-
lieveth a God as much as they^ and he cannot believe a God
but he must beheve Him to be omnipotent. " Thou believest Jam. ii. 19,
there is one God, thou dost well ; the devils also believe and
tremble." I shewed him, that inward piety doth consist
more in the submission of the will than in the estimation of
the judgment^ ; but I may not say, that it was "too hot for
his fingers'"." He urgeth, that the de\dl "cannot esteem God
for His goodness Let it be so. Neither is there any
need that he should, to make him devout, if his ground were
true, — that "to honour God is nothing else but to think
Him to be of great power."
But to make amends for this oversight, he hath found us What are
out " two sorts" of devils : " the one" (and indeed all the ms judg.
devils that are in his creed) " are wicked men/^ to whom he
applieth the name of " Diabolus and Satan and Abaddon" in
Holy Scripture ; the other are heathen gods, " mere fancies
or fictions of terrified hearts," or (as he styleth them out of
St. Paul) " nothings ^" What he will do with Heaven, I [1 Cor. x.
know not ; but he hath emptied Hell at once, and swept away ^^'^
all the devils, except " wicked men." He might do well to
acquaint the judges with it, to save the lives of so many poor
old melancholic women, who suffer as witches for confederacy
with the devil. I desire to know of him_, whether those
devils which our Saviour cast out of the possessed, or those [Matt. viii.
devils which hurried the swine into the sea, or that devil who 5, &c?]~^^*
took our Saviour up to the pinnacle of the Temple, were
" heathen gods," or " wicked men ?" or how " a legion" of [Mark v.
"heathen gods" or "wicked men" could enter into one pos- viiTso.]
sessed person, without crowding one another to death ? But
this belongeth to another speculation. He asketh, " in what
classis of entities" I "place devils"?" Will he learn to
P [See above in the Defence, T. H. p. 35.]
Numb. XV. p. 103.] s [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv.
1 [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. p. 160.]
104 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] t [Ibid.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. u [Ibid.]
352
CASTIGATIONS OF
p^ART speak jargon'' I answer, with angels, among spiritual
'■ — substances. He hath as much authority to empty Heaven of
good angels, as to empty Hell of bad angels.
[The attri- To cover his former error, — that the honour of God is
God not all nothing else but the estimation of His power, — he hath de-
Irms^^ vised another error, — that all the attributes of God are in-
omnipo- eluded in His " omnipotence ^.'^ I confess, that the attri-
tence. I
butes of God are transcendents above our capacities, and are
not of the same nature with the same attributes of mortal
men. I confess further, that all the attributes of God, and
whatsoever is in God, is God, or is the Deity itself. But to
confound all these distinct attributes in one, to no purpose,
without any ground, is absurd ; and serveth only to make
those notions, which were piously invented to help our under-
standings, to be the ready means to confound our under-
standings.
God doth In the next place I shewed, that to command one thing
pdvateiy^^ Openly, and to necessitate another thing privately, destroyeth
what He the truth of God, the goodness of God, the iustice of God,
commands . . j j
openly. and the power of God. This is a heavy accusation, and he
had need to acquit himself like a man. But I believe he
■will fail. Here he bringeth in the " prescience'^ of God again
twice % to seem to stop a gap with it. But it will not serve
his turn. Where the soldiers are mustered over and over, it
is a sign the companies are but thin.
His opin- First, to save the truth of God, he saith, that " truth con-
eth1he^°*^ sisteth in affirmation and negation, not in commanding*."
Go*d "^^^ sense is, that God, Who is truth itself, may will one
thing and command another, and hinder that act which He
commandeth. Mark but his reason ; — " the Scripture, which
is His word, is not the profession of what He intendeth, but
an indication what those men whom He hath chosen to sal-
vation . . or destruction, shall necessarily intend^." This is
the same, which he renounced formerly as one of my " ugly
phrases^ — that God should command one thing openly, and
hinder the same privately or underhand. Reader, if thou
delightest in such a God Who will command one thing
[See above p. 278. note c] » [Ibid.]
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. ^ [Ibid.]
pp. 160, 161.] " [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
- [Ibid., p. 161.] p. 139.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
353
publicly and hinder it privately, choose Mr. Hobbes his God. Discourse
God forbid we should attribute any such double dealing to ^
our God, AYho is truth itself. Some contraries, as heat and
cold, may meet together in remiss degrees ; but truth and
falsehood, a habit and privation, can never meet together.
There is a truth in being ; the picture of a man cannot be
the man himself. There is a truth in knowing; if the
understanding be not adequate to the thing understood,
there is no truth in it. There is a truth in saying ; which is
a conformity or an adequation of the sign to the thing said,
which we call veracity. When one thing is commanded pub-
licly, and the same is hindered privately, and the party so
hindered is punished for not doing that which was impossible
for him to do, where is the veracity ? where is the conformity
and adequation of the sign to the thing said? I dare not tell
]Mr. Hobbes, that he understandeth not these things ; but I
fear it very much. If he do, his cause is bad, or he is but
an ill advocate.
Next, to reconcile the goodness of God with his principles, And His
he answereth first to the thing, that living creatures of all
sorts are often in torments as well as men," which they could
not be " without the will of God^.'' I know no torments of
the other creatm-es but death ; and death is a debt to nature,
not an act of punitive justice. The pangs of a violent death
are less than of a natural; besides the benefit that pro-
ceedeth thence for the sustenance of men, for which the crea-
tures were created. See what an argument here is (for all
his answers are recriminations or exceptions), from brute
beasts to men, from a debt of nature to an act of punitive
justice, from a sudden death to lingering torments id sen-
tiant se mori^''), fi'om a light affliction producing great good,
to endless intolerable pains, producing no good but only the
satisfaction of justice. Then, to the phrase of God's de-
hghting in torments," he answereth, that God '^'^ delighteth
not" in them^ It is true. God is not capable of passions,
as delight or grief. But when He doth those things, that
men grie'ving or delighting do, the Scriptures by an anthro-
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. ton., in Caio, c. 30. p. 424. ed. Grasv.]
p. 174.] f [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xv,
^ [An injunction of Caligula to the p. 174.]
executioners of his victims : see Sue-
KRAMHALL. * o
354
CASTIGATIONS OF
i^j^^RT popathy do ascribe delight or grief unto Him. Such are his
exceptions, not to the thing but to the phrase, because it is
too scholastical or too elegant. I see he liketh no tropes or
figures. But in all this, here is not one word of answer to
the thing itself ; — that that which is beyond the cruelty of
[.2Cor.i.3.] the most bloody men, is not agreeable to "the Father of
mercies,'^ — to create men on purpose to be tormented in
endless flames, without their own faults : — and so contrary to
the Scriptures, that nothing can be more ; wherein punish-
isai.xxviii. ment is called God^s "strange work,^^ "His strange 'act
Wivi i ]3 foi' " Grod made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the
['^•1 destruction of the living, . . but ungodly men with their
works and words called it unto them.^^ If this place seem to
him apocryphal, he may have twenty that are canonical ; —
Ezek.xxiii. " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the
^ ^ * death of the wicked, but that he turn from his way and live ;
turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O
house of Israel V
And His That his opinion destroyeth the justice of God, by making
justice. Yiim punish others for His own acts, is so plain that it ad-
mitteth no defence. And if any further corroboration were
needful, we have his own confession, — that " there can be no
punishment but for crimes that might have been left un- 79
done^.^^ Yet he keepeth a shuffling of terms, — afflictions,
and brute creatures, — which by his own confession are not
capable of moral goodness or wickedness, and consequently
not subject to punishment, — and quite taking away the pro-
portion between sin and punishment, only to make a show of
answering to them, who do not or cannot weigh what is said.
Among guilty persons to single out one to be punished for
example's sake, is equal and just ; " that the punishment may
fall upon few, fear to off'end upon alP.'^ But to punish inno-
cent persons for example's sake, is only an example of great
injustice. That which he calleth my "opinion'' of the end-
[Matt.xxv. less torments of HelP, I learned from Christ Himself, — " Go
ye cursed into everlasting fire — and from my Creed. When |
Origen and some others, called the merciful Doctors J, did
^ [Qu.,] Fount, of Arg., [p. 13.] i [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv.
h [" Ut metus videlicet ad omnes, p. 174.]
poena ad paucos, perveniret." Cic, J [See Sixtus Senensis, Biblioth.
Pro Cluentio, c. xlvi.] Sanct., lib. v. Annot. 131 ; lib. vi. An-
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
355
endeavour to possess the Church with their opinion of an Discourse
universal restitution of all creatures to their pristine estate — ^
after sufficient purgation, it was rejected by the Church.
Without doubt, a sin against infinite Majesty, and an aversion
from infinite Goodness, do justly subject the off"enders to
infinite punishment. But he talketh, as though God were
obliged to do acts of grace, and to violate His own ordinances
tliat He might save men without their own wills. God loves
His own creatures well, but His own justice better.
Whereas I shewed, that this opinion destroyeth the omni- And [His]
potence of God, by making Him the author or cause of sin, tence^lby]
and of all defects, which are the fruits of impotence, not of [Si^mf the
power j he distinguisheth between the cause of sin, and the ^^^^^
author of sin, granting that God is the cause of sin : — " He
will say, that this opinion makes Him^^ (God) " the cause of sin ;
but does not the Bishop think Him the cause of all ^ actions^
and are not sins of commission actions ? is murder no action ?
doth not God Himself say, ^ there is no evil in the city which
I have not done,^ and was not murder one of those evils'^
But he denieth, that God is the author of sin, that is, God
doth not "own" it, God doth not "give a warrant" for it,
God doth not command it^ This is downright blasphemy
indeed. AMien he took away the devil, yet I did not suspect,
that he would so openly substitute God Almighty in his place.
Simon Magus held, that God was the cause of sin ^ ; but his
meaning was not so bad; he only blameth God for not
making man impeccable. The Manichees and Marcionites
did hold, that God was the cause of sin°, but their meaning
was not so bad ; they meant it not of their good God, whom
they called light, but of their bad God, whom they termed
darkness^. But T. H. is not afi-aid to charge the true God
to be the very actor of all sin. When the prophet asketh, —
"Shall there be e-vil in a city, and the Lord hath not done Amosiii.e.
it ?" — he speaketh expressly of evil of punishment, not at all
of the enl of sin. Neither will it avail him in the least, that '
he maketh not God to be the author of sin. For, first, it is
not. 290 : and authorities in Mosh., hk. p. 175.]
II. Pt. ii. c. 3. § 9, note 4. in Soames' ' [Ibid.]
edition.] "> [See above p. 217. note ni.]
[Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xv. " [See above p. 217. note n.]
A a 2
356
CASTIGATIONS OF
P T worse to be the physical or natural cause of sin, by acting it,
' — than to be the moral cause of sin, by commanding it. If a
man be the author of that which lie commandeth, much more
is he the author of that which he acteth. To be an author
is less than to be an actor. A man may be an author by
persuasion, or by example ; as it is said of Vespasian, that he,
being " antiquo cultu victuque,'' was unto the Romans prce^
cipuus astricti moris auctor^,'^ — ^by his obser\dng of " the
ancient diet^^ of the country and the old fashion of apparel
he was unto the Romans " the principal author of their fru-
gality." Hath not he done God Almighty good service, to ac-
quit Him from being the author of sin," which is less, and
to make Him to be the proper cause of all sin, which is more?
Thus, to maintain fate, he hath deserted the truth of God, the
goodness of God, the justice of God, and the power of God.
A nght^ In the next place, I demanded, " how shall a man praise
cannot God, who believcth Him to be a greater tyrant than ever was
praise God. world, creating millions to burn eternally without their
own fault, to express His power P." He answereth, that the
word tyrant was sometimes taken in a good sensed ; a pretty
answer, and to good purpose, when all the world sees that it
is taken here in the worst sense. And when he hath fumbled
thus a while after the old manner, all his answer is a recrimi
nation : — " How can the Bishop praise God for His goodness
who thinks He hath created millions of millions to burn
eternally, when He could have kept them so easily from com
mitting any fault ^" I do not believe, that God created
millions," nor so much as one single person, to burn eternally;
which is as true as his other slander in this place, that I
"withdraw the will of man from God's dominion ^" Both
the one and the other are far from me. His principles may
lead him upon such precipices, mine do not. God created
not man to burn, but to serve Him here, and to be glorified
by Him and with Him hereafter. That many men do miss
^ this end, is not God's fault ; Who gave them sufficient strength
to have conquered, and would have given them a larger supply
o [Tacit., Annal., iii. 55.] p. 175.]
P [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105 ; ^ [Ibid.]
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] • [Ibid.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv.
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
357
of grace if they had sought it ; but man^s. God was not Discourse
bound to reverse His own decrees^ or change the order of the — —
government of the world, which He Himself had justly insti-
tuted, to hold up a man from sinning against his will, when
He could by His almighty power draw good out of evil and a
greater degree of glory out of the fall of man. Concerning
the number of those who are reprobated for their sins, I have
nothing to say, but that "secret things belong unto the Deut.xxix.
Lord our God, and things revealed to us and to our children."
My next demands were, — " how shall a man hear the Word Nor hear
. ... the Word
of God with that reverence and devotion and faith that is or receive
requisite, who believeth, that God causeth His Gospel to be ^ent worl
preached to the much greater part of Christians without any thiiy.
intention that they should be saved*." Secondly, "how shall a
man prepare himself for the receiving of the Sacrament with
care and conscience, who apprehendeth, that ' eating and [i Cor. xi.
drinking unworthily^ is not the cause of damnation, but,
because God will damn a man, therefore He necessitatetli
him to eat and drink unworthily*.^' To which two demands
he giveth one answer; — that faith is the gift of God; if they
have faith, they shall both hear the Word and receive the
Sacraments worthily; and if they have no faith, they shall
neither hear the Word nor receive the Sacraments worthily".
There needeth no more to be said, to evidence to all the
world, that he doth utterly destroy and quite take away all
care, all solicitude, all devotion and preparation of ourselves,
for holy duties. If God give us faith, we can want nothing;
if God do not give us faith, we can have nothing. We use
to say truly, that God doth not deny His grace to them who
do their endeavours. "The kingdom of Heaven suffereth Matt xi.12.
violence, and the \'iolent take it by force;'' and, "How much Matt.vii.ii.
more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things
to them that ask Him !" St. Paul maketh hearing to be the
way to obtain faith; — "How shall they believe on Him of Rom.x. u.
whom they have not heard ?" — and exhorteth Christians to
" work out their salvation with fear and tremblinsr." Devout [Phil. ii.
12 1
prayers, and hearing and reading, and participating, did use
to be the way to get faith, and to increase faith. As in our
* [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105.]
" [Qu., Aiiimadv. upon Numb. xv. p. 176.]
358
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part natural life, so in our spiritual life, we must earn our bread
j-^^^ in the sweat of our brows. Such desperate opinions as these,
19.] which are invented only to colour idleness and quench devo-
[See Ezek. tion, are the " pillows" of Satan. "\Ve believe none are excluded
xiii 18 1
from the benefit of Christ^s passion but only they who exclude
themselves. Absolute exclusion'' is opposed to exclusion upon
supposition ; which useful and necessary distinction if he do
not or will not understand, we have no reason to fancy it one
jot the worse for his supercilious censures.
Nor vow as My next demand was, "how shall a man make a free voav to
he ought. Q.^^^ ^1^^ believes himself to be able to perform nothing but
as he is extrinsecally necessitated ^.^^ To this he answers, that
" the necessity of vowing before he vowed, hindered not the
freedom of his vow^^' This itself is absurd enough; but
whether it be his misapprehension, or his cunning to avoid
the force of an argument, he comes far short both of the
force and of the hope of this reason, which was this ; — if a
man be not left in any thing to his own disposition, and have
no power over his own future actions, but is antecedently deter-
mined to what he must do and must not do, and yet knoweth
not what he is extrinsecally determined to do and not to do,
then it is not only folly but impiety, for him to vow that
which he knoweth not whether it be in his power to perform
or not ; but upon his grounds every man is antecedently
determined to ever}^ thing he shall do, and yet knoweth not
how he is determined. Universal necessity and free vows
cannot possibly consist together.
Nor repent My last demand was, "how shall a man condemn or accuse
deeds."^^^' bimself for his sins, who thinketh himself to be like a watch
wound up by God^?^^ His answer is, "Though a man think
himself necessitated to what he shall do, yet, if he do not
think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence,
there will follow no impediment to repentance My argu-800
ment looketh at the time past, his answer regardeth the time
to come; both ways he is miserably entangled. First for the
time past. If a man was wound up as a watch by God to all
" [" Excluded, . . whether positively ' [Qu., Ammadv. upon Numb. xv.
or not positively is nothing to the pur- p. 177.]
pose." Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. XV. » [Defence, Numb. xv. above p. 105.]
p. 176.] b [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv.
7 [Defence, Numb. XV. above p. 105.] p. 177-]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
359
the individual actions which he hath done, then he ought not Discoursi
to accuse or condemn any man for what he hath done : for, ~ —
according to his grounds, neither he nor they did any thin^
but what was the secret and irresistible will of God that they
should do ; and when the secret will of God is made known
by the event, we ought all to submit unto it. Much less can
any man accuse or condemn himself without hypocrisy for
doing that, which, if his life had lain a thousand times upon
it, he could not have helped, nor done otherwise than he did.
The very same reason holdeth for the time to come. There
is the same necessity in respect of God^s decree, the same
inevitability on our parts for the future, that is for the time
past ; the same submission is due to the secret will of God,
when it shall be declared by the event. How ill he hath been
able to reconcile his principles with the truth and goodness
and justice and power of God, and with those Christian duties
which we owe unto God, as vows, repentance, and praising
of God^s Holy Name, the hearing of His Word, the receiving
of His Sacraments, I leave to the judgment of the reader.
The next thing which I disliked w^as his description of what re-
repentance; — " It is a glad returning into the right way after F"*^"^®
the grief of being out of the way'^.^^ Who ever heard before
this of ^ gladness' or joy in the definition of repentance? He
telleth us, that it is not Christian repentance without a
purpose of amendment of life^. That is true. A purpose of
amendment was comprehended in the old definition of re-
pentance;— ^a godly sorrow for sins past, with a stedfast
purpose to commit no more sins to be sorrowed for^.' St.
Peter found no great sense of joy, when ^^he went out and [ftfatt.xxvi.
^ ^ 75. Luke
wept bitterly and some tell us, that so long as he lived, he xxii. 62. j
did the same, so often as he heard the cock crow^: nor Mary
Magdalene, when she washed the feet of Christ with her tears, [Luke vii.
and wiped them with her hairs; yet she was a true penitent, ^^'-^
and purposed amendment : nor David, when he "washed his [Ps. vi. g.]
" [See above in the Defence, T. H. 1609. C]
Numb. XV. p. 103.] f [This is asserted as upon the au-
d [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. thority of S. Clement of Rome by Cor-
P- 177.] derius (Annot. in c. xxii. v, 62. of the
e ["Poenitentiamquippe agere, est et Catena in S. Lucam edited by him),
perpetrata mala plangere, et plangenda See also tlie Life of S. Peter by Sanc-
non perpet;-are." Greg. Magni in torius in Bollandi Acta SS., June 29,
Evang. Horn, xxxiv. Op. torn. i. p. c. i. § 16.]
360
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^rt bed^^ night bj^ niglit, and "watered his couch with his tears/'
'- — St. Paul reckoneth all the parts of the repentance of the
2 Cor. vii. Corinthians ; " godly sorrow — carefulness — clearing of them-
selves — indignation — fear — vehement desires — zeal — re-
venge/' here is no word of joy or 'gladness' in all this. Joy
is a consequent of repentance after reconciliation, but it is
not of the essence of repentance; no more than a succeeding
[Luke XV. calm is of the essence of a storm, or the prodigal's festival joy
after his re-admission into his father's house was a part of his
conversion. He is afraid, that "this doctrine" of fasting, and
mourning, and tears, and humicubation, and sackcloth, and
ashes, " pertaineth to the establishment of Romish penance^."
Or rather they were natural expressions of sorrow, before
Joel ii. 12. Rome was builded. " Turn ye to Me with all your heart,
with fasting, and weeping, and mourning." Neither the
[Jonah iii. Nincvitcs, nor the Tyrians and Zidonians, did learn their
xL 2i!^— " sackcloth and ashes" at Rome. But many men love to serve
Luke X. 13. J q-qJ now-a-days with as much ease as they can; as if God Al-
mighty would be satisfied with any thing, ' vel uvd vel fabd' —
[Matt. vii. ' either with a grape or with a bean,' And ' with the same
^ measure they mete to God, He measureth to them again.'
Man's con- He cliargeth me, that I " labour to bring in a concurrence
with God's of man's will with God's will, and a power in God to give
grace. repentance if man will take it, but not the power to make
him take it^" Hola ! It is one question, ' utrum possif —
'what God can do;' another, ' utrum sit' — 'what God ivill
do.' God can determine the will irresistibly, but He doth not
Acts vii. 51. do it ordinarily. "Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in
prov. i. 24. heart, . . ye do always resist the Holy Ghost ;" and, " I have
called and ye refused," &c. The concurrence of God and
man in producing the act of our believing, or conversion to
God, is so evident in Holy Scripture, that it is vanity and lost
labour to oppose it. If God did not concur, the Scripture
[Phii.ii.i3.] would not say, "It is God that worketh in" us, 'both the
will and the deed.' If man did not concur, the Scripture
fPiiii.ii.i2.] would not say, "Work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling." If our repentance were God's work alone, God
[Joel ii. 12.] would not Say to man, " Turn ye unto Me with all your heart."
* [Ciu,, Auiniadv. upon Numb, xv. 1^ [Ibid.]
p. 178.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
361
And if repentance were man's work alone, we had no need to DiscounsE
pray, " Turn us, O Lord, and we shall be turned." We are q -^:^ —
commanded to " repent" and to " believe." In vain are xxxi. is.—
commandments given to them, who cannot at all concur to MaTk^Ms!
the acting of that which is commanded. Faith and repent-
;oi ance are proposed unto us as conditions to obtain blessedness
and avoid destruction: — "If thou shalt confess with thy [Rom. x. 9]
mouth and believe with thy heart," &c., " thou shalt be
saved;" and, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." [Lukexiii.
To propose impossible conditions, which they to whom they
are proposed have no power either to accept or to refuse, is a
mere mockery. Our unbelief and impenitence is imputed to
us as our own fault ; — " Because of unbelief thou wert broken Rom.xi.20.
oflP;" and, "After thy hardness and impenitent heart thou Rom. ii. 6.
treasurest up unto thyself wrath." Their unbelief and im-
penitence were not their own faults, if they neither had
power to concur with the grace of God to the production of
faith and repentance, nor yet to refuse the grace of God.
The Holy Scripture doth teach us, that God doth help us in
doing works of piety ; — " The Lord is my helper;" and, " The [Heb. xiii.
Spirit helpeth our infirmities." If we did not cooperate at viii. 26.]
all, God could not be said to ' help' us. There is therefore,
there must be, cooperation. Neither doth this concurrence
or cooperation of man at all intrench upon the power or
honour of God, because this very liberty to cooperate is His
gift, and this manner of acting His own institution.
Those words — " Behold I stand at the door and knock^ Rev. iii.20.
— are not understood only of the minister's outward knock-
I ing at the door of the ear with persuasive words, but much
more of God Almighty's knocking at the door of the heart
by His preventing grace. To what end doth He knock to
have it opened, if He Himself had shut it by an irresistible
decree ? God first knocks at the door of our hearts by His
preventing grace, without which we have no desire to open
unto Christ ; and then He helps us by His adjuvant or assist-
ing grace, that we may be able to open. Yet the very name
of God's ' adjuvant,' or ' assistant,' or ' helping' grace, doth
j admonish us, that there is something for us to do on our
parts ; that is, to open, to consent, to concur. Why should
* [Quoted by T. H., ibid.]
362
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part our Cooperation seem so strange, which the Apostle doth
— — assert so positively ? We are labourers together with
1 Cor. XV.
God/^ and, "I laboured more abundantly than they all; yet
not I^' (that is, not I alone), " but the grace of God which
was with me."
The last part of [t]his section is concerning prayer, which
he manageth no better than the rest.
Confidence First, he accuseth me for saying, that " prayer is a signifi-
andthe^' cation, that we expect" that which we pray for from God;
efficacy of ^j^j^.}^ callcth " a presumption" in me, and " a detraction
from the honour of God^." But it is so far from being a pre-
sumption, that it is a necessary requisite in prayer. St. James
Jam. i. 6. will havc US pray without "wavering ;" — " Let him ask in faith
1 Tim. ii.8. nothing wavering." St. Paul will have men to "lift up holy
hands without wrath or doubting." And our Saviour com-
Markxi.24. mands, "What things soever ye desire when ye pray, believe
that ye shall receive them, and ye shall have them."
I cited many texts of Scripture to prove the efficacy of
prayer ; whereof he is pleased to take notice of three, and to
deny, that helping, means, efficacy, availing, do " signify any
causation^ ;" contrary both to the words and scope of those
texts, and contrary to the tenor of the whole Scripture..
Jam. V. 15. " The prayer of faith shall save the sick ;" and, " I know
Phil. i. 19. that this shall turn to my salvation through your prayers."
[1 Sam. i. Hannah prayed and the Lord granted her request. We see
[1 Kings the like in Ahab, in Zachary, in Cornelius, and many others.
Lukei^8?n. Hczckias prayed, and the Lord said, " I have heard thy
04*^]^' pr^ysr, I have seen thy tears, behold I will add unto thy
isa.xxxviii. days fifteen years." Nothing can be plainer than Solomon^s
1 Kings prayer at the dedication of the Temple; — "If there be
viji. 37. &c. f^-j^jjjg land, if there be pestilence," &c., " if their
enemy besiege them in their cities, whatsoever plague, what-
soever sicknesses there be, what prayer or supplication soever
be made by any man, or by all Thy people Israel," &c., " and
spread forth his hands toward this house, hear Thou in
Heaven Thy dwelling place, and forgive, and do," &c. To
2 Chron. all which God Himself condescended, and promised to do
accordingly.
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. ^ [Ibid., p. 179.]
pp. 178, 179.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
363
His reason to the contrary, — that " no creature living can Discourse
work any effect upon God""'," — is most true ; but neither per —
tinent to his purpose, nor understood by himself. It is all
one as to the efficacy of prayer, if it work upon us, as though
it had wrought upon God Himself; if it render us more
capable of His mercies, as if it rendered Him more merciful.
Though the sword and the crown hang immoveable, yet
prayer translatetli us from one capacity to another, from
being under the sword to be under the crown.
Lastly, he telleth us in great sadness, that " though our
prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not
necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God
Almighty"." Prayers and thanksgiving are our acts, not
God's acts ; and have their distinction from us, not from
God. Prayer respects the time to come, thanksgi\ing the
time past. Prayer is for that we want, thanksgiving for that
we have. All the ten lepers prayed, Jesus, Master, have Luke xvii.
mercy on us but only one of them returned to give God
thanks. St. Paul distinguisheth prayer and thanksgiving, 2 Cor. i. u.
even in respect of God. By granting the prayers of His
people, God putteth an obligation upon them to give thanks.
He might as well have said, that faith, hope, and charity,
are the same thing.
He passeth over the rest of this chapter in silence. I think
him much the wiser for so doing. If he had done so by the
rest likewise, it had been as much credit for his cause.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS j NUMBER XVI.
Here are three things questionable in this section ; first,
whether "He who maketh all things, make all things necessary
to be," or whether it be "a contradiction of" me to myself "to
say so° ?" — First, this is certain, there can be no formal contra-
diction where there is but one proposition ; but here is but
one proposition. Secondly, here is no implicit contradiction ;
first, because there is a vast difference between making all
things "necessary to be," and making all things to be neces-
sary agents. The most free or contingent agents in the
i"^[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. o [Ibid., Animadv, upon Numb, xvi.
364
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part world, when they are, are necessarily such as they are : that
TTT * •/
: — is, " necessary to be but they are not necessarily neces-
sary agents. And yet he is still harping upon this string,
to prove such a necessity as no man did ever deny. Thirdly,
I told him, that this which he contends for here, is but a
necessity of supposition : as, supposing a garment to be
made of the French fashion, when it is made, it is necessarily
of the French fashion ; but it was not necessary before it was
made, that it should be made of the French fashion, nor of
any other fashion ; for it might not have been made at all.
T. H. still He excepteth, that the burning of the fire is no otherwise
necSsfty' i^Gcessary than upon supposition ; that is, supposing fuel be
upon sup- cast upon the fire, the fire doth burn it necessarilyP. But
position. . ^ .
herein he is altogether mistaken. For that only is called
necessary upon supposition, where the thing supposed is or
was in some sort in the power of the free agent, either to do
it or to leave it undone, indifi'erently ; but it is never in the
power of the fire to burn or not to burn indifferently. He
who did strike the fire out of the flint, may be said to be a
necessary cause of the burning that proceeded from thence
upon supposition ; because it was in his power either to strike
fire or not to strike fire. And he who puts more fuel to the
fire, may be said to be a necessary cause of the continuance
of the fire upon supposition ; because it was in his choice to
put to more fuel or not. But the fire itself cannot choose but
burn whilst it is fire, and therefore it is a necessary cause of
burning, absolutely, and not upon supposition. What unseen
necessity doth prejudice liberty, and what doth not, I have
shewed formerly. How mean an esteem soever he hath of
the tailor, either he or his meanest apprentice have more
sense than himself in this cause. The tailor knows, that there
was no necessity from eternity that he should be a tailor, or
that that man for whom he made the garment should be his
customer, and much less yet of what fashion he should
make it. But he is still fumbling to no purpose upon that
"old foolish Yule^" as he pleased once to call it, — "whatso-
ever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is.^'
The second question is, whether there be any agents in the
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xvi. i [See above p. 2CA. notek.]
p. 183.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
365
■world which are truly free or truly contingent agents, accord- Discourse
ing to his grounds. And it is easily demonstrated, that — —
there are not : because he maintaineth, that all agents are ^otl^in
necessary ; and that those agents which we call free agents ^^"[.^ti^jjn
and contingent agents, do act as necessarily, as those agents ignorance,
which we see and know to be necessary agents ; and that the
reason why we style them free agents and contingent agents,
is, because we do " not know whether they work necessarily
or not He hath told us hitherto, that all agents act ne-
cessarily ; otherwise there could not be an universal neces-
sity. Now he telleth us, that there be sundry agents, which
we " know not whether they work necessarily or not." If
we do " not know whether they work necessarily or not,"
then we do not know whether there be universal necessity or
not. But we may well pass by such little mistakes in him.
That which I deduce from hence is this, — that the formal
reason of liberty and contingency according to his opinion
doth consist in our ignorance or nescience ; and then it hath
803 no real being in the natui-e of things. Hitherto the world
hath esteemed nothing more than Hbei'ty; mankind hath
been ready to fight for nothing sooner than liberty. Now if,
after all this, there be no such thing as liberty in the world,
they have contended all this while for a shadow. It is but
too apparent, what horrible disorders there are in the world ;
and how many times right is trodden under foot by might ;
and how the worst of men do flourish and prosper in this
world, whilst poor Hieremy is in the dungeon, or writing
books of Lamentation. If there be true liberty in the world,
we know well whereunto to impute all these disorders ; but
if there be no true liberty in the world, free from antecedent
necessitation, then they all faU directly upon God Almighty
and His providence.
The last question is, concerning his definition of contin- [T. H.'s
gents, — that " they are such agents as work we know not of contin
how^." Against which I gave him two exceptions in my e^"^^ ]
Defence. One was this. Many agents work we know not
how, as the loadstone draweth iron, the jet chaff ; and yet
they are known and acknowledged to be necessary and not
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvi. « [Ibid.]
p. 184.]
366
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part contingent agents*. Secondly, many agents do work we
— — — know how, as a stone falling down from a house upon a
man^s head ; and yet we do not account it a necessary but a
contingent event, by reason of the accidental concurrence of
the causes". I have given him other instances in other parts
of this treatise ; and if need be, he may have twenty more.
And yet, though his definition was shewed formerly to halt
downright on both sides, yet he, good man, is patient, and
never taketh the least notice of it ; but only denieth the con-
sequence, and overlooketh the proofs,
[indeter- His objection about the " indetermination" of the causes,
SusS/]"*^^ — "t^^t indetermination "doth nothing,'^ because "it maketh
the event equal to happen and not to happen — is but a flash
without any one grain of solidity. For by "indetermination"
in that place is clearly understood, not to be predetermined
to one by extrinsecal causes, but to be left free to its own
intrinsecal determination, this way or that way, indiff'erently.
So the first words — " by reason of the indetermination^^ —
have reference to free agents and free events ; and the other
words — "or accidental concurrence of the causes" — have
reference to casual events : and both together, referenda sin-
gula singulis J do include all contingents, as the word is com-
monly and largely taken by old philosophers.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XVII.
[The opi- Eeader, I do not wonder, now and then, to see T. H. sink
cessity^tak- lender the weight of an absurdity in this cause. A back of
the nature ^^^^^ were not able to bear all those unsupportable conse-
of sin. ] quences which flow from this opinion of fatal destiny. But
why he should delight to multiply needless absurdities, I do
not know. Almost every section produceth some new mon-
ster. In this seventeenth section I demonstrated clearly,
that this opinion of universal necessity doth take away the
nature of sin. That which he saith in answer thereunto, is
that which followeth.
First, " it is true, he who taketh away the liberty of doing
^ [Defence, Numb. xvi. above p. 11 1 ; * [Qu., Animadv. upon Niunb. xvi.
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 184.]
" [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
367
according to the will, taketh away the nature of sin ; but he Discoukse
that denieth the liberty to will, doth not soy." This answer —
hath been sufficiently taken away already, both in the De-
fence^ and in these Castigations*. Inevitable and unresistible
necessity doth as much acquit the will from sin as the action.
Again, whereas I urged, that w^hatsoever proceedeth essen-
tially by way of physical determination from the First Cause,
is good and just and lawfuP, he opposeth, that I might as
well have concluded, that whatsoever man hath been made
by God, is a good and just man*^." So I might. What
should hinder me to conclude, that every creature created by
God is good qua talis — as it is created by God ? But, being
but a creature, it is not immutably good, as God Himself is.
If he be not of the same opinion, he must seek for compa-
nions among those old heretics, the Manichees, or Marcionites.
So he Cometh to his main answer ; — " Sin is not a thing
really made ; those things which at first were actions, were
not then sins, though actions of the same nature with those
which were afterwards sins ; nor was then the will to any
thing a sin, though it were a will to the same thing which in
willing now we should sin; actions became then sins first,
when the Commandments came," &c. ; " there can no action
be made sin but by the law ; therefore this opinion, though it
derive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essen-
tially from Him, but relatively, and by the commandment "^.^
The first thing I observe in him is a contradiction to him-
self. Now he maketh the anomy, or the irregularity and
repugnance to the law, to be the sin ; before he conceiveth
the action itself to be the sin : — " Doth not the Bishop think
God to be the cause of all actions ? and are not sins of com-
mission actions? is murder no action? and doth not God
Himself say, 'there is no evil in the city which I have not
done ?^ and was not murder one of those evils," &c. ? " I am
of opinion, that the distinction of causes into efficient and
deficient is Bohu, and signifieth nothing^"
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. pp. 258, 274.]
P- 188.] t> [Defence, Numb. xvii. above pp.
^- Defence, Numb. iii. [above pp. 30 113, 114.]
— 32.] c [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii.
» [Answ. to the] Stat, of Quest., p. 189.]
[above pp. 221— 223.]— Castig. [of " [Ibid.]
Animadv.] Numbers i. and iii, [above e [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xv.
368
CASTTGATIONS OF
Part This might have been pardoned to him ; but his second
— - — slip is worse, — that the world was I know not how long
world be- without sin. I did demonstrate, that upon his grounds all
dvViaw. sins are essentially from God, and consequently are lawful
and just. He answereth, that the actions were from God,
but the actions were not sins at the first, until there was
a law. What is this to the purpose? It is not material
when sin did enter into the world, early or late ; so as,
when it did enter, it were essentially from God ; which it
must needs be upon his grounds, — that both the murder,
and the law against murder, are from God. And as it doth
not help his cause at all, so it is most false. What actions
Job iv. 18. were there in the world before the sin of the angel ? " He
2 Pet. ii. 4. charged the angels with folly and, " If God spared not the
Jude 6. angels that sinned, but cast them down to Hell and, " The
angels which kept not their first estate. What were those
Rom. V. 12. ' first actions' that were before the sin of Adam ? " By one
man sin entered into the world, and death by sin.'^
Thirdly, he erreth most grossly in supposing that the
world at first was lawless. The world was never without the
eternal law, that is, the rule of justice in God Himself, and
that which giveth force to all other laws ; as the Divine Wis-
Prov. viii. dom saith, By Me kings reign, and princes decree justice.'*
And sin is defined to be " that which is acted, said, or
thought, against the eternal law^." But to let this pass for
the present, because it is transcendentally a law. How was
the world ever without the law of nature ? which is most pro-
perly a law, " the law that cannot lie, not mortal from mor-
tal man, not dead, or written in the paper without life, but
incorruptible, written in the heart of man by the finger of
God Himself^." Let him learn sounder doctrine from St.
Rom. ii. Paul ; — ^' For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do
by nature the things contained in the law, these, ha\ing not
the law, are a law unto themselves ; which shew the work of
the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing
witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or excus-
ing one another." I pass by those commandments of God
p. 175. •in3=" Res vacua et inanis." ^ [See above p. 80, note a.]
Gen. i. l-j if [See above p, 329, note e.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
369
which were delivered by tradition from hand to hand^ from Discourse
father to son. This, — that mankind was ever without all — —
law, — is the most drowsy dream that ever dropped from pen.
Whereas he saith, that I " allow," that " the nature of sin [The true
doth consist in this, that it is an action proceeding from oar ^in^^
will against the law," and thence inferreth, " that the formal
reason of sin lieth not in the liberty of willing^," he doth wrong
himself, and misinform his reader ; for I never " allowed" it,
nor never shall allow" it in that sense, but said expressly
the contrary. My words were these, — " which in our sense
is most true, if he understand a just law and a free rational
will';" and then I added further, that the law which he un-
derstandeth, is a most unjust law, and the will which is in-
tended by him, an irrational necessitated will. Where did
he learn to take that for granted, which is positively denied ?
He saith indeed, if the reader could trust him, that he hath
"shewed that no law can be unjust^." But I expect
arguments, not his own authority, which I value not. He
neither " hath shewed," that all laws are just, nor ever will
be able to shew it, until the Greek Calends. Likewise, where
he seemeth not to understand what " the rational will" is', I
do think there is scarcely any one author, who did ever write
upon this subject, but he hath this distinction between the
rational and the sensitive appetite; and hath, particularly,
made this main difference between them, that the rational
appetite is free, but the sensitive appetite is necessary. If he
alone will not understand that which is so e\ident and uni-
versally received by all scholars, it is no great matter.
It is as unjust to command a man to do that which is To com-
" impossible" for man to do, as to command him 'contradic- JJl^^ssibiiT-"
tions"'.' This siUy evasion will not serve his turn. Those
. . . just,
things are said to be impossible to us in themselves, which
are not made impossible to us by our own defaults. And
805 those things which we make impossible by our defaults, are
not impossible in themselves. Those impossibilities, and only
those, which we by our defaults have made, may lawfully be
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii.
p. 189.]
» [Defence, Numb. xvii. above p.
114; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
BRAMHALL. ,
•* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii.
p. 189.]
1 [Ibid.]
[Ibid., p. 190.]
370
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part punished. TMiere he confesseth, that " law makers^ not
'■ — knowing the secret necessities of things to come/^ do " some-
times enjoin things that are made impossible from eternity'^/'
it Cometh every way short of the truth. Firsts in limiting it
to human " law makers/^ who only know not the necessities
of things to come ; for my argument^ — that law which com-
mandeth impossibilities is an unjust law, — doth hold as well
of God's law as of man's law : not that we believe any law of
God can be unjust, God forbid ; but to demonstrate to him
undeniably, that all those things which he conceiveth to be
impossible from eternity, are not impossible from eternity,
because the contrary is commanded from God, and God
never commandeth impossibilities. Secondly, he cometh
short of the truth in this also, that he saith human law-givers
" do sometimes enjoin impossibilities for, by his leave, upon
his grounds, they do always enjoin either absolute impossibi-
lities or absolute necessities, both which are equally ridicu-
lous. Lastly, whereas I argued thus, — if the will of man be
determined by God without the will of man, " then it is not
man's will, but God's will," — he denieth my " consequence,"
because " it may be both God's will and man's will°." I
answer, it is God's will effectively, because He maketh it
necessarily, and subjectively, because He willeth it ; but
upon his grounds, it is the will of man only subjectively, be-
cause he is necessitated to will it, but not effectively, because
he had no hand in the production of it ; and therefore, how
faulty soever it may be, yet it cannot be imputed to man.
Concerning his instance in a ci\il judge ; —
[T. H.'s First, I shewed that it was " impertinent because neither
L"civU^^ ^ ^^^'^ j^clo^ the judge of sin, nor the law of the land the
judge.] rule of sin P." To my reasons he answereth nothing in par-
ticular; but in general, — that whereas I '^'^said," that "the law
cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity,
it was no impertinent answer to say, that the judge looketh
no higher than the will of the doer^." Here are so many
imperfections, that I scarcely know where to begin. First, I
never " said that the law cannot justly punish a crime that
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii. ^ [Defence, Numb. xvii. above p. 113.]
p. 190.] 1 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xvii.
° [Ibid.] p. 190.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
371
proceedeth from necessity/^ I always said, and do still SaV, DlSCOl'R^E
that if it be antecedently necessitated, it is no crime, either — —
punishable or unpunishable. Secondly, he did make the
civil judge to be the judge of sin, and the law of the land to
be the rule of sin, in express terms ; — " a judge, in judging
whether it be sin or not, which is done against the law''.^^
Thirdly, that will which the law and the judge do regard, is
not his brutish necessitated irrational appetite, but our free
rational will, after deliberation determined intrinsecally by
the, agent himself.
Secondly, I shewed, that his instance in a civil judge was Yet further
against himself ; because "this which he saith, that ' the judge sfiiy dis-
looketh no higher than the will of the doer,' doth prove that fJ-ee^to^drT
the will of the doer did determine itself freelv, and that the ^^1^^^^'^^]'
^ ' not free to
malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would ^.^^ To will,
this he answers, that " it proveth indeed that the malefactor
had liberty to have kept the law if he would, but it proveth
not that he had the liberty [to have a will] to keep the law^^'
Hath not this silly senseless distinction been canvassed suffi-
ciently yet, but it must once more appear upon the stage ?
Agreed. Thus I argue. — First, if " the malefactor had liberty
to have kept the law if he would,^' then the malefactor had
liberty to have contradicted the absolute will of God, if he
would ; then he had liberty to have changed the unalterable
decrees of God, if he would : but he had not liberty to have
contradicted the absolute will of God, if he would ; he had
not liberty to have changed the unalterable decrees of God,
if he would. The assumption is so evident, that it were
great shame to question it. The consequence is as clear
as the sun. For, upon Mr. Hobbes his grounds, it was the
absolute will of God, and the unalterable decree of God, that
the malefactor should do as he did, and not do otherwise.
And, therefore, if the malefactor had liberty to have kept the
law, and to have done otherwise if he would, he had liberty
to have contradicted the will of God, and to have changed
the decree of God, if he would. But this is too absurd.
Secondly, to have " liberty to have kept the law if he would,''
r [See above in the Defence, T. H. t [Q^.^ Animadv. upon Numb. xvii.
Numb. xvii. p. 112.] p. 190.]
s [Defence, Numb.xvii. above p. 114.]
Bb 2
372 CASTIGATIONS OF g
p^A^RT implieth necessarily a conditional possibility. But the will
of God and the decree of God, that the malefactor should do 806
as he did and not keep the law, implieth an absolute im-
possibility. Now, it is a rule in logic, that " impossibile habet
in se vim adverbii universaliter negantis" — " an impossibility
hath the force of an universal negative." But an universal
negative and a particular affirmative are contradictory : — that
it was impossible for the malefactor to have kept the law, and
yet he had liberty to have kept the law if he would. There
is not the least starting hole for him, through which he can
endeavour to creep out of this contradiction, but by making
this supposition — " if he would" — to signify nothing ; and to
affirm, that it was equally impossible for the malefactor to
will otherwise and to do otherwise. Then see what a pretty
liberty he hath left us, even a mere impossibility. If the sky
fall, then we shall catch larks. Observe further the vanity
of this distinction, between " liberty to do if we will," and
liberty to will ;" when both the one hberty and the other
are equally impossible, upon his own grounds. And yet,
with this mock liberty, which signifieth nothing, he is fain to
answer all the texts of Scripture which are brought against
him, and all the absurdities which are heaped upon him.
Lastly, to say a man is free to do any thing if he will, im-
plieth that he hath poAver enough, and there is nothing
wanting to the doing of it but his will. Otherwise, if there be
not power enough to do it (as in this case upon his grounds
there is not), it is as ridiculous to say, a malefactor was free
to have kept the law if he would, as to say, a man is free to
jump over the sea if he will, or to fly in the air if he will.
Yet still he saith, the will of the malefactor " did not de-
termine itself"." Then, by his own confession, the malefactor
had the more wrong, to be punished for that which was un-
avoidably and irresistibly imposed upon him. If the male-
factor was necessitated from God by an essential determina-
tion of extrinsecal causes, both to will as he did and to do as
he did, he was no more a malefactor than his judge.
Of mon- I have no reason to "retract" any one syllable of what I said
concerning monsters''; but he had need to retract his ordinary
" [Qu., Auimadv. upon Nmnb. xvii. [Defence, Numb. xvii. above pp.
p. 190.] 114, 115; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
373
falsifying, and dismembering, and misinterpreting of my Discourse
sayings. I affirmed (as all sound philosophers do affirm), ~
that nature never intendeth the generation of a monster, but
that every monster is a deviation from the law of the first
institution, that every creature should beget another in his [Gen. i. 21,
. 24 25 1
own likeness ; which proceedeth sometimes from the defect '
or inordinate force of the plastical or forming virtue, some-
times from the excess or defect of the matter, sometimes from
the fault of the womb wherein the conception is perfected,
sometimes from other lesser reasons ; and therefore, that the
universal causes, as God and the sun'', are not to be blamed
for monstrous births, but that particular cause from which
the excess or defect or distortion did proceed y. What was
herein to derogate from the God of nature ? Who permitteth
and disposeth of such irregularities in nature, as He doth of
sins in morality ; but with this difference, that moral aberra-
tions are culpable and punishable, but aberrations in nature
are only deformities, not sins. When philosophers do say
that nature intendeth any end, they do not mean that nature
doth deliberate or resolve this or that, but that nature doth
act for an end ; which no man can deny with any credit.
The spider makes her w^ebs to catch flies, there is nature^s
end. The ant gathers provision in summer for winter suste-
nance. The bee makes cells for a depository for honey, and
receptacles for young bees. The vine brings forth leaves,
flowers, and grapes, one in order to the production or preser-
vation of another ; and lastly followeth the wine, which is the
end of all the rest ; which, being the last, was the first or
principal end of nature. It is not the part of a real scholar,
to except against evident truth upon grammatical scruples.
In the last Animadversion of this section, nothing is con-
tained that is either new or requireth an answer.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; — NUMBER XVIII.
I cited Lipsius^, only to shew that the distinction of [Lipsius.]
destiny into Christian and Stoical destiny was not mine.
X [Compare e. g. Thoin. Aquin., y [Defence, Numb. xvii. above pp.
Summ., P. I. Qu. Ixxix. art. 4. Re- 114, 115 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
spondeo; — " Non enim solus .vo/^cweraf ^ [Defence, Numb, xviii. above pp.
hominem, sed est in homine virtus gene- 116, 117.]
rativa hominis." — &c. &c.]
374
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part And though Lipsius incurred some dislike by reason of some
'■ — inusitate expressions, yet there is no cause why T. H. should
please himself so much as to think that Lipsius was of his
opinion. He was no such friend of any sort of destiny, as to
abandon the liberty of the will. The Stoics themselves came
short of T. H. his universal necessity. Yet I do not blame
him, if he desire to have one partner in such a desperate
cause as this is.
That which concerneth" him in the second distinction, is 8i
this ; that though he acknowledge a mock liberty, that is, a
will or an appetite of the object, yet he maintaineth, that this
appetite is neither moved, nor excited, nor determined to its
act or appetibihty of this or that, less or more, by the free
agent, but altogether by extrinsecal causes ; and so the pre-
tended free agent is no more free, than a bird which a man
holdeth fast in his hand is free to fly whithersoever she will.
What is I said, " those things which God Avills \\ithout Himself He
" in Deo," "wilh freely and not necessarily ^ which he censureth in this
^^l^t^a^^ manner; — He says rashly and untruly; rashly, because
Deurn." thcrc is nothiug without God, Who is infinite, in Whom are
[Actsxvii. ^jj^ things, and in Whom ^ we live, move, and have our being;'
and untruly, because, whatsoever God foreknew from eternity.
He willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily^." What
should I do ? Should I fall down and thank this great Mogul
(as the ^Ethiopian slaves do their emperor when they are
lashed) for thinking on me ? Although I know his Thrasonical
humoui' very well, that his animal spirits are mere bubbles
of vain glory, and that he knoweth right well that he cannot
reign securely whilst there is one of a different opinion sur-
viving ; yet I am persuaded, that if he had been so well read,
or so much versed in the writings of other men, as to know
how many he wounded " rashly and untruly," in this " rash
and untrue" censure, he would have foreborne it for his own
sake. Hath he never heard of a common rule in theology,
that " Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa" — " The works
or acts of the Trinity without Itself are undivided ?" Or
a [Defence,Numb. xviii. abovep. 120; § 1 ; Op. torn. iii. P. ii. p. 731. A. (and
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] elsewhere) ; — " ScEpe diximus inse-
^ [Qu.,Animadv. upon Numb, xviii. parabilia opera esse Trinitatis." And
p. 198.] that " Alia a Se Deus non ex necessi-
[Borrowed from St, Augustin, In tatc vult," see Thom. Aquin., Summ.,
Johan. Evang., cap. xvi. Tract, xcv. P. I. Qu. xix. art, 3.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
375
hath he never heard of that common distinction between a Discourse
necessary being and a necessary acting"^ ? The most perfect 11:
manner of being is necessary, and therefore God is a neces-
sary being; and that which He willeth within Himself, He
willeth necessarily, because "whatsoever is in God is God^
but the most perfect manner of acting without the Deity is
freely ; and therefore the Schools do agree, that God is a free
agent without Himself.
These free acts are principally two. The first is the crea- [Free acts
tion, whereby things created do pass from a not being to
^ tra Deum ;
being. The second is government, by which all things ^j^go-^"'
created are moved and ordered to their ends. All men ac- vemment.]
knowledge, that the Deity filleth all places by Its essence, by
Its presence, by Its power ; being within all places and things,
but not included ; and without all places and things, but not
excluded. They acknowledge, that all things which have a
real being, do depend upon God for their being, for their
making, for their conservation. And therefore, when we
speak of any thing that is without the Deity, we do not in-
tend, that any thing is without the essence, or the presence,
or the power, or the circumference of It. God is a circle.
Whose centre is every where, the circumference no where.
But by " the works of God without Himself," we understand
the creation and the government of the world ; which are not
terminated in the Deity Itself, but in the creatures ; which
are from God as their efficient, and for God as their end,
and in God or through God in respect of their necessary and
perpetual dependance upon Him, Who is the original essence
of all things, — " I am hath sent me unto you — yet they Exod. iii.
are not of God as particles of the Divine essence, nor in God
in that sense wherein we use to say, " Whatsoever is in God
is God and so they are His works " ad extra*^ — " without
the Deity."
To make good the second part of his censure, — that it was
"untruly" said, — he produceth nothing but his old thread-
bare argument taken from the prescience of God, which hath
been answered over and over. Neither the prescience of God,
d [" Nccessitas essendi — ncccssitas 265; and note 1.]
operandi." Sec above in the Answ. to e [See above p. 159. note f'.]
Animadv. npon Niunb. iii. pp. 2(54,
376
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part nor tlie will of God upon prescience, do imply any more tlian
'- — a mere hypothetical necessity^, which will do his cause no good.
To will and In the conclusion of this section he confesseth, that " God
the 's^mf' doth not all things that He can do if He will but he saith,
thing.-He Qo(i cc cannot will that which He hath not willed from
willeth not
all He eternityg understanding by eternity an everlasting succes-
sion, whereas in eternity nothing is past or to come. I have
shewed often in these Castigations, the falsity, uselessness,
and contradiction, of this absurd silly senseless distinction, in
respect of men. But being here applied by him to God,
nothing can be imagined more absurd. For to will effica-
ciously, and to do, in God are the same thing. What He
doth. He doth by His will. To imagine, that many things
are free to God to do, which are not free to Him to wiU, 808
sheweth that his "meditations^' upon this subject were either
none at all, or worth nothing.
But it shall suffice for the present, to shew how absurd and
how unappliable this exposition is to the two places by me
produced. John Baptist told the Jews, that they might not
flatter themselves with this, that they were the posterity of
Abraham ; that though all they should prove impenitent
Luke iii. 8. and unbelievers, yet God was able to raise up children to
Abraham of stones." If it were impossible for God to will
the doing of any such thing, how was this truly said? And
how could this afford any supply to the seed of Abraham, in
case his carnal posterity should continue obstinate ? In the
other place, St. Peter drawing his sword in defence of his
Master, Christ reprehended him and told him that He could
have a better guard to secure Him from all the attempts of
the Jews, if it pleased Him not to lay down His life freely ; —
[Matt.xxvi. "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to My Father, and
'^'^'■^ He shall give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels ?" He saith not, I can if I would, but positively,
" I can." Neither speaketh He of remote possibilities, but,
" He shall give Me presently." Christ would shew by these
words, that if it had not been His own will freely to suffer
for the redemption of mankind, He could have "prayed to
His Father," and He would have sent Him a guard of more
♦ [See above in the Defence, Numb. « [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xviii.
xxxvi. pp. lyO— 192 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 198.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
377
than "twelve legions of angels/^ and that "presently^^ — Discourse
without delay. If it was impossible for God to will any such —
thing, then our Saviour^s plea to St. Peter was but a vain
pretence, and had nothing of reality in it. If T. H. regarded
the honour and veracity of Christ, he would not impose such
a juggling delusory sense upon His clear assertion ; as if our
Saviour should have said, ' Peter, I have no need of thy
endeavours to defend Me, for I could pray to My Father, and
He would immediately send Me a guard of twelve legions of
angels ; but to say the truth, He is not willing to do it, and
to say the whole truth, it is not possible for Him to be
willing.^
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER XIX.
He professeth, that he "never said the will is compelled, T.H.makes
but doth agree with the rest of the world that it is not com- be^com-^^
pelled^.'' But, to let us see that he understandeth not what p^"^^-
" the world^' meaneth, in saying, the will " is not compelled,^^
twice or thrice in the same page he maketh it to be com-
pelled. "Many things (saith he) "may compel a man to
do an action in producing the will'.^^ If a man can be com-
pelled to will, then the will can be compelled. This ap-
peareth yet more plainly a little after, where he maketh the
casting of one's goods into the sea in a storm to be a volun-
tary free elective act ; and yet he confesseth, that " terror
was "a necessary cause of the election^.'' To which if we add
what he saith in his Answer, — " A man is then only said to
be compelled, when fear maketh him willing to it^ — it ap-
peareth, that (according to his grounds) it is a compulsory
action also. If voluntary actions may be compulsory actions,
then the will may be compelled. To help to bear off this blow,
he distinguislieth between the compulsion of the will and
the compulsion of the voluntary agent"", denying the former,
but acknowledging the latter ; — " that is, not a compulsion of
the will, but of the man"." The very same he hath again in
these words, " The necessitation of the will is the same thing
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. Numb. xix. p. 122.]
P- 208.] m [Q,u,, Animadv. upon Numb. xix.
' [Ibid.] p. 208.]
" [Ibid.] n [-ibia.]
' [See above in the Defence, T. H.
378
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part with the compulsion of the man^." If this be not plain
— ^ii: — jargon/^ and ''Bohu^^ (as he phraseth it?), let him tell me
what is the compulsion of a man to will, but the compulsion
of his will. Whether by the will he understand the soul as
it willeth, or the faculty of the will, or the act of willing ;
every way, he that compelleth a man to will, compelleth his
will. Let him call it what he please, either to compel a man
to ^nll or to compel the will ; by his leave, it is a gross con-
tradiction j for to compel implieth reluctance and opposition,
and to will implieth inchnation and appetition. To necessi-
tate the will (as he doth) is to compel the will, so far as the
will in the elicit acts of it is capable of compulsion.
[What is That is properly said to be compelled, " which hath its
co^pui- beginning from an extrinsecal cause, that which suffereth
sion. ] contributing nothing to it,^' but " resisting as much as he
CRU^.'^ But he hath devised a new improper kind of com-
pulsion, which is caused only by "fear""," which is not properly
a compulsion ; and such as it is, [is] common to many other
causes with fear; as, to persuasion, — so SauPs servants
1 Sam. compelled him" to eat ; — to command, — so, " the drinking
Ebth!'i,~l. '^^^s according to law, none did compel — to occasion, — so
2 Cor. xii. St. Paul saith, " I am become a fool in glorying, ye have
compelled me."
I pass by his uncouth term of "creation of the wilP" in
every single act of willing: and his extravagant exception, — 809
if " the same indi\idual man who did choose to throw his
goods overboard,'' might " choose not to tlirow his goods over-
board," then " he might choose to throw overboard and not
throw overboard*." As if the liberty to tlu'ow or not to
throw and the liberty to throw and not to tlu'ow, that is, the
libei*t\' to do either part of the contradiction or to do both
parts of the contradiction, were the same hberty. And,
secondly, as if a man who hath actually chosen, were as free
to choose now, as he was at the same time when he did
choose. I see, if he cannot find a knot in a bulrush, he will
do his endeavour to make it. If "a man" (saith he) "by
° [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. crd^fTos."]
p. 208.] r [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. .\ix.
p [See above p. 368. note f.] p. 208.]
q Aristot., Eth.,lib. III. c.j. [§ 12.— » [Ibid.]
'^"EoiKe St] rh ^laioi' ehai ov ^wdiv v ^ [Ibid., p. 209.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
379
force seize on another man's limbs^^ (as suppose his hancl^^ Discourse
" and move them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth, '- —
. . . the action so done is not the action of him that sufFer-
eth, but of him that useth the force ""/^ But if he that useth
the force shall give a thii-d person a box on the ear with that
hand which he forceth, then it is the action of both; but
with this difterence^ that it is the voluntary action of the one^
and the forced or compelled action of the other. But sup-
posing the first man had the will of the second as much in his
power as his hand (as God Almighty hath)^ and should necessi-
tate him to beat the third person wilHngly; certainly the second
person, being so necessitated, could be no more blamed for
willing in such a case, than for striking im willingly.
That motions proceeding from ^^antipathies" are " primo Motuspri-
2)rimi^,'^ such as surprise a man and prevent not only all an/amTpa-
actual dehberation but all advertence of reason, there is no ^^^^'*
doubt. But he who knoweth no other motus primo primos^'
but only " antipathies," is like to prove some such rare di-
vine or philosopher, as Megabyses shewed himself a painter
by his ignorant discourse; — "^Miilst thou wert silent (said
Apelles) thou seemedst to be somebody, but now there is not
the meanest boy that grinds ochre but he laughs at thee''."
The difference between necessity upon antecedent supposi-
tion, and necessity upon a consequent supposition, hath been
sufficiently cleared several times in these Castigations^", and
in my Defence in this very section 2. to which I remit the
reader. Whosoever shall tell us, that he who hath chosen to
himself the profession of a Romish Priest, is still no more
necessitated to take the oath of celibate, than he was before
he made choice of that office'' ; and that the action of him
who runs away upon the first ^iew of a cat, by reason of an
antipathy " wliich he cannot help," before all advertence of
reason, is as fi'ee as a man casting his goods into the sea to
° [Qii., Ajiimadv. upon Numb. xix. Megabv5^5 in the text should be Mega-
p. 209.] bYi«^.— .Elian (Hist. Var., ii. 2. ) relates
^' [Ibid., p. 210. — Ilet it pass, noting the same anecdote of Z(?f/.r/5 and Mega-
only, that he expoiindeth ' primo byzus; and Pliny (Hist, Nat., xxxv.
/)r/iHi,' which I understood not before, 12), of Apelles and^/t-aarjrff rMf Grfa^]
by 'antipathies.'"] r [Above Numbers i, iii; pp. 257,
[PluL, De Animi Tranquillitate, 258; 2G4— 268.]
c. xii ; and with a little variation, De ^ [Above pp. 126, 127.]
Discrim. Adulat. et Amici, c. xv : Op. ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix.
Moral, torn. ii. p. 629, and torn. i. p. 155. p. 210.]
1
380 CASTIGATIONS OF
Part save his own life after a sad and serious deliberation^: and
III. .
tliat he who takes physic out of wantonness, was as much
necessitated to stay -within doors, as he who lay bedrid of a
[Numb. hectic fever '^j and that Balaam's blessing of Israel against
&c.] ' his purpose and desii'e, and Caiaphas his prophecy, which he
[John xi. (c spake not of himself/^ but necessarily, by the special deter-
mination of the Holy Ghost, were altogether as free as
[Gen.xiix.] Jacob^s blessing of his sons upon election'^; I say, he who
shall tell us all this in earnest upon his own word without
any reason or authority, had need to meet with very credu-
lous disciples, who judge of colours winking.
To search It is true, WO wlio " SCO but through a srlass darkly/^ do
tooboiaiv ... 1 T 1 f '/.v. 1
into the not in this mortality comprehend exactly the nature of God
GodTs a ^^cl the Holy Angels ; partly by reason of the weakness of
[1 Cor xiii Understanding, — the water can ascend no higher than
12.] the fountain's head, — and partly for want of revelation.
Not to know what God hath not revealed, is a learned igno-
rance j and therefore, he who searcheth presumptuously into
the majesty of God, is oppressed deservedly by His glory.
But the But the much greater offence doth lie on the other side, —
greater ^
fault is neg- that men do not endeavour to know God so much as they
hgence. Qught, and might, by the light of nature, the contemplation
of the creatures, and the revelation of God's Holy Word, nor
to serve Him according to their knowledge. How shall we
serve God if we do not know God at all ? The least means
of the knowledge of God is by the contemplation of the crea-
Rora, i. 20. tures : yet even that doth render men " without excuse.''
Ko man but himself would have objected it as a presumption
to any man to have said, that God was freer to do good than
mortal man, and uncapable of doing e^il. Yet this is that
which those di'eadful terms implied^. We measure hberty by
the degree of rationabiht}', and the power of reason over pas-
sion j he by the largeness or straitness of the prison. Ours
is a liberty of men, his is a liberty of blackbirds. If I were
disposed to ca\'il at words as he doth, I could shew him outsio
of Scaliger, that one heat is not more intensive than another,
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xix. pp. 210, 211.]
p. 210.] ^ [Ibid., p. 211.— "He takes upon
[This instance, which is one of liim to attribute to them" (viz. to God
Bramhall's, is not mentioned by Hobbes and to the good angels) liberty of
in the passage here referred to.] exctc se, and to deny them liberty of
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. specijication.'']
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
381
any more than one liberty is more intensive than another^. Discourse
Both phrases are metaphorical. Intention is properly the '■
di'amng out of the two extremes, the one further from the
other ; as in the string of a bow by bending it^ and in a cord
by stretching it out. But I forbear.
He had said in his first answer, " He that can do what he will, t. h. his
hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot has none at all^ orem^po-
I answered, that he who can do what he ^vll], hath not only ^^"^
a liberty but omnipotence To this he replieth, that "it is deed
one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he -will, and "°
another to say that a man hath power to do what he will^^'
This is very true, but it helpeth not him at all. He spake
directly of power, — " he that can do what he wiU," and " he
that cannot do what he will." Thus I argue ; — either a man
can do what he will, or he cannot do what he will ; if he can
do what he will, then he is not only free but omnipotent;
if he cannot do what he will, then he hath no liberty at all.
So he hath made men to be either almighty gods or senseless
logs ; both ways he erreth. If he that can do what he will
be not omnipotent (in good English), I have forgot my mo-
therms tongue. He that is bound hand and foot, may wish
that he were loosed, and he that is so sick that he cannot
stand, may wish that he were in health, that they might
both be able to walk ; but to elect walking in that state and
condition wherein they are, without supposition of the loos-
ing of the one, or the recovery of the other, they cannot ; for
both want power, and election is of things actually possi-
ble. There is only this difference, that in probability the
bound man may be loosed, before the sick man recover his
strength. But yet it may so fall out, that the sick man may
be restored to his health, before the other be loosed from his
bonds. Therefore he saith amiss, that the sick man wanteth
power, not liberty ; and the bound man hberty, not power
If he understood the difference between the elicit and impe-
rate acts of the will, he would be able to judge of such cases
better than he is. I have only one more advertisement to the
reader, that after all this glorious ostentation — " he that can
^ [Exercit.de Subtilitate &c.,] Exer- 128 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
cit. xii. c. 2. [pp. 66, 67.] i [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix.
[T. H. Numb. xix. above p. 123.] p. 211.]
[Defence, Numb. xix. above p. ^ [Ibid.]
383
CASTIGATIONS OF
p R T do what he will, hath all liberty possible" — he leavetli man
'■ — as poor and bare and helpless as a grasshopper in winter,
without any liberty to will, and consequently without any
liberty to do.
He dare He nameth two Schoolmen, — I think, by the matching of
himself to them, they be a great part of his store, — Suarez and " J ohan-
witnesses. ^ Duns" (so he is pleased to call that honour of our
nation, and one of the subtilest writers that these last ages
have afforded), and four later divines, Luther, Melancthon,
Calvin, Perkins, whom he "always much admired If he
did so, they are the more beholden to him; for a man
may see by his treatises, that unless he "meditated""" of
them sometimes, he hath not been much acquainted with
them. He dare not refer his two sorts of devils, or his
temporary pains of Hell, or his lawless state of mankind by
nature, or his necessity of active obedience to all human
laws, or his inefficacy of prayer, or his infallible rule of moral
goodness, or his universal necessity of all events by the phy-
sical determination of the second causes, or any one of his
hundreds of paradoxes, to their determination.
Terms of Room for a great censor, not an old Roman censor, but a
new English censor, who cometh armed with his own autho-
rity, to reform not only authors, but the arts and sciences
themselves, after he hath been dreaming (I should have said
"meditating") some years upon the top of Parnassus, and
now cometh forth suddenly
" Grammaticus, rhetor, geometres, pictor, aliptes"."
To stay there were to do him wrong; a pentameter added
will not contain half his exploits ; a poet, a logician, a phi-
losopher natural and moral, an astronomer, a mathema-
tician, a theologian. To what purpose did our universities
nourish so many little professors ? One great professor is
best, as the cat in the fable said of one great way. But for-
get not Epictetus his rule, " Remember to distrust o." We
have seen a mountebank, or quacksalver, or operator, or char-
latan, call him what you will, vapour upon a stage, and slight
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. *" [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv.
p. 212. Johannes Duns Scotus became p. 47.]
Theological Professor at Oxford in 1301, n [Juv., Sat., iii. 76.]
and at Paris in 1304; Suarez was a ° [Epic/mrwet*, ap. Cic, ad Attic, i.
Spanish Jesuit, born 1548, died 1617.] 19.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
383
the good old physicians for poring upon Galen and Hippo- Discouuse
crates to learn a company of senseless aphorisms, whilst they — —
by their own meditation and experience had found out reme-
i 11 dies more easy, more effectual, more universal. We blame
the Court of Rome for their Index Expiirgatoriiis ; it is a
shi'ewd sign, when litigants are forced to cut out the tongues
of their own witnesses : yet they purged out but words, or
sometimes a sentence; rarely prohibited one of their own
authors. Here words, and sentences, and whole authors, and
arts, go to wrack together ; much like the Mahometan refor-
mation, when they sacrificed the most part of their interpre-
ters of the Alcoran to the fire without ever reading them.
Yet, what they did, they did by public authority, and spared
some as genuine expositors. But what this our new censor
doth, he doth upon his own head, and like death sparing
none ; so did not they.
Down goes all astrology and metaphysics. The moral
philosopher must quit his means and extremes in order to
virtue P, his hberty of contradiction and contrariety his ne-
cessity absolute and hypothetical'^, his proportion arithmetical
and geometrical^ (I hope the geometrician may have leave
to hold it still), his prhicipia congenita and acquisita^, his
eKov(TLov and Trpoatperov^, and most of his terms of art, be-
cause Mr. Hobbes hath not read them. It is well if moral
philosophy escape his censure. For if the law of the land be
" the only infalUbie rule of right reason,^^ then the knowledge
of actions, morally good and morally bad, belongeth properly
to the common lawyer. The moral philosopher may put up
his pipes. The same arbitrary power he assumeth to himself
in natural philosophy, rejecting all the common terms used
by philosophers, euphonice gratia, because they sound not well
in his ears, for other reasons he hath none. " Let the natural
philosopher no more mention his intentional species, his
understanding agent and patient, his receptive and reductive
power of the matter, his qualities symbolical and dissymbolical,
his temperament ad pondus and ad jmtitiam" &"c. ; " I would
have him fling away his sympathies and antipathies, his anti-
P [Aristot., Ethic, II. vi. &c.] [Id., Ethic, Y. iii.iv.]
1 [See above in the Defence, Numb, » [Id., Analyt. Poster., II. xviii.]
iv. p. 36 ; Disc i. Pt. iii.] " [Id., Ethic, III. iii, iv.]
' [Aristot., Physic. Auscult.,II. ix.]
384
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part peristasis and the like''." Whether it was astronomy or
'■ — astrology in my original, I do not know, nor have means
to see^. Both may signify the same thing. I am sure, I
neither said nor meant judiciary or genethhacal astrology, as
my instances do evidence. The truth is, there are so many
mistakes in that impression, that sometimes I scarcely know
myself what to make of them.
But he is more propitious to the astronomer. His "apogseum
and perigseum, arctic, antarctic, equator, zodiac, zenith, hori-
zon, zones,^^ are not so much as ^' terms of art," but are as
intelligible as a hatchet or a saw^." What? Imaginary
circles, and lines, and poles, and points, and an imaginary
axletree, and ram, and bull, and bears, and dragon, and yet
no terms of art ? What are they then ? Let him put it to a
jury of Malmsburians themselves, whether they understand
these so well " as a hatchet or a saw," and he is gone.
The hke favour he shews to logicians. Their words of the
first and second intention, their abstracts and concretes, their
subjects and predicates, their moods and figures, their method
synthetic and analytic, their fallacies of composition and divi-
sion, are no terms of art, but plain intelligible words. He
that can say this without blushing, may dispute with any
man. Porphyry^ makes the five predicables to be five terms
of art. Are not the predicaments and post-predicaments,
and demonstrations a priori and a posteriori, terms of art ?
Who made a mood and a figure to signify what they do but
artists ? Let all the world hear them, or read them, who
have not learned logic, and they shall understand no more of
them than of his "jargon." 'Whj is not an antecedent and
hypothetical necessity as intelhgible as a categorical and
hypothetical syllogism ? An individuum vagum, if it were not
a term of art, should signify rather an atom, or a rogue, than
an honest person. Though he be so favourable to logic here,
he is as little beholden to it as to the other arts, who knows
no better what are terms of art. One of the first distinctions
which we meet withal in logic, is between the first and second
notions. The second notions, such as all these are, are called
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. Animadv. upon Numb. xix. p. 213.]
p. 213.] ^ [Ibid.]
^ [" And for the astrologer (unless " [Viz. in his Eiffaycayrj.^
he means astronomer)," &c. — Qu.,
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
385
expressly terms of art, or logical notions, or logical organs, Discourse
which they define to be " images or representations, whereby —
the understanding doth form to itself real notions and they
compare them to brazen weights, of no value in themselves,
whereby nevertheless all sorts of gold are weighed. There
can be nothing more certain and evident than this, that
all these logical and astronomical terms be second notions,
and terms of art.
812 Nay, so extremely blind and partial he is, that he ap-
proveth of " Barbara, Celarenty Darii, Ferio,^' which he
maketh " terms of art,^' as a good invention to help " the ap-
prehension of 3'oung men^ and yet, with the same breath,
rejecteth these most excellent and most significant distinc-
tions and expressions, which have been received in a manner
universally, some of them for two thousand years, all of them
for divers centui'ies of years, in the Church, and in the
Schools, as well of theology as philosophy, which were invented
for remedies against confusion, and helps to the clearer and
more distinct understanding of high and difficult notions, upon
this false and slanderous pretext, that they were invented
to blind the understanding because he presumed to con-
demn them before he took pains to understand them.
He addeth, that I '^^cite no terms of art for geometry," saying
he "was afraid" I "would have put in lines, or perhaps equality
and unequality, for terms of art^." To free him from this
fear, I put in their numbers, numbering and numbered, their
supei-ficies, concave and convex, their triangles, amblygone
and oxygone, their cones, cubes, cylinders, their parallels,
and parallelograms, their proportions, superpartient and su-
perbipartient, &c., their rules of algebra and helcataim, their
integers, and numerators, and divisors, and denominators,
and fabrical figures, their proportionality, arithmetical and
geometrical, continual and discontinual, direct, conversed,
alternative, inversed, compounded, parted. Geometry hath
its words of art and proper expressions, as well as all other
arts and sciences. So hath physic, chyrurgeiy, law. So
have soldiers, mariners, hawkers, hunters.
But of all others he hath the least favour for the divine ;
^ [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xix. c [Ibid.]
p. 213.] d [Ibid.]
BRAMHALL. (- p
386
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part ^yhom he will not permit " to use a word in preaching, but
'■ — such as his auditors_, nor in writing, but such as his common
readers, may understand I do not hke it any more than
he, that a di^-ine should affect uncouth words, to make his
I Cor. xiv. ignorant auditors to gape. " I had rather speak five words
in the Church with understanding," &c., ^^than ten thousand
in an unknown tongue." But doth he make no distinction
between the Church and the Schools ? Doth he think, that
theology, which hath the subliraest subject, doth not require
as high, as learned, and as distinct expressions, as any art or
science whatsoever ? All hearers and readers are not no\'ices,
nor of the vulgar or common sort. There are those who have
[Acts xxv. been " brought up at the feet of Gamaliel," and have been ad-
^'^ mitted into the innermost closet of the School learning. The
Holy Scripture itself, though it affect plainness, is not always
such a stranger either to learning or elegance. The only answer
I shall give him to this, is, that he is beyond his last."
A contra- In the last part of this section^, he troubleth himself more
diction. ^-|^^^ needeth about a testimony, which I cited out of his
book De Give ; not out of any esteem I had for it, — for I
condemned it, — but to let him see his contradiction. There
he made the ecclesiastical doctors to be infallible, here he
maketh them to be fallible. There he made their infallibility
to be a peculiar pri\Tlege derived to them by imposition of
hands from the Apostles, whom they succeeded, and from the
promise of Christ ; here he attributeth it wholly to that
power which is committed to them by the ci^il magistrate.
And what if the civil magistrate commit no power to them ?
Then, by his doctrine, Christ breaketh His promise, and this
pri^-ilege ceaseth. Infallibilitatem hanc promisit Set'vato}'
noster {in Us rebus qucB ad sahitem simt necessarice) ApostoUs
usque ad diem judicii, hoc est, ApostoUs et Pastoribus ab Apo-
stolis successive per manuum impositionem consecrandis^ " He
answereth, that "the infallibility of ecclesiastical doctors . . doth
not consist in this, that they cannot be deceived, but that a
subject cannot be deceived in obeying them, when they are
Matt. XV. lawfully constituted doctors*." A pretty fancy. " If the
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. ^ [De Give,] c. xvii., § 28. [p. 256.
p. 214.] ed. 1642.]
8 [Ibid., pp. 214, 215. See above in " [Qu., Animadv. upoii Numb. xix.
the Defence, Numb. xix. p. 130. note a.] p. 214.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
387
blind lead the blind, botli fall into the ditch doctor and Discourse
subject together. If the doctors be deceived themselves,, they ^ —
must needs deceive the subjects, who trust to their interpre-
tation. Secondly, he waveth now the two grounds of their
infallibility, that is, the promise of Clu'ist and the prinlege
conferred by imposition of hands, and ascribeth all their in-
fallibihty to the constitution of the ci\il power ; which may
render theii' expositions legal, according to the municipal
laws, but cannot render them infallible. Thirdly, if ecclesias-
813 tical doctors lawfully constituted, be so far infallible that they
cannot deceive the subject, why did he vary so much (noto-
riously) fi'om their expositions at that time, as he hath done
in his book De Give, when they had both imposition of hands
and approbation from supreme authority? Why doth he now,
wanting both the promise of Christ and imposition of hands,
take upon him to be the tryer and examiner of the exposition,
not only of single prophets, but of whole Convocations ?
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER XX.
If Mr. Hobbes did understand what true election and true Election
compulsion is, it were evident, that election of one out of pufjion"!,"!.
more than one cannot consist with antecedent determination •consistent,
to one j much less with compulsion or force, where he that is
compelled opposeth and resisteth as much as he can. That
the same act should be both voluntary, that is, with oiu' will,
and compulsoiy, that is, against our will, not in part but in
whole, is impossible. But as the sepia, to preserve herself
undiscovered, doth shed forth about her a quantity of black
inky blood, to hide herself from the fisher; so T. H., for fear
to be catched in palpable errors, doth confound and blunder
all things, making a new election, a new compulsion, a new
liberty. There is not a word of moment here that hath not
been discussed formerly in this treatise. And I do not
esteem his raw " meditations" worthy of repetition over and
over. AMiat is new in them, I shall cull out from the rest.
He telleth us, that when a stone is thrown upwards, the [t. h.'s in-
external agent giveth it a beginning of motion ^^".^^ So far we sloirfaii-''
agree, whatsoever gives it the continuance. He saith further,
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. \x. p. 22(5.]
C C 2
388
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part that " when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the
III
~ — power of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible
to the eye, is not imperceptible to reason Herein we
differ, wherein all the world hitherto have agreed. But it was
very meet, that he should deny the stone the determination
of its natural motion, who had denied the intellectual soul the
determination of its own will. Yet, since he is pleased to
conceal his new agent, I have no desire to scrape acquaintance
with it ; especially upon such terms, — to relinquish that in-
trinsecal principle which all the world hitherto hath received.
There are So, passing by his spiritual court "^^^ unsaluted (he loves
tions! to shew his teeth, though he cannot bite), and leaving
''^counterfeiting" in hope of" quarter"" to himself as a person
much more capable of that design, the next new subject that
presenteth itself is, whether there be any mixed actions, partly
voluntary, partly unvoluntary. He denieth it positively, upon
this ground, that " one and the same action can never be
both voluntary and unvoluntary I answer, first, to his
argument, that voluntary and unvoluntary are not opposed
contradictorily, so as to admit no mean, but privatively, which
do admit a mean ; as the dawning of the day, or the twilight,
is a mean between light and darkness, when it may be truly
said, it is partly light and partly dark. Melancthon hath an
excellent rule to this purpose ; — " Privative opposita nequeunt
esse in eodem subjecto gradibus excellentibus^' — " Privative op-
posites cannot be in the same subject in eminent degrees,"
but in remiss degrees they may. As, to avoid importunity,
a man may do a free act with reluctance ; all reluctance is a
degree of unwillingness. "V^Hien Nero, in the beginning of
his quinquennium, was to sign the condemnation of a male-
factor, he used to wish that he had never learned to write p ;
to shew, that though he did it willingly to satisfy justice, for
otherwise he might have pardoned him, yet he did it un-
willingly in his own nature. And with this Aristotle agreeth
fully : — There are some actions" which are neither properly
voluntary nor unvoluntary, but "of a middle kind" (or "mixed"
* [Q,u., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p ["Quam vellem nescire litteras."
Sueton., in Vita Neron., c. x. — Seneca,
De Clement., lib. ii. c. 1. p. 644. ed.
1607.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
389
actions) ; " as things done for fear of a greater evil, or for Discourse
some honest causes ^.^^ And he giveth two instances '"^ This — —
is one, of a man who throws his goods into the sea^ willingly
in respect of the end — to save his life^ but the action being
simply considered in itself, unwillingly. The other instance,
of one commanded to do some dishonest act by a tyi'ant, who
hath his parents and children in his power. And so he con-
cludeth truly, that " they are mixed actions, but participate
more of the voluntaiT" than of the unvoluntary^
Whereas I urged, that election of one out of more could [Election
not consist with determination to one*, he answereth, ^^that a ofmo^^hi-
man forced to prison may choose whether he will walk upon det"er-
his feet or be haled upon the ground"/^ which, as it is false,
as I have shewed in my former Defence ^, so it is wholly ^dde
814 from his purpose. There is no doubt but he who is neces-
sitated in one particular, may be left free in another ; as he
who is appointed the time and place for a duel, may choose
his weapon. But in that particular wherein he is neces-
sitated, he cannot choose. If they will tie him to a horse-
tail, he must be tied. K they will fasten him to a sled and
draw him to prison, he must be dra^Ti. There cannot pos-
sibly be any election, where there is, and so far as there is,
an antecedent determination to one.
He disliketh the term of " rational will,^^ saying there is Rational
nothing rational but God, angels, and men^".'^ I hope he is
not in eai'nest. Surely he believeth there is a reasonable soul,
or otherwise he deserts his Athanasian Creed; that is, the soul
of a rational man, as a [rational] will is the will of a rational
man. Whether he make the will to be a faculty of the
reasonable soul, or to be the reasonable soul as it willeth, I
am indifferent. As the appetite of a sensitive creature is
called the sensitive appetite, so the appetite of a rational or
intellectual creature is called the rational or intellectual will.
He saith ''^le would not have excepted against this expression,
but that every where^^ I speak of the will and other faculties as
of men, or spirits in men's bellies'." I do not confine the rea-
•« Ethic, lib. III. c. i. [§ 4, 6.] Numb. xx. p. 228.]
- [Id., ibid., § 4, 5.] x [Numb. xx. above p. 134 ; Di
ISC. 1.
» [Id., ibid., § 10.] Pt. iii.]
* [Defence, Numb. XX. above p. 130.] y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx.
» [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx. p. 228.]
above p. 132; and Qu., Animadv. upon ^ [Ibid.]
390
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part sonable soul to the "belly/' but it is a spirit in a man's body.
' — If it be not, let him say what it is. The will is either a faculty
of the reasonable soul, or (which is all one) the reasonable soul
itself, as it dischargeth the duties of such a faculty. Some-
times he confesseth as much himself; — "Indeed as the will
is a faculty or power of a man's soul, so to will is an act of it
according to that power *.^' He jesteth at my " five terrible
things/' saying, I " had no more reason for five than fifteen^."
It seemeth that when he should have been reading authors,
he was " meditating^" upon a dry summer. Let him consult
with Aristotle^ and his expositors. That which determined
[Dan. iii. the three children, was no antecedent extrinsecal cause, but
16, &c.] conscience and their own judgment, which dictated to them
their duty to their God.
Passive He secmcth to be troubled at sundry passages in my
obedience. £Qj,j^gj, Defence, as exempting subjects from active obedience
to unjust laws; which (he saith) "makes it impossible for
any nation in the world to preserve itself from civil wars®."
Whether was it want of memory or rather subtlety in him.
Acts iv. 19. among these passages to omit that, — "Whether it be right in
the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God,
judge ye ?" It is hard, that we, who have formerly been
accused to maintain blind obedience, should now be charged
with seditious principles, which our souls abhor. But we sail
securely between this Scylla and that Charybdis, by steering
the ancient and direct course of passive obedience. We
justify no defensive arms against a sovereign prince. We
allow no civil wars for conscience' sake. When we are per-
secuted for not complying with the unlawful commands of a
lawful sovereign, we know no other remedy but to sufi'er or
to flee : according to that memorable example of the The-
bsean legion, consisting wholly of Christians of unmatchable
valour, and such as might in probability have defended them-
selves from the emperor's fury ; yet, when Maximian com-
manded them to sacrifice to idols, they refused, suff'ering every
a [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. XX. ^ Ethic, lib. III. cc. vi, vii, viii.
above p. 133.] [See above in the Defence, Numb. xx.
[Q,u., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. p. 134. note f ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
P- 228.] e [^Q„^ Animadv. upon Numb. xx.
[Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. p. 229.]
p. 47.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
391
tenth man of them to be slain without a blow smitten ; and Discourse
when the bloody emperor came among them again to renew — —
his command, and to see them decimated the second time,
they cried out with one voice, " Cognosce, O Imperator,^^ kc.
— " ^Know, O emperor, that we are all Christians, we submit
our bodies to thy power, but our free souls flee unto our
Sa\dour ; neither our known courage nor desperation itself
hath armed us against thee ; . . because we choose rather to
die innocents than to live nocents ; . . thou shalt find our
hands empty of weapons, but our breast armed with the
Catholic Faith;' and so, having power to resist, yet they
suffered themselves without resistance to be cut in pieces
They are T. H. his own principles (which make no difference
between just and unjust power, between a sword given by
God and a sword taken by man), which do serve to involve
nations in civil wars.
He saith, ^^it seemeth that" I "call compulsion force," and Compui-
he "calleth it a fear of force I called it as all the world called iu".'
it, and as it hath been defined in the Schools for two thousand
years. Yet I do not believe, that it is always necessary to all
sorts of compulsion, that the force be actually exercised ; as
it is when a man is driven hither and thither with the wind
(there is no fear in that case, yet there is compulsion). But
it sufficeth sometimes to compulsion, if the force be present,
such as cannot be resisted, and ready to be put in execution
1 5 if there be need. As a man that will not appear freely upon
summons, is forced hj poursuivants and Serjeants, although
they do not carry him upon their backs, nor drag him upon
the ground. It sufficeth, that they be masters and able to
compel him, "/cat hwajJuevoL KLvelv /jltj ^ov\6/jb€vov.'^ But ac-
cording to his heterodox principles, every remote fear doth
make compulsion. As if a man should say, that a child was
compelled to run away from a mouse, or a coward was com-
pelled to wink when a man holds up his hand at him, or a
man is compelled to throw his goods tDverboard ; which he
himself confesseth to be freely and dehberately elected^.
From this first mistake of what compulsion is, proceedeth
a second, — that " the actions of men compelled are neverthe-
' [Euclier.,ap.Surium, Vit. Sanctor., p. 229.]
22 Sept. toni. iii. p. 222. td. 1618.] h [Scc above T. H. Numb, viii ; in
8 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. the Defence, p. 45.]
392
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part less voluntary*;" and a thirds — that compulsion doth not
— — justify the party compelled^ : all which are mere logomachies
or contentions about words, which he is fallen into, either
ignorantly, by not understanding what compulsion is, or
cunningly and deliberately, to have a pretext of excepting
against former authors; although it be but like the dog's
barking at the moonshine in the water. Force actually
[2Sam.xiii. excrciscd did acquit Tamar and the betrothed damsel from
xxir25-27.] all guilt. But Hcrod's fear of a successor did not excuse
[Luke xix murder of the Innocents ; nor the fear of his Master's
20-24.] severity excuse the unprofitable servant's hiding of his talent
in a napkin. But I leave these contentions about words,
which signify not so much as " the shadow of an ass/^
Fear of He hath plunged himself here into two real errors. The
not abro- onc is, that " if the fear be allowed, the action which it pro-
[Gen.^S' duceth is allowed also\'^ Abraham^s fear was just ; ^^The
fear of God is not in this place, they will murder me for
my wife's sake.'' But the action which it produced, that is,
fMatt.xxvi. the denial of his wife, is not " allowed." Peter's fear was
69-75 &c 1
allowed," but the denial of his Master was not allowable.
The other and more dangerous error is, that fear doth abro-
gate a law, and make it to be no law in some cases'". Take
the larger exposition of this, out of his book De Cive ; — ^' No
man is bound by any pacts or contracts whatsoever not to
resist him who goeth about to kill him, or wound him, or to
hurt his body" — Mortem vel vulnera vel aliud damnum cor-
poris inferenti nemo pactis suis quibuscunque obligatur non re-
sistere^." So a scholar may resist his master when he goeth
about to whip him ; so a company of traitors or other capital
malefactors may lawfully resist the sovereign magistrate.
This is seditious indeed, and openeth a large window to civil
war. This is directly contrary to what he said in his book
De Cive ; — " In every perfect commonwealth, the right of the
private sword is excluded, and no subject hath right to use
his power to the preservation of himself at his own discre-
tion °." Judge, reader, whether we or he be better subjects ;
'"■ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. "Est enim in unoquoque gradus qui-
p. 229.] dam timiditatis summus, per quem
^ [Ibid.] malum quod infertur appreliendit ut
' [Ibid., p. 230.] maximum, ideoque necessitate natural!
[Ibid,] quantum potest fugit," &c.]
" [De Cive,] cap. ii. § 18. [p. « [Ibid.,] cap. vi. § 13. [p. 66.—
20. The passage continues tlms, — " In omni civitate perfecta, hoc est,
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
393
he, who holdeth that in case of extreme danger a subject hath Discourse
no obligation to his sovereign, or we, who hold it better to — ~ —
die innocents than to live nocents. His reason — because we
bind or guard capital malefactors p — sheweth a distrust of
what they may do de facto, not a doubt of what they ought
to do de jure. I alleged, that "the omission of circumcision
I in the wilderness was not sin^i to shew, that though no fear
or necessity can justify the breach of the negative laws of
God or nature, yet in some cases it may justify the trans-
gression of the positive law, or the omission of a duty
enjoined by affirmative precepts.
To my instance of two servants'", the one spending his Natural
master's money in a tavern, the other having it taken away determi-^
from him by force, or yielding it up upon just fear, he "^^^^y'
j answereth nothing; the scope of them being to shew, that
strength of temptation doth not justify an act, so much as ex-
trinsecal necessity. If "the second causes" were as "rackets,"
and men as "tennis-balls" or " foot-balls to what purpose
did God give men reason to govern themselves, and to bridle
their passions, who are tossed to and fro inevitably, irre-
sistibly, as the rackets please ? Reason had been a fitter gift
for the rackets, than for the balls, if his opinion were true.
That upon the planting of a cannon against a wall the battery
is necessary before the bullet arrive*, is true ; but there is no
such necessary connexion between free or contingent agents
and their acts, as there is between the cannon and the
battery; which he might have easily perceived, if he had
been pleased to have enlarged his "meditation'^ a little further.
It was in the power of the cannonier not to have charged the
cannon, or to have given it but half a charge, or to have given
816 no fire, or to have turned the mouth of it another way,
higher or lower, to the right hand or to the left. In all these
cases, what had become of his battery ?
If he hath such a conceit, that no man doth or can deter- Not volun-
tarily.
ubi nulli civium jus est viribus suis ad num certissimum est non videri illos . .
propriam conservationem sue arbitrio satis obligates esse."]
utendi, sive ubi gladii privati jus ex- 'i [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 135 ;
cluditur."] Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
P [Ibid., c. ii. § 18. p. 21 — " Ei qui ' [Ibid., pp. 135, 136.]
pacto tenetur, creditur ; . . qui vero ad * [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx.
supplicium ducuntur, sive capitale sive p. 230.]
capitali mitius, constringuntur vinculis, t [Ibid., p. 231.]
vel satellitibus custodiuntur : quodsig-
394
CASTIGATIONS OF
P^A R T mine himself, contrary to the sense of the whole world, let
him enjoy it. Some men have conceited themselves to be
urinals, and suffered none to touch them for fear of breaking
them. But he must not think to obtrude his phlegmatic
fancies upon all other men, who understand themselves
better. If he were not resolved to oppose all the world with-
out any ground, he would never have denied a '^moral" efficacy,
or metaphorical ^^motion,^' or have affirmed that motives, that
is to say, persuasives or reasons, weighed in the understand-
ing, do determine the free agent naturally". Is the per-
suading of a man to eat, and the thrusting of it down his
throat, the same thing ? Do an argument and a cannon bullet
work after the same manner? Did he ever hear a bullet
called a " motive^^ to the beating down of the wall, or flowers
called " motives'^ to the production of the fruits, or meat a
" motive^^ to nourishment ? Natural efficacy is always neces-
sary, and determinate, and active to the height of its power ;
but moral agents act not necessarily, nor determinately, nor
always to the height of their power. The lawyer that he
speak eth of ^, may refuse to plead, or delay his pleading, or
plead better or worse ; and when he hath done his uttermost,
it may so fall out that he effecteth nothing for his client.
I am ashamed of such silly verbal objections, contrary to the
known principles of arts.
[The more He complaineth, that I put his notions oftentimes into
more"' mine own terms 'f. I had thought I had done him a favour
liberty.] render him more intelligible, and put his sense into the
common language of scholars. The understanding being the
root of liberty, and the will being but intelledus extensus ad
habendum aut faciendum quod cognoscif — "the understand-
ing extended to enjoy or do that which it knoweth^,^^ it must
needs be, that the more reason, the less passion, the less
reluctance, and consequently the more liberty. He saith,
" When we mark not the force that moves us, we think . . that
it is not causes but liberty, that produceth the action I
rendered him thus, — " The ignorance of the true causes and
their power is the reason that we ascribe the effect to
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. ^ Scalig.,[DeSubtilitate&c.,] Exerc.
p. 231.] cccvii. c. ;3. [p. 923.]
" [Ibid.] z [Above in the Defence, T. H.
" [Ibid.] Numb. xx. p. 132.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
395
liberty*." Where lieth the fault ? That which he calleth Discourse
"force" and "strength/' I call "power;" and for "that which —
moves us/' I say "causes," as he himself doth express him-
self in the same place. Where I say " the will causeth," he
saith " the man chooseth." As if there were any difference
between these two, 'the eye seeth/ and 'the man seeth.'
This, and a confounding of voluntas with volitio, the faculty
of willing with the act of willing, and a young suckling con-
tradiction which he hath found out, — that "the will hath power
to refuse what [it] willeth'^," that is, before it have willed it,
not after, — is the substance of this Animadversion ; which de-
serve no other answer, but that a man should change his risi-
bility into actual laughter.
I produced two reasons, to prove that true liberty is a [True
freedom not only from compulsion but from necessity'^ : the freedom^
former drawn from the nature of election, or the act of the gj^^as ^weii
will, which is always inter plura ; the latter, which I called a ^^^pJJJ
"new" argument, because it had not formerly been touched in sion.]
this treatise, taken from the nature of the faculty of the will,
or of the soul as it willeth ; which is not capable of any other
compulsion but necessitation, and if it be physically necessi-
tated, it is thereby acquitted from all guilt, and the fault
transferred upon those causes that did necessitate it. This
argument indeed began with a distinction, but proceeded to
a demonstration, which was reduced by me into form in my
Defence, to which he hath given no show of satisfaction,
either in his first answer, or in these Animadversions, except
it be a * concedo omnia,' or a granting of the conclusion.
The same ground which doth warrant the names of "tyrant,
prcsmunire, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday^" (that is, use,
" Quern penes arbitrium est et vis et norma loqv\endie"),
doth likewise justify these generally received terms of the
"elicit" and "imperate acts of the will," there being scarcely
one author, who hath written upon this subject in Latin, that
doth not use them, and approve them. In the Council of
Dort (which he himself mentionethf) he may find this truth
« [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 137 ; ^ [Ibid., p. 138 ; and Qu., Animadv.
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] upon Numb. xx. p. 234.]
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. « [Horat, A. P., 72. — "et jus ct
P- 233.] norma" &c.]
*= [Defence, Numb. xx. above pp. 130, f \Q.\x., Animadv. upon Numb. xx.
138.] p. 235.]
396
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Pa^rt positively maintained, — that "voluntas elicit actum cvMm^.^'
'- — Where he may likewise find_, what moral persuasives^^ or
motives ^ are, if he have a desire to learn.
T. H. mak- Although he be convicted, that it followeth from his prin- 8
the cause ciples, that God is the cause of all sin in the world, yet he is
of sin. Jq^i^ much ; for that is " an unseemly phrase, to say
that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like a
saying that God sinneth^" Yea, it is even as like it as one
egg is like another ; or rather it is not like it, for it is the
very same. "Nullum simile est idem" He that is the deter-
mining cause of sin in others, sinneth himself. It is as well
against the eternal law, that is, the rule of justice which is
in God Himself, to make another to sin, as to sin. Yet,
though he will not avow such " an unseemly phrase,^' — that
"God is the cause of sin," — yet he doth endeavour to prove it
by four texts of Holy Scripture^, which are altogether imper-
tinent to his purpose. The first is that of the Prophet Amos,
Amosiii.6. — " Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done
it?^^ But that is clearly understood of the e\'il of punish-
ment, not of the evil of sin. To the three other places —
2 Sam. xvi. that " the Lord said unto Shimei, curse Da^dd," and that
10.
1 icings the Lord put a lying spirit into the mouth oF^ Ahab's
1 Kings'xii. ^' pi'opliets,^^ and that of Rehoboam's not " hearkening to the
people,^^ — the reader may find a satisfactory answer formerly^.
But because he seemeth to ground much upon those words
which are added to the last place — " for the cause was from
the Lord,^^ — conceiving some singular virtue to lie in them,
and an ovation at least to be due unto himself [" I will not say,
lest the Bishop exclaim against me^^^), applauding himself like
the fly upon the cart-wheel — " See what a dust I do raise," —
I will take the liberty to tell him. further, that there is nothing
of any "cause of sin^^ in the text, but of a cause of Jeroboam's
advancement; as he might have perceived plainly by the
[1 Kings words immediately following, — "The cause was from the
xii. 15.]
8 [Judic. Theol. Britann. de III. et J [Ibid., p. 'iSi.]
IV.ArticulisRemonstrantium, DeCon- [Answ. to] Fount of Arg., [above
versions qua denotat actionem homi- pp. 230, 231.]
nis &c., thesis i ; ap. Act. Syn. Dordr., ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xx.
P. ii. p. 171. 4to. Dordr. 1620.] p. 234.— "That which God sayeth of
h [Id., Ibid., Thes. Heterod., thes. Himself 1 Kings xii. 15," &c., "I will
ii; ibid., pp. 173, 174.] not say, lest the Bp. exclaim against
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. me; but leave it to be interpreted by
p. 235.] those that have authority," &c.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
397
Lord, that He might perform His saying, which the Lord Discourse
spake by Ahijah the Shilonite unto Jeroboam the son of — ~
Nebat;" which saying was this, ''I will rent the kingdom [i Kings
out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee." ^^'^
So he hath produced an evil effect of punishment for an evil
effect of sin, and a cause of advancement for a cause of sin,
and a permitting or ordering or disposing of sin for a neces-
sitating or determining to sin.
Yet he produceth six witnesses, to prove that liberty is not Six witnes-
opposed to necessity, but to compulsion ; — Luther, Zanchy, versa/ne"'"
Bucer, CaMn, Moulin, and the Synod of Dort^. swered.^"'
First, reader, I desire thee to judge of the partiality of this
man ; who rejecteth all human authority in this cause (as he
hath reason, for it were an easy thing to overwhelm and smother
him, and his cause, with testimonies of Councils, Fathers,
doctors, of all ages and communions, and all sorts of classic
authors), and yet seeks for protection under the authority of
a few neoteric writers. " A double weight and a double [Prov. xx.
10;— "Z)/.
measure are an abommation. leri weights
" Aut haec cum illis sunt habenda, aut ilia cum his amittenda sunt. ^"^^ divers
' measures,
" Harum duarum conditionum nunc utram mails vide"." &c.]
If he will reap the benefit of human authority, he must
undergo the inconvenience also. Why may he use the testi-
mony of Calvin against me in this cause, and I may not make
use of the testimonies of all the ancients, Greek and Latin,
against him ? whom CaMn himself confesseth to have been
for liberty against necessity ; — " Semper apud Latinos liberi
arbitrii nomen extitit ; Ch^aecos vero non puduit multo arrogan-
tius usurpare vocabidum, siquidem avre^ovcnov dixerunt, ac si
potestas suiipsius penes hominem fuisset^.'' But I am able to
give him that advantage in this cause.
Secondly, a man may see by his citing of these testimonies,
that he hath taken them up upon trust, without ever perusing
them in the authors themselves. I demand therefore, whether
he will be tried by his own witnesses in this case in difference
between him and me; that is, concerning universal necessity,
in natural, civil, and external actions, by reason of a necessary
connexion of second causes, and a natural determination of
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. 35.]
P- 235.] o Calvin., Instit., lib. II. c. ii. dist. 4.
[Terent., Heautontim., IT. iii. 31-, [Op. torn. ix. p. 62. ed. Amst. 1667.]
398 CASTIGATIONS OF
^ni ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ deserve to have so much
^ — as one of his testimonies looked upon.
Thirdly, I answer, that supposing (but not granting) that
all his testimonies were true as he citeth them, yet none of
them will advantage his cause at all. Luther his first witness
disclaimed it, and recanted Avhat he had saidP; and the
necessity which he speaketh of, is only "a necessity of immu-
tability:" and the Synod of Dort speaketh only of "a necessity
of infalhbility^ :" both which do imply no more than a conse-
quent hypothetical necessity, which we also maintain. Zanchy^'j
Bucer% Calvin*, Moulin", speak of a necessity of sinning in 818
respect of our original corruption. This concerneth not the
liberty of the will, whether it be free or not free, but the
power of free will, whether it can w ithout grace avoid sin and
determine itself to moral or supernatural good; which is
nothing to the question between him and me.
And for an essay what he may expect from his witnesses,
Calvin, who is the least disfavourable to him of them all,
saith no more but this ; — " Deum, guoties viam facere vult Suce
providenti(E, etiam in rebus externis hominum voluntates flectere
et versare ; nec ita liberam esse ipsorum electionem, quin ejits
liber tati Dei arbitrium dominetur^^' — "That God," (not always
but) " as often as He will make way for His pro\ddence, even
in external things doth bow and turn the w ills of men ;
neither is their election so free, but that the good pleasui-e of
God hath a dominion over their liberty." Calvin did know
no universal determination of all external acts by God, but
only in some extraordinary cases. He acknowledged, that
the will of man w^as free to elect in external things, but not
so free as to be exempt from the dominion of God; which two
V Visit. Saxon. [See above p. 218. by T. H., ibid.]
notes u, y. The passage quoted by s [Lib. de Concordia (viz. De Vera
Hobbes (Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. Eccles. in doctrina &c. Reconciliatione
XX. p. 235) is in the tract De Servo et Compositione, Respons. ad Alb. Pig-
Arbitrio (Op. torn. iii. p. 165. b.).] hium, Art. de Lib, Arb., p. 34. b.—
^ [Syn. Dordr. as quoted by T. H., " Non necessitas sed coactio libertati
ibid. The sentence quoted is not the voluntatis adversatur"), quoted by T.H.,
doctrine of the Synod of Dort, but of ibid.]
the deputies from one of the Dutch pro- * [Instit., lib. II. c. ii. § 6, Op. torn,
vincial Churches there present; being ix. p. 63; quoted by T. H., ibid.]
taken from the Judic. Orthod. Eccles. u [BouclierdeiaFoi, Art. ix. (Part. I.
Nassovio-Weteravicarum de III. et IV. § xxi. p. 112. first ed. Gcnev. 1619)
Artt. Remonstr., thes. de Lib. Arb., ap. quoted by T. H., ibid.]
Act. Syn. Dordr. P. ii. p. 196.] v Calvin, Instit., lib. II. c. iv. dist. 7.
«■ [Tract. Theol., lib. I. c. vi.thes. 1. [Op. torn. ix. p. 77.]
(Op. torn. iv. p. 90. ed. 1605); quoted
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
399
tilings none of us doth deny. So we may conclude from Cal- Discourse
vin, that God doth not ordinarily necessitate external events ; __H:_
that is as much as to say, there is no universal necessity.
He will yet have less cause to please himself with the
Council of Dort, when he shall see Avhat was said there by
our British divines, and approved by the Synod : — that
God made oiu' wills and endowed them with liberty''
tliat " He leaves to exery thing its proper manner and motion
in the production of acts/^ and to the wills of men to act
after their native manner, freely^';" that "in vain are punish-
ments threatened to malefactors by the laws of men, if no
man could leave undone that which he doth^^^ They ask,
" who in his right wits will say, that David could not but
have committed adultery," or after that could not but
have murdered Uriah They condemn this opinion posi-
tively, as an error, " hominem non posse jjIus boni facere quam
facit, nec plus mali omittere quam omittif — " that a man can-
not do more good, or leave more e\il undone, than he doth^."
Still he is about his old quarrel concerning the "elicit" and [Elicit and
" imperate acts of the will not against the thing, for it is as S^ofthe
clear as the day-light, that there is a ground in nature for ^^^^••j
such a distinction; and that external agents have not so
much power over the will of man, to make him choose what
they think fit, as over the locomotive faculty and other
members, to make a man move them at their pleasure. But
all his contention is still about the words, — "Imperate or
commanded acts, as if" (saith he) "the faculties could speak
one to another^." I answered him, that there were mental Mental
terms as well as vocal, by which the soul, being willing, may
express itself to the locomotive and other inferior faculties^.
As the angels do understand one another, not by speech, but
as we behold one another in a glass. Here he is out again,
quite mistaking the plain and obvious sense of my words,
shewing that in his long and profound "meditations" he
did never meet with this subject; and telling us, that by
Judic. Theol. Brit, de Lib. Arbit. [ibid. p. 175.]
[soil. De Convers. qua denotat actionem » j- j^^^^ ^i^j^^ -j
hominis, &c., thes. ii; ap. Act. Syn. " [In the Defence, T. H. Nixmb.
Dordr., P. ii. p. 171.] xx. above p. 132.]
^ [Id., ibid.] c [Defence, Numb. XX. above p. 139;
' [Id., ibid, Thes. Heterod.,] thes. iv. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
400 CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part mental speech I understand only "an idea of the sound, and of
'■ — the letters, whereof the word is made*^;^^ and charging me
most untruly to say, "that when Tarquin commanded his son
by striking off the tops of poppies, he did it by mental terms
This I said truly, that "howsoever a superior doth intimate his
commands to his inferior," whether it be by vocal terms, as
ordinarily, or by mental terms, as it is among the angels,
or by signs, as it was between Tarquin and his sons, " it is still
a command^." And in this case of the souFs employing the
inferior faculties, it is without dispute. But I never said, that
the striking off the tops of the poppies with his rod was
mental language, or the terms of his mind. It seemeth he
hath never heard of mental terms, or mental prayer. The
conceptions of the mind are the natural representations of
things. Words are signs or symbols of the inward concep-
tions of the mind, by imposition. What way soever the
inward conceptions are intimated, it is the same that speech
is in effect, " KOLvcovLa<; opyavoT/' — "an instrument or means of
communication;" as a sign is an intimation to a traveller
where he may find a harbour.
Metaphori- He saith, "No drawing can be imagined but of bodies," and
ing. "whatsoever is drawn out, is di-awn out of one place into
another^." He knoweth no drawing, but drawing of wire,
or di'awing of water, or drawing of cars. St. James saith.
Jam. iv. 8. Draw nigh to God, and He will draw nigh to you and, 819
John vi. 44. f^Xo man can come to Me, except My Father draw him;"
Johnxii.32. and, " If I be lifted up from the earth, I wiU draw all men
unto IMe." In aU these "drawings," here is no "drawing
out of one place into another." A fair object draws men's
eyes ; a good orator draweth them by the ears. There is
Prov. XX. 5. metaphorical "di-awing." Take but one place more; —
" Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep water, but a man
of understanding will draiu it out."
CASTIGATION OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXI.
Paradoxes, A paradox is a private opinion of one man, or a few fac-
w^^at the> ^.^^^^ uiQQ.y assumcd or maintained sometimes out of error of
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Xumb, xx. Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
p. 236.] ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xx.
• [Defence, Numb. xx. above p. 139 ; p. 236.]
MR. IIOBEES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
401
judgment, but commonly out of pride and vain-glorious Discourse
aflFectation of singularity, contrary to the common and re —
ceived opinion of other men. Such paradoxes were the Sto-
ical opinions (Stoics were fruitful in producing paradoxes),
that "all sins are equal," and that "a wise man is all
things," a good king, a good captain, a good cobbler^. I
hope he will be better advised than to condemn all those of
ignorance, who out of civility styled those new-fangled opi-
nions " Stoical paradoxes," rather than Stoical errors. He
saith, " Christian religion was once a paradox^." Never. A
paradox is a private opinion contrary to the common opi-
nion. Points of faith are more than opinions. Faith is a
certain assent grounded upon the truth and authority of the
revealer. Opinion is an uncertain assent grounded upon the
probable conjectures of reason. We do not use to call Turk-
ish, heathenish, or heretical errors, by the name of paradoxes.
I confess there may be opinions, and consequently paradoxes,
in religion; that is, in such points, the truth or falsehood
whereof is grounded more upon the probable discussion of
reason than upon the evidence of Divine revelation; but
errors in essentials of faith are not paradoxes. He who dis-
believes any article of his Creed, is not paradoxical but here-
tical. Such another mistake is his other, — "that but for para-
doxes we should be now in that savage ignorance, which
those men are in that have not, or have not long had, laws
and commonwealth'." Politic precepts, and civil institutions,
and practical instructions, which consist not in theory or
speculation but in the application of practical truths, neither
are, nor ever were called properly, either opinions or para-
doxes. But to come to the purpose, I did not, I do not,
deny, that there may be some true paradoxes ; and rather in
such things as are found out by reason, than in such as
depend upon revelation, which are delivered from age to age
by universal tradition. An able industrious person, by con-
stant meditation, and the help of other men^s experience and
observations, may sometimes find out a latent truth, or vin-
dicate one from the oppressive tyranny of prejudice or cus-
f [Cic.,Paradoxa,§iii,v,vi.— Horat, p. 2;59.]
Epist. I. i. 106, 107. &c.] i [Ibid.]
[Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xxi.
BRAMIIALL. jj (J
402
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^rt torn. But this is rarely. God and nature do not give all
' their gifts to one man, lest he should grow proud. But
when men are composed of paradoxes, that as Ovid could
not express himself without a verseJ, so they cannot speak
without a paradox ; when they take upon them to censure
all ancient truths in divinity and humanity, and seek to
obtrude their brain-sick conceptions upon all other men as
oracles ; I think he w ho telleth them only of their " para-
doxes," dealeth gently with them. Zaleucus was more
severe against innovators ; who enacted, that if any man
made a proposition for a change in their policy, he should
make it with a halter about his neck, that if he failed to jus-
tify it by reason, he should justify his attempt by suflPering''.
[T. H.'s I leave his paradoxes, and come to his subtlety, — that
thafeverjT " there is hardly any one action, to the causing whereof con-
thing is a cur not whatsoever is in rerum naturd ;" and that " there can-
cause of
every not be a motion in one part of the world, but the same must
thiHc,.] communicated to all the rest of the world ^ :" that is to say,
in plain English, that there is not a pie that chattereth, nor
so much as an aspen leaf that waggeth, here in England, but
it maketh some alteration in China and Peru, and the efficacy
of it, like Drake or Cavendish, doth encompass the globe of
the earth, and mounteth to heaven, and (if there be any such
thing) helpeth to make the eighth sphere tremble. I thought
it had been a modest expression to call this a " paradox."
Whether a To prove this, he maketh a narration, — what " a scholar"
make^a "maintained" to him, — that if a grain or a feather be "laid
yieX"^ upon an anvil of diamond, at the first access it maketh it yield
which he demonstrated thus, that " if the whole world would
do it, the least part thereof would do its part"^ ;" where-
with he rested convinced. But his relation is doubly imper-
tinent. First, we speak of voluntary agents, and he in-
stanceth in a natural agent ; we speak of the yielding of the 820
will, and he instanceth in the yielding of an anvil. Secondly,
it doth not come home to his assertion ; because, when a fea-
ther is laid upon an anvil of diamond, yet it toucheth it, and
by assiduous touching something may be done : as we see
j [Ovid., Trist., IV. X. 25, 26. " Sponte urn. Serin, xlii.]
sua numeros carmen veniehat ad aptos, ^ [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. xxi.
Et quod tentabam dicere versus erat."] p. 239.]
[Zaleuc, Procem. Leg., ap. Stobae- [Ibid,]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
403
how drops of rain do wear the hard stones ; and Pliny tell- Discourse
eth, that "flints have been worn with the feet of ants''^." But —
to think the chattering of a pie, or the shaking of an aspen
leaf, should move the whole world, when the greatest earth-
quakes are not felt many leagues, is incredible. Neither do
I beheve, that the first touch of his feather doth make an
anvil of diamond to yield. I believe the "scholar^^ put a
fallacy o£ composition and division upon him. All the parts
being conjoined do make the whole, and so have their pro-
portionable part of the efficacy in the production of all
effects which are produced by the whole, be it the breaking
of an anvil of diamond or whatsoever else. But the parts
being divided and subdivided into grains and lesser quanti-
ties, though they still have their proportionable weight to-
wards the producibility of the same effect, if they were con-
joined, yet it is not necessary that being so divided they shall
actually produce the same part or proportion of the former
effect. It is not universally true, that the patient suffers so
much as the agent acts. The reason is, because ' quicquid
recipituVj recipitur ad modum recipientis' — ' that which receiv-
eth,' doth not receive according to the force of that which
makes the impression, but ' according to its own capacity
of receiving.^ The first drop of water taketh away part from
a piece of clay ; but a hundred drops fall before a stone doth
yield, or actually lose the least particle, though the first drop
may affect the stone and prepare it. Suppose one scale of a
balance to have a weight in it of a pound, which depresseth
the scale to the ground : put into the other scale a weight of
two pounds, it lifteth up the other scale and sinketh that
down; but take away the two pound weight, and put into
the place of it a feather or a grain, and try if it will lift up
the scale proportionably. Not at all, no more than if it
were nailed to the ground. It were not well argued to say, — an
elephant can carry a castle a league, therefore a fly can carry
it such a proportion of the way. Yet I commend his discretion,
for choosing such an instance, wherein he cannot be contra-
dicted by experience. If a man could live until the revolution
of Plato's year°, and the feather not be consumed in all that
° [Hist. Nat., xi. 30.] publ. lib. x (Op. torn. ii. p. 1431. Basil.
" [Viz. 36,000 ordinary years, ac- 1576), and Voss., De Theol. Gentil.,
cording to Ficinus, In Platon. Rem- lib. ii. c, 35 ; quoted by Brucker, Hist.
D d 2
404
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part time, he might still plead as he may do now, that the feather
— — had worn the diamond something, but it was invisible.
Or a falling To make his new paradox good, he telleth ns a tale of a
the whoie^ tub ; — that if a great " tun'^ (suppose the great tun at He}^-
worid. delberg) were filled with water, "one little particle" (suppose a
drop, or the hundredth part of a drop) " being moved, all the
rest would be moved also but "the greatness of the tun alter-
eth not the case, and therefore the same would b^ true, if
the whole world were the tun p." I answer, first, the case is
not like. A tun of water is one continued body, apt for
motion; but the world is full of contiguous bodies of all
sorts, which are more apt to terminate an easy motion than
to continue it. Secondly, I deny, that the least particle of
w ater, suppose the hundredth part of a drop, falling into a
great tun of water, doth move all the water in the tun. The
first particle moves the second, but more weakly than itself
was moved ; the second moves the third, yet more weakly ;
the third moveth the fourth, still more weakly ; and so suc-
cessively, until the motive power cease altogether, before the
hundredth, or it may be the thousandth, part of the water in
the tun be moved. As we see in a stone thrown upwards ;
the motion is swifter or slower, of longer or of lesser conti-
nuance, according to the degree of the first impression of
force and the figure of the thing cast upwards ; which ceas-
ing by continued diminution, the motion ceaseth. Violent
motions are vehement in the beginning, remiss in the mid-
dle, and cease in the end. Lastly, I answer, that the case of
a great tun and the whole world is not the same. The world
is too large a sphere, and exceedeth the activity of poor little
weak creatures ; which are not able to leave such an impres-
sion of might, as should move upwards to the convex superfi-
cies of heaven, and downwards to the centre of the earth, and
round about to the extremities of the world. If this were
true, the fly might say in earnest, ^ See what a dust I do raise.' s;
It hath been given out, that the burning of our heaths in
England did hurt their vines in France. This had been
strange, yet not so strange as his paradox, — that the least
motions that are, " are communicated to the whole world —
Phil., P. II. lib. ii. c. vi. sect. 1. § P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxi.
12.] pp. 239, 240.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
405
but wise men looked upon this pretence as a mere scarecrow or Discourse
made dragon ; the hurt it did was nearer home^ — to destroy — — .
the young moorpouts, and spoil some young burgesses game.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXII.
He "cannot imagine how the question — whether outward Power of
objects do necessitate or not necessitate the will — can any c?ifcerneth
way be referred to moral philosophy q." That is his fault. If JJjfji^o*^^^
the objects do necessitate the will_, they take away both virtue P^er.
and vice, that is, moral good and moral evil, which consist in
preelection, and cannot stand with antecedent necessitation
to one. To reform his error, let him consult with Aristotle ;
— "Those things that are fair and pleasant do seem to be
"violent" after a sort, "because, being without us, they move
and necessitate" agents to act with their beauty and delight ;
but it is not so'". What he addeth — that "the principles of
moral philosophy are the laws^," — is an absurd supposititious
obtrusion of the municipal law in place of the law of right
reason ; which error hath formerly been sufficiently refelled
And to his "horse" that " is lame from some cause that was not
in his power"," I answer, that the lameness is a natural or acci-
dental defect in the horse, but to instance in a horse as a fit
subject of virtue or ^dce is a moral defect in him. If he desire
to speak to the purpose, he must leave such impertinencies.
In the next Animadversion, I meet with nothing but a mere still he
• • sGckctli to
sawing of the wind, or an altercation about nothing. All the obtrude
difference between him and me is concerning an antecedent ne- cJf neces-'
cessity ; but of a necessity of consequence — that when a thing f^^'J^^'
is produced it must necessarily be so as it is — there can be no
question between us. He himself confesseth as much, — " If the
Bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is
expressed in that old foolish rule — ^ Whatsoever is, when it is^
is necessarily so as it is,' — he understandeth me not'';" — and
he confesseth, that the necessity which he maintaineth, is "an
antecedent necessity derived from the beginning of timey."
•J [Qu., Aniinadv. upon Numb. xxii. upon Numb, xiv. pp. 345 — S I?.]
P- 244 ] u [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxii.
' [Aristot.,] Ethic, lib. III. c. ii. p. 244.]
[§11-] ^ [Ibid., Aniinadv. upon] Numb. i.
» [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. [p. 26.]
V- 244.] 7 [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Nimib. iiu
• [Above in Castig. of Animadv. [p, 3().]
406
CASTIGATIONS OF
P A T And yet, nevertheless, a great part of that altercation
■ '■ — which he makes in these Animadversions, is about such
a necessity. Socrates confesseth, that naturally he had
vicious inclinations 2. This is no more than a proclivity
to evil. If by his own condescension he fall into sin,
this is but a hypothetical necessity ; yet he maketh it an
antecedent necessity. Socrates, by his good endeavours,
reformeth his \icious propensions, and acquireth the contrary
habits or virtues. This is but a hypothetical necessity, yet
he pretendeth it to be antecedent. Lastly, Socrates, by the
help of these habits which he himself had acquired, doth
freely do \-irtuous actions. Still here is no necessit}^ but
consequent, and still he pretendeth to antecedent. Either"
(saith he) " these habits do necessitate the will, or the will fol-
loweth not^." If these habits or somewhat else do not neces-
sitate the will, it may foUow freely. But, saith he, if they
do only facilitate men to do such acts, " then what they do,
they do not^." I deny his consequence. Acquired habits are
not solitary, but social and adjuvant, causes of wtuous actions.
Hearing His next error is yet more gross, making the person of the
ing aii^one preacher, and not the sound of his voice, to be the object of
with T. H. iiearing; adding, that the preacher's voice is the same thing
with the hearing, and a fancy of the hearer*^." Thus (as com-
monly errors spring from confusion) he confoundeth the
images of sounds with sounds themselves. AATiat then ? Is
the report of a cannon, or the sound of a trumpet, turned to
a mere " fancy ?" By the same reason he may say, that the
preacher himself is nothing but a mere " fancy ;" there is as
much ground for the one as for the other. If he go on in this
manner, he will move me beyond smiling^," to laugh out-
right. In what sense the object of sight is the cause of sight,
and in what sense it is not the cause of sight, I have shewed
distinctly^. Here he setteth down another "great paradox," as
he himself styleth it out of gallantry, — "that in all the senses
the object is the agent^." If he had not said "t/ie agent," which
signifieth either the sole agent, or the principal agent, but
^ [Cic, Tusc. Quaest., iv. 37 ; De <= [Ibid.]
Fato, c. 5.— Aiex. Aphrod., De Fato, [Ibid.]
§ vi. p. 31. 8vo. Lond. 1658.] « [Above in the Castig. of Animadv.
a [Qu., Aniraadv. upon Numb. xxii. Numb, vii, pp. 291, 292.]
p. 245.] f [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii.
" [Ibid.] p. 245.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
407
only an agent, we had accorded so far. But the principal Discourse
agent in all the senses is the creature endowed with sense, '■ —
or the sensitive soul perceiving and judging of the object by
the proper organ. The preacher's voice and the auditor's hear-
ing have two distinct subjects ; otherwise speaking should be
hearing, and hearing speaking. I conclude this Castigation
12 with the authority of as good a philosopher as himself, — that
it is ridiculous to think external things either fair or de-
lightful to be the causes of human actions, and not rather
him who is easily taken with such objects^."
In the latter part of this Animadversion his en'ors are There are
greater and more dangerous than in the former. He affirmeth, uons than
that the will is produced, generated, and formed, . . in such
sort as accidents are eflPected in a corporeal subject,'' and yet
" it" (the will) "cannot be moved''." As if generation, and aug-
mentation, and alteration, were not kinds of motion or muta-
tion ^ But the last words — "because it goeth not from place to
placej" — do shew plainly, that he acknowledgetli no motion but
local motion. What ? No other natural motion but only local
motion ? No metaphorical motion ? That were strange. We
read in Holy Scripture of those who have been " moved with [Heb. xi.
fear" — "moved with envy" — "moved with compassion" — viir9;Vvii.
" moved with choler"— " moved by the Holy Ghost." In all ^^.-^f^f^^^^
these there is no local motion. Outward persuasives, inward i^; xvii
T 1 1 27: Mark
suggestions, are all motions. God moveth a man to good by i. 4i ; vi.
His preventing grace. The devil moveth a man to sin by his viii7~7;^xi.
temptations. There are many kinds of motions besides moving ?
from place to place. He himself confesseth in this section,
that "we are moved to prayer by outward objects k."
In the next place, supposing there were no other motions Spirits
than local motions, yet he erreth in " attributing no motion to weii as
any thing but bodies^" The reasonable soul is moved acci- ^o^'^''-
dentally, according to the motion of the body. The angels are
spirits or spiritual substances, no bodies, by his leave ; and yet
move locally from place to place. Jacob sees " the angels [Gen.
xxviii. 12.]
^- [Aristot.,] Ethic, lib. III. c. ii. species of /xeraiSoAr; (ibid., V. i. 10.).]
[§ 11. J j [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xxii.
^ I Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 215. J
p. .245.] k [ In the Defence, T. 11. Numb. xxii.
' I According to Aristotle, a^^lTjo-ts and above p. 141-.]
aKKoiwa-is are species of Kii/riffis (Phys. ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii.
Auscnlt., VII. ii. 1.), and yeutais is a p. 245. J
408
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part of God ascending and descending/^ The " angels came and
— — ministered" unto Christ. The angels " shall gather the elect
1 1 ; .Aiatt. from the one end of Heaven to the other." The soul of
&c.^- Luke Lazarus was borne by the angels " into Abrahara^s bosom."
Actsx"ii 7 ^^^^ angel to deliver Peter out of prison; and every
10; Heb.i. where useth His angels as "ministering spirits."
Both bo- Thirdly, he erreth in this also, that "nothing can move, that
spSts"^ is not moved itself""." If he mean, that all power to move is
^^'^ from God, he speaketh truly, but impertinently ; but if he
selves. mean (as he must mean if he mean sense), that nothing
moveth which is not moved of some second cause, he
speaketh untruly. The angels move themselves. All living
creatures do move themselves by animal motion. The in-
animate creatures do move themselves ; heavy bodies de-
scending downwards, light bodies ascending upwards, accord-
ing to their own natures ; and therefore nature is defined to
be "an internal cause or principle of motion and rest"," &c.
And even they who held, that " whatsoever is moved, is moved
by another," did limit it to natural bodies, and make the form
to be the mover in natural motion, and the soul in animal
motion °.
Quality in- His last error in this Animadversion (and a dangerous one)
God^ t^^t " it is not truly said, that acts or habits are infused
by God, for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but
bodies °." I wish, for his own quiet and other men's, that he
were as great an enemy to errors and innovations, as he is to
metaphors and distinctions. Affectation of words is not
good, but contention about words is worse. By such an
argument a man might take away all zones and zodiac in
astronomy, moods and figures in logic, cones and cylinders in
geometry; for all these are borrowed terms, as "infusion" is.
What logician almost doth not distinguish between acquired
habits and infused habits ? If all " infusion" be of bodies,
then he never "infused" any paradoxical principles into his
auditors. When any difi'erence doth arise about expressions,
the only question is, whether there be any ground in nature
^ [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb. xxii. Kiuela-Oai." — Id., ibid., VII. i. 1. — And
p. 246.] compare II. i. 8 ; and tbe De Anima,
n [" 'fIs ovaris T'?iS (pvTecos apxvs ri- I. iii. 1.]
fhs Koi alrias rov Kiv€7crdai kuI Tjpe/^eii/." " [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii.
Aristot., Phys. Auscult., TI. i. 2.— p. 216.]
""ATraj/ TO Kivov/jLeuov audyKr) vtto rj/fos
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
409
for such an expression. He himself telleth us, that faith and Discourse
repentance are the "gifts" of God?. To say they are "the gifts" — ~
of God, and to say they are "infused" by God is the same
thing ; saving that to say they are infused by God, is a more
distinct and a more significant expression. I hope he will
not control the language of the Holy Ghost, — " I will pour Joel ii.
out My spirit upon all flesh.'^ No (saith T. H.), that cannot ^'^'^
be, nothing can be " poured out^^ but "bodies." Saint Peter
telleth us otherwise ; — " This Jesus, . . being exalted by the Acts ii. 33.
right hand of God, hath shed forth this, which ye now see
and hear." That was the gift of tongues, an act or habit
" infused." That which was shed forth or effused on God's
part, was " infused" on their part. So saith Saint Paul ; —
" The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Rom. v. 5.
Ghost ;" — again, — " He saveth us by the washing of regene-
ration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which He shed on
us abundantly through Jesus Christ:" — "e^e^ecz/" — the word Tit.iii.5,6.
823 is still the same, signifying an effusion from God, and an in-
fusion into us. All those graces freely given, which were in-
fused by the Holy Ghost, and are recited by the Apostle to
the Corinthians, are either permanent habits, or transient acts. 1 Cor. xii.
In the remainder of this section, is contained nothing but [T. H.'s
relapses, and repetitions of his former paradoxical errors j paradoxes.]
still confounding the intellectual will with the sensitive appe-
tite, liberty with spontaneity, the faculty of the will with the
act of willing, the liberty of reasonable creatures with the
liberty of madmen and fools. Before, he told us, that he
that can do what he will, hath no liberty at all'i. Now he
telleth us of " the liberty of doing what we will in those things
we are able to do""." Before, he limited the power by the
will ; now he limiteth the will by the power. I affirmed most
truly, that "liberty is diminished by vicious habits;" which he
saith "cannot be understood otherwise, than that vicious
habits make a man less free to do vicious actions s." There is
little doubt but he would expound it so, if he were my
interpreter; but my sense and my scope is e^^dent to the
contrary, — that vicious habits make a man less free to do
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xv. ^ [Ibid., Auimadv. upon Numb. xxii.
p. 178.] p. 24-().]
n [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Numb. ix. » [Ibid.]
[pp. 74, 75.]
410
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part virtuous actions. He will take notice of no difference be-
'■ — tween the liberty of a man and the bias of a bowl.
Yet, in the midst of all these mistakes and paradoxes, he
hath not forgotten his old Thrasonical humour. Where, I say,
"liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lostV' he
telleth me, it is "a mere shift, to be thought not silenced"." I
had not thought him such a dangerous adversary. " Metuent
omnes jam te, nec immeritoP Well, if it be " a shift,^^ it is
such a shift as all conscionable men do find by experience to
be time. And for his " silencing" of me, " impavidum ferient
ruiiKR^.^^ I do not fear "silencing" by him, except liis argu-
ments have some occult quality, more than he or I dream of.
If a fish could speak, a fish would not be " silenced" by him
in this cause.
CASTIGATIOXS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXIII.
The under- There is a double question discussed in this section : first,
and wm supposing that the will doth always follow the last judgment
ofThrrer* of the understanding, whether this do take away the liberty
sonabie of the will ; Secondly, whether the "v^dll doth always follow the
last judgment of the understanding : both which questions
have formerly been discoursed of in this treatise y. For
clearing of the former question, it ought to be considered,
that although men do ordinarily speak of the understanding
and of the will as of two distinct agents, or individual sub-
stances, subsisting by themselves, whereof the one under-
standeth and the other willeth, partly for the eminence of
these two powers, and partly for the clearer and more distinct
conception and comprehension of them, and although the
practice of all former divines and philosophers do warrant us
in so doing, yet, if we will speak properly and in rigour of
speech, the understanding and the will are but two powers,
flowing fi'om the reasonable soul : and that the acts of willing
and understanding are predicated most properly of the man,
whilst the soul and body are united (" actiones sunt supposi-
torum'^)j and of the reasonable soul after its separation. And
t [Defence, Numb. xxii. above p. 146; * [Horat., Carm., III. iii. 8.]
Disc. i. Ft. iii.] ^ [Above, Castig. of Animadv.
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.xxii. Nmnb. vii. pp. 288 — 291.]
p. 246.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
411
because he suggesteth, that this is done for advantage, and Discourse
that "it is not without cause men use improper language, — —
when they mean to keep their errors from being detected
to let him see that this is the sense of all men, and that this
assertion will advantage his cause nothing, I am contented to
answer his Animadversions upon this subject in the same
plirase that he proposeth them.
He pleadeth, that the election of the free agent doth [Election
necessarily follow his last judgment, and therefore his elec- necessarily
tionisnotfree^ SJi^ig^''
My first answer to this is, that determination which he ^ent.]
maintaineth, and which taketh away freedom and liberty, is
extrinsecal and antecedent; but the determination of the
agent^s election by his judgment is intrinsecal, made by him-
self, and concomitant, being together in time with the elec-
tion ^. To this now he replieth, that the will and the last dic-
tate of the understanding " are produced in the same instant,"
but "the necessity" of them both "was antecedent before they
were produced ; . . as, when a stone is falling, the necessity of
touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself, . . unless
it be hindered by some contrary external motion, and
then the stop is as necessary as the proceeding would have
been^"
To this I give three clear solutions. First, that his instance Man's will-
of the stone is altogether impertinent. The stone is a natural li^e a faii-
agent, the man is a voluntary agent ; natural agents act ^"^
necessarily and determinately, voluntaiy agents act freely
and undeterminately. The stone is determined to its motion
824 downwards intrinsecally by its own nature, that is, by the
weight or gra\dty of it ; but he maketh the will of the free
agent to be determined extrinsecally, by causes without
himself. Secondly, there is not the like necessary or deter-
minate connection between the will and its antecedent causes,
as is between the stone falling and its touching the ground.
It was in the power of the man to deliberate or not delibe-
rate, to elect or not elect ; but it is not in the power of the
stone to fall or not to fall. So the motion of the stone was
2 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. [Defence, Numb, xxiii. above pp.
P- 24G.] 149^ 150; Disc. i. Tt. iii.]
* [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. •= [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii.
xxiii. above p. 149.] p. 253.]
412
CASTTGATIONS OF
Part determined to one antecedently in its causes, but the elective
will of man is not determined to one antecedently in its
causes, until the man determine himself by his choice.
Thirdly, though the stone be not such a free undetermined
agent as the man is, and therefore this concerneth not liberty,
yet he himself confesseth, that casually it may be hindered
from touching the ground ; — " unless it be hindered by some
contrary external motion^.'^ So the stone's touching of the
ground is necessary only upon supposition, — unless it be
hindered.^' But that necessity which he maintaineth, is a
necessity antecedent, ''which cannot possibly be other\\dse^.''
But there is this difference between the man and the stone,
that the thing supposed (to deliberate or not to deliberate) is
in the power of the man, but the thing supposed (to be
hindered or not hindered) is not in the power of the stone.
Absolute He pleadeth further, that supposing the stone " be hindered,"
admuteth ^hcu "the stop is ucccssary^" So still there is necessity. Nay,
no contrary j^y ]^|g favour, if the cvcnt be necessary to fall out this way
supposi- . ,
tion. upon one supposition, and necessary to fall out another way
upon a contrary supposition, then there is no absolute or
antecedent necessity at all; for absolute necessity admitteth
no such contrary suppositions, absolute or antecedent neces-
sity being that " which cannot possibly be otherwise.^'
A man may My second answer was negative, that the free agent in
rraryTo"the electing doth not always choose what is best or most con-
reason venient, in his judgment He affirmeth, that I "say this is but
a probable" opinion^. Nay, I said it was probable at the
least ^ ; and if he press me further, I say it is but too evident.
Otherwise there should be no sin against conscience; for
what is conscience but " the practical judgment, or dictate
of reason, concerning things to be done, or to be shunned,
here and now, with these or those circumstances^.^' And
[Tit.iii.ii.] such a man is truly ^' avTOKaraKptro^'' — "condemned by
himself." A man who hath two dishes of meat set before
him, the one more agreeable to his health, the other more
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii. 150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
p, 253.] ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii.
^ [Ibid., Animadv, upon Numb. i. p. 253.]
p, 26.] i [Bramball certainly did not say so.
' [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. See above pp. 148, 150.]
xxiii. p. 253.] j [See above p. 329. note c]
^ [Defence, Numb, xxiii. above p.
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
413
one-
ous con-
science
pleasing to his palate, may and many times doth choose the Discourse
latter and the worse, his judgment at the same time dis * —
allowing it. St. Paul confesseth, that ^ he had done that Rom. vii.
which he allowed not.^ He saith, '^it is impossible for a man
to will any thing which appeareth not first in his understand-
ing to be good for him^." That is very true, but it cometh
not home. If he would speak to the purpose, he should say,
it is impossible for a man to will any thing which appeareth
not in his understanding to be best for him. But this is
false. As, suppose one thing appear to a man to be honest,
that is one good ; another thing appeareth to be delightful,
that is another good : every man knoweth in his own judg-
ment and conscience, that that which is honestly good, is
better than that which is delightfully good : yet men often
choose pleasure before honesty, their conscience at the same
time accusing them for it.
I said, a man is bound to follow his conscience, as the last An en
practical dictate of reason There is no doubt of it. The §
Scripture is plain ; — He that doubteth is damned if he eat, fij^jt^^ ^e-
because he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not of faith"
... then to
(that is to say, is not done upon a firm resolution that it is fellow it.
lawful), ^*^is sin." Reason is as plain; — all circumstances 23!"^*
must concur to make an action good, but one single defect
doth make it evil ; the approbation of conscience is required
to every good action, and the want thereof maketh it sinful ;
not simply in itself, but to that person, at that time. He
excepteth, that "a man ought not to follow the dictate of his
understanding when it is erroneous"^." That is most true
with this limitation — 'wherein it is erroneous,^ or, 'as it is
erroneous.' But there is an expedient for this in case-
divinity, which I easily believe he did never meet with. He
who hath an erroneous conscience, is doubly obliged; first,
to reform it, and then, to follow it. The dictates of right
reason ought ever to be followed ; and erroneous reason
ought ever to be reformed, and made right reason.
15 I said, that '' reason was the true root of liberty"." That is Reason is
plain. The object of the will is good, either real or apparent ; root of
liberty.
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii. [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii.
p. 253.] p. 253.]
' [Defence, Numb, xxiii. ahove p. " [Defence, Numb. xxii. above p.
150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] 11-6; Disc. i. Tt. iii.]
414
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part and a man cannot will any thing as good, but that wliich he
— judgeth in his understanding to be good. Nothing can affect
that which it doth not know. And therefore reason must of
necessity be "the root of liberty." This he taketh to be con-
tradictory to what I say here, — that " actions" and objects
'^may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate,
that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the elec-
tion to liberty or chance°." "How then" (saith he) "can a
man leave that to liberty when his reason can give no sentence?
And if by ^ chance' " I " mean that which hath no causes,^^ I
"destroy providence; if that which hath causes," I "leave it to
necessity P." So, where I say, that "reason cannot give a posi-
tive sentence," he maketh me say, that " reason can give no
sentence." There is a great difference between these two.
The judges name three men to the sheriffwick of a county ;
here is a nomination or judgment, but not yet positive. The
king picks one of these three; then the nomination or judg-
ment is positive. So reason representeth to the free agent,
or the free agent judgeth in his understanding, three means
to obtain one end, either not examining or not determining
any advantage which one mean hath above another. Here
is an indefinite judgment for three good means, though it be
not positive for any one more than the rest. In this case
the will or the free agent chooseth one of these three means
as good, without any further examination which is best.
Reason is "the root of Hberty^^ in representing what is good,
even when it doth give no positive or determinate sentence
what is best. I am neither so vain to think there is any
thing that hath a being which hath not causes ; nor so stupid,
on the other side, as to think that all causes are necessary
causes. Chance proceedeth neither from the want, nor from
the ignorance, but from the accidental concurrence of causes.
Actions His next charge is, that " it is false that actions may be so
eciuaHy cir- eq^^^^lv circumstantiated that reason cannot give a positive"
tiated^"" (that is, a determinate) "sentence^." Yet he confessetli, that
" in the things elected there may be an exact equality If
he did not confess it, it is most evident in itself : as ap-
° [Defence, Numb, xxiii. above p, p. 254.]
150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] ^ [Ibid.]
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii. [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
415
peareth in ray former instance of two plasters of equal Discourse
virtue ; or, if he please, in two pieces of gold of the same — —
stamp, weight, and alloy, sent to one man upon condition to
choose the one and leave the other. He judgeth them hoth
to be good, and is not such a fool as they are who say, that
he would hang in a perpetual equilibrium, and could choose
neither, for want of determination which was best. There-
fore he chooseth one of them, without more to do. But he
saith, there m^y be circumstances in him that is to elect,^^
that he do not "spend time in vain," or lose both^ It is true
there are reasons to move him to elect, because iliey are 1)oth
good ; but there are no reasons to move him to elect the one
rather than the other, this rather than that, or that rather
than this, but only the will of him that electeth, all things
being so equally circumstantiated, that reason can give
sentence for them both as good, but not for the one posi-
tively and determinately as better than the other. AYhat-
soever is good, is the object of the will, though it be not
always the best.
I said, that "reason doth not weigh every indiAddual" object
or " action to the uttermost grain ^.^^ He pleadeth in answer,
" True, but does it therefore follow a man gives no sentence ?
the will may follow the dictate of the judgment, whether the
man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed^.^^ I
acknowledge it, but he mistaketh the scope of my argument.
The less exactly that reason doth weigh actions or objects,
the less exactly it doth determine the free agent ; but leaveth
him, as in a case of indifFerency, or having no considerable
difference, to choose what he will, as being not much ma-
terial, or not at all material, whether he choose the one part
or the other.
"Passions and affections" (saith he) "prevail often against Passions
wisdom, but not against the judgment" or "dictate of the vS^"gainst
understanding; . . the will of a peevish passionate fool doth
less follow the dictate of" his "understanding, than the will" of
a wiser man''. He must pardon me ; passions prevail not
only against wisdom, but against the dictates of reason. It
s [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii. u [q^^.^ Aniniadv. upon Numb, xxiii
P- 254.] p. 2-54.]
t [Defence, Numb, xxiii. above p. [Ibid 1
150; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
416
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part
III.
was Medea's passion which dictated to her^ that to revenge
herself upon her husband was more eligible than the Uves of
her children. Her reason dictated the contrary.
Aliudque cupido, ^oQ
Mens aliud suadet ; video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor^."
Jam. i. 14. It was St. Peter's fear^ not his judgment^ which dictated
to him to deny his Master. Every man is tempted when
he is drawn aside of his own lust/' not of his intellectual
judgment. Jacob did not curse the misunderstanding of
[Gen. xiix. Simeon and Levi, but their passion; — Cursed be their
anger, for it was fierce; and their wrath, for it was cruel."
As the law is silent among arms," so is reason silent
among passions. Passion is like an unruly passenger, which
thrusts reason away from the rudder for the time. Therefore
they use to say, that the dominion of reason, or of a reason-
able man, over his sensitive appetite, is not despotical, like
the government of a master over his slave, but pohtical, like
that of a magistrate over the people, which is often disturbed
by seditious tumults and rebellions. Passion is an echpse of
reason, "a short madnessy" the metamorphosis of a man into
a wild beast that is gored, which runneth upon every thing
that comes in her way without consideration, or like a violent
torrent descending do^vn impetuously fi'om a steep hill, which
beareth down all respects before it, Di\dne and human.
Whilst passion is at the height, there is no room for reason,
nor any use of the dictates of the understanding, the mind
for the time being like the Cyclopian cave^, where no man
heard what another said,
ivian was The last part of this section is not concerning the fortunes
heTo^d of Asia, but the weighing of a horse -load of feathers % a light
jh^^^rea- and trivial subject, wherein there is nothing but a contempt
of School terms without any ground, bold affirmations without
any proof, and a continued detraction from the dignity of the
human nature, as if a reasonable man were not so consider-
able as a jackdaw. When God created man. He made hira
a mean lord under Himself, " to have dominion over all His
Vs. viii. a creatures," and " put all things in subjection under his feet."
*■ [Ovid., Metam., vii. 19—21.] * [Virg., JEn., viii. 416 sq.— &c.]
y ["Ira furor brevis est." Horat., " [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii.
Epist., I. ii. 62.] pp. 254— 25G.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS. 417
And to fit him for this command, He gave him an intel- Discoitrse
lectual soul. But T. H. maketh him to be in the disposition li^
of the second causes: sometimes as a sword in a man^s hand^,
a mere passive instrument ; sometimes like " a top, that is
lashed" hither and thither "by boys^;" sometimes like "a foot-
ball^/' which is kicked hither and thither by every one that
comes nigh it ; and here to a pair of scales, which are pressed
down, now one way then another way, by the weight of the
objects^. Surely this is not that man that was created by
God after His own image, to be the governor of the world, [Gen. i. 20. ]
and lord and master of the creatures. This is some man that
he hath borrowed out of the beginning of an almanac, who
is placed immovable in the midst of the twelve signs, as so
many second causes. If he offer to stir, Aries is over his
head ready to push him, and Taurus to gore him in the neck,
and Leo to tear out his heart, and Sagittarius to shoot an
arrow in his thighs.
Yet he tells us boldly, that no man can understand, that How the
the understanding maketh any alteration of weight or light- standing
ness in the object, or that reason lays objects upon the fjje^fljg*" •
understanding What poor trifling is this, in a thing so their
plain and obvious to every man's capacity ! There can be weight,
no desire of that which is not known in some sort. Nothing
can be willed but that which is apprehended to be good
either by reason or sense, and that according to the degree
of apprehension. Place a man in a dark room and all the
rarest objects in the world besides him, he seeth them not,
he distinguislieth them not, he willeth them not ; but bring
in a light, and he seeth them, and distinguisheth them, and
willeth them, according to their distinct worths. That which
light is to visible objects, making those things to be actually
seen which were only potentially visible, that is the under-
standing to all intelligible objects, without which they are
neither known nor willed. Wherefore men define the under-
standing to be '*a faculty of the reasonable soul, understand-
ing, knowing, and judging, all intelligible things The
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii. *" [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii.
p. 37.] p. 25,5.]
[Ibid., p. 41.] ( [Ibid.]
«i [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. ^ [See above p. 290, note z.]
p. 230.]
BRAMHALL. E q
418
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part understanding then doth not " alter the weight of objects/^
— no more than the light doth change the colours_, which with-
out the help of the hght did lie hid in the dark : but the light
makes the colours to be actually seen; so doth the under-
standing make the latent value of intelligible objects to be
apprehended, and consequently maketh them to be desired
and wiUed according to their distinct degrees of goodness.
This judgment, which no man ever denied to intelhgible 827
creatures, is the " weighing of objects," or attributing their
just weight" to them, and the trying of them as it were by
the balance and by the touchstone. This is not " the laying
of objects upon the understanding." The understanding is
not the patient but the judge; but this is the representing of
the goodness or badness of objects to the will, or to the free
agent willing, which relatively to the wiU giveth them all
their weight and efficacy.
There may be difference between these two propositions,
' Repentance is not voluntary and by consequence proceedeth
from causes,' and, ^ Repentance proceedeth from causes, and
by consequence is not voluntary^,' if his consequence were
well intelligible, as it is not. All acts both voluntary and
involuntary do proceed from causes. He chargeth me to
have "chopped in" these words, "and therefore'." The truth
is, his words were, " and by consequence," which I expressed
thus, " and therefore." " Therefore" and " by consequence"
are the very same thing, neither more nor less. Is not this
a doughty exception ? But the other is his greater error, —
that repentance is not voluntary-*. No Schoolman ever said,
that the faculty of the wiU w as voluntary, but that the agent
was a voluntary agent and the act a voluntary act.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXIV.
Blasphemy He accuscth me of "charging" him "with blasphemy and
stracrand atheism^." If he be wronged in that kind, it is he who
PTetrt^d^ffer wrongeth himself by his suspicion. Spreta exolescunt ; si
much. irascare, agnita videntur^r I accused him not either of blas-
h [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiii. • ^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb, xxiv.
p. 255.] p. 262,]
i [Ibid.] ' [Tacit,, Annal., iv. 34.]
j [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
419
man-
ner.
phemy or atheism, in tlie concrete. One may say a man^s Discouhsf.
opinions are blasphemous and atheistical in the abstract, — —
without charging the person with formal atheism or blasphemy.
The reason is evident ; — because it may be, that through pre-
judice he doth not see the consequences, which other men,
whose eyes are not blinded with that mist, do see, and if he
did see them, would abhor them as well as they. For this
reason, he who chargeth one with speaking or writing implicit
contradictions, or things inconsistent one with another, doth
not presently accuse him of lying, although one part of a con-
tradiction must needs be false, because it may be the force of
the consequence is not evident to him.
A man may know a truth certainly, and yet not know the A man may
formal reason or the manner of it so certainly. I know that truth cer-
I see, and I judge probably how I see ; yet the manner how no^iJ^i'i^w
I see, whether by sending out beams, or by receiving in the ^^^^
species, is not so evident as the thing itself, — that I do see.
They who do not agree about the manner of ^'ision, do all
agree about the truth of vision. Every man knoweth certainly,
that he can cast a stone up into the air; but the manner how
the stone is moved after it is separated from the hand, —
whether it be by some force or form or quality impressed into
the stone by the casters or by the air ; and if it be by the air,
whether it be by the pulsion of the air following or by the
cession of the former an-, — is obscure enough; and not one of
a thousand wbo knoweth the certainty of the thing, knoweth
the manner how it cometh to pass. If this be true in natural
actions, how much more in the actions of God, Who is an
infinite Being, and not comprehensible by the finite wit of
man? The water can rise no higher than the fountain's
head. A looking-glass can represent the body, because there
is some proportion between bodies ; but it cannot represent
the soul, because there is no proportion between that which
is material and that which is immaterial. This is the reason
why we can in some sort apprehend what shall be after the
end of the world, — because the soul is eternal that way ; but
if we do but think of what was before the beginning of the
world, we are as it were presently swallowed up into an abyss,
because the soul is not eternal that way. So I know, that
there is true liberty from necessity, both by Divine revelation,
E e 2
420 CASTIGATIOXS OF
I
Part and by reason, and by experience. I know likewise, that
— — God knowetli all events from eternity. The difficulty is not
about the thing, but about the manner, — how God doth
certainly know things free or contingent, which are to come
in respect of us, seeing they are neither determined in the
event itself, nor in the causes thereof. The not knowing of
the manner, which may be incomprehensible to us, doth not
at all diminish the certain truth of the thing. Yet even for
the manner sundry ways are proposed, to satisfy the curiosi-
ties rather than the consciences of men ; of which this is one
way which I mentioned"^. It were a great madness to reject
a certain truth, because there may be some remote difficulty
about the manner ; and yet a greater madness, for avoiding
a needless scruple, to destroy all the attributes of God, which 828
is by consequence to deny God Himself. His proof of neces-
sity drawn from God^s eternal knowledge of all events, hath
been sufficiently discussed and satisfied over and over.
The doc- I pleaded, that my doctrine of liberty is an ancient truth
iTberty ail generally received ; his opinion of universal necessity, an up-
truth"^ start paradox, and all who own it may be written in a ring ;
so I am an " old possessor," he is but " a new pretender".''
He answereth, that he is in possession of a truth derived''
to him " from the light of reason," and " it is an unhandsome
thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by
succession from his ancestor"." I answer, that just posses-
sion is either by law or by prescription. I have all laws,
Divine and human, ecclesiastical and ci\dl, and a prescription
of two thousand years, or at least, ever since Christianity
came into the world, for liberty. His opinion of universal
destiny by reason of a necessary connection of the second
causes, was never the general, nor the common, nor the
current opinion of the world ; and hath been in a manner
wholly buried for sixteen hundred years, and now is first
conjured out of its grave by him, to disturb the world. If
this be just possession, a highway-robber may plead posses-
sion so soon as ever he hath stripped an honest traveller. It
is not only no unhandsome thing," but it is a most comely
[See the Defence, Numb. xxiv. " [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.
above pp. 156, 157 ; Disc. i. Pt, iii.] p. 263.]
" [Ibid., pp. 155, 156.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
421
and commendable thing, for a man to derive his religion by Discourse
the universal approbation of the Christian world from the '
purest primitive times throughout all ages, and never to
deviate further from the steps of his ancestors than they had
first degenerated from their predecessors. And where he
telleth us, that "the first Christians did not derive" Christianity
"from their ancestors?," it is very true, but very impertinent.
For they had not their religion from their own invention or
presumption, as he hath his opinions, but by Divine revela-
tion, confirmed with miracles. When he is able to produce
as authentic proof for his paradoxes, as they did for their
religion, he saith something.
That which he calleth my " scurrilous argumentation —
he that drinks well, sleeps well," &c. — is none of mine, but
a common example used in logic, to shew the weakness of
such forms of aiguings as his is, when the dependance is not
necessary and essential but contingent and accidental ; as it
is in his argument here. All actions are from God by a
general power, but not determinately. The like contingent
connection there is between " action" and " sense," sense
and "memory," memory and "election'"." This is enough to
shew the weakness of his argument. But he hath one main
fault more, he hath put more in the conclusion than there
was in the premisses.
He sayeth, " If by liberty" I had understood only " liberty Liberty to
of action," and not "liberty of will," it "had been an easy mat- recomine-
ter to reconcile it with prescience and the decrees of God ^" I prescTence
answer, first, that "liberty of action" without "liberty of will" thaniiberty
is but a mock liberty, and a new nothing, like an empty bottle
given to a child to satisfy his thirst. Where there is no
liberty to will, there is no liberty to act ; as hath been
formerly demonstrated*. Secondly, the liberty to will, is as
reconcileable with the prescience and decrees of God as the
liberty to act. God^s decrees do extend at least as much to
acting as to willing. Thirdly, this liberty of acting without
a liberty of willing is irreconcileable with all the other attri-
butes of God, His truth, His justice, His goodness, and His
[Qu., Auiniaclv. upon Numb. xxiv.
p. 2(J3.]
q [Ibid., p. 264.]
[Ibid., pp. 263, 264.]
' [Ibid., p. 264.]
t [See above p. 305. note k.]
422
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part power ; and setteth the decrees of God in opposition one with
— another. How should a man have a liberty to act, and have
no liberty to will, when he cannot act freely except he will
freely, because willing is a necessary cause or means of
acting? That which followeth about God's aspect" and
" intuition is merely a contention about words, and such
words as are received and approved by all authors. God's
intuition is not of the same nature with ours. We poor
creatures do stand in need of organs ; but God, Who is a
pure simple infinite essence, cannot be made perfecter by
organs, or accidents. Whatsoever He seeth or knoweth, He
seeth or knoweth by His essence. The less T. H. under-
stood the terms of aspect" and " intuition,'^ the more apt he
was to blunder them.
How the He pleadeth, " If liberty cannot stand with necessity, it
is'the^ne"'^ Cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which decrees
afnhin^^ necessity is a consequent and he citeth somebody without
name, who said, "The will of God is the necessity of all
things^'." I deny his consequence. Liberty is consistent
with God^s decrees, though it be not consistent with universal
necessity. The reason is plain ; — because liberty is a con- 829
sequent of God's decrees as well as necessity. He who said,
that ^^the will of God was the necessity of all things," was
St. Austin^. I wish he would stand to his judgment, or to
his sense of those words. The meaning of those words is not,
that God doth will that all things should be necessary, but
that whatsoever God doth will, that must necessarily be. If
He will have all things necessary, then all things must be
necessary. If He will have all things free, then all things
must be free. If He will have some things necessary, and
some things free, then some things must be necessary, and
some things free. "VMien God formed man of the dust of the
earth, He might have formed him either a child or a man ; but
whether he should be formed the one or the other, "it was
not in the condition of the creature, but in the pleasure of
the Creator, Whose will is the necessity of aU things y." What
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. cessitns renwi.' "]
p. 264.] ^ De Genesi ad Litteram, lib. vi. c.
' [Ibid., p. 26o.— "If I had said it, 15. [§ 26; Op. torn. iii. P. i. p. 207.
it had not been -without authority of B.]
learned men, in vfhose \ynnY\gs, Rxe often y [Id., ibid. — "Hoc enim non erat
found this sentence, ' J'oltinfas Dei ne- in condition? creaturae, sed in placito
MR. IIOBBES* ANIMADVERSIONS.
423
doth this concern the liberty of man ? Nothing. It con- DiscotrasE
earned him more to have understood St. Austin^s distinction
between God^s will and His prescience in the same place^ —
"What God willeth, shall necessarily be" (that is, according
to an absolute antecedent necessity) ; what God foreknows,
shall truly be^^^ (that is, only by a necessity of infallibility).
I might produce the whole world against him in this cause ;
but because he renounced human authorities, I have been
sparing to allege one testimony against him. But to free St.
Austin from all suspicion of concurring in such a desperate
cause, I -^dll only cite one place of a hundred ; — " Neither
is that necessity to be feared, which the Stoics fearing, were
careful to distinguish the causes of things so, that some they
substracted from necessity, some they subjected to necessity ;
and in those which they would not have to be under neces-
sity, they placed our wills, lest they should not be free if
they were subjected to necessity; for if that be to be called
our necessity, which is not in our power, but effecteth what
it can although we will not, such as is the necessity of death,
it is manifest, that our wills, whereby we live well or ill,
are not under such a necessity &c. Here he may find the
two sorts of necessity, which we have had so much conten-
tion about; the one in our power, which is not opposed to
liberty ; the other not in our power, that is, an antecedent
extrinsecal necessity, which destroy eth liberty : but he saith, [i- e. St.
that "it is manifest, that our wills are not subject" to such "^"^"""^"^'^
antecedent "necessity." Here he may see, that his friends
the Stoics, the great patrons of necessity, were not for uni-
versal necessity as he is, nor did countenance necessity to
the prejudice of the liberty of the will.
"Only to permit," and, "to permit [barely^]," do not sig- what it is
nify the same thing in this placed " Only to permit," is op- onrand
to permit
n, • barely.
Creatoris, Cujus voluntas rerum neces- vere futuriim erat), tunc erat finiturus
sitas est."] vitam quando fiiiivit vitam . . . I dec
' [Id., ibid.,] c. 17; [ibid., p. 207. quod preesciebat" (Deus), ^' necessario
D — G. — "i/oc enim necessarlo futu- futuru7n erat."'\
rum est quod Ille vult, et ea vere Jutura ^ [Id.,] De Civit. Dei, lib. v. c. 10.
sunt quee Ille prcescivit. . . Secundum [Op. torn. vii. p. 124. F, G.]
aliquas caussas inferiores jam vitam ^ [" Liberty " in former editions, by
finierat" (Ezechias); " secundum illas a manifest misprint.]
autem quae sunt in voluntate et prae- " [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.
scientia Dei, Qui ex aeternitate noverat p, 285 : from the Defence, Numb. xxiv.
quid illo tempore facturus erat (et hoc above p. lo7 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
424
CASTIGATIONS OF
^ni ^ P^^^^ acting ; " to permit barely/^ is oppoeed to disposing.
'■ — There are many things which God doth not act^ there is
nothing which God doth not dispose. He acteth good, per-
mitteth evil, disposeth all things both good and evil. He
that cutteth the banks of a river, is the active cause that the
water floweth out of the channel : he that hindereth not the
stream to break the banks when he could, is the permissive
cause ; and if he make no other use of the breaking out, it is
" nuda permissio'^ — "bare permission but if he disposeth
and draweth the water that floweth out, by furrows, to water
the meadows, then, though he permit it, yet he doth not
"barely permit^^ it, but disposeth of it to a further good. So
God " only permitteth'^ e^il, that is. He doth it not ; but He
doth not "barely permit" it, because He disposeth it to
good.
[Universais Here he would gladly be nibbling at the question, whether
nothing . I'l i -».tt-'t
but words, universals be nothing but only words; — "^^othmg m the
t^ox'.^ H^f "^orld," saith he, "is general, but the significations of words
and other signs ^ :" hereby affirming unawares, that a man is
but a word, and by consequence, that he himself is but a
titular and not a real man. But this question is altogether
impertinent in this place. AVe do not by a general influence
understand some universal substance or thing, but an influ-
ence of indeterminate power, which may be applied either
to good or e^il. The influence is a singular act; but the
power communicated is a general, that is, an indeterminate
power, which may be applied to acts of several kinds. If he
deny all general power in this sense, he denieth both his
own reason, and his common sense.
Eternity is Still he is for his old error, — that eternity is a successive
siveXra- everlasting duration 6. But he produceth nothing for it,
tion. j^Qj, answereth to any thing which I urged against it : — that
the eternity of God is God Himself ; that if eternity were an
everlasting duration, then there should be succession in God ;
then there should be former and latter, past and to come, 830
and a part without a part, in God ; then all things should
not be present to God ; then God should lose something,
namely, that which is past, and acquire something newly,
d [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Numb. xxiv. * [Ibid., pp. 265, 266.]
p. 265.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
425
namely, that which is to come ; and so God, Who is " with- Discourse
out all shadow of chansre," should be mutable, and chansre '- — -
. . . [James i.
every day^ To this he is silent, and silence argueth i7.]
consent.
He saith, those '^many other ways which are ^proposed by [t. h.'s
divines for reconcihng eternal prescience with liberty and confi-°^
contingency,* . . are proposed in vain, if they mean the same ^^^nce.]
liberty and contingency^^ that I do, " for truth and error can
never be reconciled I do not wonder at his show of con-
fidence. The declining sun maketh longer shadows ; and
when a merchant is nearest breaking, he maketh the fairest
show, to preserve his reputation as long as may be. He
saith, he "knoweth the loadstone hath no such attractive
power^.^' I feai' shortly he will not permit us to say,
that a plaster or a plantain-leaf draweth. What doth the
loadstone then, if it doth not draw ? He " knoweth, that
the ii'on cometh to it, or it to the iron'." Can he not
tell whether? This is worse than "drawing," to make
iron come or go. By "^potentiality" he understandeth
"power^" or might; others understand possibility or inde-
termination. Is not he Hkely to confute the Schoolmen to
good purpose ?
Whereas I said, "God is not just but justice itself, not eter- w^hy God
nal but eternity itself^;" he telleth me, that "they are un- bVj^ustice
seemly words to be said of God," he " will not say blasphe-
mous and atheistical, that ' God is not just,' that ' He is not
eternal"^.' " I do not fear, that any one scholar, or any one
understanding Christian in the world, should be of his mind
in this. If I should spend much time in pro\dng of such
known truths, approved and established by the Christian
world, I should shew myself almost as weak as he doth shew
himself, to talk of such things as he understandeth not in
the least, to the overthrowing of the nature of God, and to
make Him no God. If his God have accidents, ours hath
none. If his God admit of composition and division, ours is
' [Defence, Numb. xxiv. above pp. ^ [Ibid.]
157—159; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] ' [In the Defence, Numb. xxiv.
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. above p. 153.]
p. 266.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.
h [Ibid.] p. 266.]
' [Ibid.]
426
CASTIGATIOXS OF
Part a simple essence. "Wlien we say, God is not just but jus-
'- — tice/^ not wise but wisdom,, dotli he think that we speak of
moral virtues ? or that we derogate or detract from God ?
Noj we ascribe unto him a transcendental justice and wisdom,
that is not comprehended under our categories, nor to be
conceived perfectly by human reason. But why doth he not
attempt to answer the reasons which I brought ? — that that
which is infinitely perfect, cannot be fmther perfected by
accidents; that God is a simple essence, and can admit no
kind of composition ; that the infinite essence of God can act
sufi&ciently without faculties; that it consisteth not with
Di\ine perfection to have any passive or receptive powers",
I find nothing in answer to these, but deep silence. Attri-
butes are names ; and justice and wisdom are moral virtues :
but the justice, and wisdom, and power, and eternity, and
goodness, and truth of God, are neither names nor moral
virtues, but altogether do make one eternal essence,
wherein all perfections do meet in an infinite degree. It
is well, if those words of our Saviour do escape him in his
John xiv. 6. ucxt Animadversions, — " I am the truth or St. Paul, for
Actsxvii. ^^^.^g '^Detrm'' and Deit at em''— God'' and ^^the God-
Prov. viii. head^' or Deity, to be all one; or Solomon, for personating
and ix. under the name of ''Wisdom'' in the abstract.
God is in- To prove eternity to be no successive duration but one
divisible. jji(ji^-;isi}3ie moment, I argued thus, — "the Divine substance is
indivisible, but eternity is the Di^'ine substance^.''
In answer to this, in the first place, he denieth the major,
— that "the Di^^ine substance is indi^^isibleP." Khe had not
been a professed Christian, but a plain Stoic, I should not
have wondered so much at this answer ; for they held, that
God was corporal^. If the Divine substance be not indivisible,
then it is material, then it is corporal, then it is corruptible,
then the Anthropomorphites had reason to attribute human
members to God. But the Scriptures teach us better, and
John iv. 24. all the world consenteth to it; — that "God is a Spii'it,'' —
iTim.i.17; that He is "immortal and invisible," — that He "dwelleth in
[and vi.I6.J
n [Defence, Numb. xxiv. above pp. [See Mosheim's edition of Cud-
157—159; Disc. i. Ft. iii.] worth's Intell. System, vol. ii. p. 1123:
° [Ibid., p. 158.] on the authority of Origen, contra Cel-
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. sum, lib. i. p. 169.]
p. 267 ]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
427
light which no man can approach unto, AVhom no man Discoursk
hath seen nor can see." It is inconsistent with the nature
of God to be finite; it is inconsistent with the nature of
a body to be infinite. The speculations of philosophers,
who had only the light of reason, were not so gross ; who
made God to be a most simple essence or simplicity itself*".
All matter, which is the original of diWsibility, was created
by God ; and therefore God Himself cannot be material nor
didsible.
>31 Secondly, he denieth the minor, — ^that the "eternity" of God God iseter-
is the Divine substance s." I proved it from that generally
received rule, " whatsoever is in God, is God." His answer
is, that " this rule hath been said by some men, thought by no
man ; for whatsoever is thought is understood — " Said by
some men ?" Nay, said and approved by all men, that ever
had occasion to discourse upon this subject, and received
without contradiction as a received principle of theology.
They who say against it, do, wittingly or unwittingly, destroy
the nature of God. That which followeth is equally pre-
sumptuous,— "thought by no man, for whatsoever is thought is
understood." It was too much to censure all the Schoolmen
for pies or parrots, prating what they did not understand ;
but to accuse all learned Christians, of all communions,
throughout all ages, who have either approved it or not con-
tradicted it, of not understanding themselves, is too high an
insolence. God, being an infinite essence, doth intrinsecally
include all perfection, and needeth not to have His defects
supplied by accidents.
Where I say, "To-day all eternity is coexistent with this [Eternity
day, and to-morrow all eternity will be coexistent with to- ^tan»""}
morrow he inferreth, " It is well, that his eternity is now
come from a 'nunc stans' to be a 'nunc fluens,^ flowing from this
day to" to-morrow^. It were better, if he would confess that
it is a mere deception of his sight ; like that of fresh-water
passengers when they come first to sea, " terrceque urhesque
recedunf^y^ — who think the shore leaveth them, when they
' ["Moj/cis — rh eV- virepovcriou." [Defence, Xumb. xxiv ; above p.
K. T. \. See Mosleim's Cudworth, 159; Disc, i, Pt. iii.]
vol. i. p. 303.] ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv.
s [Qu,, Animadv. upon Numb, xxiv p. 268.]
P- 267.] « [Virg., ^:n., iii. 72.]
' ribid.i
428
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^rt leave the shore. It is time that floweth and moveth, not
'■ — eternity.
" Non tellus cymbam, tellurem cymba relinquit."
To conclude this point of eternity, and this section, God
Exod. iii. gave Himself this name, " I am that I am,^^ to shew the
truth, the simplicity, the independence, and immutability of
His essence ; wherein there is neither "fuif nor " erit" —
" hath been^' nor " shall be," but only present, " I am."
Eternity, only eternity, is, truly, simply, independently,
immutably.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXV.
What a His first contradictions have been handled before, whither
eih°to"'be^ I refer the reader^ ; but because he expresseth his sense more
rate^'is^im- clearly here than there, I will take the liberty to add a few
pertinent, words. I charged him with contradictions, in making vo-
luntary to presuppose deliberation, and yet making many
voluntary acts to be without dehberation. He distinguisheth
" between deliberation and that which shall be construed for
deliberation by a judge — some voluntary acts are " rash
and undeliberate" in themselves, yet the judge judgeth them
to be deliberate, because they ought to have deliberated, and
had time enough to deliberate, whether the action were law-
ful or not 2." First, this answer is a mere subterfuge. The
question between us is not, what actions are punishable by
law, and what are not, but what is deliberation in its own
nature, and whether all voluntary actions be deliberate or
not ; not in order to a trial before a judge, but in order to
the finding out of the truth. Secondly, many of these rash
actions do imply no crime ; nor are cognoscible before a
judge, as tending only to the agent^s particular prejudice, or
perhaps no prejudice but advantage. In all these cases, the
sentence of the judge cannot help to reconcile his contra-
Aud his diction. Thirdly, the ground of his distinction is not true.
faUef^^" The judge doth not always judge of such rash acts to be de-
y [Castig. of Animadv.] Numb, viii ; [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv.
[above pp. 296—300.] p. 272.]
429
liberate acts, but judgeth them to have been indeliberate Discourse
acts, whensoever he findeth them to have been justly desti- — — —
tute of all manner of deliberation : from whence did arise
the well known distinction between manslaughter and wilful
murder in our law. Murder committed upon actual de-
liberation is held to be done maliciously — ex malitid sua
but if it proceed out of sudden passion, it is found only
manslaughter. The same equity is observed in the judicial
law. He who did kill another " suddenly without enmity,^^ Numb.
I was allowed the benefit of the city of refuge. Lastly, in ^^^^*
many cases the judge cannot judge, that the agent had suf-
ficient time to deliberate, nor that it was his fault that he
did not deliberate, for really he had not sufficient time to
deliberate.
And where he talketh, that the judge supposeth all the a man
time" after the making of the law to have been "time of deli- de"ii)eV'fttf*
beration%" he erreth most pitifully. There needeth little or contingent^
no time to deliberate of the law. All the need of delibera- events,
tion is about the matter of fact, and the circumstances
332 thereof. As, for example, a sudden affront is put upon a
man, which he did not expect nor could possibly imagine,
such as he apprehendeth that flesh and blood cannot endure,
and conceiveth himself engaged in honour to vindicate it
forthwith. This is that which required deliberation ; the
nature and degree of the afiront, the best remedies how to
procure his own reparation in honour, the inconveniences
that may arise from a sudden attempt, and the advantage
which he may make of a little forbearance, with all the cir-
cumstances of the accidents. How could he possibly deli-
berate of all these things, before any of these things were
imaginable ? He could neither certainly divine, nor pro-
bably conjecture, that ever such an accident should hap-
pen. And therefore it remaineth still a gross contradiction
in him, to say, that voluntary always supposeth delibera-
tion^, and yet to confess, that many voluntary acts are un-
deliberate''.
Whereas he saith, that he always used the word sponta- [Sponta-
neity.]
* [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. above p. 45.]
P- 272.] , c [Ibid. Numb. xxv. above p. 160.]
^ [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. viii.
430
CASTIGATIONS OP
Part neous in the same sense he must excuse me if I cannot
-iH: — assent unto it. In one place he telleth us, that " by sponta-
neity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is
meant by it^." In another place he telleth us, that to give out
"money for merchandize" is a "spontaneous" action*". All
the world knoweth, that to buy and sell doth require con-
sideration.
iberty.] He defineth "hberty" to be " the absence of all extrinsecal
impediments to action^:" but extrinsecal causes are extrinsecal
impediments, and no man is free (according to his grounds)
from the determination of extrinsecal causes ; therefore no
man is free from extrinsecal impediments.
Endeavour His answer is, that "impediment or hindrance signifieth an
opposition to endeavour, . . . and consequently extrinsecal causes
liberty, -j^j^^^ ^^kc away endeavour are not to be called impediments^."
He is very seldom stable to his own grounds, but is con-
tinually interfering with himself. Now he telleth us, that an
"impediment signifieth an opposition to endeavour;" else-
where he telleth us, that a man " that is tied" is not free to
walk, and that his bonds are "impediments," without any re-
gard to his endeavour^ It were mere folly for him to en-
deavour to walk, who can neither stir hand nor foot. This is
not all. He telleth us further, that an inward impediment is
not destructive to liberty, as a man is free to go though he be
" lame ;" and men do "not say, that the river wants liberty to
ascend, but the power," because the water cannot ascend^.
And is not want of endeavour intrinsecal as well as lameness ?
Or did he ever hear of a river that endeavoured to ascend up
the channel ? It is not true, therefore, that endeavour is of
the essence of liberty, or that impediment always " signifietli
opposition to endeavour." Lastly, "extrinsecal causes" do
not always " take away endeavour," but many times leave
men free to endeavour to obtain those things, which they
never do obtain. If extrinsecal causes do take away all en-
deavours but such as are successful, then there should never
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxv, ^ [Qu., Aniraadv. upon Numb. xxv.
p. 273.] p. 274.]
" [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. i [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb,
xxxiii ; [above p. 175.] xxix ; [above p. 1()7.]
' [Ibid.,' Numb, viii ; [above p. 4.3.] [Ibid.]
[Ibid., Numb, xxix; above p. 1G6.]
MR. HOBBEs' ANIMADVERSIONS.
431
be any labour in vain. It remaineth, therefore, upon his Discourse
own grounds, that extrinsecal causes whensoever they do not .
take away endeavours are extrinsecal impediments and de-
stroy liberty.
He saith, one " may deliberate of that which is impossible There may
for him to do^^^ True, if he apprehend it as possible, and m^eivts'^be-
judge it to be possible ; or, otherwise, he is stark mad to de- b^JratloIi be
liberate about it. ' The shutting of the door of the tennis- done,
court' is no impediment to play, until a man have a will to
play, and that is not until he have done deliberating °^.'' Yes,
even in the act of deliberation, the finding of the door of the
tennis-court shut determineth the deliberation, changeth the
will, and may be the only impediment which hindereth a
man from playing. One may have a will to play before
deliberation, sometimes more absolute, out of humour, than
after. Many times the last judgment is conditional ; as, to
play if the door be open, and if the court be not taken up
beforehand ; and if it be shut, or the place taken up, then to
go to bowls, or some other exercise.
Wheresoever the judgment is indiflPerent, to do either And liber-
this or that, or conditional, to do this upon such conditions^ [l gnded.^*^
it is not the deliberation or the last judgment that doth de-
termine the liberty of the free agent, but leaveth him free to
choose either part, or to suspend his consent to both parts,
pro re natd. So liberty may remain after deliberation is
done. Although he did not use these words, sensitive ap-
petite— rational hope — rational fear — irrational passions,^'
nor "confound" the terms of "sufficiency '' and "efficiency,'^ or
"beginning of being" and "beginning of working"," yet
he might confound the thing whereof these terms are but
notions ; and so he doth.
3"^ All men do understand well enough what secret sympa- [Secret
thies and antipathies are, except such as are captious ; though and arJti-^*
men understand not usually why they are, as why one man P^thies.]
gapeth at a custard rather than at a pie, and runneth away
from a cat rather than from a mastiff. When I say, " it is thus
far true, that the action doth follow the thought necessarily"
(namely in antipathies and violent passions, which admit no
^ [Qu., Animudv. upon Nun;b. XXV. "' [Ibid.]
p. 274.] " [Ibid.]
432
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part deliberation °), he demandeth, ^'how far it is falseP." I answer,
III .
' — it is false in ordinary thoughts,, which are not accompanied
with such violent passions. A man thinketh a thousand
things in a day accidentally, which he never putteth in ex-
ecution; nor so much as thinketh them worthy of deli-
beration.
[Habits No man would have denied, that habits do facilitate ac-
actlons!] tions, and render them less difficult and cumbersome, and
consequently more easy and more free'^, but he that meant
to make himself ridiculous. He might even as well tell us,
that he who gropeth in the dark for every step, is as free to
walk as if it were fair day -light ; or that a foundered horse,
that is afraid to stumble every foot, is as free to go, as he
which is sound and goeth on boldly without fear. But all
this abuse groweth from the misunderstanding of liberty. I
take it for a power to act or not to act, and he taketh it for
an absence of outward impediments." This confounding of
words, and the heaping together of Scholastical terms with
scorn, because he never understood them, are the chiefest in-
gredients in his discourse. I am not ashamed of motus
primo primij' or '^judicium practice practicum" or actus
elicitus" and " imperatus^." But he hath great reason to be
ashamed of his slighting them ; which he would not do, but
that he never learned them, and so would make a \drtue of
culpable necessity. He saith, he " will not contend with one
who can use ' motus primo primi' &c.^ He is the wiser, to
have as little to do with scholars as he can. His best play is
in the dark, where there is no fencing.
Some un- We both agree, that some sudden undeliberated acts are
edactTmay j^^^^y Punished. His reason is, because the agent "had time
be punish- deliberate from the instant that he knew the law to the in-
able.
stant of his action*.^' But I have shewed the vanity of this
reason, and that it was impossible to deliberate of sudden
affronts and injuries which could not be expected or fore-
seen. But if the occurrences or accidents were such as were
° [Defence, Numb. xxv. above p. that can use * motus primo primi,'
161; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] 'practice practicum,' 'actus elicitus,'
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. and many other phrases of the same
p. 275.] kind."]
[Ibid.] « [Ibid.]
[Ibid " For improprieties of t [Ibid., p. 270: from T. H. Numb.
speech, I will not contend witli one xxv. above in the Defence p. 160.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
433
foreseen, or whereof the agent was premonished, and he Discourse
did dehberate of them, or if it was his own fault or improvi- '
dence that they were not foreseen nor deliberated of, then
he is punishable, because his predeliberation about some such
accident as might probably happen, was a virtual deliberation
about this very act, which did afterward happen, though it
were not then acted but only expected ; or.because he refused
or neglected to fore-arm himself by deliberation against a
surprise.
Here he cavilleth about terms of actual and virtual deli- Virtual de-
beration, as his manner is ; — " If virtual deliberation be not
actual deliberation, it is no deliberation adding, that I call
virtual deliberation, that which ought to have been and was
not^\^^ He mistaketh the matter. I call ^- virtual delibera-
tion^^ a former deliberation about this very act, feared or ex-
pected out of providence or premonition before it was acted,
or about some act of the like nature. So it was an actual
deliberation, yet not about this very act. But it might have
served to have prevented the agent^s being surprised, and have
had the same virtue as if it had been an actual deliberation
about this very accident. Did he never learn nor hear of the
distinction in philosophy between " cont actus verus^' and
" contactus virtualis" — " true touching^^ and " virtual touch-
ing — ^'true touching,^^ when the superficies of two bodies
are together, so as they can move and be moved mutually ;
and "^drtual touching,^' when the virtue of one body doth
extend itself to another, as it is between the sun and the
earth, the loadstone and the iron, the hand of the caster
and the stone moving upwards in the air. His argument
holdeth as much in all the [se] cases as in this of deliberation.
If " virtual touching^' be not " true touching," it is no touch-
ing ; and if virtual motion be not true motion, it is no motion.
I shall find English enough at all times to answer him^'.
Concerning my instance, which he saith, pleasantly, dotli
"stink to the nose of the understanding^," I desire him only
to read the fifteenth chapter of Leviticus. I am sure he dare
not call that a " stinking" passage.
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. ing from that the custom of School-
p. 276.] language hath made him forget the
^' [Ibid. — "His reprehension here language of his country."]
is a reprehension of himself, proceed- " [Ibid.]
BHAMHALL. p f
484 CASTIGATIONS OF ^
Part He saith^ " the Bishop would make but an ill judge of in-
— — nocent children and that he " hopeth we shall never have 834
not' punish- the administration of public justice in such hands as his,
delTth^'^^ or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him^ be-
cause I said, that " if a child, before he have the use of reason, ^
shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he wanted malice ^
to incite him to it and reason to restrain him from it, he
shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular justice, un-
less there be some mixture of public justice in the case""/'
" Si ego dignus hac contumelia
" Sum maxime, at tu indignus qui faceres tamen''." —
If I deserved a reproof, he was a most unfit man to be my re-
prover ; who maintaineth, that ^^no law can be unjust^," that
in the state of nature it was lawful for any man to kill another %
and particularly, for mothers to expose or make away their
children at their pleasure — ita ut ilium vel educare vel ex
yonere suo arbitrio et jure possit^ — that '^parents to their
children," and "sovereigns to their subjects," cannot be "in
jurious," whether they kill them or whatsoever they do unt
them^. But what is it that I have said ? I have delivered no
judgment or opinion of mine own in the case. I know what
hath been practised by some persons, in some places, at som
times. I know what reasons have been pretended for such
practices ; sovereign dominion, the law of retaliation (Psalmj
cxxxvii. 8, 9.), the common safety, the satisfaction or con-|
tentment of persons or families injured. But if I have de
livered any opinion of mine own, it was on the contrary ; — \
though I affirm not but that it may be sometimes lawful t
punish parents, for acts truly treasonable, in their posterity
with lesser punishments, as loss of liberty, or the loss of the
father's estate, which was at the time of the delinquency iu
the father's power to dispose, that they who will not forbear
to oifend for their ovrn sakes, may forbear for their posterity's
sakes ; — though I know the practice of many countries, even
in this, to be otherwise. But for death, I know no warrant.
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxv. [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xv.
p. 277.] above p. 85.]
^ [Defence, Numb. xxv. above p. c [Ibid., p. 86.]
162 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] De Cive, c. ix. § 2. [p. 90.]
" [Terent., Eun., V. ii. 26, 27.] [Ibid., § 7. p. 98.]
1
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
435
Pliny observeth of the lion, that he preyeth first upon men, Discoukse
more rarely upon women, and not upon children, except he —
be extremely pressed with hunger ^
Private right and private justice is between particular men ; [Private
public right and pubHc justice is either between common- justice
wealths, as in foreign war, or between commonwealths and
subjects, as in case of lawgiving or civil war. Many things
are lawful in the way of public justice, which are not lawful
in the way of private justice. But this inquisition hath no
relation to our present controversy. My exception — " except
there be some mixture of public justice in the case^^ — is as
much as to say, unless there be something more in the case,
that doth nearly concern the safety of the commonwealth.
It is not impossible, but before the ordinary age of attaining
to the perfect use of reason, a child may be drawn into very
treasonable attempts, so far as to act a ministerial part ; and
in such cases there is a rule in law, ' Malitia supplet aetatem'
He hath confessed here enough to spoil his cause, if it were
not spoiled already; — that "want of reason takes away" both
"crime" and "punishment, and maketh" agents " innocent^.'^
If "want of reason" do it, without doubt antecedent extrinsecal
necessity doth much more do it. How then hath he taught
us all this while, that voluntary faults are justly punishable
though they be necessary^ ? A child^s fault may be as
voluntary as a man's. How a child may justly be put to
death to satisfy " a vow,'' or " to save a great number of peo-
ple," or " for reason of state'," I know not. This I do know,
that it is not lawful " to do evil, that good may come" of it. [Rom. iii.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXVI.
It seemeth, — by the Animadversion which T. H. hath in He know-
this section, wherein he maketh " consideration, understand- soil butTm
ing, reason, and all the passions" (or affections) " of the agmatiou.
f [Hist. Nat., viii. 19.] above p. 86.— &c.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. i [Qu., Auimadv. upon Numb. xxv.
p. 277.] p. 277.]
[In the Defence, T. H., Numb. xiv.
r f 2
436
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part mind/^ to be " imaginations j and by some other passages in
— this treatise, where he attributeth to bees and spiders " not
only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near equal
to that of mankind'';" and where he denieth to man all
dominion over the creatures," making him like a top," or a
"football,"or a pair of scales," and his chiefest difference from
brute beasts to consist in his language and in his hand, and
his liberty to consist in " an absence of outward impediments,"
ascribing to brute beasts deliberation such as (if it were con-
stant) " there were no cause to call men more rational than
beasts' ;" — that he maketh the reason and understanding of
men to be nothing else but refined and improved sense, or
the sense of brute beasts to include reason. It was an old^
Stoical opinion, that the affections were nothing else but
imaginations ; but it was an old groundless error. Imagina-
tions proceed from the brain, affections from the heart. But
to make '^'^reason" and " understanding" to be " imaginations,"
is yet grosser. Imagination is an act of the sensitive phantasy,
reason and understanding are proper to the intellectual soul.
Imagination is only of particulars, reason of universals also.
In the time of sleep or some raging fit of sickness, when the
imagination is not governed by reason, we see what absurd
and monstrous and inconsistent shapes and fancies it doth
collect, remote enough from true deliberation. Doth the
physician cure his patient by ^' imaginations ?" Or the states-
man govern the commonwealth by " imaginations ?" Or the
lawyer determine differences by imaginations ?" Are logical
arguments, reduced into due form and an orderly method,
nothing but ^'^imaginations ?" Is prudence itself turned to "im-
agination ?" And are the dictates of right reason, which God
hath given as a light, to preserve us from moral vices and to lead
us to virtuous actions, now become mere " imaginations ?" We
see the understanding doth often contrary and correct the
imaginations of sense. I do not blame the " puzzled School-
men"*," if they dissented from such new-fangled speculations.
[And this And the ground of all these vain imaginations is imagina-
upon the
ground of
imagina- ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. d, e ; pp. 339, 341 ; and below pp. 441.
lion.] p. 278.] note o, 445. note h.]
^ [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi.
viii. [above p. 46.] p. 279.]
• [See above pp. 416, 417. notes c,
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
437
tion ; — " As any man may perceive as easily as he can look Discourse
into his own thoughts"/^ His argument may be thus re '- —
duced, — That which we imagine is true, but we imagine all
these to be imaginations. I deny both his propositions.
First, our imaginations are not always true, but many times
such as are suggested to us by our working phantasies upon
some slight grounds, or by our fond or deceitful instructers,
or by our vain hopes or fears. For one Whittington, that found
his imagination to prove true, when the bells rang him back
to his master, " Turn again, Whittington, thou shalt be Lord
Mayor of London," a thousand have been grossly abused by
their vain imaginations. Secondly, no man can imagine any
such thing, who knoweth the difference between the reason-
able and the sensitive soul, between the understanding
and the phantasy, between the brain and the heart ; but
confident assertions and credulity may do much among sim-
ple people. So we have heard or read of some, w^ho were
contented to renounce their eye-sight, and to affirm for com-
pany, that they saw a dragon flying in the air, where there
was not so much as a butterfly ; out of a mannerly simpli-
city, rather than to seem to doubt of the truth of that, which
was confirmed to them by the testimony and authority of
such persons, whose judgment and veracity they esteemed.
We have had enough of his "understanding nnderstand-
eth," and "will willeth^j" or too much, unless it were of
more weight. What a stir he maketh every other section
about nothing ! All the world are agreed upon the truth in
this particular, and understand one another well. Whether
they ascribe the act to the agent, or to the form, or to the
faculty by which he acteth, it is all one. They know, that
actions properly are of individuums. But if an agent have
lost his natural power or acquired habit (as we have instances
in both kinds), he will act but madly. He that shall say, that
natural faculties and acquired habits are nothing but the acts
that flow from them, that "reason" and "deliberation" are "the
same thing p" (he might as well say, that wit and discourse are
the same thing), deserveth no other answer but to be shghted.
° [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. Qu., State of Quest, p. 4.]
P- 279.] p [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi.
° [Ibid. And sec above p. 287 ; and p. 279.]
438
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part That a man, deliberating of fit means to obtain his desired
— end, doth "consider the means singly and successively there
is no doubt. And there is as little doubt, that both the in-
quiry, and the result or verdict, may sometimes be definite,
or prescribe the best means or the only means, and sometimes
indefinite, determining what means are good, without defining
which are the best, but leaving the election to the free agent.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXVII.
ThefacuUy I do not know what the man would have done but for his
if the^wifi. trifling homonymy about the name of " will'",'^ which affordeth
him scope to play at fast and loose between the faculty and
the act of willing. We ended with it in the last section, and
we begin again with it in this section : — " The faculty of the
wiir^ (saith he) "is no will, the act only which he calleth
volition is the will; as a man that sleepeth hath the power
of seeing and seeth not, nor hath for that time any sight, so 836
also he hath the power of willing, but willeth nothing, nor
hath for that time any wilP."
" Quantum est in rebus inane M" —
What profound mysteries he uttereth, to shew that the
faculty of willing, and the act of willing, are not the same
things ! — did ever any creature in the world think they
were ? — and that the faculty doth not always act ! — did ever
any man think it did ? Let him leave these impertinencies,
and tell us plainly, whether the faculty of willing and the act
of willing be not distinct things ; and whether the faculty of
the will be not commonly called the will by all men but him-
self ; and by himself also, when he is in his lucid intervals.
Hear his own confession ; — " To will, to elect, to choose, are
all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will ; and
indeed, as the will is a faculty or power of a man^s soul, so
the will is an act of it according to that power"." That
which he calleth the "faculty" here, he calleth expressly
'> [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi. xxvii. p. 281.]
p. 279 : — to prove, that " there is no s [Ibid.]
such thing as an indefinite considera- ' [Pers., Sat, i. 1.]
tion of what are good and fit means."] " [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb.
^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xx. [above p. 133.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
439
"the wiW^ there. Here he will have but "one will/' there Discourse
he admitteth two distinct Avills — " to will is an act of the — —
will." Here he will not endure, that the "faculty^' should be
the will; there he saith expressly, that "the will is a faculty."
All this wind shaketh no oats. Whatsoever he saith in this
section, amounteth not to the weight of one grain.
If he had either known what concupiscence doth signify, Of concupi-
• • • • scGncc.
which really he doth not, or had known how familiar it is [Rom. vii.
(both name and thing) in the most modest and pious au- 5*ZiThess.
thors, both sacred and profane, which he doth not know, he ^-3
would have been ashamed to have accused this expression as
unbecoming a grave person'^. But he, who will not allow
me to mention it once to good purpose, doth take the liberty
to mention it six times in so many lines to no purpose y.
Tliere hath been an old question between Roman Catholics
and Protestants, whether concupiscence without consent be
a sin or not^ And here cometh he, as bold as blind, to de-
termine the difference ; committing so many errors, and so
gross, in one short determination, that it is a shame to dis-
pute with him; thrashing those doctors soundly, whom he
professeth to honour and "admire," not for ill will, but because
he never read them. He maintaineth that which the Roman-
ists themselves do detest, and would be ashamed of : as, first,
that concupiscence without consent is no sin% contrary to all
his much "admired doctors^;" secondly, that there is no "con-
cupiscence without consent^," contrary to both parties, which
we use to call the taking away the subject of the question ;
thirdly, that "concupiscence with consent" may be " lawful'^,"
contrary to all men ; — (though the Church of Rome do not
esteem it to be properly a sin, yet they esteem it a defect,
and not altogether lawful, even without consent, much less
with consent^ ;) — fourthly, that "concupiscence makes not the
sin, but the unlawfulness of satisfjdng such concupiscence," or
the "design to prosecute what he knoweth to be unlawful f;"
^ [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb, xxvii. •= [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxvii.
p. 281.] p. 282.]
y [Tbid., pp. 281, 282.] d [Ibid.]
^ [See Bellarm., De Amiss. Gi-at. et ^ [Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et
Statu Peccati, lib. v. cc. 5 — 14.] Statu Peccati, lib. v. c. 10; Op. toin.
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxvii. iii. p. 396. D.]
p. 282.] ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxvii.
l> [Viz. Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, p. 282.]
Perkins. See above p. 382, note 1.]
440
CASTIGATIONS OF
Jam. i. 15.
Part which last errors are so gross^ that no man ever avowed them
IH: — before himself. " When lust hath conceived, it bringeth
forth sin;" that is, when a man hath consented to the sug-
gestion of his own sensuality. Though he scorn the School-
men, yet he should do well to advise with his doctors, whom
he professeth to admires," before he plunge himself again
into such a whirlypool.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXVIII.
Of the in- If I should give over the well known terms of the " ra-
tell CCtli 3,1
andsensi- tional" or intellectual "will^," so well grounded in nature,
tite. ^^11 warranted by the authority and practice of all good
divines and philosophers, to comply with his humour or dis-
tempered imaginations, I should right well deserve a babied
The intellectual appetite and the sensitive appetite" are both
appetites, and in the same man they both proceed from the
same soul, but by divers faculties, the one by the intellectual,
the other by the sensitive ; and proceeding from several
faculties, they do differ as much as if they proceeded from
several souls. The sensitive appetite is organical, the intel-
lectual appetite is inorganical. The sensitive appetite followeth
the judgment of the senses, the intellectual appetite follow-
eth the judgment of the understanding. The sensitive appe-
tite pursueth present, particular, corporal delights ; the intel-
lectual appetite pursueth that which is honest, that which is
future, that which is universal, that which is immortal and
spiritual. The sensitive appetite is determined by the object.
It cannot choose but pursue that object which the senses
judge to be good, and fly that which the senses judge to be
evil. But the intellectual appetite is free to will, or nill, or 837
suspend, and may reject that which the senses say to be
good, and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil, ac-
cording to the dictate of reason.
Not the Then, — to answer what he saith in particular, — " the appe-
same ing. ^.^^ will" are not always "the same thingJ." Every
will is an appetite, but every appetite is not a will. Indeed, in
& [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xix. i [Bable=bauble. Nares' Glossary.]
p, 212.] J [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.
^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxviii. p. 284.]
xxviii. p. 283.]
MR. hobbes' animadversions. 441
the sfvme man, appetite and will is the same thing (secluding Discourse
natural appetite, which concerneth not this question) ; but — —
the sensitive appetite and the intellectual appetite are not the
same thing; following several guides, pursuing several objects,
and being endowed with several privileges. He demandeth,
whether sensual men and beasts do not deliberate and choose
one thing before another, in the same manner that wise men
do*"?^^ Although he hath found out a brutish kind of de-
liberation, if we take the word in the right sense, beasts cannot
dehberate. " Sensual men^^ may dehberate, but do not delibe-
rate as they ought. And by consequence beasts act neces-
sarily, and cannot choose ; sensual men do choose, or may
choose, but do not choose as they ought, nor as wise men
do.^^ He saith, it " cannot be said of wills, that one is rational,
another sensitive'." Not very properly; but it may be said
of appetites, " that one is rational, another sensitive." And
why not a rational will, as well as a rational discom'se ? The
will of a rational creatui-e, rationally guided, is a rational will;
and so will be, when we are dead and gone.
He concludeth, "If it be granted that dehberation is always His deiibe-
(as it is not), there were no cause to call men rational more Si\'ibera-°^
than beasts, for it is manifest by continual experience, that
beasts do deliberate™." Such a dehberation as he fancieth is
not worth contending for, good for nothing but to be thrown
to the dogs or the swine ; — " an alternate imagination, alter-
nate hope and fear, an alternate appetite"." Here is a heap
of " alternates," every one unlike another, and all of them as
far distant from deliberation as reason is from sense. Imagi-
nation is seated in the head, fear and hope in the heart;
appetite is neither the one nor the other. Yet this is all the
deliberation, and all the reason, which he attributeth to man.
And he attributeth the same to brute beasts, but not at all
times j — if they had this deliberation at aU times, " there were
no cause to caU men rational more than beasts °." So the
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Xumb.
xxviii. p. 284.]
' [Ibid.]
[Ibid. — The passage in the origi-
nal stands as above printed, and Bram-
hall argues \ipon it accordingly ; but
the first clause manifestly should run
thus, — " If it be granted that delibe-
ration is always (as it is not) rational,
there were" &c. ; and Molesworth in
his edit, of Hobbes (vol. v. p. 365) has
so printed it.]
" [In the Defence, T. H., Numb,
xxvi. above pp. 163, 164.]
o [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb,
xxviii. p. 284.]
442
CASTIGATIONS OF
p A R T diflPerence between a man and beast is this, that man, or
— — — rather some men, are reasonable creatures at all times, thanks
to their own industry, and brute beasts are reasonable crea-
tures at some times. If he had said, that some men are but
reasonable creatures at some times, I should rather have
believed him for this discourse.
His liberty He is beholden to his catachrestical expressions for all the
liberty! ^^^st of his discoursc in this section. I take liberty to be a
power of the rational soul, or of the free agent, to choose
or refuse indifferently, upon deliberation. And he maketh
liberty to be no more than the bias of a bowl, a strong in-
clination to one side, affixed by deliberation. And by this
abusive expression he thinketh to avoid the two arguments
which were brought against him in this section.
The former argument was this, ^' If every agent be neces-
sitated to act what [he] doth act by extrinsecal causes, then
he is no more free before deliberation than after which is
demonstratively true of true liberty ; but applying it to his
new-fangled acception of liberty, he answereth, " He is more
free" but " he is no less necessitatedP." Yet withal he confess-
eth, that he is necessitated to deliberate as he doth, and to
will as he doth^i ; that is to say, he is necessitated to be free.
This is a freedom of a free stone, not of a free man. If this
be all the freedom which a man hath, we must bid adieu to
all election. Then there is neither freedom of our will, nor
of our actions, more than an inclination extrinsecally neces-
sitated; and then all those absurdities which he hath sought
so carefully to avoid, tumble upon his head thick and three-
fold.
The second argument was this, — '^Deliberation doth pro-
duce no new extrinsecal impediment, therefore either the
agent is free after deliberation, or he was not free before
He answereth, that he "cannot perceive anymore force of infer-
ence in these words than of so many words put together at
adventure^" I wonder at his dulness. He defineth liberty to
be an "absence of extrinsecal impediments*." If this definition
!• [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. s [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb,
xxviii. p. 284.] xxviii. p. 284.—" Of so many other
q [Ibid.] words," &c.]
[Defence, Numb, xxviii. above p. * [In tlie Defence, T. H. Numb,
166 ; Disc. i. rt. iii.] xxix. above p. 1(>6.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
443
be true, then, wheresoever there is the same absence of ex- Discourse
trinsecal impediments, there is the same hberty ; but if —
dehberation produce no new extrinsecal impediments, there
is the same absence of extrinsecal impediments after delibera-
tion, which was before ; therefore, upon his grounds, there is
the same liberty after deliberation, which was before.
What he telleth of "thoughts" that " arise in him that de-
liberateth"^," is nothing to the purpose. The last judgment
is more than bare "thoughts.^^ But this maketh but an
intrinsecal determination, and a necessity upon supposition,
not an extrinsecal determination, and an antecedent necessity,
of which the question is between him and me. A man cannot
" have liberty to do, or not to do, that which at the same time
is already done^." But a man may do that which he doth
freely from all antecedent necessity ; and necessity upon sup-
position is not destructive to liberty. He "profaneth the
Name of God who maketh Him to be corporal and divisible,
to be compounded of substance and accidents, to be mutable,
and to acquire and lose daily ; not he who argueth soberly
and submissively from the attributes or works of God.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXIX.
He hath given a proof lately of his theology, now he Hisdefini-
pretendeth to shew his skill in logic and philosophy. He [jberty.
needeth not to tell us, that he acquired his knowledge by his
own " meditation y he is so long fumbling and spelling of
eYery word. In the first place, he giveth us the definition of
a definition ; — " A right definition is that" (what ? a right
definition without a genus ?) " which determineth the signi-
fication of the word defined ^" This definition agreeth as
much to a lexicon as to a definition. By his leave, a right
definition is an explication of the thing defined by the essen-
tial terms; those are, the genus and the diff'erence. His
definition is but a poor description.
He " confesseth," that "the rule is good" in defining to
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. y [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv.
xxviii. p. 285.] p. 47.]
^ [Ibid.] f [Ibid., Animadv. iipon Numb.
' [Ibid.] xxix. p. 287.]
444
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part use first some general term and then to restrain the signifi-
— cation^^ thereof % &c. He is but learning to spell in logic, and
yet is already censuring. It is no marvel if he never thrive
of the trade. It is not only " good/^ but a necessary rule, that
in every perfect definition there be two notions ; the one more
common, wherein the thing defined doth agree with other
things, the other more distinct, wherein it difi'ers from all
other things. This was Plato's doctrine and Aristotle's, and
received by all logicians ever since; and now he taketh upon
him to be judge of it, as Midas judged of Apollo's music.
He dislikes the terms "genus^^ and " difference,^^ as too
obscure for " English readers,^^ and fitter for " Schoolmen^,^'
comprehending all logicians old and new under the name of
" Schoolmen." Then why doth he himself use the term of
"logic^"' and not rather witcraft, or "definition^^ and not
rather declaring? The vulgar reader will understand his
" general term^" no better than " genus," nor his new
"restraint^" better than the old " diff'erence ;" but be ready
to mistake his restraint of a general term," for the im-
prisonment of some commander in chief. But thus it must
be done; first, to render the people more benevolent to a man
who studieth nothing but their edification, and then to hide
his own ignorance.
He pleadeth, that some words are so general, that they
cannot admit a more general^." Yea, hath he found out that
with his "meditation^?" Every freshman in the University
could have told him that, and much more, — that " omne quod
perfecte definitur est species He saith, I " shall give" him
"leave to cite" some passages out of his "book,i)e Corpore^i"
and he shall "give me leave" to slight them and let them
alone. If he will admit of human authority, I am ready to
bury him and his destiny in a heap of authorities. But for
his own authority, I do not esteem it (more than he produceth
reason) the value of a deaf nut.
At length he hath found us out a genus and a difference in
his definition of liberty, but that I am such a beetle that I
a [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix.
p. 287.]
" [Ibid.]
c [Ibid.]
" [Ibid.]
e [Ibid., p. 288.]
f [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iv.
p. 47.]
^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb.
xxix. p. 288.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
445
cannot see them. His genus is " absence of impediments to Discourse
action Let him peruse all the tables of the predicaments '■
and predicables ; and if he find any such genus there, either
summum or subalternum, "he shall be my great Apollo \" To
make a genus of a privation, that is, an " absence/^ nay, " an
absence of impediments,^^ was never heard of before ; unless
!^ it be true in this cause, bina venena juvant -/^ unless two pri-
vatives make one positive and two negatives one affirmative.
His difference or " restriction^^ is worse, if worse may be, —
I '^not contained in the nature of the agent So the essential
difference is a negative also. His liberty must needs be a
rare jewel, which consisteth altogether of negatives.
He chargeth me, that I " require the matter and the form Analogical
of the thing in the definition," but " matter is a corporeal sub-
stance,^^ and cannot be " part of a definition^^^ Whensoever
he meddleth with these things, he doth but shew his weakness.
It were better for him to let them alone. I do not say, that
genus and materia are all one ; but I say, that genus hath a
great analogy with the first matter, and so may be "materia
analoffica which Porphyry upon the Predicables might
have taught him. The first matter is indeterminate to any
form, so is the genus to any difference. The matter is sus-
ceptible of opposite forms, so is the genus of opposite differ-
ences. His reason, — that " matter is corporeal," — is as silly
as his exception, and sheweth what a no\ice he is in logic.
There is intelligible matter, as well as sensible : as three
lines are the matter of a triangle, and three propositions of
a syllogism.
He telleth us confidently, that " a very absence is as real as
a ver}^ faculty".'^ If he told it twice so confidently, we could
not believe it; — that a privation, which is nothing, and out of
all predicaments, should be as real as a quality. Potential
qualities ought to be defined by their efficients and proper
acts, not by privations. But, saith he, what "if the word
defined do signify absence or negation"?" Then it cannot
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. " [Porph., Eta-ayojyr} seu De Predi-
p. 288.] cab.,] c. iii. § 7. ["'O dvOpooiros 6 Koiwds
' [" Erismihimagnus Apollo." Virg., re Koi eldiKhs, e| uArjs /Au avaK6yov
Eel., iii. 104'.] (Tvvea-TriKe rod yeuovs, e'/c fiopcprfs SeTTjs
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. Zia<popas."'\
V- 288.] n [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix.
' [Ibid.] p. 288.]
446
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part be defined, but only described. And this description must
— not be by heaping together mere negatives or privations
but by mentioning the habits or powers whereof they are pri-
vations. What is this to Hberty, which is a potential quality?
Byhisde- I urged, that by his definition of hberty "a stone is free to
stone^"free ^^scend into the air, because there is no outward impediment
to ascend, hinder it^.^^ He answered, that "the stone is stopped by
external impediments,^^ othen^ise " it would either go upwards
eternally, . . or it must stop itself;" but it doth not ascend
eternally, and I "have confessed that nothing can move itself;"
and therefore he "doubts not "but I "will confess, that nothing
can stop itself P." First, his memory is very shppery. I
never said, that " nothing can move itself but, if that will
do him any good, I have often said the contrary. Secondly, he
doth but flatter himself with vain hopes to think, that I will
say " nothing can stop itself." Although there were no re-
sistance in the air, when the easterns force is ceased, the
weight of the stone alone is sufficient to stop it. Thirdly,
there have been those, who have thought themselves as good
philosophers as he, who affirmed that the stone did find no
resistance in the air, but was driven forwards by the following
air towards the air before it to prevent a vacuum^ : that is far
from resistance. Fourthly, why might not I say as well, that
upon his grounds a stone is free to ascend into the air, be-
cause there is no outward impediment to hinder it, as he
might say, that " the water is free to ascend up the channel ?"
— " Men never say that the water wanteth liberty to ascend,
but power^." Yet the water hath greater impediments to
ascend up the channel, than the stone hath to ascend in the
air. Lastly, this is without all doubt, that though a stone be
not capable of moral hberty, yet, if liberty were such a thing
as he imagineth, by his definition, a stone hath as much
liberty to ascend up the air contrary to its natural appetite,
as it hath to descend downwards according to its natural
appetite, there being no extrinsecal impediment in the one
motion more than in the other, the air being more easily or
at least as easily driven upwards as downwards. Yet the
° [Defence, Numb. xxix. above p. i [See e. g. Liicret, vi. 1021 — 1032.]
166; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] [In the Defence, T. H. Numb.
P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxix. xxix. above p. 167.]
p. 288.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
447
stone stoppeth in its ascent, but not in its descent (except it Discourse
be accidentally) until it come to the earth. — ~ —
To the rest of this section he maketh an easy reply, —
that I " talk so absurdly of the current of rivers, and of the
motion of the seas, and of the weight of water, that it cannot
be corrected otherwise than by blotting it all out^" He
mistaketh but one word. It should have been, it cannot be
answered by him " otherwise than by blotting it all out."
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER XXX.
Although his paradoxes be contrary to the opinion of the Beginning
whole world, yet in these five last sections he hath not froShe"
brought one argument to prove them_, but only explained his ^^o^^*"-
meaning, as if his own authority were proof sufficient. Now
at last he bringeth two silly arguments. The first is this : —
"Nothing taketh beginning fi'om itself;" therefore ^the will
taketh not beginning from itself, but from something without
itself I answered, by distinguishing a beginning into a
beginning of being and a beginning of working or action.
No creatm'e taketh its beginning of being from itself, because
tlie being of all creatures is a participated being, derived from
the infinite and original being of God, " in Whom we Hve [Acts xvii.
28 1
and move and have our being." But if he understand a *■'
beginning of action, it is a gross error to say, that nothing
hath a beginning of its own actions or operations within itself '\
This is all I said, and this I said constantly. Then how un-
ingenuously did he charge me in the last section to have con-
fessed, that " nothing can move itself-"^ ?" and in this section
accuse me of ' contradiction,^ for " sa\dng, that when a stone
descendeth, the beginning of its motion is intrinsecaly." Now,
to justify himself, he saith, that from this which I did say, —
" that finite things cannot be produced by themselves," — he
"can conclude that the act of willing is not produced by the
faculty of willing'." If he could do as much as he saith, yet
it was not ingenuously done, to feign that I had confessed all
[Qu., Aiiiiuadv. upon Numb. xxix. 169, 170 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
p. 289.] * [Above p. 446, note q.]
' [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx.
XXX. above p. 168.] p. 292.]
" [Defence, Numb. xxx. above pp. ^ [Ibid.]
448
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^rt that which he thinketh he can prove, and that I contradicted
'- — myself, when I contradicted his conclusions.
The same But let US SCO how he goeth about to prove it. " He that
wiiSh or faculty of willing, hath the faculty of willing some-
niiieth. thing in particulars.^' — In good time. This looketh not like
a demonstration. But let that pass. — "And at the same
time he hath the faculty of nilling the same^.^' How? two
faculties, the one of willing, the other of nilling ? Hola. He
hath but one faculty, and that is a faculty of willing or nilling
something in particular, not of willing and nilHng. He pro-
ceedeth ; — " If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he
willeth any thing whatsoever, for the same reason the faculty
of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it ; and
so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time,
which is absurd'^.'' I deny his consequence. It doth not
follow, that because the agent hath power to will or nill in-
differently, therefore he hath power to will and nill contra-
dictorily. He may choose indifferently whether he will
write or not, but he cannot choose both to write and not to
write at the same time contradictorily. It doth not follow,
that because the agent hath power to will or nill indifferently,
before he do actually either will or nill, therefore, when he
doth will actually, he hath power to nill at the same time.
Hath he forgotten "that old foolish rule°, ^Whatsoever is,
when it is, is necessarily so as it is?''' How often must I tell
him, that in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity he
seeketli to obtrude upon us hypothetical necessity ?
[Matter He procccdeth, " It seems the Bishop had forgotten, that
indifferent Hiattcr and powcr are indifferent to contrary forms and con-
formfr'^ trary acts^" No, /had not forgotten it, but he had forgotten
it. To say, that the matter is " indifferent to contrary forms"
and yet necessitated antecedently to one form, or that power
is " indifferent to contrary acts" and yet necessitated antece-
dently to one act, is a rattling contradiction,
other He saith, that "it is somewhat besides the matter that
cur with°"" determineth to a certain form, and something besides the
the will, power that produceth a certain act^." I acknowledge it, and
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. p. 26.]
p. 292.] ^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx.
[Ibid.] p. 292.]
- [Ibid.] _ f [Ibid.]
[Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. i.
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
449
it is the only piece of sense that is in this section. I made Discourse
this objection to myself in my Defence, and answered it in these —
words. — " Yet I do not deny, that there are other beginnings
of human actions, which do concur with the will : some out-
ward, as the First Cause by general influence, which is ever-
more requisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by
tempting, the object or end by its appetibility ; some inward,
as the understanding by directing ; so passions and acquired
habits. But I deny, that any of these do necessitate or can
necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to
one, except God alone. Who doth it rarely in extraordinary
cases : and where there is no antecedent determination to
one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty
Where he maketh " the beginning of motion in a stone
thrown upwards and a stone descending downwards to be
both " in the stone*^,^^ it is but a poor trifling homonymy ; as
the most part of his treatise is. The beginning of motion in
a stone ascending is in the stone subjectively but not efi'ec-
tively, because that motion proceedeth not from the form of
the stone. But in the descent of the stone, the beginning
of motion is both subjectively and eff'ectively in the stone.
And what he telleth us of a former motion in the ambient
body, air or water," to make the stone " descend'," is needless
and frustraneous. Let him but withdraw the pin that holdeth
the slate upon the house against its natural inclination, and
he shall see presently there needeth no "motion in the
ambient body" to make the stone drop down.
He adviseth me to "consider, with what grace" I "can Necessary
say, that necessary causes do not always produce their noraiw^ys
effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced-"." g^riiy^^*^^'
Rather let him "consider, with what grace" he can misrecite
that which I say, by leaving out the word " necessary." I
said, "necessary causes do not always produce necessary
effects^;" and I can say that with better grace than he can
deny it. When necessary agents and free agents are con-
joint in the production of the same effect, the effect is not
If [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. » [Ibid.]
170; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] j [Ibid., p. 293.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxx. ^ [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p.
p. 292.] 170.]
BRAMHALL. q q-
450
CASTIGATIONS OF
Pa^ut antecedently necessary. I gave him an instance. Prota-
'■ — goras writ a book against the Gods, — " De Dis, utrum sint
utrum non sint, nihil habeo dicer e;" the senate ordered his 841
book to be burned for it^ Although the fire be a necessary
agent, yet, because the senators were free agents, the burning
of his book was not antecedently necessary.
[The will Where I say, that "the will is not a necessary cause of what
cessary^ it wiUcth in particular actions he inferreth, that there are
its"partfcu "universal actions," and if it be not "a necessary cause of
laracts.] particular actions," it is the necessary cause of no actions";
and again, he "would be glad" to have me "set down what
voluntary actions (not particular) those are" which are " neces-
sitated o." It is scarcely possible for a man to express himself
more clearly than I did ; but clearly or unclearly, all is one
to him, who is disposed to ca\il. I did not oppose "particular
acts" to "universal acts," but to a collection of all voluntary
acts in general, ' qua tales' — as they are voluntary. It is neces-
sary, that all acts generally which proceed from the will,
should be voluntary ; and so the will is " a necessary cause of
voluntary acts," that is, of the voluntariness of them. But the
will is not a necessary cause of the particular acts themselves.
As, upon supposition that a man be willing to write, it is
necessary that his writing be voluntary, because he willeth it ;
but put the case without any supposition, and it is not neces-
sary that he should write, or that he should will to write,
because it was in his own power whether he would write or
not. So the voluntariness of all acts in general, proceeding
from the will, is necessary ; but the acts themselves were not
necessary before the free agent had determined himself, and
then but upon supposition.
His excepting against these common expressions, "the will
willeth," or, " the will may either will or suspend its acts?," is
but seeking of a knot in a bulrush. It is all one, whether
one say " the will willeth," or, " the man willeth," or, " the
will may will or suspend its act," or, " the man may will or
suspend his acts." Scaliger saith, that " w/o velle" is a "pro-
per" speech, — " I will will,'-' — and " received by the common
' [See above p. 138. note h.] . 293.]
^ [Defence, Numb. xxx. above p. ° [Ibid,, p. 294.]
170 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p [Ibid., p. 293.]
" [Qu., Animadv. npon Numb. xxx.
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
451
consent of all nations^.^^ If he had any thing of moment to Discourse
insert into his Animadversions, he would not make use of ^
such leptologies. " Canting""^^ is not chargeable upon him, who
useth common and known terms of art, but upon him who
deviseth new terms, as canters do, which die with their in-
ventors. He asketh, " how can he that willeth at the same
time suspend his will" Rather, why doth he insert into his
demand " at the same time It is enough to liberty, if he
that wdlleth could have suspended his will. All this answer
of mine to his second argument was illustrated by the in-
stance of the election of a Pope; to which he opposeth
nothing but, " It may be," and, " It doth not follow," and,
" I would be glad to know by what arguments he can prove "
that "the election" was "not necessitated*." I have done it
sufficiently all over in this treatise. I am now answering to
what he produceth, not ' proving.' If he have any thing to
demand, let him go to the Cardinals, and inquire of them,
whether they be such fools to keep such a deal of needless
stir, if they were antecedently necessitated to choose one
certain man Pope and no other.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ; NUMBER XXXI.
AND NUMBER XXXII.
I join these two sections together, because they concern Two sorts
one and the same thing : namely, whether every sufficient ciency.
cause do necessarily effect whatsoever it is sufficient for ; or,
which is the same in effect, whether a free agent, when all
things are present which are needful to produce an effect,
can, nevertheless, not produce it. Which question may be
understood two ways, either inclusively or exclusively : either
including and comprehending the will of the agent under the
notion of sufficiency and among things requisite to the pro-
ducing of the effect, so as the cause is not reputed to be
sufficient, except it have both ability and will to produce the
effect, and so as both requisite power and requisite will do
1 [See above p. 287. note o.] s [ibid.]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. XXX. ' ribid.1
p. 293.]
G g3
452
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part concuT ; and then there is no question but the effect will
— infalhbly follow ; — positd causa ponitur effectus — or else
it may be understood exclusively, not comprehending the
will under the notion cf sufficiency, or not reckoning it
among the necessary requisites to the production of the
effect, so as the agent is supposed to have power and ability
to produce the efPect, but no will ; and then it is as in-
fallibly true on the other side, that the effect cannot be
produced. Thus far this question is a mere logomachy or
contention about words, without any real difference. And
T. H. doth but abuse his readers, to keep a jangling and a
stir about nothing. But in truth " the w^ater stoppeth" not
here. If he should speak to the purpose, he should leave 842
these shallows. If the will of the free agent be included
under the notion of sufficiency, and comprehended among
those things which are requisite to the production of the
effect, so as both sufficient ability and sufficient will are re-
quired to the making a sufficient cause, then it cometh to be
considered, in the second place, whether the will in things
external be (under God) in the power and disposition of the free
agent himself, which is the common opinion of all men, who
understand themselves ; and then the production of the
effect is only necessary hypothetically, or upon supposition
that the free agent is willing ; or else, whether the will of
the free agent be not in his own power and disposition, but
determined antecedently by extrinsecal causes, which is the
paradoxical opinion of T. H . ; and then the production of the
effect is absolutely and antecedently necessary. So still the
question is where it was, and all his bustling about " suffi-
ciency" and " efficiency " and " deficiency ^ " is but labour in
vain. If he would have spoken any thing at all to the purpose,
he should have attempted to prove, that every sufficient cause
(excluding the will), that is, eveiy cause which hath sufficient
power and ability, doth necessarily produce whatsoever it is
able to produce, though the agent be unwiUing to produce
it ; or that the wiU of the agent is not in his own power and
disposition. We expect proofs, not words. But this he could
not do ; for he himself, in this very treatise, hath several times
distinguished between hberty and power : telling us, that a
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. pp. 296, 297.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
453
"sick man^' hath "hberty to go/' but '^wanteth power;" Discourse
and that "a man who is bound" hath "power" to go, but —
"wanteth Hberty^." If he that is bound hath "power to
go," then he hath sufficient power to go; for unsufficient
power cannot produce the effect : and so, by his own confes-
sion, an agent may have sufficient power, and yet cannot
necessarily nor yet possibly produce the effect.
I urged, that " God is sufficient to produce many worlds, but [A suffici-
rv' 11 cause
He doth not produce them; therefore a sufncient cause doth notaneces-
not necessarily produce all those effects which it is sufficient to ^^''^''^^"^^•l
produce y. He answereth, that " the meaning" is, " that God
is sufficient to produce them if He mil 2." Doth he not see,
that it followeth ine^dtably from hence, that there may be a
sufficient cause without will ? Doth he not see likewise from
hence plainly, that for those things which are within the
power of man, he is " sufficient" also " to produce them if he
will ?" So still he would obtrude a necessity of " supposition"
— " if a man will" — for an absolute necessity. That which is
but necessary conditionally — "if a man will" — is not neces-
sary absolutely. And he confesseth, that " without this sup-
position— 'if he wilF — a man is not sufficient to produce
any voluntary action^."
I added other instances ; as this, that the Passion of Christ
is a sufficient ransom for all mankind, and so is acknowledged
by all Christians, yet all mankind shall not be saved by vir-
tue of His Passion, therefore there may be a sufficient cause
without production of the effect^. This is the language of
Holy Scripture ; — " Which of you, intending to build a tower, mke xiv.
sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have
sufficient to finish it^ ?" that is, as our Saviour expoundeth
Himself in the next verse, whether he be ''able to finish it." 2Cor. ii.
So St. Paul saith, "Who is sufficient for these things?" that
is, who is able for these things ? When God saith, " What isai. v. 4,
could I have done more for My vineyard, that I have not
done ?" — God had given them " sufficient" means, and could
' [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxix. ^ [Ibid.]
above p. 167 ; and Qu., Animadv. upon [Defence, Numb. xxxi. above p.
Numb. xix. p. 211.] 172.]
y [Defence, Numb. xxxi. above p. [" Sufficient" is added in the Eng-
172; Disci. Pt. iii,] lish Version to complete the sense: —
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. " el cx^i ra irphs a.irapri(Tfx/>v.''~\
p. 297.]
454
CASTIGATIONS OF
p R T have given them more^ if they had been more capable ; but
'■ — because they were wanting to themselves^ these sufficient
[isai. V. 4.] means were not efficacious. "I looked for grapes," saith
God ; how could God look for grapes," if He had not given
them sufficient means to bring forth grapes? yet these suf-
ficient means were not efficacious.
These things being premised, do answer whatsoever he
saith j as this, The Bishop thinks two horses may be suf-
ficient to draw a coach, though they will not draw^," &c. I
say they " may be sufficient" in point of power and ability,
"though they will not draw." Many men have sufficient
power to do what they will not do. And if the production of
the effect do depend upon their wills, or upon their contin-
gent and uncertain endeavours, or if their sufficiency be but
conditional, as he maketh it, — " if they be not lame or resty V'
— then the production of the effect is free or contingent, and
cannot be antecedently necessary. For otherwise all these
conditions and suppositions are vain.
Where he chargeth me to say, that ^' the cause of a monster
is unsufficient to produce a monster V' he doth me wrong, and 843
himself more. I never said any such thing. I hope I may
have leave to speak to him in his own words : — I must take
it for an untruth, until he cite the placed," where I have said
so. I have said, and I do say, that the cause of a monster
was unsufficient to produce a man, which nature and the free
agent intended, but it was sufficient to produce a monster,
otherwise a monster had not been produced. When an
agent doth not produce what he and nature intend, but pro-
duceth a monster instead of a man, it is proof enough of his
insufficiency to produce what he should, and would have pro-
duced, if he could. Where he addeth, — that " that which is
sufficient to produce a monster, is not therefore to be called
an insufficient cause to produce a man, no more than that
which is sufficient to produce a man is to be called an in-
sufficient cause to produce a monster^," — is even as good
sense, as if a man should say, he who hath skill sufficient to
hit the white, is insufficient to miss the white.
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. « [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb,
p. 296.] xxxii. p. 301.]
* [Ibid., p. 297.] ^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi.
^ [Ibid.] p. 297.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
455
He pretendeth, that sensiis divisus and compositus "is non- Discourse
sense' (though they be logical terms of art) ; and what I —
say of " the power of the will to forbear willing/' or " the domi- Sstakes.]
nion of the will over its own acts," or "the power of the will
in actu primo^j" he saith "are as wild words as ever were
spoken within the walls of Bedlam' though they be as sad
truths as the founders of Bedlam themselves could have
uttered, and the authors who used them the greatest wits of
the world, and so many that ten Bedlams could not hold
them. But it may be he would have the scene changed, and
have the wisest sort of men thrust into Bedlam, that he might
vent his paradoxes more freely. So Festus accused Saint
Paul of madness, — "Paul, Paul, much learning hath made [Actsxxvi.
thee mad.''
In the definition of a free agent, — " which, when all things
needful to the production of the effect are present, can never-
theless not produce it"",'' — they understood all things needful
in point of ability, not will.
He telleth us gravely, that " act and power differ in nothing
but in this, that the former signifieth the time present, the
latter the time to come"." As if he should tell us, that the
cause and the effect differ nothing, but that the effect signi-
fieth the time present, and the cause the time to come.
Lastly, he saith, that except I shew him " the place where"
he " shuffled out effects producible and thrust into their place
effects produced," he will " take it for an untruth °." To con-
tent him, I shall do it readily, without searching far for it.
My words were these ; — " The question is, whether effects pro-
ducible be free from necessity ; he shuflSes out ' effects
producible,' and thrusts in their places ' effects produced?.' "
Now, that he doth this, I prove out of his own words in the
section preceding ; — " Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever
is produced, is produced necessarily ; for whatsoever is pro-
duced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had
not been 'I." Let the reader judge, if he have not here
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxi. p. 301.]
P- 297.] ° [Ibid.]
^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. p [Defence, Numb, xxxii. above p.
xxxii. p. 301.] 175; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
' [Ibid.] q [In tbe Defence, T. II. Numb.
™ [See above p. 173. note y.] xxxi. above p. 171.]
■ [Qu., Animadv. upon NumI). xxxii.
456
CASTI6ATI0NS OF
Part shuffled " eflPects producible" out of the question, and thrust
'■ — into their places "effects produced." The question is, whether
effects producible be necessarily produced ; he concludeth, in
the place of the contradictory, that effects actually produced
are necessary.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; NUMBER XXXIII.
Our con- He saith, that "to define what spontaneity, deliberation,
are not the wiU, propcusion, appetite, a free agent, and hberty, is, and to
of"truth°"^ prove that they are well defined, there can be no other proof
offered but every man's own experience and memory, what
he meaneth by such words'"." I do readily believe all this to
be true in order to his own opinions ; — that there neither is
nor can be any proof of them but imagination. But his
reason was shot at random ; — " For definitions, being the
beginning of all demonstration, cannot themselves be demon-
strated, that is, proved to another man^" Doth he take all
his particular imaginations to be so many definitions or
demonstrations? He hath one conception of spontaneity, of
deliberation, of a free agent, of liberty ; I have another. My
conception doth not prove my opinion to be true, nor his
conception prove his opinion to be true ; but our conceptions
being contrary, it proveth either his, or mine, or both, to be
false. Truth is a conformity or congruity of the conceptions
of the mind with the things themselves, which are without
the mind, and of the exterior speech as the sign, with the
things and conceptions as the things signified. So there is a
threefold truth : the first is objective, in the things them-
selves ; the second is conformative, in the conceptions of the
mind ; the third is signative or significative, in speech or
writing. It is a good proceeding, to prove the truth of the
inward conceptions of the mind from their conformity with
the things themselves ; but it is vain and ridiculous, to prove 844
the truth of things from their agreement with the conceptions
of my mind or his mind. The clocks may differ, but the
course of the sun is certain. A man^s words may not agree
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. * [Ibid.]
xxxiii, p, 306.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIOXS.
457
with his thoughts, nor his thoughts agree with the things Discourse
themselves. — —
But I commend his prudence in this, and in this only, that
he hath chosen out a way of proof that cannot be confuted
without his own consent, because no man knoweth another
man^s inward conceptions but himself. And the better to
secm-e himself, he maketh his Enghsh reader judge of Latin
words, and his ignorant readers judge of words of art. These
are the fittest judges for his purpose. But what if the terms
be obscure ? He answereth, " K the words be unusual," the
way must be "to make the definition" of '"'^ their signification"
by " mutual consents" What " mutual consent ?" The signi-
fication of these words was settled by universal consent and
custom; and must they be unsettled again, to satisfH^ the
humour of every odd paradoxical person, who could find no
way to get himself reputation but by blundering all things ?
He telleth us, that "the Schoolmen use not to argue by
rule, but as fencers use to handle weapons, by quickness of
the hand and eye"." The poor Schoolmen cannot rest
quietly in their graves for him, but he is still persecuting
their ashes, because they dui'st presume to soar a pitch above
his capacity. The Schoolmen were the most exact observers
of rules in the whole world, as if they had been composed
altogether of rules. But they observed not his rule, — that
whatsoever any man imagineth a word to be, that it is.
Much good may his Lesbian rule do him, which he may bend
this way or that way at his pleasure. It is just such another
rule as the parish-clerk's rule of the time, who preferred the
clock before a dial, because he set it according to his own
imagination.
He asketh me (for he is much better at making knots
than loosing them), "what" I "will answer, if" he "shall
ask" me how I "will judge of the causes of things, whereof"
I "have no idea or conception in" mine "own mind^?^^ As
if there were no mean, but either a man must want all inward
notions and conceptions, or else he must make his own imagi-
nations to be the touchstone of truth. "Aw//a Iilv" and
* J Q"m Animadv. upon Numb. " [Ibid., p. 307.]
xxxiii. pp. 306, 307.]
458
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part " nimia lux^^ — no light and too mucli light — are both enemies
'- — to the sight ; so, to take away all inward conceptions, and to
ground the true being and nature of things upon our fallible
conceptions, are both enemies to the truth.
Albeit he ^'^dare^'' say (as he is bold enough, whilst the danger
is but in words), that if one should " ask an ordinary person
whether our antipodes should have their heads upwards or
downwards, they would "tell him as significantly as any
scholar,^^ that their heads were upwards, because they are
" towards heaven and that w^hen they say there is nobody
in that room, they mean no more but " there is nobody that
can be seen;^^ or when they say that vessel is "empty,"
they do apprehend it to be full of air^ ; yet neither I, nor
these " ordinary persons" themselves, do believe him. How
should they apprehend such things rightly, until they be
better informed both of the figure of the earth, and the
nature of the air, than they are by their senses ? He saith,
" the question is not, whether such and such tenets be true,
but whether such and such words can be well defined without
thinking on the things they signify I should be glad to
find him once stating of a question truly. The question is
not, " whether such and such words can be well defined with-
out thinking on the things they signify;" but whether every
thought or every imagination of every odd fantastic person,
or of the common people, be a right determination of the true
sense and signification of every word. They who do not
understand the distinct natures of things signified, cannot
understand the right significations of words, w^hich are but
signs of things.
" Right discipline," or learning and good instruction, doth
not only enable a man to " reason truly in more numerous
or various matters %" but to reason more truly and exactly in
all matters ; yea, even in those things which we have learned
from our own "senses and memories^." As I shewed him before
in the instance of the sun; which sense judgeth to be no
greater than a ball, but learning and reason do convince us,
that it is many times greater than the globe of the earth. If
y [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. » [Ibid., p. 308.]
xxxiii. p. ,307.] " [In the Defence, T. II. Numb.
[Ibid.] xxxiii. above p. 175.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
459
he will not admit this to be "matter of fact%" let him try Discourse
if he can persuade us, that it is matter of right. A man^s '-
"sense and memory" doth teach him, that the lightning is
long done before the thunderclap begin ; but being better in-
structed, we know it to be otherwise. In vain were so many
)4o rules and precepts in logic, if they did not teach us to reason
better, as well as to " reason in more numerous and various
matters."
He inveigheth against impostors, as bad "masters, de-
ceivers or deceived, that teach for truth all that hath been
dictated to them by their own interest*^;" and doth not see,
or will not see, that no man is so much concerned in this re-
prehension as himself, who without these paradoxes had con-
tinued still a cypher and signified nothing. If there be any
" changelings," it is no other than himself, not by any " en-
chantment of words not understood %" but by his own over-
weening and vain-glorious conceits. He reciteth it as a say-
ing of mine, that "matter of fact is not verified by sense and
memory but by arguments^." I never said so; and ^ until
he produce my words,^ I must put it into the catalogue of
his "untruths^." Neither did I, nor any Schoolman, ever
say, that "the testimony of a witness is the only verifier
of matter of fact," or that it doth " not consist in sense and
memory," or that it doth "consist in arguments and syllo-
gisms^." These are his own collections and consequences,
which hang together like ropes of sand.
He asketh, "how can an unlearned man be brought to
think the words he speaks ought to signify, when he speaks
sincerely, any thing else but that which he himself meaneth
by them' ?" Right, he cannot "be brought to think" that they
do signify otherwise than they do signify. But although he
meant never so sincerely, he may be " brought to think," that
the signification by him used was improper, and that which
he said according to the right sense of the words was untrue.
As a man might say, sincerely enough, that water is moister
or more humid than air, by the seeming warrant of his
^ [QiL, Animadv. upon Numb. » [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb,
xxxiii. p. 308; and in the Defence, xxxii. p. 301.]
T, H. Numb, xxxiii. above p. 175.] h [[bid., Animadv. upon Numb.
[Ibid.] xxxiii. p. 308.]
« [Ibid.] i [Ibid.]
' [Ibid.]
460
CASTIGATIONS OF
sense ; and jet, upon better instruction, reform his judgment,
and acknowledge that then he did not understand truly what
moist or humid did signify.
To that which I urged, — that " to love any thing and to
think it good" is not the same thing^, — he answereth no
more but this, that he doth not think" so^ ; as if he were
some oracle of truth, or some great lawyer declaring his
opinion to his poor ignorant clients. Let him reserve his
thoughts for his credulous scholars.
His next mistake is much worse. This was but in a word,
but that is in a thing, eternity. He would have his reader
believe, that somebody holdeth, that " eternity is this pre-
sent instant of time," and that "the next instant" is eternity
after this, "and consequently that there are as many eternities
as there be instants in time"^." He doth but dream waking.
Surely never any man since the beginning of the world did
hold any part of this ; — that eternity should be a part of
time. Time is but the measure of motion, eternity was
before motion. Time succeeding doth repair the losses of
time passing ; but God, Who is infinite, can acquire nothing,
can lose nothing. Suppose a body to be infinite actually, it
could have no middle, no extremities, but every point of it
should be a centre. So, in the infinite eternity of God, there
can be no extremities of past or to come, but a present inter-
minable possession of life. His ignorance is his best plea.
Let him learn to cite his adversary's sajdngs more ingenu-
ously, or hold his peace for ever, and keep his paradoxes to
himself ; and not shew himself like the Athenians, who being
well beaten by the Cretans, and having no other way to
revenge themselves, invented feigned stories of bulls and
minotaurs.
Being taken tripping in an apparent contradiction about
spontaneity, making it to be considerate proceeding, and "in-
considerate proceeding or nothing he hath no more mind
to meddle with it, but quitteth his hands of it in these terms;
— it is no "English," but " let it signify what it will, provided
it be intelligible, it would make against" me^. Had not this
^ [Defence, Numb, xxxiii. above p. [Ibid.]
' [Qn., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiii.
p. -m.]
" [See above, pp. 429, 430.]
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb,
xxxiii. p. 300.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
461
man need to have credulous readers^ who, before he knoweth DiscounsE
what the word signifieth, knoweth by instinct that it " would ^— —
make against" me ? J ust like that mountebank, who haWng
made a long oration to his hearers of the rare virtues of a
feather, which he affirmed to have dropt from the wing of
Michael the Ai'changel; and the feather being stolen from
under his sleeve out of drollery, and a cinder put in the place
of it, to try his humour, he went on confidently vriih. his dis-
course; telling them, that though it was not the feather
which he had mentioned, yet it was one of the coals which
St. Lawrence was broiled with, and had all those virtues
which he had formerly ascribed to the feather. So, whether
spontaneity be a feather or a coal, it hath still the same
846 vii^tue ; and "if it be any thing, it would make against" me.
If it be "all one" to consider of the fittest means to
obtain a desired end or object, and "consider of the good
and evil sequels of an action to comeP," why did he change
the definition generally received, to make a show of difference
where there is none by his own account ?
I was willing to have brought him to his right wits, that
he might have acknowledged himself a reasonable man : but
seeing he is so peremptory, that all " the reason and under-
standing" which man hath, is but "imagination^;" and weigh-
ing his ground, — that he "finds it so" in himself, "by con-
sidering" his own thoughts and "ratiocinations'";" and
(which worketh with me more than all his confidence) finding
his writings more full of fantasy than of judgment ; I begin
to relent, and am contented to come to an accord with him,
that he, and such as he can gain to be of his mind, shall have
the privilege of fantastics, provided that other men may still
retain theii' old reason. Moreover, I confess, that when I left
other "business" to examine his writings, I did meet with
greater " trifles ^" than I did before.
I would gladly save his credit, but he plungeth himself what is his
into so many gross errors, that "ipsa si cupiat salus servare, fio/,|^^''^"
prorsus non potest." Now he telleth us, that " deliberation
is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed' ;" as
J* [Qu.jAnimadv.upon Numb, xxxiii. ^ [Ibid. — " When he is about those
p. 309.] trifles he calleth business," &c.]
[Ibid.] t [Ibid., p. 310.]
' [Ibid.]
462
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part if deliberation was but the measuring of a rod by inches with
— his thumbs alternatively/' — he wills, he wills not, he wills,
he wills not, &c., — and as the last thumb -breadth happeneth,
so the agent either willeth or nilleth. Before, he made but
one will; now he maketh I know not how many alternate
wills. Before, he made deliberation to be a "consideration
of the good or evil sequels of an action/' The will is an
appetite, not a " consideration/' The will is blind, and
cannot " consider." Wise men use to look before they
leap, and "consider" before they "will." But he may
have the privilege to have his will stand for his reason; —
''Stat pro ratione voluntas^.'' So, whilst the bias of his
bowl is changing from the one side to the other alternatively
by extrinsecal causes, the bowl is deliberating.
Man is free I confess, I "wondered" at his definition of a free agent, —
he is not He that Can do if he will, and forbear if he will'' :" not that
free to do. j ^-^ foresee what paradoxical sense he would give it,
but why he should retain the ancient terms. I remember
well his distinction between freedom to do if a man will and
forbear to do if he will, and freedom to will if he will and to
nill if he will ; and have made bold now and then to repre-
sent, what a vain, false, useless, contradictory distinction it is :
and I believe it lieth at the last gasp. But I might have
saved my labour. I used but one short argument in this
place; — "Either the agent can will and forbear to will, or he
cannot do and forbear to do^ ;" — and it driveth him into a
contradiction, — " There is no doubt, a man can will one thing
or other, and forbear to will it^." If a man can will and for-
bear to will the same thing, then he can will if he will and
forbear if he will. Where he maketh the state of the question
to be, whether a man " to-day can choose to-morrow's will^,"
either he feigneth or mistaketh grossly. I will never trust
him with stating of questions, or citing of testimonies.
He maketh Although it be his turn now to prove, and mine to defend
free to a?- niysclf and my cause from his objections, yet he is still calling
scen/^ proofs ; and (which is worse) would have me to prove
" [Juv., vi. 223.—" Sit pro ratione," 178 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
&c.] ' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.
[In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxiii. p. 310.]
xxxiii ; above p. 175.] [Ibid.]
y [Defence, Numb, xxxiii. above p.
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
463
negatives, when he himself cannot prove affirmatives : — Discourse
" How doth it follow^^ (saith he), "that a stone is as free to '■
ascend as descend^ unless he prove there is no outward im-
pediment to its ascent ? which cannot be proved, for the con-
trary is true;^^ or "how proveth he, that there is no out-
ward impediment to keep that point of the loadstone, which
placeth itself towards the north, from turning [to] the
south^?'^ First, for the stone, the case is clear: there is no
other extrinsecal impediment to the stone ascending or de-
scending, but the medium through which it passeth ; now the
medium is supposed to be the same, that is, the air equally
disposed ; the air is as easily driven upwards as downwards ;
and therefore, though the air give some impediment to the
motion upwards, yet it giveth the same impediment at least
to the motion do-vvnwards; and therefore, the impediment
being as -sincible upwards as downwards, if the cause of
motion were the same, and the presence or absence of extrin-
secal impediments being the same, it followeth clearly, upon
his grounds, that the stone is as free to ascend as descend.
Next, for the loadstone, I prove, that there is no extrinsecal
147 impediment which holdeth it from turning to the south, by
sense and reason, both mine own and all other men^s, by the
common consent of the world, and by his silence, who is not
able to pretend any impediment that is probable, without the
stone, except it be in some other body far distant, which will
render the difficulty the same.
His next passage is ridiculous : — A hawk wants " liberty a hawk,
to fly when her wings are tied,^' but it is " absurd to say, frel\^ fiy *
she wants liberty to fly when her wings are plucked^.^' So ^|^jf"g ^re
she wanted no liberty to fly when she was naked and newly plucked,
hatched. So he himself wanteth no liberty to fly from hence
to China. He saith, " Men that speak English use to say,
when her wings are plucked, that she cannot fly'^." So they
"use to say" likewise, "when her wings are tied." He de-
mandeth, whether it be not " proper language, to say a bird
or a beast are set at liberty from the cage, wherein they Avere
imprisoned^?" What it may be at another time, when men
[Qu., Animadv, upon N umb. xxxiii. ° [Ibid.]
P- 311.] e [Ibid.]
^ [Ibid.]
464
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part are discoursing upon another subject^ is not material at this
— — — time; and as to this subject which we are about,, it is most
impertinent and "improper/^ He himself, as partial as he
is, cannot think, that this liberty is any thing to that moral
liberty which renders a man capable of reward or punish-
ment ; any more than a tailor^s measure is to the measure of
motion.
A begin- I Said, and say again, that nothing can "begin to be without
being°and ^ causc,^^ and that "nothing can cause itself:^'' yet I say, many
acting. things do " begin to act of themselves^." This (he saith) is to
" contradict myself, because I make "the action^^ to "begin
without a caused." This is not the first time that he hath noted
this for a ^contradiction.' I shall sooner salve the contradic-
tion, than he save his credit. As if the agent and the action
were the same thing. Or as if the agent was not the cause
of the action. Or as if there were any consequence in this, —
the agent cannot begin to be of himself, therefore he cannot
begin to act of himself, — or, — he cannot cause himself, there-
fore he cannot cause his action. Nothing can cause itself;
but that which is caused by one thing, may cause another.
Whereas he addeth, that it "hath been proved" formerly,
that every " sufficient cause " is a " necessary " cause, and
that [it] is but "jargon" to say "free causes determine
themselves^," it is but a puff of his vain-glorious humour.
He hath made nothing to appear but his own ignorance and
mistakes.
His answer In the latter end of this section, I made bold to make
mands^^^' somc serious demands to Mr. Hobbes, which did not at all
reflect upon him in particular, but at those "natural notions"
which are common to all mankind.
The first demand was, " whether he doth not find by expe-
rience that he doth many things which he might have left un-
done if he would'," &c. He answereth, Yes, if he would ; but
he maketh it impossible for him to have had any other wiU^.
So he doth as good as tell us, that he might have done them
upon an impossible condition or supposition ; as he himself
^ [Defence, Numb, xxxiii. above p. i [Defence, Numb, xxxiii. above p.
179 ; Disc. i. Ft. iii.] 180 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
* [Qu.,Animadv.uponNumb. xxxiii. [Qu.,Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiii.
p. 312.] p. 312.]
h [Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
465
might have flown over sea if he had had a pair of wings, d
This is a contradiction indeed, implied; first, to say he might
have done otherwise, and then to add an impossible condition
which makes his proposition negative. I am sure it is not
fairly done to avoid the scope and meaning of the demand.
The second question was, " whether he do not some things
out of mere animosity and will without regard to the direc-
tion of right reason &c. He answereth, ^^this question
was in vain, unless^^ I ^'thought^^ myself his " confessor^'^
No, it is enough, I desire not to intrude into his secrets.
My third demand (as he saith) was, whether he " writ not
this defence of necessity against liberty, only to shew that^^ he
"will have a dominion over" his "own actions"^." He answer-
eth, " No, but to shew that" he " had no dominion over" his
"will, and this at" my "request"." My request was, that
what he did upon this subject, should rather be in writing
than by word of mouth o. It seemeth, that I had the domi-
nion over his will. So might I come to be questioned for all
his paradoxes. The truth is, this was no distinct question,
but a corollary of the second question.
My third demand was, "whether he be not angry with those
who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires ;
and why he is angry with them (if they be necessitated to do
what they do), any more than he is angry with a sharp
winterP," &c. This is wholly omitted by him.
The last demand was, " whether he do not sometimes blame
himself and say, O what a fool was I, to do thus or thus ; or
548 wish to himself, O that I had been wise :" and why he doth
this, " if he were irresistibly necessitated to do all things that
he doth ; he might as Avell have wished, O that I had not
breathed, or, O what a fool was I to grow old^." To this
he answereth nothing but, " subtle questions, and full of
Episcopal gravity ;" and that he " thinks, in this question," I
"will appear the greater fooP;" supposing that I meant to
put the fool upon him, which I profess myself to be innocent
^ [Defence, Numb, xxxii. above p. p. 2 : and the Defence, Numb, xxxvii.
180; Disc. i. Pt. iiL] above p. 192; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
' [Qu.jAnimadv. upon Numb. xxxiii. p [Defence, Numb, xxxiii. above
p. 312.] p. 180.]
[Ibid.— from the Defence, ibid.] i [Ibid.]
" [Ibid.] r [Qu.,Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiii.
° [See Qu., Occas. of Controv., pp. 312, 313.]
UUAMHALL. II \i
466
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part of; as he might have found by these words inserted among the
^ — questions^ — which "wise men find in themselves sometimes
Though I jest sometimes with his cause, or his arguments, I
do not meddle with his person ; further than to condemn his
vain-glorious presumption, to arrogate so much to himself.
Though I have not half so gi'eat an opinion of him as he hath
of himself, yet I wish his humility were answerable to his wit.
Thus, of four questions, he hath quite omitted one, neglected
another, refused to answer a third, and answered the fourth
contrary to the scope of the question.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;
NUMBER XXXIV. &C.
[T. H.'s His bragging humour will not leave him; he still forgetteth
blunders.] Epictetus his shcep'. He saith, "When" I "shall have read
over his Animadversions, Numb, xxxi," I "will think other-
wise, whatsoever^' I "will confess^." "Male ominatis parcito
verbis^.'' I should sooner turn Manichee, and make two
Gods, one of good, the other of e^dl, than to make the true
God to be the cause of all evil. But there is no danger
either of the one or of the other. I have "read over his
Animadversions, Numb, xxxi;" I have weighed them; and
I profess I find nothing in them worthy of a divine, or a
philosopher, or an ingenuous person, who made a sad inqui-
sition after truth ; nor any thing that doth approach within
a German mile of the cause in controversy. And so I leave
him to the Castigations.
That " his two instances, of casting ambs-ace and raining
to-morrow, are impertinent appeareth by these two reasons :
first, the question is of free actions, these two instances are
of contingent actions ; secondly, the question is of antecedent
necessity, these instances are of a hypothetical necessity.
And though I used the beauty of the world as a medium to
* [Defence, Numb, xxxiii. above p. " [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv.
180 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 320.]
t [Enchirid., c. xlvi. § 2. p. 222. ed. ' [Horat., Carm., III. xiv. 11, 12.]
Schweig. See above in the Defence, * [Defence, Numb, xxxiv. above p.
Numb. ii. p. 26. note e ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] 181 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
467
prove liberty wherein contingency is involved, yet this doth Uiscouhse
not warrant him to give over the principal question, and to —
start and pursue new questions at his pleasure. But let him
be of good comfort ; be they pertinent or impertinent, they
shall not be neglected.
Because I would not blunder as he doth, I distinguished [Four sorts
actions into four sorts : first, the actions of free agents ; actions.]
secondly, the actions of free and natural agents mixed ;
thirdly, the actions of brute beasts ; fourthly, the actions of
natural inanimate causes ^ Of these four sorts, the first only
concerneth the question, and he according to his custom
quite omitteth it; yet it was of more moment and weight
than all he saith in this section put together. " A man pro-
portioneth his time each day, and allotteth so much to his
devotions, so much to his study, so much to his diet, so much
to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visit, so much
to his rest ; he that will seek for I know not what necessary
causes of all this without himself (except that good God, Who
hath given him a reasonable soul), may as well seek for a
necessary cause of the Egyptian pyramids among the croco-
diles of Nilus*.^^ This distinction of a man^s time is an act of
dominion, done on purpose to maintain his dominion over
his actions against the encroachments of sensual delights.
He saith here plainly, that he "knowethno action that pro- i. [The
• 3-CtS of* frGO
ceedeth from the liberty of man^s wilP;" and again, A man's agents.]—
will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing Yet ^^.^l'^
he hath often told us, that a man is free to do if he will, and yet not f ree
^ /to will, IS
not to do if he wilP. If no action proceed from the liberty against law
of the will, then how is a man free to do if he will ? Before,
he told us, "He is free to do a thing," that may do it if he have
the will to do it, and may forbear it if he have the will to
forbear it^.^' If the liberty of the will be nothing, then this
supposition — " If he have the wiW^ — is nothing but an im-
possibility. And here, to all that I have said formerly against
that frivolous distinction, I shall add an undoubted rule both
^ [Defence,Numb.xvi.abovep. 109; p. 321.]
Disc. i. Pt. iii.] <^ [Ibid.]
[Ibid., pp. 181—183.] d [See above p. 305, note k.]
• [Ibid., p. 182.] e [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb.
^ [Qu.,Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv, iii. [above p. 27.]
H h 2
468
CASTIGATIONS OV
Part
III.
2. [Con-
cerning
mixed ac-
tions.]— A
necessary
effect re-
quires all
necessary
causes.
in law and logic; — "A conditional proposition, having an
- impossible condition annexed to it, is equipollent to a simple
negative.'^ He who is " free to write if he will/' if it be im-
possible for him to will, is not free to write at all, no more
than he is free to will. But this castle in the air hath been
beaten down often enough about his ears.
Where T say, that " contingent actions do proceed from the 84<
indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes V
my intention was not to exclude contingent determination,
but necessary determination according to an antecedent ne-
cessity ; which he hath been so far from pro^dng unanswer-
ably, that he hath as good as yielded the cause, in his case
of ambs-ace, by making the necessity to be only upon sup-
position^.
Concerning mixed actions, partly free and partly necessarj%
he saith, that "for proof of them,'' I "instance in a tile falling
from a house, which breaketh a man's head^." How often
must I tell him, that I am not now ^ pro\dng,^ but answering
that which he produceth ? He may find " proofs" enough to
content him, or rather to discontent him, in twelve sections
together, from the fifth to the eighteenth' ; and upon the by,
throughout the whole book. He who proveth, that election
is always inter plura and cannot consist with antecedent
determination to one, proveth, that that man who did elect or
choose to walk in that street, at that very time when the
stone fell, though he knew not of it, was not antecedently
necessitated to walk there ; and if any one of all those causes,
which concur to the production of an effect, be not antece-
dently necessary, then the effect is not antecedently neces-
sary ; for no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause.
He saith, I " should have proved, that such contingent
actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of
natural causes, though a little before" I "granted they are^."
First, he doth me wrong, I never granted it, either before
or after. It is a foul fault in him to mistake himself or his
adversary so often. Secondly, it is altogether improper and |
^ [Defence, Numb, xxxiv. above p,
181 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
g [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. iii.
[p. 37:— See above pp. 270, 271.]
[Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb.
xxxiv. p. 322 ; from Defence, Numb,
xxxiv. above p. 182.]
' [Above pp. 37—114.]
j [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv.
p. 322.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
469
impertinent to onr present controvers}-. Let liim remember Discourse
what he himself said; — "If they" (the instances of casting '
ambs-ace and raining to-morrow) " be impertinent to his
opinion of the liberty of man's will, he doth impertinently to
meddle with them''." Xot so neither, by his leave. Though I
refuse to prove them formally or write volumes about them,
yet I do not refuse to answer any thing which he doth or can
produce. Such is his argument which followeth imme-
diately;— "Whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural
causes, was antecedently detennined in the cause of such
conciuTence, though contingent concuiTenceV He addeth,
that though I "perceive" it not, " concurrence and contingent
concurrence are all one™." It may be in his dialect, which
differs from the received dialect of all scholars, but not in the
dialect of wiser and leai'neder men. To his argument (par-
doning his confounding of natural and voluntary causes), I
answer, that if he speak of the immediate adequate cause as
it is a cause in act, without doubt he saith truth. " Causa
proximd in actu jmsitd, impossibile est non sequi effectum."
But he told us of a necessary connexion of all causes from
eternity; and if he make not this good, he saith nothing.
K he intend it in this sense, I deny his assertion, — that
"whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natui'al causes,
was antecedently determined" from eternity : as, for in-
stance, that the generation of a monster, which nature or the
agent never intended, was necessary from eternity, or neces-
sary before the contingence was determined.
Concerning the individual actions of brute beasts, that 3- [The in-
they should be necessitated to every act they do fi'om act? of
eternity ; — as the bee (for example), how^ often she shall hum nm^fnte^^^
in a dav, and how often she shall flv abroad to scather thvme, ^edentiy
*. ' . ^ " necessi-
aud whither, and how many flowers precisely she must suck tated.]
and no more, and such like acts ; — I had reason to say, " I see
no ground for it"." Yet the least of all these acts is known
to God, and subject to His disposition. He telleth us, that
he " hath pointed out the gi'ound in the foimer discourse
[Qu., Animadv.upou Numb, xxxiv. ° [Defence, Numb, xxxiv. above
P- 321.] p. 182 ; Disc. i. Pt, iii.]
1 [Ibid.,p.322. — " though, aji he calli " [Qii.,Aimuadv.upou Numb, xxxiv.
it, contingent concurrence."] p. -322.]
[Ibid.]
470
CASTIGATIONS OF
^iii'^^ If he have, it is as the blind senator (of whom I told
him formerly) pointed the wrong way P. All his intima-
tions have received their answers. But whereas I made an
Malt, X. 29. objection to myself, — " Are not two sparrows sold for a
farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground with-
out your Father/^ — he doth not deal clearly, to urge mine
own objection and conceal my answer : — " He doth not say,
'which your Father casteth not down/^^ or, 'which your
Father doth not necessitate to fall,^ but "without your
Father;" that is, without your Father's knowledge, without
His protection, "without the influence of His power, or,
which is exempted from your Father^s disposition
4. [The The last sort of actions are the natural actions of inanimate
of inani-^*^ creaturcs ; which have not the least pretence to liberty, or so 85(
turesneces- •'^^^^ as spontaneity; and therefore were declined by me as
sary.] impertinent to this question Out of my words concerning
these, he argueth thus ; — " If there be a necessary connexion
of all natural causes from the beginning, then there is no
doubt but that all things happen necessarily;" but there is a
necessary connexion of all natural causes from the begin-
ning^.
First, I deny his consequence ; and by it, he (who is so busy
to "take^^ other men^s heights in logic*," wherein he never
meddled yet but he was baffled) may have his own "height
taken" by them that are so disposed. There is scarce a fresh-
man in the University, but could have taught him the differ-
ence hetween causa efficiens physica/' and ^'voluntaria the
one acting by necessity of nature, the other freely according
to dehberation. The former cannot defer nor moderate its
act, nor act opposite actions indifferently ; but the latter can.
So, though a necessary connexion of all natural causes were
supposed, yet it inferreth not a necessary connexion of all
voluntary causes.
Secondly, I deny his assumption, — that there is a neces-
sary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning ; —
for proof whereof he produceth nothing, nor is able to pro-
P [Juv., Sat., iv. 119—121. See ' [Ibid., p. 183.]
above, Answer to Relat. of the Occas. * [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv.
of the Controversy, p. 218.] p. 32;5.]
[Defence, Numb, xxxiv. above * [Ibid., p. 324.]
pp. 182, 183; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
471
duce any thing. All he saith he allegeth out of me, — that it Discouuse
deserveth farther examination";" and from thence, according '-
to his wild roving " imaginations," he draweth consequences
from the staff to the corner, that have not the least grain of
salt or weight in them. As these, — " Hitherto he knows not
whether it be true or no, and consequently all his arguments
hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath he shewed any thing
to . . prove that elective actions are not necessitated^." Thus
his pen runneth over without rhyme or reason. He that would
learn to build castles in the air, had best be his apprentice.
The truth is, I was not willing to go out of mine own profes-
sion, and therefore desired to hold myself to the question of
liberty, without meddling with contingency; but yet, with
the same reservation that the Romans had in their military
discipline, " nec sequi nec fugere^y^ not to seek other questions,
nor yet to shun them if they were put upon me.
And now we are come to> his two famous instances, of Hisin-
, • 1 -, . . i. - • L. T stance of
casting ambs-ace, and rammg or not raining to-morrow, i ambs-ace.
said, that I had already " answered" what he produceth to
prove "all sufficient causes" to be "necessary causes y." Now,
saith he, " it seemeth, that distrusting his" former " answer
he answereth again ^" O memory ! he did not urge them
in that place, neither did I answer them at all in that place.
But though he had urged them and I answered them there,
yet he repeating them or enforcing them here, would he not
have me to answer him ? It is true, that in another section,
upon the by, he hath been gravelled about his ambs-ace^;
and therefore he treadeth tenderly still upon that foot.
He saith, I "bring no other argument to prove the cast
thrown not to be necessarily thrown, but this, that" the caster
did "not deliberate^." By his leave, it is not truly said. I
shewed undeniably, that the necessity upon which he buildeth
is only hypothetical : I enumerated all the causes which were,
or could be recited, to make the necessity ; as, the dice, the
" [Qu., Animadv.uponNumb.xxxiv. xxxii. [pp.171 — 175: Disci. Pt. iii. ]
p. 323 : from the Defence, Numb, xxxiv. ^ [Q,u. , Animadv. upon Numb.xxxiv.
above p. 183 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 323.]
V [Qu.,ibid.] ^ [Defence,] Numb. iii. [above pp.
" [Vegetius, De Re Militari, lib. ii. 29, 30.]
c. 17.] »• [Qu.,Animadv. upon Numb. xx>>iv.
y [Defence, Numb, xxxiv. above p. 323.]
p. 181 ; and see also] Numbers xxxi,
472
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part posture of the caster's hand, the measure of the force, the
—HI: — posture of the table, &c. ; and shewed clearly, that there was
not the least grain of antecedent necessity in any of them*^ :
which he is not able to answer, and therefore he doth well to
be silent. But if I had urged nothing else, this alone had
been sufficient to prove the caster a free agent from his own
principles. A " free^^ agent (saith he) " is he that hath not
done deliberating He who never began to dehberate,
"hath not done deliberating." There can be no necessity
imaginable, why the caster should throw these dice rather
than those other, or cast into this table rather than that, or
use so much force and no more, but the easterns will, or
mere chance. The caster never deliberated, nor so much as
thought, of any one of these things. And therefore it is un-
deniably apparent, that there was no necessity of casting
ambs-ace but only upon supposition; which is far enough
from antecedent necessity.
But he pleadetli further, that " from our ignorance of the
particular causes, that concurring make the necessity," I "infer
that there was no such necessity at all ; which is that indeed
whichhath deceived" me, " and all other men, in this question^."
Whose fault was it then, first to make this an instance, and
then to plead "ignorance?" Before, he was bold to reckon up 851
all the causes of the antecedent necessity of this cast ; and
now, when he is convinced that it is but a necessity upon
supposition, he is fain to plead "ignorance." He who will
not suffer the loadstone to enjoy its attractive virtue without
finding a reason for it in a fiddle-string^ (as Scoggin sought
for the hare under the leads, as well where she was not as
where she was), is glad to plead ignorance about the neces-
sary causes of ambs-ace. Whereas my reasons did evince, not
only that the causes are unknown, but that there are no such
causes antecedently necessitating that cast. Thus, if any
causes did necessitate ambs-ace antecedently, it was either
the caster, — but he thought not of it; — or the dice, — but
they are square, no more inclinable to one cast than another ;
— or the posture of the table, — but the caster might have
[Defence, Numb, xxxiv. above p. * [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv.
185 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] p. 324.]
^ [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. ^ [See above p. 463.]
xxviii. above p. 165.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
473
thrown into the other table ; — or the posture of the hand, — Discourse
but that was by chance ; — or the measure of the force, — but ~ —
that might have been either more or less ; — or all of these
together, — but to an effect antecedently necessary all the
causes must be antecedently determined ; where not so much
as one of them is antecedently determined, there is no pre-
tence of antecedent necessity ; — or it is some other cause that
he can name, but he pleadeth "ignorance." Yet I confess the
deceit lieth here ; but it is on the other side, in the " igno-
rant" mistaking of a hypothetical necessity for absolute ante-
cedent necessity.
And here, — according to the advice of the poet,
" Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus
" Incident s,— "
he calleth in the foreknowledge of God to his aid ; as he doth
always when he findeth himself at a loss ; but to no purpose.
He himself hath told us, that " it cannot be truly said, that
the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing,
seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth
on the existence of the thing known^." God seeth not future
contingents in an antecedent certainty which they have in
their causes, but in the events themselves, to which God^s
infinite knowledge doth extend itself. In order of time, one
thing is before another, one thing is after another ; and ac-
cordingly, God knoweth them in themselves to be one before
another. But His knowledge is no beginning, no expiring
act. Nothing is past, nothing is to come, but all things pre-
sent, to His knowledge ; even those things which are future,
with the manner of their futurition.
His casting ambs-ace hath been unfortunate to him ; he His other
will speed no better with his shower of ram. In the entrance rainin"- or
to my answer, and as it were the stating of the cause, I *j^or"o";J
shewed, that rain was more contingent in our climate than in
many other parts of the world, where it is almost as neces-
sary as the seasons of the year^; — I do not find so much
weight in his discourse, as to occasion me to alter one word ;
— for which I could have produced authors enough, if I had
^ [Herat., A. P., 191, 192.] * [Defence, Numb, xxxiv. alovo p.
h [In the Defence, T. H.J Numb. 184; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
xi ; [above pp. 58, 59.]
474
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part thought it needful ; but I alleged only the Scriptures^ men-
] — tioning " the former and the latter rain." And even this
is objected to me as a defect or piece of ignorance; — "I
Hos. VI. 3. thought" (saith he) "he had known it by experience of some
travellers^ but I see he only gathereth it from that place in
Scripture^;" — as if the Scripture alone were not proof good
enough, except it be confirmed by the experience of
travellers."
From this preparatory discourse he frameth two argu-
ments, and puts them into my character, as if they were my
reasons : — " In our climate, the natural causes do not pro-
duce rain so necessarily at set times, as in some Eastern
countries ; therefore they do not produce rain necessarily in
our climates, then when they do produce it : again, we can-
not say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow;
therefore it is not necessary, either that it should rain, or
that it should not rain, to-morrow Such reasons as these
do become him better than me. I disclaim them, and (to
use his own phrase) " must take them for untruths, until
he cite the place""," where I have made any such ridiculous
inferences ; which conclude against hypothetical necessity,
which we om'selves do establish.
But I come to his arguments, which I shall set down in
his own words, for it cannot be worse disposed, to let us see the
great skill of this new controller in logic : — " It is necessary,
that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain ; if therefore it be
not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not
rain ; otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition— it
shall rain or it shall not rain — should be true"^." To this I an-
swered, that it was "most false," that the proposition "could 85
not be necessarily true except one of the members were
necessarily true ;" which is a truth evident and undeniable.
This answer I illustrated thus; — "a conjunct proposition may
have both parts false, and yet the proposition be true ; as, ' If
the sun shine, it is day,^ is a true proposition at midnight."
Logicians use to give another example ; — ' If an ass fly, then
^ [Q,u.,Animadv. upon Numb. xxxiv. xxxii. p. 301.]
p. 323.] n [In the Defence, T. H. Numb.
' [Ibid., p. 324.] xxxiv. above p. 181.]
[Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb.
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
475
he hath wings/ The proposition is true, but both the parts are Discourse
false; neither doth the ass fly, neither hath he wings. To ' —
my direct answer he replieth not a word, either by denial or
distinction ; and so by his silence yieldeth the controversy.
But to my illustration he excepteth thus. First, ^'^What
hath a conjunct proposition to do with this in question,
I which is disjunctive 0?" By his good favour, there are two
propositions in his argument : the former is disjunctive,
which is not questioned at all by either party, either for the
truth of it or the necessity of it, namely, "Either it will rain
to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow his second propo-
sition is conjunctive, and not disjunctive, namely, " If there-
fore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary that it
shall not rain.^^ This conjunctive proposition I deny; and I
deny it upon this evident ground, — because, as in a conjunctive
proposition, both parts of the proposition may be false and
yet the proposition true, or both parts true and yet the pro-
position false, because the truth or falsehood of the proposi-
tion dependeth not upon the truth or falsehood of the parts,
but only of the consequence, so in a disjunctive proposition,
the disjunction may be necessarily true, and yet neither
member of the disjunction be necessarily [true] , because the
truth or falsehood of a disjunctive proposition dependeth
not upon the necessary truth of either member distinctly
considered, but upon the necessary truth of the disjunction.
The reason is evident. In a disjunctive proposition, nothing
is affirmed or denied, either of the one member or the other,
but only the necessary truth of the disjunction ; according
to that rule in logic, " In propositione disjunctivd affirmatio et
negatio (Bstimatur ex sold conjunctione disjunctivd^ cui necesse
est addi iiegationeniy si debet negativa esse propositio." Now
the disjunction of contradictories is most necessary, — " either
it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow;" — though
neither part of the contradiction be necessarily true. As, for
example, a man is to pay a sum of money ; ' either he will
pay it in gold or he will not pay it in gold,^ is necessarily
true ; but it is not necessary that he shall pay it in gold,
neither is it necessary that he shall not pay it in gold,
seeing he hath it in his choice to pay it in gold or in silver,
" [Qu., Auiniaclv. upon Nuinh. xxxiv. p. 324.]
476
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part or any other coin which is current. This is so clear, that
— — no man can seriously oppose it, without his own discredit.
Secondly, he saith, that a conjunctive proposition "is not made
of two propositions, as a disjunctive is^.^' What then? First,
this is altogether impertinent, and nothing to his purpose.
Secondly, it is also false. Every compounded proposition (such
as a conjunct proposition is) doth either actually or virtually
include two propositions. Indeed, a hypothetical proposi-
tion may sometimes be reduced to a categorical : that is,
when there are but three terms ; for when there are four
terms, it is hardly reducible. What is this to the question ?
or to any difference between us ? J ust, " Which is the w^ay
to London? A sack full of plums.^^ He might do well,
for his reputation' sake, to reduce his argument into any
scholar-like form ; either categorical, or hypothetical, or dis-
junctive, or any thing. But then the ugliness of it would
straight appear. This is the nearest to his sense that I can
contrive it ; — Either it is necessary that it shall rain to-
morrow, or it is necessary that it shall not rain to-morrow,
or this proposition — ' either it will rain or it will not rain
to-morrow^ — is not necessarily true. I deny the disjunction.
^ Pom quartuMj — or the one of these two (raining or not
raining) will happen contingently. The disjunction is
always necessarily true, before either of the members be
determinately or necessarily true.
Whether this proposition — "I know that either it will rain
to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow — be a disjunctive
proposition or not, is not material. It includeth a dis-
junctive proposition in it; and sheweth plainly, that the
certainty of a disjunctive proposition doth not depend upon
the certainty of either of the members determinately, but
upon the certainty of one of them indifferently.
God's de- He taketh great exception at my manner of expression, —
sidereT"' made His own decrees freely, — because " what-
act[iveliy soever was made had a besrinninff, but God^s decrees are
and pas- .
siveiy. eternal: besides, God^s decree is His will; and the Bishop 85
said formerly, that the will of God is God"".^' Although God,
[Q,u., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv. Numb, xxxiv. above p. 186; Disc. i.
p. 324.] Pt. iii.]
" [Ibid., p. 325.— from the Defence, ' [au., ibid.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
477
being a simple and infinite essence (to speak properly), is Discourse
not capable of any manner of composition, or of being per-
fectcd any further than He is ; yet, to help our conception,
we use to attribute to God such acts and qualities and per-
fections, which being spoken after the manner of men are to
be understood according to the majesty of God. Such is the
notion of God^s decrees. More particularly, " the decrees of
God^^ may be taken, and is taken in the Schools, two ways,
actively or passively : actively, as it is an act immanent in
God ; and so the decree of God is nothing else but Deus
decernens'' — " God decreeing or else the decree of God
may be taken passively, for the execution of this decree, or
the order set by God for the government and disposition of
the world ; which is an act done in time, and " ad extra''
or without the Deity. This executive decree was that which
I intended ; as he might easily have perceived, if he had
pleased. He himself saith the same which he dislikes in
me ; — " This concourse of causes, whereof every one is de-
termined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former
causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and
ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the
decree of God^^^ What difference is there, whether one say
this decree was " made," or it was " set and ordered," as he
himself saith ? My argument holds as well the one way as the
other. God was not necessitated to " set" this " order and
yet this disjunctive* proposition was always necessarily true,
— Either God will order it thus or He will not order it thus.
To my last argument used in this section he ansvvereth God knows
nothing but this ; — " If God had made either causes or efi^ects possibm!
free from necessity. He had made them free from His own
prescience, which had been imperfection^." Which reason,
besides all the inconsequences thereof, and all the other ab-
surdities which flow from it, doth deny to the infinite know-
ledge of God the knowledge of possibilities and future con-
tingents ; whereas it is most certain, that God doth perfectly
know, not only all future contingents (not in their causes
only, but in themselves), but also all possibilities, upon sup-
^ [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xi. by an obvious misprint.]
[above p. 58.] " [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv.
' ["Distinctive" in former editions, pp. 325, 326.]
478
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part position of a condition, such as were never to be actually
— — produced. Woe unto thee Chorazin, woe unto thee Beth-
Matt.xi.2i. gg^-jjj^^ •£ ^jjg mighty works which were done in you had
been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long
ago in sackcloth and ashes To know certainly future pos-
sibilities which shall never come into act, is more than to
know future events, though never so contingent and void of
1 Sam. necessity. Take another instance ; — " Will the men of Kei-
[^20 lah deliver me up? — will Saul come down? — he will come
[Wisdom down, — they will deliver thee up — and again, — " He was
speedily taken away, lest wickedness should alter his under-
standing.^'
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS; — NUMBER XXXV,
His argu-
ment to
prove uni-
versal
necessity
answered.
His first endeavour in this section is to reduce his argu-
ment into better form ; and Avhen all is done, it proveth but
a sorites. The only commendation that I can give it is this,
that the matter and form are agreeable, both stark naught.
Thus he argueth ; — " That which is an agent, worketh ; that
which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the ac-
tion ; . . and consequently is thereof a sufficient cause ; and if
a sufficient cause, then also a necessary cause^." I deny his
first proposition, — that every "agent worketh.'^ There are
causes and agents in power, as well as in act. But it may be,
he meaneth an agent in act ; then he proveth the same by
itself. ^ That which acteth, worketh f and, ' when they re-
turned, then they came home again/ He taketh pains to
prove that, which no man in his right wits can doubt of.
His second proposition containeth such another sublime
point of apodeictical learning, called "idem per idem" —
'^'^the same by the same/' — "that which worketh, wanteth
nothing requisite to produce the action, or the effect it pro-
duceth.'' It may want much that is requisite to the produc-
tion of that which it ought to produce. But it can want
nothing to produce that which it doth produce. " Whatso-
ever acteth, when it acteth, doth necessarily act what it doth
act.'' He is still stumbling upon that "old foolish rule*."
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxv.
p. 327.]
^ [See above p. 257. note u.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
479
What is all this to his antecedent necessity ? His third pro- Discouuse
position follows^ — And consequently is thereof a sufficient —
cause.^^ Yes, in his "canting^" language, which makes " defi-
cience'^ and " sufficiencey^^ to be all one. Whereunto tendeth
all this ? Hitherto he hath not advanced one hair's breadth ;
but now he uniteth all his force, to pull down the castle of
liberty : — " And if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary
cause. I denied his consequence, and gave him a reason
54 for it: — ^^otherwise God Himself should not be all-sufficient^."
He replieth, that God^s " all-sufficience signifieth no more . .
than" His "omnipotence, and omnipotence signifieth no more
than the power to do all things that He will''.^^ Yes ; God's
infinite power and sufficience ought not to be limited to
those things which He doth actually will, or which have
actual being; no more than His eternity is commensurable
by time. He was sufficient to raise up children to Abraham [Luke iii.
of stones, which He never did, and probably never will do. ^*
If God did all Avhich He could do, and could justly do,
"who" was able to "abide it?'' we were in a wretched [Ps. cxxx.
condition. A covetous person may have more than sufficient book v^eT-
for his back and his belly, and yet no will to bestow it upon ^^""'^
himself. So he hath proved himself a " sufficient'' agent ;
sufficient to make this sorites, though very unsufficient to
prove his intention.
But I took pity on him, to see him toil himself to no pur- Possible
pose ; and was contented, out of grace and courtesy, to admit siljie an°^"
these two things : first, that every effect in the world hath
sufficient causes ; secondly, that supposing the determination
of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the world is
necessary, that is, necessary upon supposition. But this will
do him no good. Necessity upon supposition is far enough
from antecedent necessity. He objecteth, that "necessity is
only said truly of somewhat in future^." I deny it. He
proveth it thus; — "^Necessary' is that which cannot possi-
bly be otherwise ; and possibility is always understood of
some future time^" Good : where are his eyes that he can-
^ [Qu., Aniuiadv. upon Numb. xxx. 189; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
P 293.] a [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xxxv.
^ [See Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. p. 328.1
xxxi. p. 297.] b [Ibid.]
* [Defence, Numb. xxxv. above p. [Ibid.]
480
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part
III.
Remote
causes are
not toge-
ther with
the effect.
not distinguish between * possible' and 'not possible'? If
necessary had been that which could possibly be otherwise,
or if impossibility had always reference to the future as well
as possibility^ he had said something. By this argument he
might proye_, that yesterday is not past but to come ; because
it is not possible to bring back yesterday, and possibility " is
always understood'' of the time to come.
But out of pure necessity he is contented to make use of
my courtesy : — " Seeing he granteth so favourably, that suf-
ficient causes are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude
from it, that whatsoever those causes do cause are necessary
antecedently'^." He may easily" prove it, if he can make
possible and impossible all one. I gave him an inch, and he
takes an ell. I admitted, that every effect in the world is
necessary upon supposition; and he taketh it for granted,
that they are necessary without supposition : but that is
more than I can yield him. If that be his meaning, he had
best stick to his own grounds. But they will afford him
no more relief than my concession. Howsoever, thus he
argueth. —
" If the necessity of the thing produced, when produced,
be in the same instant of time with the existence of its im-
mediate cause, then also that immediate cause was in the
same instant with the cause by which it was immediately
produced. The same may be said of the cause of this cause,
and backward eternally. From whence it will follow, that
all the connexion of the causes of any effect from the begin-
ning of the world, are altogether existent in one and the
same instant^." It is well that I meet with a beginning of
the world," for I was afraid of those words — " and so back-
wards eternally." If his mathematical engines be such as
these, he will never prove so terrible an enemy as Archime-
des. He proveth, that all immediate causes and their par-
ticular distinct effects successively were together in time at
the very instant of their causation successive^ since the be-
ginning of the world : but he lets the question alone, as bad
archers do the butt, whether the first cause did determine
the second to every individual act which it doth, necessarily
" [Qu., Aniniadv. upon Isiimb. xxx^
p. 328.]
[Ibid.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
481
and without any supposition^ and the second the third, and Discourse
so downward to the last j of this he saith not a word. Where '-
there is no need of proof, he swelleth with arguments ; where
the question is, he is silent. I will shew him the palpable
absurdity of his argument in an instance. When Mr. Hobbes
made his Leviathan, his Le^dathan and he were necessarily
coexistent in the same instant of time. So likewise, when
his father did beget him, his father and he were necessarily
coexistent in the same instant of time. The like may be
said of his grandfather and his great grandfather ; and so
upwards to the beginning of the world. Therefore, Adam^s
begetting of Seth had a necessary connexion with his writing
of his Le\dathan, so as to necessitate him antecedently and
inevitably to write it, and stuff it with paradoxes. Or thus ;
— a man kindles a fire to warm himself ; the fire and he are
necessarily coexistent, and there is necessary connexion be-
tween them ; another man steals part of the fire and burns
55 a house with it ; the fire and the conflagration are together
and have a necessary connexion ; therefore the kindling of
the fire had a necessary connexion with the burning of the
house, to render it inevitable. See with what doughty argu-
ments they use to catch dotterels.
From hence he concludeth, that "consequently all the Nor doth
time from the beginning of the world, or from eternity to this make one
day, is but one instant Better and better. W^hy doth he i"^*^"*-
not infer likewise, that the sea burneth ? His premisses will
sustain the one as well as the other. Why will he lose his
cause for want of confidence ? If God, Who is an infinite es-
sence, be free from all " variableness^^ and succession of time, [James i.
must he, who is but a turning shadow upon the old exchange
of this world, challenge the same privilege ? Because eternity
is a " nu7ic sta?is/' must successive parts of time make " one
instant or ' nunc stans' But he addeth, that " by this time"
I ''know it is not sos.^^ He hath been spinning a fair thread,
and now like a curst cow casts down his meal with his foot : —
first, to endeavour to prove that it is so ; and then confess, that
it " is not so." Neither can he say, that he proceedeth upon
my grounds, whilst his own grounds are so much higher than
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxv. stans: "]
p. 328. — "but one instant, or a 'nunc E [Ibid.]
BRAMHALL. t \
483
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part mine. I make but a hypothetical necessity, which implieth
— only an accidental connexion ; he maketh an absolute ante-
cedent necessity, which implieth a necessary connexion of
the whole conjoint series of causes and effects.
CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;
NUMBER XXXVI.
T. TT. ad- I cited his sense, that " he could add other arguments if
Xwclities he thought it good logic^." He complaineth, that I ''mis-
sii)nyticr^" ^ccite^^ his ^' words ; which are, ' I could add, if I thought it
good logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it
destroys both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty^'
And are not these reasons, drawn from the decrees and pre-
science of God, "arguments?^' Or are they not his prime
arguments ? How glad would this man be to find any little
pretence of exception? He distinguisheth "absurdities''
and "inconveniences;" — "absurdities'' (he saith) "are impos-
sibilities," and it is a " good form of reasoning to argue from
absurdities," but not "from inconveniences j." If all "absurdi-
ties" be "impossibilities," then there are no absurdities in
rerura naturd; for there can be no impossibilities. This it is,
to take the sense of words, not from artists in their own arts,
but from his own "imaginations'^." By this reason there never
was an absurd speech or absurd action in the world ; other-
wise absurdities are not " impossibilities." But he hath con-
futed himself sufficiently in this treatise. One absurdity may
be greater than another; and one inconvenience may be
greater than another; but ^absurd' and 'inconvenient' is com-
monly the same thing. That is absurd, which is incongruous,
unreasonable, not fit to be heard. Truth itself may acci-
dentally be said in some sense to be inconvenient to some per-
sons at some times. But neither absurdities nor inconve-
niences in themselves do flow from truth. Now let us see,
what are those inconveniences which he mentioneth here. To
^ [Defence, Numb, xxxvi. above p. upon Numb, xxxvi. p. 331.]
190 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] j [Qxi., ibid., p. 332.]
1 [In tbe Defence, T. II. Numb. [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxvi.
xxxvi. above p. 189 ; and Qu., Animadv. p. 278.]
MR. HOBBES* ANIMADVERSIONS.
483
"destroy the decrees and i3rescience of God Almighty.'^ There Discoursk
can be no greater absurdities^^ imagined, than these things —
which he calleth " inconveniencies.^^ He himself hath at the
least ten several times drawn arguments in this treatise from the
prescience of God . Where was his logic then ? or his memory
now ? And in this very place, Avhere he condemneth it as "no
good form of reasoning to argue from inconveniences yet
he himself doth practise it, and argues from inconveniences.
I But he hath worn this subject so thread-bare, withovit adding
|i either new matter or new ornament, that I will not weary
the reader with a needless repetition, but refer him to my
Defence ; which I dare well trust with his Animadversions.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS j
NUMBER XXXVII.
It is vain to talk any longer of keeping this controversy [Little
secret "\ Neither do I regard whether it was made public by publication
his fault or his friend^s", or who it was that hanered out the ^^ 'f .
' ^ arguments.]
ivy-bush before it, to beg custom and procure utterance for
his first fardel of paradoxes. He thinketh it is great " confi-
dence in" me to say, that "the edge of his discourse was so
abated, that it could not easily hurt any rational man, who
was not over much possessed with prejudice But I have
much more reason to wonder at his transcendent 'confidence.'
The people of China did use to brag, that they only had two
eyes, the Europeans one eye, and all the rest of the world no
eyes ; but he maketh himself to be a very Argus, all eye,
better sighted than "either eagle or serpent p,''' and all the rest
of the European world to be as blind as moles or beetles, like so
many "changelings^" or ' enchanted^i' persons that had lost
their senses. For my part, I am more confident since I see
'56 his Animadversions, than before. And why should I not be
confident in this cause ? Grant me but that there is a God ;
that He is just, and true, and good, and powerful ; that there
* [Qu,, Animadv. upon Numb. xxxvii. above p. 192 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
xxxvi. p. 332.] P [" Cur in amicoruni vitiis tarn cer-
™ [See alK)ve p. 192. note o.] nis acutum Quam aut aqvila aut ser-
" [See above p. 251. notes r, t.] pe7is Epidaurius." Herat., Sat. I. ii.
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. 26, 27.]
xxxvii. p. 333. — Defence, Numb. 'i [Sec above p. 459. note c]
I i 2
484
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part
III.
Abuses do
not flow es
sentially
from jrood
doctrines,
as [they
do] from
universal
necessity.
is a Heaven, and a Hell, and a Day of Judgment, that is,
rewards and punisliments ; that good and evil, %irtue and
vice, holiness and sin, are any thing more than empty names ;
that there is any election in the world: that admonitions and
reprehensions, and praises and dispraises, and laws and con-
sultations, do signify any thing; that care, and good en-
deavours, are to be cherished ; that all motives to godliness
and religious piety are to be maintained : and I cannot fall
in this cause. There is no doubt but the best doctrines may
be abused ; as the doctrine of God's providence to idleness,
and His patience to procrastination, and His mercy to pre-
sumption. But such abuses do not flow necessarily and
essentially from good doctrines, as they do from universal
necessity. He telleth us, how God dealeth with those whom
He ''will bring to a blessed end," and how He " hardeneth"
others'"; but he telleth us of nothing that is in man's power
under God to do, either to prevent this " hardening,^' or to
attain this "blessed end." He talketh of a man's "examining"
his ways^ ; but he teacheth withal, that a man is either neces-
sitated unresistibly to examine his ways, or otherwise it is
impossible for him to examine them. He mentioneth some
who " reason erroneously. If I shall be saved, I shall be saved,
whether I walk uprightly or no^;" but he teacheth also, that
they are necessitated to reason erroneously, and to walk up-
rightly or not uprightly ; and that they cannot avoid it by all
the endeavours which are in their power. For, according to
his principles, nothing at all is in their power, either to do, or
to leave undone ; but only to cry patience, and shrug up their
shoulders ; and even this also is determined antecedently and
inevitably to their hands. So he maketh man to be a mere
"foot-ball" or "tennis-ball"," smitten to and fro by the second
causes, or a " top, lashed" hither and thither v. If the watch
be wound up by the artist, what have the wheels to do to be
solicitous about any thing, but only to follow the motion
which it is impossible for them to resist ? When he first
broached this opinion, he did not foresee aU those absurd con-
sequences which did attend it ; which might easily happen to
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xx.
xxxvii. p. .334.] p. 230.]
» [Ibid.] " [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
t [Ibid.] p. 41.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
485
a man, wlio buildeth more upon his own "imaginations^^ than Discourse
other men's experience : and being once engaged, he is re — —
solved to wade through thick and thin, so long as he is able.
CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE POST-
SCRIPT; NUMBER XXXVIII.
We are now come to his last section, which is as full of Solid rea-
empty and unsignificant vaunts as any of the former. True soonesr^
real worth useth not to send forth so many bubbles of vain- j^u^J^gf^^ents
glory. The question is not, whether persons " once publicly
engaged''" in the defence of an opinion, be more tenacious of
their errors, than those who have no such prejudice ; which
his own example doth confirm sufficiently, and no rational
man can doubt of; but whether solid substantial proofs do
work sooner upon persons of wit and learning, than upon
those who are ignorant, whose judgments are confused and
unable to distinguish between feigned shows and real truths.
How should he, who understandeth not the right state of the
question, be so likely to judge what reasons are convincing
and what are not, as he who doth understand it ? Or he who
knoweth not the distinction between that necessity which is
absolute and that which is only upon supposition, be a com-
petent judge, whether all events be absolutely necessary?
He might even as well tell us, that a blind man is more
likely to hit the mark, or judge rightly of colours, than he
that hath his sight. He himself doth half confess as much ;
— " I confess, the more solid a man's wit is, the better will
solid reasons work upon himy.''' What is it then that dis-
gustethhim ? It is the addition of that which I "call learning,
that is to say, much reading of other men's doctrines, without
weighing them with his own thoughts^." When did either I
or any man else ever call that learning, — to " read" authors
"without weighing them ?" Such extravagant expressions be-
come none but blunderers, who are able to say nothing to the
question when it is truly stated. But I wonder what it is
which he calleth learning. Nothing but a fantastic opinias-
trete, joined with a supercilious contempt of all other men
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Answ. to ^ [Il)id.]
Postscript, Numb, xxxviii. p. 338. J ^ [Ibid.]
486
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part that are wiser or learneder than himself, making the private
'■ — thoughts of ignorant persons to be the standard and pubhc
seal of truth. As the scholar thinketh, so the bell clinketh.
If there were nothing else^ this alone — to except against them
who should be both his jurors and his judges — were enough to
render him and all his paradoxes suspected. Let him re- 85
member who said^ "Learning hath no enemy but ignorance."
If he had ever read those authors whom he condemneth,
namely, " the Fathers and doctors of the Church his pre-
sumption had been somewhat more tolerable, though too high;
but to condemn them all before he ever read any of them,
requireth a prophetical light, to which he is no pretender.
In the mean time he would have his readers believe, that
what is done by him upon design, merely to hide his own
ignorance, is done out of depth of judgment^. Like the fox
in the fable, which having lost his tail by mischance, per-
suaded all his fellows to cut off theirs, as unprofitable
burdens.
Three sorts The philosopher divided men into three ranks : some, who
o men. good and were willing to teach others ; these he said
were like Gods amongst men : others, who though they knew
not much, yet were willing to learn ; these he said were like
men among beasts : and lastly, some who knew not good,
and yet despised such as should teach them; these he
esteemed as beasts among men^.
Whereas he talketh of such as " requite those who endea-
vour to instruct them at their own intreaty with reviling"
terms^, although he dictate more willingly than dispute,
where no man may contradict him; yet neither do I take
him to be of the rank of ^instructors,' before he himself
hath first learned ; nor is he able to bring so much as one
instance of any "reviling," or so much as discourteous lan-
* [Defence, Numb, xxxviii. above p. /ce ix-^t* avrhs uoerj fi.'f}T &A\ov aKovu v 'Ef
194; Disc. i. Pt. iii. — Qu., Animadv. 6vfx^ fidWrjTai, 6 ^ oSt' axpri'ios aurjp."
upon Numb, xxxviii. p. 339.] Hesiod., Op, et Dies, 291 — 295 : quoted
[Qu., ibid. — " By reading others, by Aristot., Ethic, I. iv. 7 ; Cic, Pro
men commonly obstruct the way to A. Cluentio, c. xxxi ; Liv., xxii. 28 ;
their own exact and natural judgment, and others. And see Sigonius' note
and use their wit, both to deceive them- upon Liv., xxii. 28, in Drakenborch's
selves with fallacies, and," &c.] edition ; and Graevius, Lectt. Hesiod.,
l"OuTos IJ.€V iravapLffros %s avrhs in Op. et Dies, c. xiii.]
iravTa vor\(Tr), ^paaaafx^vos rd k ew^ira ^ [Q,u., Animadv. upon Numb.
Koi es reAos fiffiv a/jLcli/u' 'EaOxhs S' ad xxxviii. p. 339.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
487
guage, throughout my Defence. If his back was galled Discourse
before^ and that make him over sensible and suspicious of an —
affront where none was intended, who can help it ? But now,
he himself having shewed so much scorn and petulance in his
Animadversions, though I have abstained from all " reviling"
terms, yet I have tempered my style so as to let him plainly
see, that he is not so much regarded, nor half so formidable
an adversary, as he vainly imagineth.
In the next place, he setteth down eight conclusions, The doc-
which he dreameth that he hath proved in this treatise^. It liberty
is good beating of a proud man. Though he be thrown flat man^cm-e-*^
upon his back at every turn, yet he hath the confidence to J^^^ ^\
tilfinKlGSS.
proclaim his own achievements with a silver trumpet, when
they do not deserve to be piped upon an oaten reed. I
will make him a fair offer. If he have proved any one
of them, or be able to prove any one of them, I will
yield him all the rest. Besides the notorious falsehood of
them all, the two last are apparently ridiculous; — that the
doctrine of liberty is "an error, that maketh men, by
imagining they can repent when they will, neglect their
duties and, moreover, " makes them unthankful for God's
graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability
of their own wiU^." The doctrine of liberty from superstoical
necessity doth neither make men " truncos'' nor " sacrilegos''
— neither stupid blocks void of all activity, nor yet sacri-
legiously to rob God of His honour. We know and acknow-
ledge, that both free will, and the good use of free will in
repentance and all other acts of gratitude towards God, is
from God, and proceedeth from grace. These inferences
which he makes, are no consequences of our doctrine, but his
own drowsy dreams. All men that are not blinded with pre-
judice, do see clearly, that it is his desperate doctrine of in-
evitable necessity, which "maketh men to neglect their
duties," by teaching them to believe, that though they be
impenitent or unthankful, yet it was not at all in their power
to have been otherwise; they are as they must be, and as
God hath ordained and necessitated them to be.
He taketh me up for " saying unskilfully, that they who (iod hatii
no facul-
^ [Qu., Aniinadv. upon Numb. ' [Ibid.]
XXXV iii. p. 339,]
488
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part dispute philosophically of God, ascribe unto Him no proper
iL^' faculties Indeed I do not wonder, if he who ascribes to
God ^^potentialities" and "successive duration^/' who denies
that the Di^dne substance is indivisible^, and saith that actus
simplicissimus' signifieth nothingJ," who makes an "incorpo-
real substance" to be a "contradiction''/' do make Him Ukewise
to be compounded of substance and faculties. But they who
penetrate deeper into the ugly consequences of these bold
and blind assertions, who consider, that whatsoever is tTuly
[James i. infinite is not capable of any " variation or shadow of turning
^^*"' by change," and that whatsoever is infinitely perfect in itself
cannot be further perfected by the supplemental addition of
any faculties or accidents, will not judge my assertion to be
"unskilful," but his paradoxes to be dishonourable to the
Divine nature, and derogatory to the majesty of God.
His reason of this reprehension is, because "to dispute 858
philosophically is to dispute by natural reason and from prin-
ciples evident by the light of nature, and to dispute of the
faculties and proprieties of the subject whereof they treats"
What ? Whether they have any faculties or no ? That were
verv hard. It seemeth, that Christian philosophers are not
philosophers with him. And why may not a philosopher
make use of Divine revelation ? But let him not trouble him-
self about this. This truth hath been sufiiciently cleared
already by the light of natural reason. Either the Di\ane
essence is infinitely perfect in itself, or God is not God ; and
if it be infinitely perfect in itself, it cannot be further per-
fected by any faculties.
He saith, he " would fain know of" me " what improper
faculties" I "ascribe to God""." I ascribe no faculties at aU
to God, except it be anthropopathetically ; as the Scripture
ascribes eyes and hands to God ; which must be understood
as is beseeming the majesty of God. He addeth, that I
"know not how to make it good that the will and understand-
ing of God are faculties, and yet will have these words — ' His
g [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb,
xxxviii. pp. 339, 3 10.]
*■ [Ibid., Animadv. upon] Numb,
xxiv. [p. 266.]
i [Ibid., p. 267.]
i [Ibid.]
^ Leviath.,[Pt. iiL] c. xxxiv. [p. 214.
ed. 1651.]
1 [Qu., Animadv, upon Numb,
xxxviii. p. 339.]
[Ibid., p. 340.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
489
understanding and His will are His very essence^ — to pass for Discourse
an axiom of philosophy"." It is true, I "know not how" to
make them faculties in God, speaking properly ; and yet I
doubt not of this truth, that God's understanding aud His
will are His very essence. And this very objection sheweth
clearly, that he neither understandeth me nor himself. This
axiom, — that the will and the understanding of God are His
very essence, — is a fit medium to prove they are no faculties.
^'Quicquidest in Deo est ipseDeus^ " — "Whatsoever is in God, is
God." If he have any thing to say against it, why is he silent ?
That God is incomprehensible, and that His nature can God is in-
neither be expressed nor conceived perfectly by mortal men, henSwe.
is a truth undeniable, not to be doubted of p. How should
finite reason be able to comprehend an infinite perfection ?
And therefore they who do search too curiously into the
majesty of God, or define His nature too saucily and pre-
sumptuously, are justly to be reprehended. The pipe can
convey the water no higher than the fountain's head. But, Yet, so far
on the other side, seeing " the invisible things of Him, that we are^^"'
is. His eternal power and Godhead," are " clearly seen from ggarchafter
the creation of the world," and seeing He hath given us His ^im.
word to be " a light unto our feet and a lanthorn unto our p^^x^i'x.
paths," not to endeavour soberly and humbly to know God, l105.]
so far as He is represented to us by the creatures and re-
vealed unto us in the Scriptures, to the end we may glorify
Him as God and help others to know Him and glorify Him
aright, is inexcusable ingratitude. It is not then simply the in-
quiring into or the discoursing of the nature of God, but the
transgressing of the right manner and due bounds of our in-
quiry, which is unlawful. The Fathers disputed well from
the nature of God against the Anthropomorphites^. So did
St. Paul against the idolatrous Athenians ; — " Forasmuch as Acts xvii.
we are the ofi^spring of God, and live and move and have our ^^'^
being in Him and from Ilim, we ought not to think, that the
Godhead is like unto gold and silver or stone graven with
art." I acknowledge, that though all possible perfection
n [Ibid. — from the Defence, Numb. aud that He is no fit subject of our
xxxviii. above p. 194; Disci. Pt. iii.] phih)sophy, he denies it not." Qu.,
° [See above p. 159. note f.] Animadv. upon Numb, xxxviii. p. 340.]
^ ["Whereas I had said, that we 'i [See Fleury, Hist, de I'Egl., liv.
ought not to dispute of God's nature, xxi. § 1.]
490
CASTIGATIONS OF
Paut ought to be ascribed to God, yet the safest way to express
— — Him is by negative attributes. Admit but one negative attri-
that God is bute, which all men must admit, and do admit, that believe a
enough to Grod ; and I will easily evince all the rest from thence: that
confote -that He is actually infinite, or an indivisible unity of
infinite perfection. If God's Being be infinite, then it is not
by successive duration. In successive duration, something is
added every minute ; but to that which is infinite, nothing
can be added. Again, if God be actually infinite, then He is
not divisible nor materiate nor corporal, nor hath parts with-
out parts : an aggregation of finite parts cannot make up an
infinite being. If God be actually infinite, then His under-
standing and His will are not distinct faculties ; then His
goodness and His wisdom and His justice and His truth are
not distinct qualities. For if His will be without His under-
standing, or His justice without His wisdom, then His under-
standing and His wisdom are not infinite; for that only is
infinite, without which nothing is or can be. It is not there-
fore enough to ascribe unto God whatsoever is " honourable","
unless we do it in an honourable manner, that is, infinitely ;
and that we can never do, but by making Him " an indi-
' visible unity of infinite being and perfection not acci-
dental, but essential, or transcendent perfection. He who
calleth God "most perfect'^ (though T. H. see it not), comes
short of that honour which is due to God. "Most perfect" 859
is but a degree of comparison. But he who calleth Him per-
fection itself, acknowledgeth, that all the perfection of the
creatures is by participation of His infinite perfection. Such
errors as these formerly recited, do deserve another manner
of refutation. And when he is in his lucid intervals, he
himself acknowledgeth what I say to be true, — that God is
incomprehensible and immaterial; — and he himself proveth
so much from this very attribute of God, that He is infinite^ ;
— " Figure is not attributed to God, for every figure is finite ;
neither can He be comprehended by us, . . for whatsoever we
[In the Defence, T. H. Numb, quid enim concipimus finitum est. . . .
xxxviii. above p. 193.] Neque dici de Deo honorifice, ....
* De Give, c. xv. § 14. [pp. 183, quod habeat partes, aut quod sit totum
184- — Non igitur Deo tribuetur figura, aliquid, quae attributa sunt finitorum.
omnisenim figura finita ; neque dicetur . . . Neque plures esse Deos, quia nec
concipi sive comprehendi imaginatione plura infinita."]
vol quacunque facultate nostra, quic-
MR. HOBBES* ANIMADVERSIONS.
491
conceive is finite ; . . . nor hath He parts, which are attributed Discourse
only to finite things ; . . nor is He more than one, there can —
be but one infinite."
Whereas I called Hell "the true Tophet^'^ he telleth ns Xophet.
gravely, that " Tophet was a place not far from the walls of
Hierusalem, and consequently on the earth";" adding, after
his boasting manner, that " he cannot imagine what" I " will
say to this in" my "answer to" his "Le\dathan, unless" I "say
that by the true Tophet in this place is meant a not true
Tophet"." Whosoever answereth his Leviathan, will be more
troubled with his extravagancies than with his arguments.
Doth he not know, that almost all things happened to them [i, e. to the
as figures ? There may be a true mystical Tophet as well as •^^^^''•^
a literal ; and there is a true mystical Gehenna or valley of
Hinnom as well as a literal. He that should say, that
Christ is the true Paschal Lamb, or the Church the true
Hierusalem, or John Baptist the true Elias, may well justify
it without saying, that by the true Paschal Lamb is meant
no true Paschal Lamb, or by the true Hierusalem no true
Hierusalem, or by the true Ehas no true Elias. What poor
stuff is this !
And so he concludeth his Animadversion with a rapping True reii-
paradox indeed : — " True religion consisteth in obedience to f/s"ethTiot
Clirist^s lieutenants, and in giving God such honour both in JjjJJjce'to
attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies princes,
shall ordain^'." That sovereign princes are God's lieutenants
upon earth, no man doubteth ; but how come they to be
" Christ's lieutenants" with him ? who teachetli expressly,
that the kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general
ResmTection'^. His errors come so thick, that it is difficult
to take notice of them all ; yet if he had resolved to maintain
his paradox, it had been ingenuously done to take notice of
my reasons against it in this place.
First, "what if the" sovereign "magistrate shall be no
Christian himself y ?" Is a heathen or Mahometan prince the
" lieutenant of Christ," or a fit infallible judge of the contro-
* [Defence, Numb, xxxviii. above upon Numb, xxxviii. pp. 340 — 31'2.]
p. 195; Disc. i. Pt. iii.] Leviath., [Pt. III.] c. xlii. [pp.
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. 269, 317.]
xxxviii. p. 340. J ^ [Defence, Numb, xxxviii. above
" [In tbe Defence, T. H. Numb. p. 196 ; Disc. i. pt. iii.]
xxxviii. above p. 193 — Qu., Animadv.
492
CASTIGATIONS OF
versies of Christian religion ? Are all his Christian subjects
obliged to sacrifice to idols or blaspheme Christ upon his
command ? Certainly he giveth the same latitude of power
and right to heathen and Mahometan princes that he doth
to Christian ; there is the same submission to both ; — " I
authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this
man^ — whom he maketh to be " a mortal God^." To him
alone he ascribeth the right to allow and disallow of all doc-
trines % all forms of worship, all miracles, all revelations^.
And most plainly in the forty-second and forty-third chap-
ters of his Leviathan, where he teacheth obedience to infidel
princes in all things, even to the denial of Christ, to be ne-
cessary by the law of God and nature ^
My second reason in this place w^as this : — ^' what if the
magistrate shall command contrary to the law of God ? must
we obey him rather than God^ He confesseth, that Christ
"ought to be obeyed rather than . . His lieutenant upon earth^."
This is a plain concession, rather than an answer. But he
further addeth, that '^the question is not who is to be obeyed,
but what be his commands^." Most vainly. For if true reli-
gion do consist in obedience to the commands of the sove-
reign prince, then to be truly religious it is not needful to
inquire further than what he commandeth. " Frustra fit per
plura quod fieri potest per paucior a.'' Either he must make
the sovereign prince to be infallible in all his commands con-
cerning rehgion ; which we see by experience to be false, and
he himself confesseth, that they may command their subjects
to deny Christ^: or else the authority of the sovereign prince
doth justify to his subjects whatsoever he commands ; and
then they may obey " Christ^s lieutenant as safely without
danger of punishment as Himself.
My third reason was this ; — if true religion do consist in
obedience to the commands of the sovereign prince, then the
sovereign prince is " the ground and pillar of truth,^' not
the Church^ ; but the Church is " the ground and pillar of
^-Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. xvii. [p. 87.] ^ T Defence, Numb, xxxviii. above
» [Ibid., Pt. II.] c. xviii. [p. 91 :— p. 196 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
Pt. III. c. xlii. pp. 295—300.] e [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.
^ [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiii. pp. 205, xxxviii. p. 341.]
206; c. xxxvii. pp.237, 238. &c. &c.] ^ Leviath., [Pt. III.] c. xlii. [p. 271.]
" [Ibid., Pt. III. cc. xlii, xliii. pp. » [Defence, Numb, xxxviii. above
270, 271. 330, 331.] p. 196; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
493
iGOtnitli," not tlie sovereign prince: — ''These things wi'ite I Discourse
unto thee/' &c., " that thou mayest know how thou oughtest ^
to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the Chui'ch u, [15.]
of the hving God, the pillar and ground of truth/' T\liat
the Church signifieth in this place, may be demonstratively
collected, both from the words themselves, — wherein he
calletli it " the house of God,'' which appellation cannot be
applied to a single sovereign, much less to a heathen prince,
as theii' sovereign then was, — and likewise by the things
written, which were directions for the ordering of ecclesiasti-
cal persons.
The last argument used by me in this place was ad hominem,
— "why then is T. H. of a different mind from his sovereign
and from the laws of the land concerning the attributes of
God^," and the religious worship which is to be given to Him?
The canons and constitutions and Articles of the Church of
England, and their discipline, and form of Di\ine worship,
were all confirmed by royal authority. And yet Mr. Hobbes
made no scruple to assume to himself, that which he denieth
to all other subjects, ''the knowledge of good and evilV^ or
of true and false religion, and a judgment of what is con-
sonant to the law of nature and Scripture, different from
the commands of his sovereign and the judgment of all his
fellow-subjects ; as appearetli by his book De Cive, printed
in the year 1642. Neither can he pretend, that he was then
a local subject to another prince^' ; for he diflPered more from
him in religion, than from his own natural sovereign.
This paradox hath been confuted before^, and some of those
gross absm'dities which flow from it represented to the
reader; to all which he may add these following reasons. —
First, true religion cannot consist in any thing which is
sinful ; but obedience to sovereign princes may be sinful.
This is proved by the example of Jeroboam, who established
idolatry in his kingdom. And the text saith, "This thing i Kings xii.
became a sin." It may be he will say, this idolatrous wor-
' [Defence, Numb, xxxviii. above ^ [Scil. of the King of France, in
p. 19fi ; Disc, i, Pt, iii.] which kingdom Hobbes resided from
' [De Cive, c. xii. § 1. p. 126. — 1641 mitil tlie latter part of the year
" Doctrinarum qua? ad seditionem dis- 1651. See the Biogr. Brit.]
ponunt, prima hoec est, Cognitionem de 1 [Castig. of Animadv.] Numb. xiv.
bono el nialo pertinerc ad singulos.'^l [above pp. 325 — 332.]
494
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part ship was a sin in Jeroboam, not in the people, who obeyed
— — — him. But the text taketh away this evasion, branding him
1 Kings ordinarily with this mark of infamy, " Jeroboam, the son of
xxu. 32. ;f<rg|3at, who made Israel to sin.^^
Secondly, true religion cannot consist in obedience to con-
tradictory commands; but the commands of sovereign princes
are often contradictory one to another. One commandeth
to worship Christ, another forbiddeth it. One forbiddeth to
offer sacrifice to idols, another commandeth it. Yea, the same
person may both forbid idolatry in general, and yet authorize
it in particular; or forbid it by the public laws of the
country, and yet authorize it by his personal commands.
Thu'dly, true rehgion is always justified in the sight of
God ; but obedience to the commands of sovereign princes is
not always justified in the sight of God. This is clearly proved
out of his own express words ; — Whatsoever is commanded
by the sovereign power, is as to the subject (though not so
always in the sight of God) justified by their command ^.'^
Whence it is evident, by his own confession, that the wicked
commands of sovereign princes are not justified by their own
royal authority, but are mcked and repugnant to the law of
God. And consequently that of the Apostle hath place here,
Actsiv. 19. — " Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto
you more than unto God, judge ye." True religion hath
always reference unto God.
Fourthly, true religion doth not consist in obedience to
any laws whatsoever which are repugnant to the moral law of
God or to the law of nature. This proposition is granted by
himself; — "The laws of nature are immutable and eternal" ;"
and, " All writers do agree that the law of nature is the same
with the moral law°;" again, " Sovereigns are all subjects to
the law of natm-e, because such laws be Divine, and cannot
by any man or commonwealth be abrogated i' and, " In all
things not contrary to the moral law, that is to say, to the
law of nature, all subjects are bound to obey that of Divine
law, which is declared to be so by the laws of the common-
"•• Leviath., [Pt.II.] c. xxii,[p. 117.] naturalem eandem esse cum lege mo-
n De Give, c. iii. § 29. [p. 38. — rali consentiunt omnes scriptores."]
" Leges naturae immutabiles et aeternae P Leviath., [Pt. IL] c. xxix. [p.
sunt."] 169.]
" [Ibid.,] § 31. [p. 38.— "Legem
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
495
wealth 'I." But the commands of a sovereign prince may be Discourse
repugnant not only to the moral law or the law of nature, — —
but even to the laws of the commonwealth. This assumption
is proved four ways. First, by his own confession ; — " It is
manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary com-
mands, and knows that one of them is God^s, he ought to obey
that and not the other*." If there can be no such contrary
m commands, then it is not " manifest," nor yet true. Secondly,
this is proved by his resolution of two queries. The first is
this, — " whether the city" (or the sovereign prince) " be to
be obeyed, if he command directly to do any thing to the con-
tumely of God, or forbid to worship God;" — to which he
answereth directly, " non esse obediendwii" — that ^' he ought
not to be obeyed;" and he gives this reason, — because the sub-
jects, " before the constitution of the commonwealth, had no
right to deny the honour due unto God, and therefore could
transfer no right to command such things to the common-
wealth ^" The like he hath in his Leviathan; — "Actions
which do naturally signify contumety, . . cannot by human
power be made a part of Di\ine worship*." As if the denial
of Christ upon a sovereign's command (which he justifieth)
were not contumelious to Christ ; or as if subjects, before the
constitution of the commonwealth, had any right them-
selves to deny Christ. But such palpable contradictions are
no novelties with him. How doth true religion consist in
obedience to the commands of a sovereign, if his commands
maybe contumelious to God, and deny Him that worship which
is due unto Him by the eternal and immutable law of nature,
and, if he " be not to be obeyed" in such commands ? His
second question is, — " If a sovereign prince should command
himself to be worshipped with Divine worship and attributes,
whether he ought to be obeyed ;" to which he answereth,
that "although kings should command it, yet we ought to
abstain from such attributes as signify his independence upon
God, or immortality, or infinite power, or the like, and from
q Leviath., [Pt.II.] c. xxvi. [p. 149.] dieiidum . . . Neque etiam habuit quis-
' Ibid., [Pt. III.] c, xliii. [p. quam antecivitatemconstitutam, eorum
321.] qui Deum regnare agnoverunt, jus
• De Give, c. xv. § 18. [p. 190. — negandi honorem Ipsi inde debitum,
" Primo, an non sequatur obediendum neque ergo jus talia imperandi in civi-
civitati esse, si directs imperet Deum tatem transferre potuit."]
contumelia afficere, vel prohibeat t [Leviath., Pt. II.] c. xxxi. [p.
colere. Dico non sequi neque esse obe- 192.]
496 CASTIGATIONS OF ^
p A R T such actions as do signify the same ; as, to pray unto him
— being absent, to ask those things of him which none but God
can give, as rain and fair weather, or to offer sacrifice to
him^i." Then true rehgion may sometimes consist in disobe-
dience to the commands of sovereign princes. Thirdly, that
the commands of sovereign princes in point of rehgion may
be contrary to the law of nature (which needeth no new pro-
mulgation or reception), doth appear by all those duties, inter-
nal and external, which by his own confession nature doth
enjoin us to perform towards God, and all which may be and
have been countermanded by sovereign princes ; as, to acknow-
ledge the existence of God, His unity. His infiniteness, His
providence. His creation of the world. His omnipotence. His
eternity, His incomprehensibility. His ubiquity ; to worship
Him and Him only, wdth Divine worship, with prayers, with
thanksgivings, with oblations, and with all expressions of
Dan. iii. 4. honour''. Lastly, this is proved by examples. Nebuchad-
Dan. vi. 7. nezzar commanded to worship a golden image. And Darius
made a decree, that no man should " ask any petition of
any God or man for thirty days save of the king only.^^ Yet
the transgression of both these commands of sovereign
princes was justified by God as true religion.
Fifthly, Christ will deny no man before His Father for true
religion; but those who deny Christ before men, to fulfil
Mat. X. 33 the commands of an earthly prince, He will deny before His
and 28. j^j^thcr Which is in Heaven.'^ And therefore Christ en-
courageth His disciples against these dangers, which might
fall upon them by disobedience to such unlawful commands ;
— " Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to
kill the soul ; but rather fear Him, Which is able to destroy
both body and soul in Hell.'^ But Mr. Hobbes hath found
out an evasion for such renegadoes : — " Whatsoever a sub-
" Ibidem, [scil., De Give, c. xv.
§18. p. 191. — " Si is homo vel curia,
cni commissa est summa potestas civi-
tatis, jubeat se coli attributis et actioni-
bus illis quibus colendus est Deus,
quseri potest an obediendum sit." And
pp. 191, 192. — "Attributis . . . quibus
significamus sentire nos hominem. ali-
quem ita imperium habere ut a Deo
non dependeat, vel esse immortalem,
vel potentiac infinitae, et similia, quam-
quam jubeant reges, abstinendum est ;
sicut et actionibus idem significantibus,
ut precari absentem, rogare ea quae
solus Deus dare potest, ut pluvias et
serenitatem, ofFerre ei quae solus Deus
accipere potest, ut holocausta, vel cul-
tum exhibere quo major exhiberi non
potest, ut sacrilicium."]
De Give, c. xv. [§ 14, 15. pp. 182—
187.]
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
497
ject is compelled to in obedience to his sovereign, and doth Discourse
it not in order to his own mind but in order to the laws of — —
his country, that action is not his but his sovereign's ; nor is
it he, that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his
governor, and the law of his country y." If this fig-leaf
would have served the turn, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed- [Dan. iii.]
nego needed not to have been cast into the fiery furnace.
For though they had worshipped the golden image, by this
doctrine they had not been idolaters, but Nebuchadnezzar
only and his princes. If this were true, Daniel might have [Dan. vi.]
escaped the lions' den. If he had foreborne his praises to God,
Darius had been faulty, and not he. But these holy saints
were of another mind. I hope, though he might in his haste
and passion censure the blessed Martyrs to be " fools
(which were so many, that there were five thousand for every
day in the year, except the Calends of January, when the
heathens were so intent upon their devotions, that they neg-
lected the slaughter of the poor Christians*^), yet he will not
62 esteem himself wiser than Daniel. " Behold thou art wiser Ezek.
than Daniel," was a hyperbolical or rather an ironical ex- ^•
pression. "With the heart man believeth unto righteous- Rom. x. lo.
ness, and with the mouth is confession made unto salvation."
If a man deny Christ with his mouth, the faith of the heart
will not serve his turn.
Sixthly, Christ denounceth damnation to all those, who
for saving of their lives do deny their religion, and promiseth
eternal life to all those, who do seal the truth of their
Christian faith with their blood, against the commands of
heathenish magistrates. " Whosoever will save his life shall [Luke ix.
. , , 24 Matt.
lose it, and whosoever will lose his life for My sake shall find x. 3o.]
it." Christ doth not promise eternal life for violation of true
religion.
Lastly, no Christian sovereign or commonwealth did ever
assume any such authority to themselves, never any subjects
did acknowledge any such power in their sovereigns, never
any writer of politics, either waking or dreaming, did ever
y [Leviath., Pt. III. c, xlii. p. 271.] Hieron. fol. Basil. 1492. It is a spu-
^ [See above p. 330. note g.] rious letter, of not the slightest autho-
" Hieron., Epist. ad Chroniat. [P. rity. See Dodwell's Dissert. Clypriiin.,
II. Tract, vi. Epist. i9. inter Epist. Diss. xi. § 2.j
BRAMHALL. 1^
498
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part fancy such an unlimited power and authority in princes, as
— this which he ascribeth to them ; — not only to make, but to
justify, all doctrines, all laws, all religions, all actions of their
subjects, by their commands : — as if God Almighty had re-
served only sovereign princes under His own jmisdiction, and
quitted all the rest of mankind to kings and commonwealths.
[Matt. XV. " In vain ye worship Me, teaching for doctrine the command-
^'^ ments of men/' that is to saj^, making true religion to
consist in obedience to the commands of men. If princes
were heavenly angels, free from all ignorance and passions,
such an unlimited power might better become them. But
being mortal men, it is dangerous; lest Phaeton-like, by their
violence or unskilfulness, they put the whole empire into a
flame. It were too much, to make their unlawful commands
[Matt. XV. to justify their subjects. " If the blind lead the blind, both
^'^'^ fall into the ditch.^^ He who imposeth unlawful commands,
and he who obeyeth them, do both subject themselves to the
judgments of God. But if true religion do consist in active
obedience to their commands, it justifieth both their subjects
and themselves. True religion can prejudice no man.
Active and He taketh upon him to refute the distinction of obedience
passive . . , . . •tip
obedience, mto activc and passivc : — " as if a sm agamst the law oi
nature could be expiated by arbitrary punishments imposed
by men^\" Thus it happeneth to men, who confute that
which they do not understand. Passive obedience is not for
the expiation of any fault, but for the maintenance of inno-
cence. When God commands one thing and the sovereign
prince another, we cannot obey them both actively; there-
[Acfs V. fore we choose to " obey God rather than men,^^ and yet are
^^'^ willing, for the preservation of peace, to suflPer from man
rather than to resist. If he understood this distinction well,
it hath all those advantages which he fancieth to himself in
his new platform of government, without any of those incon-
veniences which do attend it. And whereas he intimateth,
that our not obeying our sovereign actively is " a sin against
the law of nature," meaning by the violation of our promised
obedience, it is nothing but a gross mistake ; no subjects ever
did nor ever could make any such pact, to obey the commands
De Give, c. xiv. [§ 23. p. 172. — expiari possit quod peccatum est con-
" Quasi poenis humano arbitrio positis tra legem naturalem, quae est lex Dei."]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS.
499
of their sovereiffn actively contrarv to the law of God or Discourse
nature.
This reason drawn from universal practice was so obvious, Universal
that he could not miss to make it an " objection/^ — " The against^
greatest objection is that of the practice, when men ask where
and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged^.'^
A shrewd '^objection/' indeed; which required a more solid
answer than to say, that though in all places of the world
men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand,
it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be"^.'' As
if there were no more difficulty in founding and regulating a
commonwealth, than in distinguishing between a loose sand
and a firm rock; or as if all societies of men, of different
tempers, of different humours, of different manners, and of
different interests, must of necessity be all ordered after one
and the same manner. If all parts of the world after so long
experience do practise the contrary to that which he fancieth,
he must give me leave to suspect, that his own grounds are
the quicksands, and that his new commonwealth is but a
castle founded in the air.
That a sovereign prince within his own dominions is 'custos The just
xitnusqiie tabidce' — ' the keeper of both the tables' of the law, pri^nces?^
to see that God be duly served, and justice duly administered
863 between man and man, and to punish such as transgress in
either kind ^^ith civil punishment ; that he hath an architec-
tonical power, to see that each of his subjects do theii' duties
in theii' several callings, ecclesiastics as well as seculars ; that
the care and charge of seeing, that no doctrine be taught his
subjects but such as may consist with the general peace, and
the authority to prohibit seditious practices and opinions, do
reside in him ; that a sovereign prince oweth no account of
his actions to any mortal man ; that the kings of England in
particular have been justly declared by Act of Pai'liament
" supreme governors in their own kingdoms, in all causes,
over all persons, as well ecclesiastical as ci^il;'' — is not de-
nied, nor so much as questioned, by me. Otherwise, a king-
dom or a commonwealth should be destitute of necessary
means for its own preservation. To all this I do readily
assent ; all this I have indicated upon surer grounds, than
' Leviath., [Pt. II.] c. XX. [p. 107.] «* [Ibid.]
K k 2
500
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part those desperate and destructive principles which he snpposeth.
But I do utterly deny, that true religion doth consist in
obedience to sovereign magistrates ; or that all their injunc-
tions ought to be obeyed, not only passively but actively ; or
that he is infallible in his laws and commands ; or that his
sovereign authority doth justify the active obedience of his
subjects to his unlawful commands. Suppose a king should
1 Kings command his judges to " set Naboth on high among the
XXI. 9, [10.] people/^ and to "set two sons of Belial before him, to bear
witness against him, saying, thou didst blaspheme God
and the king, and then carry him out and stone him, that
he may die the regal authority could neither justify such
an unlawful command in the king, nor obedience in the
[Dan. iii.] judges. Suppose a king should set up a golden image, as
Nebuchadnezzar did, and command all his subjects to adore
it; his command would not excuse his subjects from idola-
try, much less change idolatry into true religion.
His answer to the words of Peter and John do signify
Actsiv. nothing^. The High Priest and his Council "commanded
[18,] 19. ^YiQ Apostles not to teach in the Name of Jesus;" here was
sufficient human authority ; yet say the Apostles, " Whether
it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more
than unto God, judge ye." The question was not "what were
the commands ;" that was clear enough, — what God com-
manded, and what man commanded ; — but " who was to be
obeyed :" which could admit no debate.
He confes- He asketh, " What has the Bishop to do with what God
ecciesiasti- says to me when I read the Scriptures, more than I have to do
hav^a^^pru ^^^^ what God says to him when he reads them? unless he have
viiege authority ffiven him by him whom Christ hath constituted His
above him- ^ „ -r^. -r i • • • i
self. lieutenants First, I answer his question with a question, —
What if "the Bishop" have such authority, and he hath not?
He cannot deny but "the Bishop" had such authority, when
he had not. And yet he doubted not even then to inter-
pret the Scriptures contrary to both "the Bishop" and to
e [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. we ought not to obey Him rather than
xxxviii. pp. 340, 341. — "No; but any man that shall be His lieutenant
(saith he) Christ is the Supreme Judge, upon earth ? The question tlierefore
and we are not to ' obey men rather is not of who is to be obeyed, but of
than God.' Is there any Christian what be His commands."]
man that does not acknowledge that ^ [Ibid., p. 341.]
we are to be judged by Christ, or that
MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
501
" Christ^s lieutenant." Secondly, I answer, that by his own Discourse
confession there is a great difference between him and me in — — —
this particular : — " Our Saviour hath promised this infallibi-
lity (in those things which are necessary to salvation) to the
' Apostles, until the Day of Judgment ; that is to say, to the
Apostles, and to pastors to be consecrated by them by impo-
sition of hands : therefore the sovereign magistrate, as he is
a Christian, is obliged to interpret the Holy Scriptures, when
there is question about the mysteries of faith, by ecclesiasti-
cal persons rightly ordained^." Unless he have such "ordi-
nation" by "imposition of hands," I am better qualified
than he is for the interpretation of Scripture, by his own
confession.
But he "supposeth," that "a Bishop or a synod of Bishops
should be set up for our civil sovereign^." A likely thing
indeed. Suppose the sky fall, then we shall have larks. But
to gratify him, let us " suppose" it. What then? " Then
that which" I "object against" him, he "could object in the
same w^ords against" me'. So he might, if I should be so
fond as to say that true religion did consist in obedience to
that single Bishop, or that synod of Bishops ; as he saith,
that it doth consist in obedience to the sovereign prince. He
deceiveth himself, and mistaketh us, if he think that we hold
any such ridiculous opinions. If he could shew, that Bishops
do challenge an infallibility to themselves by Divine right,
and (which is more than infallibility) a power to authorize
all their commands for true religion, he said something to
the purpose.
He telleth us, that he " remembers there have been books
written to entitle the Bishops to a Divine right underived
from the civil sovereign^." Very likely, if the law of nature
do make a Divine right. Perhaps a locomotive faculty, or a
^64 liberty of respiration, which all other men do challenge as
well as Bishops. But he meaneth in religion. Why not ?
They have their holy orders by succession from the Apostles,
B De Give, c. xvii. [§ 28. p. 256. — is qui habet civitatis imperiiuii, Scrip-
" lufallibilitatem hanc promisit Serva- turas Sacras, ubi quaestio estde myste-
tor Noster (in iis rebus quae ad saluteni riis Fidei, per ecclesiasticos ritd ordi-
sunt necessariae) Apostolis usque ad natos interpretari."]
Diem Judicii, hoc est, Apostolis, et ^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.
l)astoribus ab Apostolis successive per xxxviii. p. 341.]
impositionem maiiuum consecvandis : ' [Ibid.]
obligatur ergo, quatenus Christianus, [Ibid.]
502
CASTIGATIONS OF
Part not from their civil sovereigns. They have the power of the
[John XX ^^^^ concession of Christ ; — " Whose sins ye remit
23.] they are remitted, whose sins ye retain they are retained/'
None can give that to another, which they have not them-
selves. Where did Christ give the power of the keys to the
civil magistrate ?
[The pri- I was far enough from thinking of " odes V' when I writ
niitive o ^
Christians my Defence of Liberty. That which he calleth my "ode/'
G^oT rather written about a thousand years before I was born. I
than man.] cited it Only to shcw the sense of the primitive Christians
concerning obedience to the unlawful commands of sovereign
princes, — that ''we ought to obey God rather than'' them.
And to that it is full. —
*' Jussura est Caesaris ore Gallieni,
*' Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes ;
* * *
" Sternum colo Principem, dierum
" Factorem, Dominumqiie Gallieni"."
This put him into such a fit of versifying, that he could not
forbear to make a "parodeV^ such as it is, wherein out of
pure zeal (if it were worth taking notice of) he retaineth the
errors of the press.
[T. H.'s And so, confounding regal supremacy with a kind of om-
cipi^es!]"' nipotence, and the external regiment of the Church with the
power of the keys and jurisdiction in the inner court of con-
science, and foreign usurpations with the ancient rights and
liberties of the English Church, and a stipendiary " school-
master" (who hath neither title nor right but the mere plea-
sure of the master of the family) with Bishops, who are the
successors of the Apostles in that part of their office which is
of ordinary and perpetual necessity, and the king's proper
council in ecclesiastical affairs o, he concludeth his Animadver-
sion with this fair intimation to Dr. Hammond and me, —
that if we "had gone upon these" his "principles, when we
' [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 342. — In the first edition of
xxxviii. p. 342.] Bramhall's Defence (in 1655) the third
[See the Defence, Nunrib. xxxviii. line of the quotation was misprinted
above p. 196. note n; Disc. i. Pt. iii. thus, — "iEternum colemus Principetn
Prudentius was born in 348, and wrote dierum," — so as to destroy the metre;
the poem containing these lines proba- which error Hobbes in his Questiont
biy about the year 405: — See Chal- (as printed in 1656) retained.]
mers' Biogr. Diet.] » [Ibid., pp. 342, 343.]
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIONS. 503
did write in defence of the Churcli of England against the Discourse
imputation of schism, quitting our own pretences of jurisdic —
tion and Divi7ium, we had not been so shrewdly handled
as we have been by an English Papist p/^ I hope neither
the Church of England nor any genuine son of the English
Chm'ch hath complained to him, that the Church hath suf-
fered any disadvantage by our pains ; nor our adversaries in
that cause boasted to him of any advantage they have gained.
I do rather believe, that it is but his own " imagination/' with-
out ever reading either party. Why should he interrupt his
sadder "meditations" with reading such trifles? But for
his "principles" (as he calleth them), I thank him, I will
have nothing to do with them, except it be to shew him how
destructive they are both to Church and commonwealth.
But this I believe in earnest, that if we had "gone upon"
his "principles," we should not have made ourselves the
object of our adversaries^ pity, but well of their scorn.
In his conclusion, or in his postscript (choose whether you [His post-
will call it), first, he setteth down his "censure" of my De-
fenced; with the same ingenuity and judgment that he hath
shewed hitherto, that is, none at all : w^hich I esteem no more
than a deaf nut ; let the book justify itself. And to the
"manner" of writing, he bites first, and whines; doth an injury
and complains. The reader will find no "railing^" in my
treatise, nor any of those faults which he objecteth. I rather
fear, that he will censure it as too compljdng with such an
adversary. But he had not then given me so much occasion
as he hath done since, to make him lose that pleasure in
reading which he took in writing.
In the next place, he presenteth to the reader's view a
large muster of terms and phrases, such as are used in the
Schools, w^hich he calleth "nonsense," and the "language
of the kingdom of darkness^;'' that is all the confutation
which he vouchsafeth them. He hath served them up often
enough before, to the reader's loathing. Let him take it for
a warning ; wheresoever he reneweth his complaint, I shall
make bold to renew my story of old Harpaste, who com-
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. [Ibid]
xxxviii. p. 313.1 ' flbid.l
n [Ibid.1
504
CASTIGATTONS OF
Pa^rt plained that the room was dark, when the poor beldam
— wanted her sights There is more true judgment and solid
reason in any one of the worst of those phrases which he
derides, than there is in one of his whole sections.
Thirdly, he cavilleth against a saying of mine, which he re-
peateth thus; — " He hath said, . . that his opinion is demonstra- 865
ble in reason, though he be not able to comprehend how it
consisteth together with God^s eternal prescience ; and though
it exceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to that
truth which is manifest^." Whence he concludeth after this
manner, — " So to him that truth is manifest and demonstra-
ble by reason, which is beyond his capacity Let the
reader see what an uningenuous adversary he is. In my
first Discourse of Liberty I had these words, — We ought not
to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to compre-
hend the certain manner^ — to which he answereth, — "And
I say the same^." In my Defence I repeat the same words,
adding these ; — " Such a truth is that which I maintain, that
the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsecal
determination ; a truth demonstrable by reason, received and
believed by all the world ; and therefore, though I be not
able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner
how it consists with God^s eternal prescience and decrees,
which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to
that truth which is manifest ^" So, first, he quarrelleth now
with that truth which formerly he yielded. Secondly, that
which I spake upon supposition — " though I be not able,^^ —
he setteth down positively in his collection — "which is be-
yond his capacity .^^ Thirdly, he leaveth out the word " ex-
actly .^^ A man may comprehend truly that which he doth
not comprehend " exactly .^^ Fourthly, he omitteth fraudu-
lently these words, " the certain manner." A truth may be
certain and demonstrable, and yet the manner of it not de-
monstrable ; or a man may know several ways of reconciling
two truths together, and yet fluctuate in his judgment, to
which of them certainly and expressly he ought to adhere.
t [See above p. 249. note k.] xxiv. p. 153; Disc. i. Part iii.]
" [Q,u., Animadv. upon Numb. y [See above ibid., T. H. Numb,
xxxviii. p. 344.] xxiv. p. 154.]
" [Ibid.] [Defence, Numb. xxiv. above p.
" [See above in the Defence, Numb. 155 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
MR. HOBBES^ ANIMADVERSIOyS.
505
It is certain^ that by the force of a man^s arm a stone is Discourse
thro^m upwards ; and vet the certain manner how to recon- — —
cile this with another truth, — that ^whatsoever acteth w-pon
another body, acteth by a touching/ — is not so easily found
out. The Incarnation of Christ is certain, yet the certain
manner passeth both my capacity and his. Lastly, I do not
say (as he suggest eth), that that truth which is demonstrable
by reason, passeth my capacity, but the ''^ certain'^ and exact
"manner^^ how to reconcile this ti'uth with another truth.
|j Yet there are sundry ways of reconciling of them ; and I have
shewed him one in the same section, which he is not able to
refute. See how his discoui'se hangs together like ropes of
sand J — The prescience and decrees of God pass the capacity
of mortal man ; therefore the liberty of the will is not de-
monstrable by reason.
From the ^^hard words^^ and ^'nonsense^^ of the Schools, he
passeth to my ^^little logic"' and ^^no philosophy^.*' It skilleth
not much what he saith, unless he were a greater clerk. He
hath passed over a great pai't of my Defence untouched : but
I have not omitted one sentence throughout his Animadver-
sions, wherein I could find any one gi'ain of reason ; and
among the rest, have satisfied his silly censures or ignorant
exceptions in their proper places ; and the splinters of those
broken reeds stick in his own fingers.
Before he concludes, he di'aweth up a summary of what he
and I have maintained^ ; very confusedly, most imperfectly,
and in part falsely. Methinks it resembleth that unskilful
painter, who durst not leave his pictui'es to the fi-ee judgment
of the beholders, unless he writ over their heads, ' This is a
dog,' and, ' This is a bear*^.' We had such a summaiy or
di'aught of the controversy in his " Fountains of Argimients,''
before his Animadversions, as a proem. And now we have
such another bre\'iate in the conclusion, by way of epi-
logue, after his Animadversions. He is very difl&dent of
his cause, who standeth in need of such proems and epi-
logues ; and dare not trust the indiflPerent reader to choose his
own diet, unless he do first chop it and chew it for him, and
then thi'ust it down his throat. The last word may be efiica-
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. b [ibid., pp. 341— 346.]
x\xviii. p. 344.] ^ [yElian., Hist. Var., lib. x. c. 10.]
506 CASTIGATIONS OF MR. HOBBES' ANIMADVERSIONS.
^iii^ T cious with an ignorant multitude : who are like a ship at
■ — hull^; every wave puts it into a new posture. But more
accurate palates do nauseate and loath such thrice-sodden
coleworts. I leave the reader to compare plea with plea, and
proof with proof; and let truth overcome.
Thus he concludeth, with a short apology, — lest the
reader should think, that^^ he "hath not used'^ me "with
that respect which" he " ought or might have done without
disadvantage to" his " cause^." His only reason is, because
"divers in their books and sermons, without answering any
of" his "arguments, have exclaimed against" him, "and
reviled" him for some things delivered by him in his book 866
De Cive^. What doth this concern me ? No more than the
man in the moon. Yes ; he saith, — " whereof the Bishop of
Derry is one?." Most falsely. I never preached against him;
nor writ against his book De Cive, but privately to himself^,
and then with more respect than either he or it deserved.
But his meaning was not, by this apology, to make me any
reparation, but to deter others from meddling with him, lest
he should " make examples" of them, as he boasteth that he
hath done of me^ Beware, reader, " he beareth hay on his
hom^." If he have gained any thing by his disrespect,
much good may it do him. I do not envy him. Let the
reader judge. And if he have any spark of ingenuity left in
him, let himself judge, whether he hath "made an example"
of me or of himself. Or if he like it better, let him thrust
his head into a bush, and suppose that no body seeth his
errors, because he is not willing to take notice of them
himself.
[Viz. riding to and fro upon the ^ [Ibid.]
water. Compare Shakspeare, Hen. ^ [See above in the Defence, Advert.
VIII, ii. 4. in fine, — " Thus huUhig in to the Reader, p. 20 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
the wild sea of my conscience."] i [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb.
e [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxxviii. p. 348.]
xxxviii. pp. 346, 347.] [" Fcenum habat in cornu, longe
^ [Ibid., p. 347.] fuge;" &c. Horat., Sat., I. iv. 34.]
DISCOUKSE III.
THE CATCHING OF LEVIATHAN
OR
THE GREAT WHALE:
DEMOXSTRATIXG,
OUT OF MR. HOBBES HIS OWN WORKS,
THAT NO :^LA^^ WHO IS THOROUGHLY A HOBBIST,
CAN BE
A GOOD CHRISTIAN OR A GOOD COMOXWE^UTH'S MN,
OR RECONCILE HIMSELF TO HIMSELF ;
BECAUSE HIS PRINCIPLES
ARE NOT ONLY DESTRUCTIVE TO ALL RELIGION,
BUT TO ALL SOCIETIES;
EXTINGUISHING THE RELATION
BETWEEN
PRLNTE AND SL^JECT, PARENT AND CHILD,
PIASTER AND SERV.ANT, HUSBAND AND WIFE ;
AND
ABOUND WITH PALPABLE CONTRADICTIONS.
BY JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.,
AND
BISHOP OF DERRY.
" THE LIP OF TRUTH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED FOR EVER, BUT A LYING TONGUE
IS BUT FOR A MOMENT." PrOV. xii. 19.
CONTENTS.
Page
Epistle to the Christian Reader. . . . . .513
The Preface. ........ 515
[Reason for the author's answering T. H.'s book.] . . . ib.
Leviathan a mere phantasm. . . . . . .516
T. H. the true Leviathan . . . . . .517
Leviathan no sovereign of the sea. . . . . . ib.
[Division of the argument]. . . . . . .518
CHAPTER THE FIRST.
That the Hobbian principles are destructive to Christianity and
all Religion. ....... 519
Nature dictates the existence and ■worship of God. . . . ib,
T. H. no friend to religion. ...... 520
excuseth atheism. ...... 522
destroys God's ubiquity. ..... 523
His eternity. . . . . , . ib.
His simplicity. ..... 524
His existence. ...... 525
[T. H.'s opinions concerning] the Trinity. .... 526
[ concerning God the Son. .... 527
Of His priestly office. . . . . . .528
Of His prophetical office. . . . . . ib.
concerning God the Holy Ghost. . . . 529
• • concerning the Holy Catholic Church. . . 531
T. H. maketh Church and commonwealth the same thing. . ib.
His opinions concerning the Holy Scriptures. . . . 532
concerning the efficacy of the Holy Sacraments. . 533
concerning Holy Orders. . . . . ib.
concerning Heaven. .... 535
• concerning Angels. . . . . ib.
concerning the immortality of the soul. . . 536
concerning the devils. . . . . ib.
concerning Hell. ..... 537
• concerning the damned spirits. . . . 538
concerning eternal punishment. . . . ib.
510
CONTENTS.
Page
1. T. H. alloweth compliance with heresy. . . • • 539
2. And outward denial of Chi-ist. . . • • . ib.
3. And licence to commit idolatry for fear of death. . . . ib.
4. And denieth the natural supremacy of Divine law. . • 540
5. And maketh the sovereign magistrate supreme arbiter of theological
truth.
6. And the civil laws the ultimate standard of good and evil. . . 541
The true doctrine of passive obedience. .... 543
A bundle of T. H. his religious errors.] . • • '544
ib.
CHAPTER THE SECOND.
That the Hobbian principles do destroy all relations between man
and man, and the whole frame of a Commonwealth. . 547
[T. H.'s political principles. . . . . . . ib.
T. H.'s commonwealth confessedly a novelty. . . . ib.
Theory insufficient without experience. .... 549
T. H.'s principles destructive to public peace. . . . 550
He teacheth, that an oath doth not bind more than a naked cove-
nant. . . . . . . . . ib.
And that confidence between princes and states is impossible. . 551
And that unconfederate states are as enemies, and in a state of
nature ; . . . . . . . . ib.
And may make war upon each other without any warning. . 552
His principles destructive to the commonwealth itself. . . ib.
He teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare. . . 553
And that self-defence supersedes all duties. . . . 554
And admitteth resistance to the sovereign in deed, although he
denieth it in w^ords. ...... 555
And holdeth no man bound to accuse himself under any circum-
stances, by any pacts. ...... 556
And that the loss of sovereignty de facto voideth all duty of allegiance. 557
His many errors against the right and authority of monarchs. . 558
His ten times grosser errors in favour of monarchs. . . 559
His grudge against the nobility. ..... 563
What is meant by a mixed form of government. . . . 564
Laws may be unjust. ...... 565
^ T. H. his oeconomics no better than his politics. . . . 566
He teacheth that parents may kill their children. . . . ib.
(His dream of a " state of mere nature.") . . . ib.
And yet that the parent hath no natural right over the child. . 568
His principles destroy the subordination of a wife to her husband. . 569
And justify adultery. ...... 570
And overthrow the relation of a servant to his master. . . 571
A bundle of T. H. his political errors.] .... 572
CONTENTS.
511
CHAPTER THE THIRD.
Page
That the Hobbian principles are inconsistent one with another. . 575
[T. H.'s own censure of self contradictions. , . . . ib.
An hereditary kingdom is and is not the best form of government. . 576
Divine law ought and ought not to be obeyed in preference to human
law. , . . . , . . . ib.
The laws of nature are God's laws, and no laws at all. . • 577
The sovereign magistrate is and is not the ultimate judge of religious
questions. . . . . . . . .578
A subject may and may not judge of what is good or evil to he done. . 580
The just power of sovereigns absolute, and yet limited. . . ib.
God is good, and yet the cause of sin. . . . • 581
Children may and may not be punished for the sins of their fathers. . ib.
The magistrate has a right as man to kill, but no right as magistrate
to punish, a guilty subject. . . . . • 582
T. H. zealous for human justice, yet regardeth not Divine. . . ib.
The institution of sovereignty an increase and not an increase of the
rights of the sovereign. ...... 583
T. H.'s contradictions relative to God. .... 584
And Christ. . . . . . . . . ib.
And eternal punishment. ...... 585
And sin. . . . . . . . . ib.
And the power of the keys. . . . . . . ib.
The Apostles had and had not power ecclesiastical. . . . ib.
Infidel sovereigns are and are not to be obeyed in wrongful commands. 587
Matter and power are and are not indifferent to contrary forms and acts. ib.
The object of sense is and is not the same thing with the sense itself. . 588
T. H. denieth and alloweth inspiration. . . . . ib.
His contradictory assertions about body. . . . . ib.
And the power of law over the will. . . . . .589
And necessity. . , . . . . . ib.
And compulsion. . . . . . . . ib.
The sovereign prince the only interpreter of Scripture, yet obliged to
make use of ecclesiastical doctors duly ordained. . . . 590
The sovereign the sole legislator, yet his hands tied by Scripture. . 591
Summary of T. H. his contradictions. . . . . ib.
The causes and grounds of T. H. his errors. .... 592
1. His fancying to himself a general state of nature. . . 593
2. His gross mistake of the laws of nature. . . . 591'
Origin of commonwealtlis not from mutual fear, as T. H. affirmeth. . 595
His device of absolute sovereignty.] ..... 59G
An Advertisement to the Reader.
. 597
69
TO THE CHRISTIAN READER.
Christian Reader, this short treatise was not iutended,
or sent to the press, as a complete refutation of all ^Ir.
Hobbes his errors in theology and policy; ])ut only as an
Appendix to my Castigations of his Animadversions, to let
him see the vanity of his petulant scoffs and empty brags,
and how open he doth lie to the lash, whensoever any one
will vouchsafe to take him in hand to purpose. But some of
my good friends have prevailed with me to alter my design,
and to make this small treatise independent upon the other ^.
He who clasheth ordinarily with all the Churches in the
world, about the common principles of religion ; he who
swerveth so often, so affectedly, from the approved rules, and
healthful constitutions, of all orderly commonwealths ; he
who doth not only disturb, but destroy, all human society,
and all relations between man and man ; he who cannot pre-
serve unity with himself, but ever and anon is interfering
and tripping up his own heels by his contradictions ; needeth
no just confutation, or single or other adversary, than God,
and himself, and all mankind.
If he did ground his opinions upon any other authority
than his own di-eams ; if he did interpret Scriptm-e according
to the perpetual tradition of the Catholic Church, and not
according to his private distempered phantasies ; if his dis-
course were as full of deep reasons as it is of supercilious
confidence, so that a man might gain either knowledge or
reputation by him ; a great volume would be well besto^.vcd
upon him. " Digna res esset ubi quis nervos intenderet suos^.''
But to what pm'pose is it to draw the cord of contention with
* [i. e. to make it a distinct treatise. See above in the Answ. to Animadv.
with a separate title-page, although upon the Bp's. Epist. to the Reader,
bound up in the same volume and p. 252. note d, Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]
printed continuously with the former ^ [" Digna res est ubi tu nervos in-
treatise, the Castigations; of which it tendas tuos." Terent., Eun., II. iii.
had been at first intended to form an 20.]
additional "two or three chapters."
BRAMHALL, L 1
514
TO THE CHRISTIAN READER.
such a man, in such a cause, where it is impiety to doubt,
much more to dispute ?
" Quid cum illis agas, qui neque jus neque bonum aut aequum sciunt ?
" Melius pejus, prosit obsit, nihil vident nisi quod lubetc."
For mine own part, as long as God shall furnish me with
ability and opportunity, I will endeavour to bestow my vacant
hours upon a better subject, conducing more to the advance-
ment of primitive piety and the reunion of Christendom, by
disabusing the hood-winked world ^, than this; — this doth
tend to the increase of atheism and destruction of ancient
truth ; — unless the importunity of T. H. or some other divert
me to look to my own defence. I desire thy Christian
prayers, that God, Who hath put this good desire into my
mind by His preventing grace, will help me by His assisting
grace to bring the same to good effect.
« [Id., Heautontim., IV., i. 29, 30.] Baxter, c. v, in vol. iii. p. 539 ; Disc.
^ [For the probable explanation of iii. Pt. ii : which was written in 1659,
the design here alluded to, see Bram- the year after the publication of the
hall's Vindication of himself against present tract. ]
THE PREFACE,
Hitherto I have made use only of a buckler to guard my- [Reason
self from Mr. Hobbes his assaults. What passed between thor's an"
him and me in private had been buried in perpetual silence, '^^^y'^l
if his flattering disciples (not without his own fault, whether it book.]
were connivance or neglect is not material to me) had not pub-
lished it to the world to my prejudice^. And now, having
carved out mine own satisfaction, I thought to have desisted
here, as not esteeming him to be a fit adversary, who denieth
all common principles, but rather to be like a pillar of smoke,
breaking out of the top of some narrow chimney, and spread-
ing itself abroad like a cloud, as if it threatened to take pos-
session of the whole region of the air, darkening the sky,
and seeming to pierce the heavens ; and after all this, when
it hath ofi*ended the eyes a little for the present, the first pufi"
of wind, or a few minutes, do altogether disperse it.
I never nourished within my breast the least thought of
answering his Leviathan ; as having seen a great part of it
answered before ever I read it^, and having moreover received
it from good hands that a Roman Catholic was about it^:
but being braved by the author in print, as giving me a title
for my answer — Behemoth against Leviathan — and
at other times being so solicitous for me, " what^^ I " would
say'^ to such a passage in my "answer to" his " Leviathan V
imagining his silly cavils to be irrefragable demonstrations ;
I will take the liberty (by his good leave) to throw on two or
[See above pp. 19, 251. notes e, r.] Good and Evil (which was an express
' [Viz. by] D. R, C. — [Of thenume- reply to Hobbes— see Mosheim's Pref.
rous opponents whom the publication to his edition of the Intell. System)
of the Leviathan called forth, these inl- being still in MS.]
tials suit none of the long list given in « [Viz.] P. I. S. [These initials also
the Vitse Hobbianae Auctarium (pp. are unintelligible to the Editor.]
193— 214. 8vo. 1681) except Dr. Ralph ^ Qu., [Animadv. upon the Hp's.
Cudworth ; and he is excluded by the Epist. to the Reader,] p. 20.
date of the present tract (1658), his In- ' Ibid., [Animadv. upon Numb.
tell. System not having been p\iblished xxxviii.] p. 340.
until 1678, and his Discourse of Moral
l1 2
516
THE PREFACE.
three spadefuls of earth towards the final interment of his
pernicious principles and other mushroom errors. And,
truly, when I ponder seriously the horrid consequences of
them, I do not wonder so much at his mistaken exception to
my civil form of valediction — "So God bless us," — miscalling it
"a bufiPoonly abusing of the Name of God to calumny^." He
conceived me amiss, — that because, in times less scrupulous
and more conscientious, men used to bless themselves after
this form at the naming of the de^dl, therefore I did intend
it as a prayer for the deliverance of all good Christians from 870
him and his blasphemous opinions.
I do believe there never was any author, sacred or profane,
ancient or modern. Christian, Jew, Mahometan, or Pagan,
that hath inveighed so frequently and so bitterly against all
" feigned phantasms," with their first devisers, maintainers,
and receivers, as T. H. hath done ; excluding out of the
nature of things the souls of men, angels, devils, and all
" incorporeal substances," as " fictions," " phantasms," and
groundless " contradictions \" Many men fear the meaning of
it is not good ; — that God Himself must be gone for company,
as being an " incorporeal substance," except men will vouch-
safe by God to understand nature. So much T. H. himself
seemeth to intimate ; — " This concourse of causes, whereof
every one is determined to be such as it is by a like con-
course of former causes, may well be called (in respect they
were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things,
God Almighty) the decree of God"^." If God^s eternal
decree be nothing else but "the concourse" of all natural
causes, then Almighty God is nothing else but nature. And
if there be no spirits or incorporeal substances. He must be
either nature or nothing. T. H. defieth the Schools ; and
therefore he knoweth no difi'erence between immanent and
emanant or transient actions, but confoundeth the eternal
decrees of God before all time with the execution of them in
time ; which had been a foul fault in a Schoolman.
Leviathan And yet his Leviathan, or "mortal God"," is a mere
a mere *^
phantasm.
^ Qu., [Animadv. upon the Bp's. ™ [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xi.
Epist. to the Reader,] p. 20. above p. 58.]— Qu., [T. H. Numb, xi.]
' [Leviath., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. pp. p. 80.
208, 214.— Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. " [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.]
XV. p. 160.— &c.]
THK PREFACE.
517
phantasm of his own devising ; neither flesh nor fish, but a
confusion of a man and a whale, engendered in his own
brain ; not unlike Dagon the idol of the Philistines, a mixture
of a God and a man and a fish. The true literal Leviathan
is the whale-fish ; — " Canst thou draw out Leviathan with a job xii. i.
hook — whom " God hath made to take his pastime in the Ps. civ. 26.
great and wide sea." And for a metaphorical Leviathan, I T, H. the
know none so proper to personate that huge body as T. H. than.^^^'^'
himself. The Leviathan doth not " take his pastime" in the
deep with so much freedom, nor behave himself with so much
height and insolence, as T. H. doth in the Schools ; nor
domineer over the lesser fishes with so much scorn and con-
tempt, as he doth over all other authors ; censuring, brand-
ing, contemning, proscribing, whatsoever is contrary to his
humour ; bustling, and bearing down before him whatsoever
Cometh in his way ; creating truth and falsehood by the
breath of his mouth, by his sole authority without other rea-
son, a second Pythagoras at least. There have been self-
conceited persons in all ages, but none that could ever job xii. 34.
"king" it like him "over all the children of prided" Ruit, i?Pth?'"^
agit, rapit, tundit, et prosternif^" Leviathan.]
Yet is not his Leviathan such an absolute sovereign of the Leviathan
sea as he imagineth. " God hath chosen the weak things of ""ign^of
this world to confound the mighty." The Httle mouse 5' 00^1.
steal eth up through the elephant's trunk to eat his brains, 27.
making him die desperately mad. The Indian rat creepeth
into the belly of the gaping crocodile, and gnaweth his bowels
asunder. The great Leviathan hath his adversaries; the sword-
fish, which pierceth his belly beneath, and the thrasher-fish,
which beateth his head above : and whensoever these two
unite their forces together against him, they destroy him.
But this is the least part of his Leviathan's suff'erings. Our
Greenland fishers have found out a new art to draw him out of
his castle, that is, the deep, though not with a fish-hook, yet
with their harping irons ; and by giving him line and space
enough to bounce and tumble up and down, and tire himself
right out, and try all his arts, as spouting up a sea of water
" [Applied by Hobbes to his own Caeteros ruerein, ao-crcm, raperem,
" Leviathan," Leviath., Pt. II. c. tundereni, ot prosternereni." Tcrent.,
xxviii. pp. 166, 167.] Adelph., III. ii. 20, 21.]
[" Post haec prajcij)item darein ;
518
THE PREFACE.
out of his mouth, to drown them, and striking at their
shallops with his tail to overwhelm them, at last to draw this
formidable creature to the shore, or to their ship, and slice
him in pieces, and boil him in a cauldron, and tun him up
in oil.
I have provided three good harping-irons for myself to dart
at this monster, and am resolved to try my skill and fortune,
whether I can be as successful against this phantastic Levia-
than, as they are against the true Le\dathan.
[Division My first dart is aimed at his heart, or theological part of
mentf^^"' discourse; to shew that his principles are not consistent
either with Christianity or any other religion.
The second dart is aimed at the chine, whereby this vast
body is united and fitted for animal motion, that is, the
political part of his discourse ; to shew that his principles are
pernicious to all forms of government, and all societies, and
destroy all relations between man and man.
The third dart is aimed at his head, or rational part of his
discourse ; to shew that his principles are inconsistent with
themselves, and contradict one another.
Let him take heed. If these three darts do pierce his
Le\dathan home, it is not all the dittany which groweth in
Crete that can make them drop easily out of his body, with-
out the utter overthrow of his cause.
" hserebit lateri lethalis arundo',"
1 [Virg.,^n.,xii.411— 419.— Plin., Hist. Nat., viii. 27. xxv. 8.]
' [Virg., JEn., iv. 73.]
DISCOURSE III.
THE CATCHING OF LEVIATHAN
OR
THE GREAT WHALE.
[first printed at LONDON, A.D. 1G58.]
CHAP. I.
THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY
AND ALL RELIGION.
The Image of God is not altogether defaced by the fall of Nature die-
man, but that there will remain some practical notions of existence
God and goodness; which, when the mind is free from gJ^^^^^^J^'
vagrant desires and violent passions, do shine as clearly in God.
the heart, as other speculative notions do in the head. Hence
it is, that there never was any nation so barbarous or savage
throughout the whole world, which had not their God. They
who did never wear clothes upon their backs, who did never
know magistrate but their father, yet have their God, and
their religious rites and devotions to Him. Hence it is, that
the greatest atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly
cast their eyes up to Heaven, as craving aid from thence, and
in a thunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And
they who are conscious to themselves of any secret crimes,
though they be secure enough from the justice of men, do yet
feel the bhnd blows ^ of a guilty conscience, and fear Divine
vengeance. This is acknowledged by T. H. himself in his
lucid intervals : — " That we may know what worship of God
natural reason doth assign, let us begin with His attributes ;
where it is manifest, in the first place, that existency is to be
attributed to Him^.^' To which he addeth, " infiniteness — in-
^ [" Quos din conscia facti Mens " Ut sciamus autcm (lucin cultuni Di-i
habet attonitos et surdo verhcre caedit." assignet ratio naturalis, iiuipianius ah
Juv., Sat., xiii. 193, 194.] attrihutis ; ubi imprimis niaiiifcstiiiu
De Give, c. xv. § 1 1. [p. 182. — attribuendam Ei esse cxistcntiani."]
520
THE CATCHING
^ni ^ comprehensibility — unity — ubiquity*^/' Thus for attributes,
next for actions : — Concerning external actions, wherewith
God is. to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason
is, that they be signs of honour ; under which are contained
T. H. no prayers — thanksgivings — oblations and sacrifices^." Yet, to
reHgion? let US SCO how inconsistent and irreconcileable he is with him-
self, elsewhere, reckoning up all the laws of nature at large,
even twenty in number % he hath not one word that con-
cerneth religion, or that hath the least relation in the world
to God. As if a man were like the colt of a wild ass in the
wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus, in de-
scribing the laws of nature, this great clerk forgetteth the
God of nature, and the main and principal laws of nature,
which contain a man's duty to his God and the principal end
of his creation. Perhaps he will say, that he handleth the
laws of nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitu-
tion or settlement of a commonwealth. In good time ; let it
be so. He hath devised us a trim commonwealth ; which is
neither founded upon religion towards God, nor justice
towards man, but merely upon self-interest and self-preserva-
tion. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds of
religion, which God Himself hath imprinted in the heart of
man, are more efficacious towards the preservation of a
society, whether we regard the nature of the thing or the
blessing of God, than all his " pacts V and " surrenders
and "translations of power^." He who unteacheth men
[Epb- yi-6. their duty to God, may make them * eye-servants,' so long
22.] ' ' as their interest doth oblige them to obey, but is no fit master
to teach men conscience and fidelity.
Without religion, societies are but like soapy bubbles,
quickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as
T. H. himself (though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to
it), that Rome owed more of its grandeur to religion than
either to strength or stratagems ; — " We have not exceeded
the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the
" [De Give, c. xv. § 14. pp. 183, 184.] e [Ibid., c. ii. § 3 : c. iii. § 1—25 :
[Ibid., p. 185.— "Circa actiones pp. 14, 24— 36.]
externas quibus Deus colendus est, . . ^ ["Pacta:" ibid., c. ii. § 9. p. 17;
generalissimum rationis praeceptuni est, and passim.]
utsint signa animi honorantis; sub quo e [" Donationes :" ibid., § 8. p. 16.]
continentur, primo, preces, . . . secundo, ^ [" Translationes juris:" ibid., § 4.
gratiarum actio, . . . tertio, dona, id est p. 14 ; and passim.]
oblationes et sacrificia."]
OF LE^'IATHAN.
521
Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art/^ &c., but Discourse
we have overcome all nations by our piety and religion'." —
Among his laws he inserteth " gratitude" to man, as the
third precept of the law of nature J but of the gratitude of
mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men
had sprung up from the earth in a night, like mushrooms or
excrescences, without all sense of honour, justice, conscience,
or gratitude, he could not have vilified the human nature
more than he doth.
From this shameful omission or pretention of the main
72 duty of mankind, a man might easily '^take the height^" of
T. H. his religion. But he himself putteth it past all con-
jectures. His principles are brimfull of prodigious impiety.
" In these four things, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second
causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual
for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion^ ;" the
"culture" and improvement whereof, he referreth only to
"policy," — "human" and "Divine politics^" are but politics.
And again, — "Mankind hath this from the conscience of their
own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the
most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the
Maker of all \dsible things And a little after he telleth us,
that " superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason,
and atheism from an opinion of reason without fear";" making
atheism to be more reasonable than superstition. What is
now become of that " Divine worship" which " natural reason
did assign unto God," the " honour" of " existence — infinite-
ness — incomprehensibility — unity — ubiquity ° ?" What is
now become of that dictate or " precept of reason," concerning
" prayers, thanksgivings, oblations, sacrifices ?" if uncertain
" opinions, ignorance, fear," mistakes, the " conscience" of
our " own weakness," and " the admiration of natural events,"
be the only "seeds of religion^."
i Cic, De Haiusp. Respons., Orat. cilitatis propriae conscientia et aduiira-
in P. Clod., [c. ix.] tione eventuum naturalium, iit pleri-
j De Give, c. iii. § 8. [pp. 28, 29.] que credant esse omnium rerum visi-
^ [Qu.,Animadv. upon Numb, xxxiv. bilium Opificem invisibilem Deum."]
pp. 323, 324. — "By this argument a " [Ibid. — " Haec enim" (supersti-
man may easily take the height of the tio) " a metu sine recta rationo, ille"
Bishop's logic."] (athcisnius) " a rationis opinione sine
1 Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xii.] p. 54. metu proficiscitur."]
J)e Cive, c. xvi. § I. [p. H)4. — ° [See above notes b, c, d.]
Habet hoc hunianum genus ab imbe-
522
THE CATCHING
Part He proccedeth further ; — that atheism itself, though it be
— : — - — an erroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be
atheism, numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorancei'."
He addeth, that " an atheist is punished, not as a subject is
punished by his king, because he did not observe laws, but as
an enemy by an enemy, because he would not accept laws^/'
His reason is, because the atheist never submitted his will
to the will of God, Whom he never thought to be^. And he
concludeth, that man^s obligation to obey God proceedeth
from his weakness ; — " Manifestum est obligationem ad pre-
standum ipsV^ (Deo) obedientiam incumber e hominibus propter
hnbecilitatem^.'' First, it is impossible that should be a sin
of mere ignorance^' or " imprudence," which is directly con-
trary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need
no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in
the heart of man. " The law of nature was written in our
hearts by the finger of God, without our assent*;" or rather,
'^the law of nature is the assent itself ^.^^ Then if nature
dictate to us, that there is a God, and that this God is to be
worshipped in such and such manner, it is not possible that
atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.^^ Secondly, a
rebellious subject is still a subject dejure, though not de facto,
by right though not by deed ; and so the most cursed atheist
that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought to
be punished, not as a just "enemy,^^ but as a disloyal traitor :
which is confessed by himself ; — " This fourth sin" (that is,
of those who " do not by word and deed confess one God the
Supreme King of Kings") " in the natural Kingdom of God is
the crime of high treason, for it is a denial of Divine power,
or atheism^." Then an atheist is a traitor to God, and
V De Give, c. xiv. § 19. [pp. 168, 169.
— " Dicet" (atheus), . . " ' quamquam
opinio sua erronea esset, ideoque etiam
peccatum, numerandum tamen esse
inter peccata imprudentiae sive igno-
rantiae.' . . Oratio haec eo usque admit-
tenda esse videtur."]
1 [Ibid., p. 169. — " Punitur enim
atheus, . . non ut suhditus punitur a
rege, propterea quod leges non obser-
vaverit ; sed ut hostis ab lioste, quod
leges noluerit acciperc."]
De Civc, [c. xiv. § 19. p. 168.—
" Si quidem peccatum non sit quod
non sit contra aliquam legem, neque
lex uUa sit quae non sit mandatum ejus
qui summum habet imperium, neque
quisquam svxmmum imperium habeat
quod non sit ei nostra consensu delatum^
quomodo peccare dicetur is, qui vel non
existere Deum vel non gubernare mun-
dum affirm averit." &c.]
« [Ibid.,] c. XV. § 7. [p. 178.]
' Qx\., [Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.
p. 136.]
u [Ibid.,] p. 137.
V De Give, c. xv. § 19. [pp. 192,
193. — " Quarto" (peccare subditos),
OF LEVIATHAN.
523
punishable as a disloyal subject, not as an " enemy Lastly, it Discourse
is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedi
ence to God to depend upon our weakness, — because we can-
not help it ; and not upon our gratitude, — because we owe
our being and preservation to Him. " Who planteth a vine- i Cor. ix. 7.
yard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a
flock and eateth not of the milk of the flock 7'^ And again, —
"Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and Rev. iv. 11.
power, for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure
they are, and were created." But it were much better (or at
least not so ill) to be a downright atheist, than to make God
to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust Him into
the deviFs office, to be the cause of all sin.
For T. H. his God is not the God of Christians, nor of any Destroys
rational men. Our God is everywhere ; and seeing He hath quity,
no parts. He must be wholly here, and wholly there, and
wholly everywhere. So nature itself dictateth. " It cannot
be said honourably of God, that He is in a place, for nothing
is in a place but that which hath proper bounds of its great-
ness"^." But T. H. his God is not wholly everywhere. "No
man can conceive, . . that any thing is all in this place and all
in another place at the same time; . . for none of these things
ever have or can be incident to sense ^'.^^ So far well, if by
"conceiving" he mean comprehending; but then follows,
that these " are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without
any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and de-
ceived or deceiving Schoolmen^." Thus he denieth the
3 ubiquity of God. A circumscriptive, a definitive, and a
repletive being in a place, is some heathen language to him.
Our God is immutable, " without any shadow of turning iiis eter-
by change;" to Whom all things are present, nothing past, .^.^
nothing to come. But T. H. his God is measured by time,
losing something that is past, and acquiring something that
doth come, every minute. That is as much as to say, that
" si uon confiteantur coram hominibus tic Divinae potestatis, sive atlieismus."]
verbis et factis, imum esse Deum Opti- * De Cive, c. xv, § 14. [pp. 183,
muni, Maximmn, Beatissimiim, totius 184. — " Neque dici de Deo honorilice,
mundi mmidanorumque regum Re- , . quod in loco aliquo sit ; in loco cnim
gem supremum ; hoc est, si Deum non est nisi quod undc([uaque fines et
nou colunt. Quavtum hoc peccatum terminos habeat magnitudinis."]
in Regno Dei naturali . . Issa? Divinae >" Leviath., [Pt. I. c. iii.] p. 11.
majestatis crimen est: est enim nega- [Ibid.]
524
THE CATCHING
Part OUT God is infinite^ and his God is finite ; for unto that which
— ill: — is actually infinite, nothing can be added, neither time nor
parts. Hear himself; — ^'Nor do I understand, what deroga-
tion it can be to the DiAdne perfection, to attribute to it
potentiality, that is, in English, power^^ (so little doth he
understand what potentiality is), ^^and successive duration^."
And he chargeth it upon us as a fault ; that " will not have
eternity to be an endless succession of time^/^ How ?
" Successive duration," and " an endless succession of time,"
in God ? Then God is finite. Then God is elder to-day than
He was yesterday. Away with blasphemies. Before, he
destroyed the ubiquity of God; and now he destroy eth His
eternity.
Hissimpii- Our God is a perfect, pure, simple, indivisible, infinite
essence ; free from all composition of matter and form, of
substance and accidents. All matter is finite ; and He, Who
acteth by his infinite essence, needeth neither organs, nor
faculties, nor accidents, to render Him more complete. But
T. H. his God is a divisible God, a compounded God, that
hath matter, and qualities, or accidents. Hear himself. I
argue thus : — " The Divine substance is indivisible, but
eternity is the Divine substance; the major is evident,
because God is ^ actus simplicissimus f . . the minor . . is con-
fessed by all men, — that ' whatsoever is attributed to God, is
God^.^" Now listen to his answer : — "The major is so far from
being evident, that 'actus simjjlicissimus^ signifieth nothing;
the minor is said by some men, thought by no man ; whatso-
ever is thought, is understood'^." The major was this, —
"'The Divine substance is indivisible." Is this "far from
being evident ?" Either it is indivisible or divisible. If it be
not indivisible, then it is divisible ; then it is materiate, then it
is corporeal, then it hath parts, then it is finite, by his own
confession ; — " Habere partes aut esse toturn aliquid sunt attri-
buta finitorwn^P Upon this silly conceit he chargeth me for
saying, that "God is not just but justice itself, not eternal
but eternity itself ;" which he calleth " unseemly words to be
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. 158,159; Disc. i. Pt. iii.J
xxiv. p. 2GG.] d Qu., [Animadv, upon Numb.
" Lcviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 371-. xxiv.] p. 2()7.
*^ [Defence, Numb, xxiv, above pp. ^ Dc Cive, c. xv. § 14. [p. 181.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
525
said of GorF." And he tliinketh lie doth me a great courtesy, Discourse
in not adding ''blasphemous and atheistical^." But his bolts — — —
are so soon shot, and his reasons are such vain imaginations
and such drowsy phantasies, that no sad man doth much
regard them. Thus he hath already destroyed the ubiquity,
the eternity, and the simplicity, of God. I wish he had con-
sidered better with himself, before he had desperately cast
himself upon these rocks.
But " pauIo majora canamus^\" My next charge is, that His exist-
he destroys the very being of God, and leaves nothing in His
place but an empty name. For by taking away all incor-
poreal substances he taketh away God Himself. The veiy
name (saith he) of an "incorporeal substance'^ is a "contra'dic-
tion and " to say that an Angel or Spirit is an incorporeal
substance, is to say in effect, that there is no Angel or Spirit
at all\" By the same reason, to say that God is an incor-
poreal substance, is to say there is no God at all. Either
God is incorporeal, or He is finite, and consists of parts, and
consequently is no God. This — that there is no incorporeal
spirit — is that main root of atheism, from which so many
lesser branches are daily sprouting up. When they have
taken away all incorporeal spirits, what do they leave God
Himself to be? He, Who is the fountain of all being, from
Whom and in Whom all creatures have their being, must
needs have a real being of His own. And what real being
can God have among bodies and accidents ? For they have
left nothing else in the universe. Then T. H. may move the
same question of God, which he did of devils: — ''I would
gladly know in what classis of entities the Bishop ranketh-""
God? Infinite being and participated being are not of the
same nature. Yet, to speak according to human apprehen-
sion— (apprehension and comprehension differ much, — T. H.
confesseth, that "natural reason" doth dictate to us, that God
is " infinite," yet natural reason cannot comprehend the infi-
niteness of God), — I place Him among incorporeal substances
or spirits, because He hath been pleased to place Himself in
* Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb. [ — " incorporeal in that sense," viz. as
xxiv.] p. 266. meaning " not body."]
^ [Ibid.] j Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xv.]
h [Virg., Bucol., iv. 1.] p. 160.
' Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 214.
526
THE CATCHING
Part
III.
John iv. 24.
[T. H.'s
opinions
concern-
ing] the
Trinity.
that rank. " God is a Spirit." Of which place T. H. giveth
his opinion, that it is unintelligible, and all others of the
same nature, " and fall not under human understanding^."
They who deny all incorporeal substances, can understand 874
nothing by God, but either nature (not " naturam natu-
rantem'^ that is, a real author of nature, but "natu-
ram naturatam^f' that is, the orderly concourse of natural
causes), as T. H. seemeth to intimate, or a fiction of the brain
without real being, cherished for advantage and politic ends,
as a profitable error, howsoever dignified with the glorious
title of " the eternal causes of all things"^."
We have seen what his principles are concerning the
Deity ; they are full as bad or worse concerning the Trinity.
Hear himself : — " A person is he that is represented, as often
as he is represented ; and therefore God, Who has been
represented (that is, personated) thrice, may properly enough
be said to be three Persons, though neither the word Person
nor Trinity be ascribed to Him in the Bible — and a little
after ; — " To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as
can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance
this, — that the God Who is always one and the same, was the
Person represented by Moses, the Person represented by His
Son incarnate, and the Person represented by the Apostles ;
as represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they
spake is God ; as represented hj His Son, that was God and
Man, the Son is that God ; as represented by Moses and the
High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our
Lord J esus Christ, is that God : from whence we may gather
the reason, why those names. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,
in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old
Testament; for they are Persons, that is, they have their names
from representing, which could not be till divers men had re-
presented God's person in ruling or in directing under Him°."
Who is so bold as blind Bayard? The emblem of a little
boy attempting to lade all the water out of the sea with a
^ Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p.
208.
' [A short explanation of these terms
may be found in Coleridge's Aids to
Reflection, p. 185. note. 4tli edit. ; and
a discussion of the subject, in Cud-
worth's Dissert, de Natura Genitrice,
in his Intell. System (vol. i. pp. 147
sq, ed. Mosh.), with Mosheini's notes
upon it.]
[See above p. 51G. note m.]
» Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 268.
° [Ibid. pp. 268, 269.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
527
cockleshell, doth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped Discourse
for him ; who thinketh to measure the profound and inscru —
table mysteries of religion by his own silly, shallow conceits.
AVhat is now become of the great adorable mystery of the
Blessed Undivided Trinity ? It is shrunk into nothing. Upon
his grounds there was no Trinity; and we must blot these
words out of our Creed, "The Father eternal, the Son eternal,
the Holy Ghost eternal P;" and these other words out of our
Bibles, "Let us make man after Oui* image;" unless we [Gen.i.26.]
mean, that this was a consultation of God with Moses and
the xlpostles. What is now become of the Eternal Genera-
tion of the Son of God, if this Sonship did not begin until
about four thousand years after the creation were expu'ed ?
Upon these grounds, every king hath as many "'persons" as
there be justices of peace and petty constables in his king-
dom. Ujion this account, God Almighty hath as many
" Persons" as there have been sovereign princes in the world
since Adam. According to this reckoning, each one of us^
like so many Geryons, may have as many " persons" as we
please to make procurations. Such bold presumption re-
quireth another manner of confutation.
Concerning God the Sou, forgetting what he had said else- [Concern-
where, where he calleth Him "God and Man^i," and, "The Son jUf f^n.]
of God incarnate r," he doubteth not to say, that the word
"h^-postatical" is " canting ^" As if the same Person could be
both "God and Man," without a personal, that is, a " hypo-
statical" union of the two natures of God and man. He
alloweth every man, who is "commanded" by his "lawful"
sovereign, to deny Christ " with his tongue" before men^
He deposeth Christ fi'om His true kingly office, making His
"kingdom not to commence or begin before the Day of
Judgment''." And, "The regiment, wherewith Christ govern-
eth His faithful in this life, is not properly a kingdom, but a
pastoral office, or a right to teach^." And a httle after, "Christ
^ [Athanasian Creed.] non ante initium suniit quam ab ad-
^ Le^•iath., [Pt. III. c. xlii, p. 269.] ventu Ejus secundo, nimirmn a Die
[Ibid.] Judicii."]
» [Ibid., Pt. I. c. v.] p. 21. ' [Ibid.,] § 6. [p. 222.—" Regimen
* Ibid., rPt. III. c. xlii.] p. 271. quo fideles Sues in liac ^^ta Christus
^ De Cfve, c. xvii. § o. [p. 219. — regit, non est proprie regnuui, sive im-
" Regnum autem Dei cujus restituendi perium, sed muuus pastoritiuni sive
causa Christus a Deo Patre missus est. jus docendi."]
528
THE CATCHING
Part had not kingly authority committed to Him by His Father
III.
in this world, but only consiliary and doctrinal
[Of His He taketh away His Priestly or propitiatory office : — "And
office.] although this act of our redemption be not always in Scrip-
ture called a sacrifice and oblation, but sometimes a price, yet
by price we are not to understand any thing, by the value
whereof He could claim right to a pardon for us from His
offended Father, but that price which God the Father was
pleased in mercy to demand^ — and again, — "Not that the
death of one Man, though without sin, can satisfy for the
offences of all men in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy
of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin as He was pleased
in mercy to accept ^.^^ He knoweth no difference between
one who is mere man, and one who was both God and Man,
between a Le\itical sacrifice and the all-sufficient Sacrifice of
the Cross, between the blood of a calf, and the precious
Blood of the Son of God.
[Of His And touching the Prophetical Office of Christ, I do much 875
cai° office.] doubt whether he do believe in earnest, that there is any
such thing as prophecy in the world. He maketh very little
difference between " a prophet" and " a madman^^ and " a
demoniac^;" and " if there were nothing else'^ (saith he) " that
bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such in-
spiration to themselves, is argument enough '^.^ He maketh
the "pretence of inspiration" in any man to be, and always to
have been, " an opinion pernicious to peace," and tending to
"the dissolution of all civil government^." He subjectetli all
Prophetical revelations from God to the sole pleasui-e and
censure of the sovereign prince, either to authorize them or
to exauctorate them : so as, two prophets prophesying the
same thing at the same time in the dominions of two different
princes, the one shall be a true prophet, the other a false ;
and Christ, Who had the approbation of no sovereign prince,
upon his grounds, was to be reputed a false prophet eveiy
where. — " Every man therefore ought to consider who is the
r [Ibid., p. 223.—" Non ergo habuit 248.
Christus a Patre Sibi commissam au- * Ibid., [c. xli.] p. 261.
thoritatem Regiam aut imperatoriam Ibid., [Pt. I. c. viii. pp. S7 — 39.]
in mundo, sed consiliariam et doctri- c [Ibid.,] p. 36.
nalem tantum."] Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
^ Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] p.
OF LEVIATHAN.
629
sovereign prophet, that is to say, who it is that is God's vice- Discourse
gereiit upon earth, and hath next under God the authority of '- —
governing Christian men; and to observe for a rule that
doctrine which in the name of God he hath commanded to
be taught ; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of
those doctrines, which pretended prophets, wdth miracle or
without, shall at any time advance,^' &c. ; and if he disavow
them, then no more to obey tlieir voice ; or if he approve
them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a
part of the spirit of their sovereign^/' Upon his principles,
the case holdeth as well among Jews and Turks and heathens
as Christians. Then he that teacheth Transubstantiation in
France, is a true prophet ; he that teacheth it in England, a
false prophet. He that blasphemeth Christ in Constantinople,
a true prophet; he that doth the same in Italy, a false prophet.
Then Samuel was a false prophet, to contest with Saul a i sam. xv.
"sovereign prophet." So was the man of God, who submitted iKingsxiii.
not to the more Di\dne and prophetic spirit of Jeroboam.
And Elijah, for reproving Ahab. Then Micaiah had but his i Kings
deserts, to be clapt up in prison, and " fed with bread of ^ chvow
affliction, and water of affliction,^' for daring to contradict ^^"i-
''God's vicegerent upon earth." And Jeremiah was justly Jer.xxxviii.
thrown into a dungeon for prophesjdng against Zedekiah his
liege lord. If his principles were true, it were strange in-
deed, that none of all these princes, nor any other that ever
was in the world, should understand then- ow n privileges ;
and yet more strange, that God Almighty should take the
part of such rebellious prophets, and justify their prophecies
by the event, if it were true, that "none but the sovereign in a
Christian" (the reason is the same for Jewish) " commonwealth
can take notice what is or what is not the word of God^^'
Neither doth he use God the Holy Ghost more favourably rconoern-
than God the Son. Where St. Peter saith, "Holy men of
God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,'^ he saith. Ghost.]
" By the Spirit is meant the voice of God in a dream ortf.]'^^'*'
vision supernatural ^;'' which dreams or visions he makcth to
be no more than "imaginations, which they had in their
sleep or in an extacy, which in every true prophet were super-
« Leviath., [Ft. III. c. xxxvi.] p. f Leviath., [I't. III. c. xl.] p. 2.>().
232. P Ibid., [Pt. III. C-. xxxiv.J p. 21 1.
BRAMHALL. ]VI ni
530
THE CATCHING
Part natural^ but in false prophets were either natural or feigned^,"
'■ — and more likely to be false than true. " To say, God hath
spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say, he dreamed
that God spake to him," &c. ; " to say he hath seen a \4sion
or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between
sleeping and waking'." So St. Peter^s " Holy Ghost" is
come to be their own ^' imaginations," which might be either
feigned, or mistaken, or true. As if the Holy Ghost did
enter only at their eyes and at their ears, not into their
understandings, nor into their minds; or as if the Holy
Ghost did not seal unto their hearts the truth and assurance
of their prophecies. Whether a new light be infused into
their understandings, or new graces be inspired into their
heart, they are wrought, or caused, or created, immediately
by the Holy Ghost ; and so are his " imaginations," if they
be supernatural.
But he must needs fall into these absurdities, who maketh
but a jest of inspiration. — They " who pretend Divine inspi-
ration to be a supernatural entering of the Holy Ghost into
a man, . . are" (as he "thinks") "in a very dangerous dilemma ;
for if they worship not the men whom they conceive to be
inspired, they fall into impiety ; . . and if they worship them,
they commit idolatry^ :" so mistaking the Holy Ghost to be
corporeal, something that is "blown into" a man, and the graces
of the Holy Ghost to be corporeal graces. "And the words im-
poured" (or infused) "virtue, and inblown" (or inspired) "vir-
tue, are as absurd and insignificant as 'a. round quadrangle '^.^^
He reckons it as a common error, that faith and sanctity
are not attained by study and reason, but by supernatural
inspiration or infusion;" and layeth this for a firm ground; — 876
"Faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent, but yet
they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, dis-
cipline, correction, and other natural ways^" I would see
the greatest Pelagian of them all fly higher.
Why should he trouble himself about the Holy Spirit ? who
acknowledgeth no spirit but "either a subtle fluid invisible
body, or a ghost or other idol or phantasm of imagination"^ ;"
Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxvi.] p. 227.
Leviath., [Pt. I. c. iv.] p. 17.
1 Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
[Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 208.]
i Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxii.] p. 196.
j Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xlv.] p. 361.
OF LEVIATHAN.
531
who knoweth no inward grace or intrinsecal holiness. Holy Discourse
is a word, which in God's kingdom auswereth to that, which —
men in their kingdoms use to call 'public/ or 'the king's';'^ and
again, — "Wlieresoe^ er the word 'holy' is taken properly, there
is still something signified of propriety gotten by consent
His 'holiness' is a relation, not a quality; but for inward
sanctification, or real infused holiness, in respect w^hereof the
Third Person is called the Holy Ghost, because He is not
only Holy in Himself, but also maketh us holy, he is so
great a stranger to it, that he doth' altogether deny it and
disclaim it.
We are taught in our Creed to believe the CathoKc or [Conoem-
universal Church. But T. H. teacheth us the contrary : — hJiv ca-
that " if there be more Christian Churches than one, all of {S^ircji ]
them together are not one Church personally and more
plainly, — " Now if the whole number of Christians be not
contained in one commonwealth, they are not one person,
nor is there an universal Church, that hath any authority
over themP and again, — " The universal Church is not one
person, of which it can be said, that it hath done, or decreed,
or ordained, or excommunicated, or absolved*^.'' This doth
quite overthrow all the authority of General Councils.
All other men distinguish between the Church and the [T. H.
commonwealth ; only T. H. maketh them to be one and the church
same thing : — " The commonwealth of Christian men and the n"onS^?i'th
Church of the same are altogether the same thinar, called bv ^^e same
*~ " thiii'^.J
two names, for two reasons ; for the matter of the Church and
of the commonweiilth is the same, namely the same Christian
men ; and the form is the same, which consisteth in the law-
ful power of convocating them"":" — and hence he concludeth,
that " every Christian commonwealth is a Church endowed
with all spiritual authority^/' and yet more fully, — " The
" Leviath., [Pt. III. c. XXXV.] p. 220. r Ibid, c. xvii. § 21. [p. 239.—" Ci-
° De Give, c. xvii. § 22. [p. 240. vitatem Christianorum hominum, et
— " Si plures sint ci\-itates Christianae, Ecclesiam eorundem, prorsus eandeni
eas simul omnes Ecclesiam' personaliter rem esse, duobus nominibus propter
unam uon esse."] duas causas appellatam; nam materia
P Leviath., [Pt. III. c.xxxiii.] p. 206. civitatis et EcclesifE eadem est, iiimi-
■1 De Give, c. xvii. § 26. [p. 251. — rum iidem homines Ghristiani ; lornia
" Ecclesia universalis non est mia per- aiitem, quae consistit in legitima potes-
sona, de qua possit dici quod fecerit, tate eos convocandi, eadem quoque
decreverit.statuerit.excommunicaverit, est."]
absolvent, et similia j ersonalia."] * Ibid., c. xviii. § 1. [[). 25S — " Gi-
M m
9
532
THE CATCHING
Part Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with the com-
— monwealth of Christians ; called a commonwealth, because it
consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign ; and a
Church, because it consisteth in Christian men united in one
Christian sovereign*/^ Upon which account there was no
Christian Church in these parts of the world for some hundreds
of years after Christ, because there was no Christian sovereign.
[His opi- Neither is he more orthodox concerning the Holy Scrip-
cerning the tures. — " Hitherto^^ (that is, for the books of Moses) "the
tures.]^"^ power of making the Scripture canonical was in the civil
sovereign The like he saith of the Old Testament, made
"canonical" by Esdras"^. And of the New Testament, — that
"it was not the Apostles which made their own writings ca-
nonical, but every convert made them so to himself^;" yet
with this restriction, that until " the sovereign ruler" had
"prescribed" them, "they were but counsel and advice, which,
whether good or bad, he that was counselled might without
injustice refuse to observe, and being contrary to the laws
established, could not without injustice observe^" — (He mak-
eth the primitive Christians to have been in a pretty condi-
tion. Certainly the Gospel was " contrary to the laws" then
"established.") — But most plainly, — " The word of the inter-
preter of the Scripture is the Word of God ;" and " the same
is the interpreter of the Scripture and the sovereign judge of
all doctrines," that is, the sovereign magistrate, "to whose
authority we must stand no less than to theirs, who at first
did commend the Scripture to us for the canon of faith
Thus, if Christian sovereigns of different communions do
clash one with another in their interpretations (or misinter-
pretation) of Scripture (as they do daily), then the Word of
God is contradictory to itself ; or that is the Word of God in
one commonwealth, which is the word of the devil in another
commonwealth ; and the same thing may be true and not
vitatem omnem Ghristianam esse Ec- " Verum est, verbum interpretis Scrip-
clesiam hujusmodi" (scil. spirituali) tiirarumesse Verbum Dei."] — §18. [p.
" authoritate praeditam."] 237 " Interpres canonicus, . . cujus
t Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] pp. . . authoritate standum non minus sit,
205, [206.] quam eorum qui Scripturam ipsam pro
u Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii,] p. 283. canone Fidei primi nobis commenda-
^ [Ibid.,] p. 284. verunt ; idemque sit interpres Scrip-
y Ibid. turae et doctrinarum omnium judex
[Ibid.,] pp. 284, [285.] supremus."]
^ De Give, c. xvii. [§ 17. p. 235.—
OF LEVIATHAN.
533
true at the same time; which is the peculiar privilege of Discourse
T. H., — to make contradictories to be true together. — ^ —
All the power, virtue, use, and efficacy, which he ascribeth [Concem-
to the Holy Sacraments, is to be " signs or commemorations^." cacy of the
As for any sealing, or confirming, or conferring, of grace, he JJaments.]
acknowledgeth nothing. The same he saith particularly of
Baptism'^. Upon which grounds a CardinaFs red hat, or a
sergeant-at-arms his mace, may be called Sacraments as well
as Baptism or the Holy Eucharist, if they be only " signs or
commemorations^* of a benefit. If he except, that Baptism
and the Eucharist are of Divine institution, but a Cardinals
77 red hat or a sergeant-at-arms his mace are not ; he saith
truly, but nothing to his advantage or purpose, seeing he
deriveth all the authority of the Word and Sacraments in
respect of subjects, and all our obligation to them, from the
authority of the sovereign magistrate, without which " these
words — ' Bepent and be baptized in the name of Jesus* — are" [Actsii.
but "counsel,** no "command'^." And so a sergeant-at-arms ^^'^
his mace, and Baptism, proceed both from the same autho-
rity. And this he saith upon this silly ground, that nothing
is a command, the performance whereof tendeth to our own
" benefit^.** He might as well deny the Ten Commandments 28.'^Deut.
to be commands, because they have an advantageous promise ^^.T^^^^^'
annexed to them : — " Do this and thou shalt live ;** and, confirmtth
" Cursed is every one that continueth not in all the words of worcis."&c.
this law to do them.** '^f- ''''
Sometimes he is for Holy Orders, and giveth to the pas- [Concem-
tors of the Church the right of ordination and absolution, Srders.'j
and iniallibility, too much for a particular pastor or the pas-
tors of one particular Church : — It is manifest, that the
consecration of the chiefest doctors in every Church, and im-
position of hands, doth pertain to the doctors*' of the same
Church^; and, " It cannot be doubted of, but the power of
binding and loosing was given by Christ to the future pas-
tors after the same manner as to His present Apostles^;**
" Leviath.,[Pt.III.c.xxxv.]p.221. ^ De Give, c. xvii. § 2i. [p. 2H.—
c De Give, c. xvii. § 7. [p. 2;JG.] " Gonstat, . . ecclesiasticorum oniniiun
d Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxv.] p. 133. oi Jinationem, sive consecrationem quae
^ [Ibid., p. 132. — viz. to the benefit fit per orationem et manuum imi)o-
oF tlie person commanded. The Ten sitionem, ad Apobtolos et doctores
( iMiimandments are aliirnied to be spectasse."]
commands," ibid., p. 133.] ^ [Ibid., § 8. p. 2M. — " De poles-
534
THE CATCHING
Part aiid^ " OuT Saviour hath promised this infallibility (in those
things which are necessary to salvation) to His Apostles until
the Day of Judgment, that is to say, to the Apostles, and
pastors to be consecrated by the Apostles successively by the
imposition of hands ^'/^
But at other times he casteth all this meal down with his
foot : — " Christian sovereigns . . are . . the supreme pastors,
and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from
God, except such as God speaketh to in these days supernatu-
rally \" What is now become of the promised " infallibility ?"
And, " It is from the civil sovereign, that all other pastors
derive their right of teaching, preaching, and all other func-
tions pertaining to that office ; and they are but his minis-
ters, in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, or
judges in courts of justice, and commanders of armies J
What is now become of their ordination? Magistrates,
judges, and generals, need no precedent qualifications. He
maketh ^^the pastoral authority of sovereigns" to be ''jure Di-
vino,^^ of all "other pastors^wre civili^." He addeth, — "Neither
is there any judge of heresy among subjects but their own civil
sovereign^^' Lastly, " The Church excommunicateth no man
but whom she excommunicateth by the authority of the
prince"*/^ and, "The effect of excommunication hath nothing
in it, neither of damage in this world nor terror," upon " an
apostate," if " the ci^^l power did persecute or not assist the
Church ; . . and in the world to come," leaves them " in no
worse estate than those who never believed; the damage
rather redoundeth to the Church":" neither "is the excom-
munication of a Christian subject, that obeyeth the laws
of his own sovereign, of any effect"." Where is now their
" power of binding and loosing ?"
tate solvendi et ligancli, id est, peccata tionem mammm consecrandis."]
remittendi et retineudi, dubium esse i Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 323.
non potest, qiiin ea data sit a Christo J Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 296. [ —
futuris tunc pastoribus eodem modo " o^//(?r functions," &c.]
quo prassentibus Apostolis: data autem [Ibid.]
est Apostolis oinnis potestas remittendi ^ [Ibid., p. 317.]
peccata quam Ipse habuit Christus."] De Give, c. xvii. § 26. [p. 250
^ Ibid., § 28. [p. 256. — " Infalli- " Xeminem igitur exconimunicat eccle-
bilitatem banc promisit Servator Nos- sia nisi quern excommunicat authori-
ter (in iis rebus quae ad salutem sunt tate Principis."]
necessariae) Apostolis usque ad Diem " Leviatb., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 227.
Jiidicii, id est, Apostolis, et pastoribus ° Ibid., p. 278.
nb Apostolis successive per imposi-
OF LEVIATHAN.
535
It may be some of T. H. his disciples desire to know, what Discourse
hopes of heavenly joys they have upon their master's princi- [-(-,^^1^^^^^^.^^"
pies. They may hear them without any great contentment, ing Hea-
— "There is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in reason/^
of "the coelum empyreum^,^' that is, the Heaven of the Blessed,
where the Saints shall live eternally with God. And again,
"I have not found any text" that can probably be "drawn" to
prove any ascension of the Saints into Heaven, that is to say,
into any ^'coelum eiJipyreum^" But he concludeth positively,
that salvation shall be "upon earth," when God shall reign at
the coming of Christ in Jerusalem^" ; and again, " In short,
the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom,^^ &c,, "called also
the Kingdom of Heaven,^^ and "the Kingdom of Glory^^'
All the Hobbians can hope for, is, to be restored to the same
condition which Adam was in before his fall. So saith T. H.
himself ; — " From whence may be inferred, that the dect,
after the resurrection, shall be restored to the estate wherein
Adam was before he had sinned As for "the beatifical
vision,^' he defineth it to be a word " uninteUigible''.^^
But considering his other principles, I do not marvel much [ Concern -
at his extravagance in this point. To what purpose should a ^"o^"^^^''-^
" coelum empyreu?n/' or Heaven of the Blessed, serve in his
judgment ? who maketh the blessed Angels, that are the in-
habitants of that happy mansion, to be either " idols" of the
" brain that is, in plain English, nothing, or thin, "subtle,
fluid bodies'^ :" destroying the angelical nature. "The uni-
verse being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no real part
thereof that is not also body^." And elsewhere : — " Every
part of the universe is body, and that which is not body, is
no part of the universe ; and because the universe is all, that
; which is no part of it, is nothing, and consequently no-
where^." How ? By this doctrine, he maketh not only the
Angels, but God Himself, to be " nothing." Neither doth he
salve it at all by supposing erroneously Angels to be corpo-
real spirits, and by attributing the name of "incorporeal"
Spirit to God, "as being a name of more honour; . . in Whom
P Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] t Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 345.
p. 210. " [Ibid., Pt. I. c. vi.] p. 30.
1 [Ibid.] ' [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 208.]
r [Ibid.,] p. 241. ^ Ibid., p. 207.
» [Ibid., Pt. in. c. XXXV. p. 21iJ.] y Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.J p. 371.
536
THE CATCHING
Pa^rt we consider not what attribute best expresseth His nature,
— which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our
desire to honour Him^/' Though we be not able to compre-
hend perfectly what God is, yet we are able to comprehend
perfectly what God is not : that is, He is not imperfect ; and
therefore He is not finite, and consequently He is not corpo-
real. This were a trim way to "honour" God indeed, to
honour Him wdth a lie. If this that he say here be true, —
that " every part of the universe is a body, and whatsoever is
not a bod}^, is nothing," — then, by this doctrine, if God be
not " a bod}^" God is " nothing not an incorporeal spirit,
but one of the "idols of the brain," a mere "nothing :" though
they think they dance under a net, and have the blind of
God^s incomprehensibility between them and discovery.
[Concern- To what purpose should a ccelum empyreum" serve in
rnortaHtySf judgment ? who dcnieth the immortality of the soul ;
the soul. J — u rpj^g doctrine is now, and hath been a long time, far
otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by
nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal^ :" — who " snppo-
seth," that " when a man dieth, there remaineth nothing of
him but his carcase^ :" — who maketh the w^ord "soul in Holy
Scripture" to "signify always either the life or the living crea-
ture ^j" and expoundeth the "casting of body and soul into
Hell-fire" to be the casting of "body and life" into Hell-fire^ :
— who maketh this orthodox truth — " that the souls of men
are substances distinct from their bodies," — to be an error con-
tracted " by the contagion of the demonology of the Greeks,"
and a "window that gives entrance to the dark doctrine of
eternal torments^ :"— who expoundeth these words of Solo-
Eccies. xii. mon — " Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was,
7.
and the spirit shall return unto God that gave it" — thus,
" God onl}^ knows what becomes of a man^s spirit, when he
expireth*"." He will not acknowledge, that there is a spirit,
or any substance distinct from the body^. I wonder what
they think doth keep their bodies from stinking.
[Concern- But they, that in one case are grieved, in another must be
["evils J relieved. If perchance T. H. hath given his disciples any
^ Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 371. ^ [Leviath., Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 340.
Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.J p. 339. e [Ibid.]
[Ibid.] f Ibid., p. 34 K
c [I bid. J » [Ibid., p. 340.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
537
discontent in his doctrine of Heaven, and the Holy Angels, Discourse
and the glorified souls of the Saints, he will make them — ^— —
amends in his doctrine of Hell, and the de^als, and the
damned spirits. First, of the devils. He fancieth, that all
those de\dls which our Saviour did cast out were frenzies,
and all demoniacs (or persons possessed) no other than
madmen^;" and to justify our Saviour's speaking to a
disease as to a person, produceth the example of " enchant-
ers'.^' But he declareth himself most clearly upon this sub-
ject in his Animadversions upon my reply to his defence of
fatal destiny : — " There are in the Scriptm^e two sorts of
things which are in English translated devils ; one is that
which is called ^ Satan,' ^ Diabolus,' ^Abaddon,' which signi- [Rev. ix.
fieth in English an enemy, an accuser, and a destroyer of the ^^'^
Church of God ; in which sense the devils are but wicked
men; the other sort of de^dls are called in the Scripture
* dcemonia/ which are the feigned gods of the heathen, and
are neither bodies nor spii'itual substances, but mere fancies
and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the Greeks and [i Cor. x.
other heathen people, which St. Paul calleth ^ nothings'^.'"
So T. H. hath killed the great infernal Devil and all his
black angels, and left no devils to be feared but devils incar-
nate, that is, wicked men.''
And for Hell, he describeth the kingdom of Satan, or ^^the [Concem-
kingdom of darkness," to be " a confederacy of deceivers ^^^'-3
He telleth us, that the places which set forth '^'^the torments
of Hell" in Holy Scripture, " do design metaphorically a grief
and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity
in others, which they themselves, through their own incredu-
lity and disobedience, have lost"\" As if ^metaphorical' de-
scriptions did not bear sad truths in them, as well as literal ;
as if final desperations were no more than a little fit of
" grief" or " discontent ;" and a guilty conscience were no
more than a transitory passion ; as if it were a loss so easily
to be borne, to be deprived for evermore of the beatifical
vision ; and, lastly, as if the damned, besides that unspeak-
" Leviiith., [Pt. I. c. viii.] p. 38. » Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 333.
> [Ibid., p.] 39. Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.J p.
^ Qu., [Animadv. vipon Numb, xv.] 21^.
p. IGO.
538
THE CATCHING
Part able losSj did not likewise suffer actual torments, proportion-
'- — able in some measure to their own sins and God's justice.
[Concern- Lastly, for the damned spirits, he declareth himself every
damne^d where, that their sufferings are not eternal : — " The fire shall 879
spirits.] be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting; but it can-
not be thence inferred, that he who shall be cast into that
fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure and
resist them, so as to be eternally burnt and tortured, and yet
never be destroyed nor die : and though there be many
places, that affirm everlasting fire, into which men may be
cast successively one after another for ever, yet I find none
that affirm, that there shall be an everlasting life therein of
any individual person ".^^ If he had said, and said only, that
the pains of the damned may be lessened as to the degree
of them, or that they endure not for ever, but that after they
are purged by long torments from their dross and corrup-
tions, as gold in the fire, both the damned spirits and the
devils themselves should be restored to a better condition, he
might have found some ancients (who are therefore called
the merciful doctors to have joined with him; though still
he should have wanted the suffrage of the Catholic Church.
[Concern- But his shooting is not at rovers, but altogether at random,
pxfnhh-"^^ without either precedent or partner. All that " eternal fire,"
ment.] those " torments," which he acknowledgeth, is but this,
— that after the resui'rection, . . the reprobate shall be in the
estate that Adam and his posterity were in after the sin com-
mitted, saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam . . and
not to themP:" adding, that they "shall live as they did"
formerly, " marry and give in marriage ; . . and consequently
engender children perpetually after the Resurrection, as they
did before^ ;" which he calleth " an immortality of the kind,
but not of the persons, of men""." It is to be presumed, that
in those their second lives, knowdng certainly from T. H. that
there is no hope of redemption for them from corporal
death upon their well-doing, nor fear of any torments after
death for their ill-doing, they will pass their times here as
" Leviath.,[Pt. Ill.c.xxxviii.] p.245.
" [See above in the Castigations,
Is'umb. XV. p. ;^54. note j ; Disc. ii. Pt.
iii.]
p Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 345.
1 Ibid., pp. 345, 346.
' [Ibid.,] p. 346.
OF LEVIATHAN. 539
pleasantly as they can. This is all the damnation which Discourse
T. H. fancieth. ' — ~ —
In sum, I leave it to the free judgment of the understand-
ing reader, by these few instances which follow, to judge
what the Hobbian principles are in point of religion. " Ex
ungiie leonem." —
First, that no man needs to put himself to any hazard for [i. T. H.
his faith, but may safely comply with the times : — " And for coSi-^
their faith, it is internal and invisible ; they have the licence he^e^y
that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger
for it^"
Secondly, he alloweth subjects, being commanded by their 2. [And
sovereign, to deny Christ. — " Profession with the tongue is deniaf of
but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture ^^'•'^-^
whereby we signify our obedience : and wherein a Christian,
holding firmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same
liberty which the Prophet EHslia allowed to Naaman,"*^ &c. ; [2 Kings v.
who, ^'^by bowing before the idol Eimmon, denied the true ^^'^
God as much in effect, as if he had done it with his lips*." —
(Alas ! why did St. Peter weep so bitterly for denying his [Matt.xxvi.
Master? out of fear of his life or members? It seemeth he x\\7i2.—
was not acquainted with these Hobbian principles.) — And in ^^"*
the same place he layeth down this general conclusion : —
^' This we may say, that whatsoever a subject . . is compelled
to in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his
own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action
is not his but his sovereign's ; nor is it he that in this case
denieth Christ before men, but his governor and the law
of his country"." His instance, in a Mahometan commanded
by a Christian prince to be present at Divine service'', is
a weak mistake, springing from his gross ignorance in case-
divinity, not knowing to distinguish between an eiToneous
conscience, as the Mahometan's is, and a conscience rightly
informed.
Thu'dly, if this be not enough, he giveth licence to a Chris- 3. [And
tian to commit idolatry, or at least to do an idolatrous act, commft "
for fear of death or corporal danger. — " To pray unto a king [(l^'^^p'
voluntarily for fair weather, or for any thing which God only d^'ath.]
s Leviath., TPt. III. c. xliii.] p. 331. » Lcviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii. p. 271.]
^ Ibid., [Ft III. c. xlii.] p. 271. * [Ibid.]
540
THE CATCHING
Pa r t can do for us, is Divine worship^ and idolatry; on tlie other
' — side, if a king compel a man to it by the terror of death or
other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry^." His
reason is, because it " is not a sign that he doth inwardly
honour, him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himself
from death or from a miserable hfe^." It seemeth T. H.
thinketh there is no Di\ine worship but internal ; and that
it is lawful for a man to value his own life or his limbs more
[Dan. iii, than his God. How much is he wiser than the tlii'ee children,
or Daniel himself! who were thrown, the first into a fiery fur-
nace, the last into the lions^ den, because they refused to 880
comply with the idolatrous decree of their sovereign prince.
4. [And A fourth aphorism may be this, — " That which is said in
natlirli'suf Scriptui'e— ' It is better to obey God than man,'— hath
Dhhfe^ place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature^"
law.] Why? Nature itself doth teach us, that it is better "to
laf " ^* obey God than men." Neither can he say, that he intended
this only of obedience in the use of indiff'erent actions and
gestures, in the ser\ice of God, commanded by the common-
wealth; for that is to obey both God and man. But if
Divine law and human law clash one with another, without
doubt it is evermore better to obey God than man.
[5. And His fifth conclusion mav be, that the sharpest and most
niaketh the _ * i i •
sovereign successiul sword, m any war whatsoever, doth give sovereign
sup^em?^ power and authority to him that hath it, to approve or reject
theoio'o-i'-^ all sorts of theological doctrines concerning the kingdom of
caitrutn.] God ; not according to their truth or falsehood, but accord-
ing to that influence which they have upon pohtical aff'airs.
Hear him: — '^^But because this doctrine . . will appear to most
men a novelty, I do but propound it, maintaining nothing in
this or any other paradox of religion, but attending the end
of that dispute of the sword, concerning the authority (not yet
amongst my countrymen decided) by which all sorts of doc-
trine are to be approved or rejected," &c. : "for the points of
doctrine concerning the kingdom of God have so great in-
fluence upon the kingdom of man, as not to be determined
but by them that under God have the sovereign power^."
r Leviath., [Pt IV. c. xlv.] p. 360. ^ Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviil]
' [Ibid.] pp. 241, [242.]
a Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxxi.] p. 193.
OF LEVIATHAN. 541
- — Careat successihus opto, Discourse
" Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putatc," — HI.
Let liim evermore waut success, who thinketh actions are
to be judged by their events." This doctrine may be plausi-
ble to those, who desire to fish in troubled waters ; but it is
justly hated by those which are in authority, and all those
who are lovers of peace and tranquillity.
The last part of this conclusion smelleth rankly of Jero-
boam : — " Now shall the kingdom return to the house of i Kings xii.
David, if this people go up to do sacrifice in the House of the
Lord at Jerusalem ; . . whereupon the king took counsel, and
made two calves of gold, and said unto them. It is too much
for you to go up to Jerusalem, Behold thy Gods, O Israel,
which brought thee out of the land of Egypt." But, by the
just disposition of Almighty God, this policy turned to a sin,
and was the utter destruction of Jeroboam and his family.
It is not good jesting with edge-tools, nor playing with holy
things. Where men make their greatest fastness, many
times they find most danger.
His sixth paradox is a rapper: — "The civil laws are the [e.Andthe
rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; thVum-^
and therefore, what the lawgiver commands, that is to be ac- a^f/ofgood
counted good; what he forbids, bad^:" — and a little after ; and evil.]
— " Before empires were, just and unjust were not, as whose
nature is relative to a command ; every action in its own
nature is indifferent ; that it is just or unjust, proceedeth
from the right of him that commandeth : therefore lawful
kings make those things which they command just, by com-
manding them, and those things which they forbid unjust,
by forbidding them^." To this add his definition of a sin ;
— " that which one doth or omitteth, saith or willeth, con-
trary to the reason of the commonwealth, that is the" (civil)
" laws^:" where, by "the laws," he doth not understand the
c [Ovid., Heroid.. ii. 85, 86.]
d De Give, c. xii. § 1. [p. 126.—
** Regulas boni et mali, justi et injusti,
honesti et inhonesti, esse leges civiles ;
ideoque quod legislator pr<3eceperit, id
pro bono, quod vetuerit, id pro malo
habendum esse."]
^ [Ibid., p. 127. — "Ante imperia
justum et injustum non exstiterc, ut
quorum natura ad mandatum sit rela-
tiva ; actioque omnis sua natura adia-
phora est ; quod justa vel injusta sit, a
jure imperantis provenit : regvs igitur
legitimi, qua? imperant justa faciunt
iniperando, quae vetant vetando in-
justa."]
f Ibid., c. xiv. § 17. [p. 168.—
" Ut culpa, id est, pcecatuni, sit, quod
542
THE CATCHING
Part written laws, elected and approved by the whole common-
— wealth, but the verbal commands or mandates of him that
hath the sovereign power ; as we find in many places of his
writings ; — " The civil laws are nothing else but the com-
mands of him that is endowed with sovereign power in the
commonwealth, concerning the future actions of his sub-
jects^;^^ — and, — " The civil laws are fastened to the lips of
that man, who hath the sovereign power^." Where are we ?
In Europe or in Asia ? where they ascribed a divinity to their
kings, and, to use his own phrase, made them "mortal Gods^;"
[Dan. ii. 4, — " O King, live for ever.'' Flatterers are the common
^^'^ moths of great palaces, where "Alexander's friends" are more
numerous than "the king^s friends^;" but such gross pal-
pable pernicious flattery as this is, I did never meet with, so
derogatory both to piety and policy. What deserved he, who
should do his uttermost endeavour to poison a common
fountain, whereof all the commonwealth must drink ? He
doth the same, who poisoneth the mind of a sovereign prince.
Are " the civil laws the rules of good and bad, just and un-
just, honest and dishonest V And what I pray you are the
rules of the civil law itself? Even the law of God and nature.
If the civil laws swerve from these more authentic laws, they
are Lesbian rules ^. " What the lawgiver commands, is to be 881
accounted good; what he forbids, bad/' This was just the
garb of the Athenian sophisters, as they are described by
Plato ; whatsoever pleased "the great beast" (the multitude),
they called holy, and just, and good; and whatsoever "the
great beast" disliked, they called evil, unjust, profane But he
is not yet arrived at the height of his flattery. — "Lawful kings
make those things which they command just, by commanding
them, and those things which they forbid unjust, by for-
bidding them.'' At other times, when he is in his right wits,
he talketh of " sufi'ering," and " expecting their reward in
quis fecerit, omiserit, dixerit, vel volu- [Vide Plutarch., Apophthegm,
erit, contra rationem civitatis, id est, Reg., in Alexand. num. 29, Op. Moral.,
contra leges."] torn. i. p. 50-5. ed. Wyttenb.]
s De Give, c. vi. § 9. [p. 64. — ^ [" T^s Aeo-jSi'osoi/coSo/xTjs 6;u.oAu)35i-
" Leges Civiles (ut eas definiamus) j/os kuvuv . . irphs rh axvf^o- tov KiBov
nihil aliud sunt, quam ejus qui in civi- fxeTaKii^eTrai koI oh yueVet." Aristot.,
tate summa potestate prffiditus est, de Ethic, V. xiv. 7.]
civium futuris actionibus mandata."] [Plat., De Republ., lib. vi. c, 7. —
h Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109. " Opeixfxaros fxeydkov Kai laxvpov,"
i [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.] K. T. A.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
543
Heaven V' aiid "going to Christ by martyrdom V' and, "if Discourse
he had the fortitude to suflPer death he should do betterP/' '- — ■
But I fear all this was but said in jest. How should they
'^expect their reward in Heaven/^ if his doctrine be true,
that there is no reward in Heaven ? Or how should they be
martyrs, if his doctrine be true, that " none can be martyrs
but those who conversed with" Christ '^^upon earth^?" He
addeth, "Before empires were, just and unjust were not." No-
thing could be written more false in his sense, more dishonour-
able to God, more inglorious to the human nature ; — that
God should create man, and leave him presently without any
rules to his own ordering of himself, as the ostrich leaveth
her eggs in the sand. But in truth there have been empires
in the world ever since Adam ; and Adam had a law 's>Titten
in his heart by the finger of God, before there was any ci^dl
law. Thus they do endeavour to make goodness, and justice,
and honesty, and conscience, and God Himself, to be empty
names without any reality, which signify nothing, further
than they conduce to a man^s interest. Otherwise he would
not, he could not say, that " every action," as it is invested
with its circumstances, " is indifferent in its own nature^."
Something there is which he hath a confused glimmering [The true
of, as the blind man sees men walking" like " trees," which p^^ive^
he is not able to apprehend and express cleai'ly. We ac- ^Jj^g^j"
knowledge, that though the laws or commands of a sovereign fMark viu.
prince be erroneous, or unjust, or injurious, such as a subject
cannot approve for good in themselves, yet he is bound to
acquiesce, and may not oppose or resist, othei-wise than by
prayers and tears, and at the most by flight ATe acknow-
ledge, that the civil laws have power to bind the conscience
of a Christian in themselves, but not from themselves*, but
fi'om Him Who hath said, " Let every soul be subject to the [Rom. xiii,
higher powers." Either they bind Christian subjects to do ^'^
their sovereign's commands, or to suflPer for the testimony of
a good conscience. We acknowledge, that in doubtful cases
>» [Leviath., Pt III. c. xliii. p. 331.] ^ [See Bramhall's sentiments upon
" [De Give, c. xviii. § 13. p. 272. — this tiuestion at greater length, above
" Eundum ad Christum per mar- in Serpent Salve, sect. xi. vol, iii. pp.
tjTium."] 348—364; Disc. ii. Pt. ii.]
P [Leviath., Pt. IV. c. xlv. p. 362.] t [See above in the Answer to La
q Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xlii.]p. 272. Millet., vol. i. p. 62. note e ; Disc. i.
' [De Give, c. xii. § 1. p. 127.] Pt. i.]
544
THE CATCHING
Part " sempei' prcRsumitur pro rege et lege'^ — ' the sovereign and the
- — ^— — law are always presumed^ to be in the right ; but in plain
evident cases, which admit no doubt, it is always better to
obey God than man. Blunderers, whilst they think to mend
one imaginary hole, make two or three real ones. They who
derive the authority of the Scriptures, or God's law, from the
civil laws of men, are like those who seek to underprop the
heavens from falling with a bulrush. Nay, they derive not
only the authority of the Scripture, but even of the law of
nature itself, from the civil law : — " The laws of nature"
(which need no promulgation) "in the condition of nature
. . are not properly laws, but qualities, which dispose men to
peace and to obedience; when a commonwealth is once
settled, then are they actually laws, and not before^." God
help us ! Into what times are we fallen ! when the immutable
laws of God and nature are made to depend upon the mutable
laws of mortal men; just as if one should go about to con-
trol the sun by the authority of the clock.
[A bundle But it is not worthy of my labour, nor any part of my in-
of T H • f 1 . .
hisreiigi- tention, to pursue every shadow of a question which he
ous errors.] gpj.jj^gg|-|j^ It shall suffice to gather a posy of flowers (or
rather a bundle of weeds) out of his writings, and present
them to the reader ; who will easily distinguish them from
healthful plants by the rankness of their smell. Such are
these which follow. —
1. "To be delighted in the imagination only, of being pos-
sessed of another man^s goods, servants, or wife, without any
intention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no
breach of the law which saith, ^ Thou shalt not covet
2. " If a man by the terror of present death be compelled
to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because no
law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation ; . .
nature compelleth him to the facty." The like doctrine he
hath elsewhere : — " When the actor doth any thing against
the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obhged
by former covenants to obey him, not he, but the author,
breaketh the law of nature ^"
" Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvi.] p. 138. ^ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 157.
Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 151. Ibid., [Pt. 1. c. xvi.] p. 81.
OF LEVIATHAN'.
545
182 3. It is a "doctrine repugnant to civil society, that vliat- Di?rorK?E
soever a man does against liis conscience is sin^." —
4. "The kingdom of God is not shut but to them that
sin ; that is, to them, who have not performed due obedience
to the laws of God : nor to them, if they believe the necessary
Articles of the Christian Faith^\"
5. "We must know, that the true acknowledging of sin is
repentance itself^.'*
G. "An opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be
heresy; nor the sovereign princes that authorize the same,
heretics^."
7. " Temporal and spiriuial government are but two words
. . to make men see double, and mistake their lawful sove-
reign," Sec; "there is no other government in tliis life,
neither of state nor religion, but temporal^."
8. "It is manifest, that they" who pennit (or tolerate) a
contrary doctrine to that which themselves beheve, and think
necessary, " do against theii' conscience ; and wiU, as much as
in them heth, the eternal destruction of their subjects-".'^
9. "' Subjects sin, if they do not worship God according to
the laws of the commonwealth?.'^
10. " To believe in Jesus" — " i?i Jesum" — " is the same as
to believe that Jesus is Christ^."
11. " There can be no contradiction between the laws of
God and the laws of a Christian commonwealths" Yet
we see " Christian commonwealths" daily contradict one
another.
12. Xo man giveth but with intention of good to himself ;
. . of all voluntai'y acts, the object is to every man his own
good^." Moses, St. Paul, and the Decii, were not of his mind.
* Levinth., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 16S. quern ipsi civibus ad salutem aeternam
" De Give, c. xviii. § 2. [p. 259. — necessario conducere credunt, nou fa-
" Xon enim clauditnir Regiium Dei ciant doceri et eshiberi, vel contrariam
nisi peccantibiis, id est, iis qui debitam doceri vel exhiberi permittant") "con-
legibus Dei obedienriam non prestite- tra conscienriam ; et velle quantum in
runt; neque illis, si credaut artictilos se est, aeternam civium perditioneni.'"]
necessarios Fidei ChristianiP.] e Ibid., c. xv, § 19. [p. 192.—" Colli-
c Ibid,, c. xvii. § 25. [p. 245. — gitur , . peccare subditos, . . si non
" Sciendum igitur . . peccati veram ag- colant Deum koto to. vofxifia."]
nitionem esse ipsam pceuitentiam."] •» Ibid., c. xviii. § 10. [p. 2G9. —
Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 318. "Credere autem in Jesum (ut ibidem
* Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxix.] p. 248. — Job. xx. 31. — explicatur) idem est
^ De Give, c. xiii. § 5. [p. 142. — quod credere Jesum esse Ghristum."]
■ Manifestimi est facere eos" (scil. qui ' Leviath.. [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 330.
• talem doctrinam et talem cultiun ^ Ibid., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 75.
BRAMHALL.
N n
546
THE CATCHING
Part 13. " There is no natural knowledge of man's estate after
'- — death, much less of the reward which is then to be given to
breach of faith ; but only a belief, grounded upon other men's
saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know
those, tliat knew them, that knew others, that knew it
supernaturally
14. " David's killing of Uriah was no injury to Uriah, be-
cause the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah
himself'"."
15. "To whom it belongeth to determine controversies
which may arise from the diverse interpretation of Scripture, . .
he hath an imperial power over all men which acknowledge
the Scriptures to be the Word of God".''
16. "What is theft, what is murder, what is adultery,
and universally what is an injury, is known by the civil law ;
that is, the commands of the sovereign o."
17. He admitteth the incestuous "copulations of the
heathens according to their heathenish laws" to have been
" lawful marriages P :" though the Scripture teach us expressly,
[Lev it.] that for those abominations the land of Canaan " spewed out"
xviii. 28, _ . _ - . ^
her mhabitants.
18. "I say, that no other article of faith besides this, that
Jesus is Christ, is necessary to a Christian man for salvation^."
[John xviii. 19. Because "Christ's 'kingdom is not of this world,'
therefore neither can His ministers, unless they be kings,
require obedience in His name'";" they "have no right of
commanding, no power to make laws^"
20. I pass by his errors about oaths, about vows, about the
resurrection, about the kingdom of Christ, about the power
of the keys, binding, loosing, excommunication, &c., his
' Leviath., [Pt, I. c. xv.] p. 74.
Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109.
n De Give, c. xviii. § 14. [p. 273.—
" Cujus enim est controversias quae ex
di versa Scripturarum interpretatione
oriri possunt determinare, ejus est omnes
simpliciter controversias determinare ;
cujus autem est hoc, ejusdem est im-
perium in omnes qui agnoscunt Scrip-
turas esse Verhum Dei."]
o De Give, c. vi. § 16. [p. 69.— Quid
igitur furtum, quid homicidium, quid
adulterium, et in universum quid sit
injuria, cognoscitur ex lege civili, hoc
est, ex mandatis ejus qui in civitate cum
summo imperio est."]
I' Ibid., c. xiv. § 10. [p. 162.— "Si-
militer ethnicorum copulationes sexuum
secundum leges suas conjugia erant
legitima."]
1 Ibid., c. xviii. § 6. [p. 265.— "Dico
autem alium articuhmi Fidei praeter
hunc — Jesum esse Ghristum — homini
Christiano, ut necessarium ad salutem,
requiri nullum,]
r Leviath., [Pt, III. c. xlii.] p. 269.
s Ibid., p, 270,
OF LEVIATHAN.
547
ignorant mistake of meritum cong)nti'\ and condi^ni/' discovrsv^
active and passive obedience, and many more ; for fear of
being tedious to the reader. His whole works are a heap of
misshapen errors, and absurd paradoxes, vented with the
confidence of a juggler, the brags of a mountebank, and
the authority of some Pythagoras, or " third Cato,^' lately
"dropped down from heaven ^"
Thus we have seen, how the Hobbian principles do destroy
the existence, the simplicity, the ubiquity, the eternity, and
infiniteness of God ; the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, the
hypostatical union; the kingly, sacerdotal, and prophetical
offices of Christ ; the being and operation of the Holy Ghost ;
Heaven, Hell ; Angels, De^dls ; the immortality of the soul ;
the Catholic, and all national Churches ; the Holy Scrip tiu'es.
Holy Orders, the Holy Sacraments; the whole frame of
religion, and the worship of God; the laws of nature, the
reality of goodness, justice, piety, honesty, conscience, and all
that is sacred. If his disciples have such an implicit faith
that they can digest all these things, they may feed with
ostriches.
CHAP. II.
THAT THE HOBBTAN PRIXCTPLES DO DESTROY ALL RELATIONS BETWEEX
MAN AND MAX, AND THE WHOLE FRAME OE A COMMONWEALTH.
The first harping iron is thrown at the heart of this great [t. h.'s
whale; that is, his religion; for "with the heart 'a man J,\*^^//Jfp^/p^ j
believeth unto righteousness.^' Xow let him look to his ^J^'j"^'
chine; that is, his compage or commonwealth. My next
task is to shew, that he destroyeth all relations between man
and man, prince and subject, parent and child, husband and
wife, master and servant, and generally all society.
It is enough to dash the whole frame of his Le\iathan or [t. h.'s
commonwealth in pieces, that he confesseth it is without J^-pailhTon-
example ; as if the moulding of a commonwealth were no tessediy_^a
more than the making of gunpowder, which was not found
t [" Tertius e coelo cecidit Cato." Juv., Sat., ii. 40.]
\ n 2
548
THE CATCHING
Part out by long experience but by mere accident. The greatest
— objection^^ (saith T. H.) '^is that of practice, when men ask
when and where such power has by subjects been acknow-
ledged"/^ It is a "great objection" indeed. Experience,
the mistress of fools, is the best and almost the only proof of
the goodness or badness of any form of government. No
man knoweth where a shoe wringeth so well as he that
weareth it. A new physician must have a new churchyard,
wherein to bury those whom he killeth. And a new unex-
perienced politician commonly putteth all into a combustion.
Men rise by degrees from common soldiers to be decurions,
from decurions to be centurions, from centurions to be
tribunes, and from tribunes to be generals, by experience,
not by speculation. Alexander did but laugh at that orator
who discoursed to him of military affairs'^. The Locrian law
was well grounded, — that whosoever moved for any altera-
tion in the tried policy of their commonwealth, should make
the proposition at his own peril, with a halter about his
neck^. New statesmen promise golden mountains; but like
fresh flies, they bite deeper than those which were chased
away before them. It were a strange thing to hear a man
discourse of the philosopher's stone, who never bestowed a
groat's worth of charcoal in the enquiry. It is as strange to
hear a man dictate so magisterially in politics, who was never
officer nor counsellor in his life, nor had any opportunity to
know the intrigues of any one state. If his form of govern-
ment had had any true worth or weight in it, among so many
nations, and so many succeeding generations from the crea-
tion to this day, some one or other would have light upon it.
His Leviathan is but an " idoF^ of his own " brain."
Neither is it sufficient to say, that " in long lived common-
wealths . . the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign's
power y." Power may be moderated, where it is not "disputed"
of. And even in those kingdoms where it was least disputed
of, as in Persia, they had their fundamental laws, which were
not alterable at the pleasure of the present prince ; whereof
[Either i. onc was, as we find in the story of Esther and the book of
J 9 Dan.
vi. 8, &c.] u Leviath., [Pt. 11. c. xx.] p. 107. ^ [Zaleuc, Prooem. Leg., ap. Sto-
V [Such an anecdote is related of bseum, Serm. xlii.]
Haniiibal when at Antiochns' coixrt, hy y Ibid. [scil. Leviath., Pt. IL c. xx.
Cic, De Orat, ii. 18.] p. 107.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
549
Daniel, that the law of the Medes and Persians altered not : Discourse
much less was it alterable by the only breath of the prince's ' —
mouth, according to T. H. his principles.
He urgeth, that " though in all places of the world men
should lay the foundations of their houses on the sand, it
could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be^.'^ He
was ashamed to make the application. So, suppose all the
world should be out of their wits and he only have his right
understanding. His supposition is a supposition of an im-
possibility, which maketh an affirmative proposition to turn
negative : much like this other supposition, ^ If the sky fall,
we shall have larks that is, in plain English, we shall have
no larks. His argument had held much more strongly thus ;
— All the world lay the foundation of their houses upon firm
ground, and not upon the sand ; therefore he who crosseth
the practice of the whole world, out of an overweening
opinion that he seeth further into a mill-stone than they all,
is he that builds upon the sand, and descrveth well to be
laughed out of his humour.
But he persisteth still, — like one that knows better how to [Theory
hold a paradox than a fort, — The skill of making and main- wuhout ex-
taining commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth P^rience.]
arithmetic and geometry," and "not, as tennis-play, on
practice only ; which rules neither poor men had the leisure,
nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the
curiosity or the method, to find out^." O excellent ! "How
884 fortunate are we, if we knew our own happiness^," to have
this great discovery made in our daj^s? What pity it is,
that this new Mercury did not live in .the days of the old
Mercury,
" Qui feros cultus hominum reccntum
" Voce formavit catus*-","
that the art of preserving the world in perpetual tranquillity
should not be discovered until the evening of the world.
May we not hope (since he pleased to tell us, that after the
resurrection mankind shall be eternally propagated'^), that
these monuments of his may escape the last fire, as well as
Ibid, [soil, Lcviath,, Pt. II. c. xx. norint." &c. Virg., Geovg., ii. 458.]
p. 107.] [Horat., Canii., I. x. 2, 3.]
^ Ibid. d Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xliv.] p. 34G.
^ ["O fcrtuuatosniniiuin, suubi bona [Sec above p. 538. notes q, r.]
550
THE CATCHING
p A R T some others are supposed to have escaped the general
'■ — deluge, for the good of those successive generations, they
being his own invention as well as this frame of government ?
Yet his argument is most improper, and most untrue.
State pohcy, which is wholly involved in matter, and circum-
stances of time, and place, and persons, is not at all like
" arithmetic and geometry," which are altogether abstracted
from matter, but much more like " tennis-play." There is no
place for liberty in " arithmetic and geometry," but in policy
there is, and so there is in " tennis-play." A game at tennis
hath its vicissitudes, and so have states. A tennis-player
must change his play at every stroke, according to the occa-
sion and accidents; so must a statesman move his rudder
diflFerently, according to the various face of heaven. He who
manageth a commonwealth by general rules, will quickly
ruin both himself and those who are committed to his govern-
ment. One man^s meat is another man's poison ; and those
which are healthful rules for one society at one time, may be
pernicious to another society, or to the same society at another
time. Some nations are like horses, more patient of their
riders than others; and the same nations more patient at
one time than at another. In sum, general rules are easy,
and signify not much in policy ; the quintessence of poHcy doth
consist in the dexterous and skilful application of those rules
to the subject-matter.
[T. H.'s But I will not rest' in presumptions. Concerning foreign
destructfve states, — and, first, such as are not only neighbours but
to public alHes of a commonwealth, such as have contracted friendship
peace , ^
He teach- and Confederated themselves together by solemn oaths with
an oath invocation of the Holy Name of the great God of Heaven
bhidmore earth, — he teacheth, that '^such an oath doth bind no
than a "na- more than nudum pactum''^ — a " naked covenant^." It is true,
ked" cove-
nant.] that every covenant is either lawful or unlawful. If it be
unlawful, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity; if it be
lawful, it bindeth in conscience, though it were never con-
firmed by oath. It is true, further, that he who can release
a naked promise, can release the same promise confirmed
by an oath ; because it was not made or intended as a vow to
e De Give, c. ii. § 22. [p. 22. — " Ex potest, pactum nudum non minus obli-
allata jurisjurandi definitione intcUigi gare quam in quod juravimus."]
OF LEVIATHAX.
551
God, but as a promise to rnau. But yet, to say, that " a Discourse
111
naked coveuant biudeth no less than an oath," or that an '- —
oath addeth nothing to the obhgation, or that the mere
viohition of a covenant is as great a sin as perjmy and cove-
nant-breaking twisted together^, is absui'd, and openeth a
large gap to foreign war.
Secondly, he teacheth, that ^' in all times kings, and persons [AmHhat
of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in between
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladia- statesTslIn-
tors, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on possible.]
one another It is good for a sovereign prince to have his
sword always by his side, to be ready to protect his subjects
and oifend those who dare invade him ; but to put princes
in " the postnre of gladiators," watching continually where
they may hit one another, or do one another a mischief, is
dangerous. There can be no firm amity, where there is no
mutual confidence. T. H. his perpetual diffidence and cause-
less jealousies, which have no ground but an universal suspi-
cion of the human nature (much like the good woman^s fear,
that the log would leap out of the fire and knock out the
brains of her cliild), do beget perpetual vexations to them
that cherish them, argue a self-guiltiness, teach them who
are suspected often to do worse than they imagined, and
ordinarily produce hostility and wai\ ^' The state of common-
wealths among themselves is natural, that is, hostile : neither
il' they cease to figlit, is it peace, but a breathing space ;
wherein the one enemy, observing the motion or countenance
of the other, doth esteem his security not from pacts but
fi'om the forces and counsels of his adversary^."
He maketh confederacies to be but empty shows without [And that
any reahty ; but for all other neighbour commonwealths, rate states '
are as ene-
which are not confederates, but exercise commerce one with n-,ies,\nd^
another by the law of nations, he reckons them all as enemies
and in a state of nature (the Hobbian nature of man is worse
than the natm-e of bears, or wolves, or the most savage wild
t [De Give, c. ii. § 22. p. 22.]
f Leviath., [Pt, I. c. xiii.] p. 63.
De Give, c. xiii. § 7. [p. 143.—
" Status enim civitatum inter se natu-
ralis, id est, hostilis, est ; ueque si pug-
nare cessant, iccixco pax dicenda est,
sed respiratio ; in qua hostis alter alte-
rius motuni vultumque observans, se-
curitatem suam non ex pactis sed ex
viribus et cousiliis adversarii a^sti-
mat."]
552
THE CATCHING
Part beasts), and maketh it lawful to destroy them, nocent or
'- — innocent, indifferently. — " All men that are not subjects, are
either enemies, or else,, they have ceased from being so by
some precedent covenants; but against enemies, whom the
commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful
by the original right of nature to make war, wherein the
sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of
nocent and innocent\^' Here is no precedent injury sup-
posed, no refusal to do right {"omnia dat qui junta negat^''),
nor the least suspicion of any will to wrong them ; but only,
that "the commonwealth^^ (that is, the prince) "judge" them
" capable to do them hurt/^
[And may Neither doth he hold it needful to denounce war in such
iTj^n each cases, but makcth it lawful to suppress them and cut their
out?nT^'^ throats without any warning. — " From this" (natural) " dif-
warniiig.] fidencc of ouc another, there is no way for any man to secure
himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or
wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till
he see no other power great enough to endanger him ; and
this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is
generally allowed^:" for, "in the state of mere nature, . . the
laws of nature are silent" as to the actual exercise of them™.
And this he may do, " vel palam vel ex insidiis'^ — either by
force or treachery. What is now become of the law of
nations? How much were the old Romans better neigh-
bours than these new Hobbians ? They did not so easily
fall to the shedding of human blood, but sent their legate,
first, to demand justice, and after three and thirty days'
expectation in vain, to proclaim aloud upon the confines of
the enemy's country, "Hear, O Jupiter, and thou Juno,
Quirinus thou, and all ye gods, that this people is unjust,"
&c."; and then the herald or fecial lanced his javelin into
the enemy's country, as a defiance, and beginning of war.
[His prin- Thus destructive are his principles to the public peace and
stmctive "to tranquillity of the world, but much more pernicious to the
The com-
monwealth
itself.] i Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 165. bus, sed etiam de lege natural!, si non
^ [Lucan., Pharsal., i. 349.] ad animum sed ad actiones referatur, et
' Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xiii.] p. 61. bellum tale intelligatur ut sit omnium
De Give, c. v. § 2. [p. 52. — " Tri- contra omnes ; qualis est status naturae
turn est 'inter arma silere leges;' et merae."]
verum est, non mode de legibus civili- " Liv., [i. 32.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
553
commonwealth itself. He did prudently, to deny tliat virtue Discourse
did consist in a mean^; for he himself doth never observe a —
mean. All his bolts fly over or under, but at the right mark
it is in vain to expect him. Sometimes he fancieth an om-
nipotence in kings, sometimes he strippeth them of their just
rights. Perhaps he thinketh, that it may fall out in politics
as it doth sometimes in physic; " Bina venena juvanV —
"two contrary poisons" may become a cordial to the com-
monwealth. I will begin with his defects, where he attri-
buteth too little to regal power.
First, he teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare [He teach-
in person, except he do voluntarily undertake it. — " A man ^o'^niaifis
that is commanded as a soldier to fisrht asrainst the enemy, . . t»ound to
° ^ , _ _ go to war-
may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice p." fare.]
Of these "many cases," he setteth down only two : first, " when
he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place, for in this
case he deserteth not the service of the commonwealth;"
secondly, " there is allowance to be made for natural
timorousness, . . or men of feminine courage^." This might
pass as a municipal law, to exempt some persons at some
time in some places ; but to extend it to all persons, places,
and times, is absurd, and repugnant to his own grounds;
who teacheth, that "justice and injustice do depend upon the
command of the sovereign," that " whatsoever he commandeth,
he maketh lawful and just by commanding it^.-"* His two
cases are two great impertinencies ; and belong to the sove-
reign to do or not to do, as graces, — "Who is timorous or jucig.vii.3.
fearful, let him depart ;" — not to the subjects as right. He
forgetteth, how often he hath denied " all knowledge of good
and ewW to subjects, and subjected their will absolutely to
the vnW of the sovereign; — The sovereign "may use every
man^s strength and wealth at his pleasure ^" His acknow-
ledgment,— that the " sovereign hath right enough to punish
his refusal with death — is to no purpose. The question is
not, whether his refusal be punishable or not, but whether it
be just or not. Upon his principles, a sovereign may "justly
° [Qu., Ariimadv. upon ISIumb. xix. above p. 541, notes d, e.]
p. 213.] De Give, c. vi. § 13. [p. 66.—" Ut
P Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 112. possit . . viribus et opibvis omnium suo
1 [Ibid.] arbitrio uti."]
r [De Give, c. xii. § 1. p. 127. See ' [Leviatli., Pt. II. c. xxi. p. 112.]
554
THE CATCHING
Part enough^' put the most innocent subject in the world to
— death ; as we shall see presently". And his exception —
" when the defence of the commonwealth requireth at once
the help of all that are able to bear arms^," — is no answer to
the other case, and itself a case never like to happen. He
must be "a mortal Gody^' indeed, that can bring all the
hands in a kingdom to fight at one battle.
[And that Another of his principles is this : — " Seciirity is the end
fence^" foi* wliich men make themselves subjects to others; which, if
aU duties^] enjoyed, no man is understood to have subjected
himself to others, or to have lost his right to defend himself
at his own discretion : neither is any man understood to 886
have bound himself to any thing, or to have relinquished his
right over all things, before his own security be provided
fQfZ/^ What ugly consequences do flow from this paradox, and
what a large window it openeth to sedition and rebellion, I
leave to the reader's judgment. Either it must be left to the
sovereign's determination, whether the subject's security be
sufficiently provided for; and then "in vain is any man's sen-
tence expected against himself or to the discretion of the
subject (as the words themselves do seem to import) ; and
then there need no other bellows to kindle the fire of a civil
war, and put a whole commonwealth into a combustion, but
this seditious article.
We see the present condition of Europe what it is, — that
most sovereigns have subjects of a different communion from
themselves, and are necessitated to tolerate diff*erent rites,
for fear lest, whilst they are plucking up the tares, they
should eradicate the wheat ; and he that should advise them
to do otherwise, did advise them to put all into fire and
flame. Now hear this merciful and peaceable author: — "It
is manifest, that they do against conscience, and wish (as
much as is in them) the eternal destruction of their sub-
jects, who do not cause such doctrine and such worship to
be taught and exhibited to their subjects, as they themselves
" [See below pp. 561, 562.]
X [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxi. p. 112.]
y [Ibid., Pt. 11. c. xvii. p. 87.]
Ue Cive, c. vi. § 3. [p. 62.—" Se-
curitas enim finis est propter quein
homines se subjiciuntaliis ; quaj si non
habeatur, nemo intelligitur se aliis sub-
jeeisse aut jus se arbitrio suo defen-
dendi amisisse : neque ante intelligen-
dus est quisquam se obstrinxisse ad
quicquam, vel jus suum in omnia reli-
quisse, quam securitati ejus sit prospec-
tum."]
OF LEVIATHAN.
555
do believe to conduce to their eternal salvation, or tolerate Discourse
the contrary to be taught and exhibited''/^ Did this man '- —
write waking or di'eaming ?
And howsoever in words he deny all resistance to [Andad-
the sovereign, yet in deed he admitteth it. — " No man is resistance
bound by his pacts, whatsoever they be, not to resist him, ^^j^Jf j*^^^*
who bringeth upon him death or wounds or other bodily deed, ai^
damage^.^^ — (By this learning the scholar, if he be able, may denieth it
take the rod out of his master's hand, and whip him.) — words.]
foUoweth; — "Seeing therefore no man is bound to that
which is impossible, they who are to suffer death or wounds
or other corporal damage, and are not constant enough to
endure them, are not obliged to suffer them'^." And more
fully: — "In case a great many men together have already
resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some
capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death,
whether have they not the liberty to join together and assist
and defend one another ? certainly they have, for they do
but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do
as the innocent : there was indeed injustice in the first
breach of their duty; their bearing of arms subsequent to
it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new
imjust Sict^." Why should we not change the name of Levi-
athan into the Rebels^ Catechism? Observe the difference
between the primitive spirit and the Hobbian spirit. The
Thebsean legion, of known valour in a good cause, when
they were able to resist, did choose rather to be cut in pieces
to a man than defend themselves against their emperor by
arms, because they would "rather die innocent than live
nocent^.^^ But T. H. alloweth rebels and conspirators to
make good their unlawful attempts by arms. Was there
ever such a trumpeter of rebellion heard of before ? Perhaps
he may say, that he alloweth them not to justify their un-
^ De Give, c. xiii. § 5. [p. 142. — See bus mors (quod maximum naturae
the passage quoted, above p. 545. note malum est) vel quibus vulnera aut alia
f.] corporis damna infer untur, nec ad ea
De Give, c. ii. § 18. [p. 20. — ferenda constantes satis sunt, ea ferre
"Mortem vel vulnera vel aliud dam- non obligantur."]
num corporis inferenti nemo pactis ^ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi,] pp. 112.
suis quibuscunque obligatur non resis- [113.]
tere."] ^ [£ucher., ap. Surium, Vit. Sanc-
[Ibid., pp. 20,21. — " Gmn igitur tor., Sept. 22. torn. iii. p. 222. ed.,
nemo teneatur ad impossibile, illi qui- 1G18.]
556
THE CATCHING
^iii ^ ^^^^^ defend themselves. First, this is contrary
to himself; for he alloweth them "to maintain what they
had" unjustly "done." This is too much, and too intole-
rable, but this is not all. Secondly, if they chance to win
the field, who must suffer for their faults? or who dare
thenceforward call their acts unlawful ?
Will you hear what a casuist he is ? — " And for the other
instance, of attaining sovereignty by rebellion, it is manifest,
that though the event follow, yet, because it cannot reason-
ably be expected but rather the contrary, and because by
gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like
manner, the attempt thereof is against reason f.-'^ And had
he no other reasons indeed against horrid rebellion but these
two? It seemeth he accounteth conscience, or the bird in
the breast, to be but "an idol of the brain^ and the King-
dom of Heaven (as he hath made it), not valuable enough to
be balanced against an earthly kingdom. And as for Hell,
he hath expunged it, and all the infernal fiends, out of the
nature of things otherwise he could not have wanted bet-
ter arguments against such a crying sin.
[And hold- Another of his theorems is, that "no man is obliged by
bound to^" any pacts to accuse himself^:" — which in some cases is true;
Wmsdf ^^^^ sense, and in his latitude, and upon his grounds,
under any it is most untruc. When public fame hath accused a man
cn-cum-
stances, by beforc-hand, he may be called upon to purge himself or
any pacts.] g^g'gj.^ When the case is of public concernment, and the 887
cu'cumstances pregnant, all nations do take the liberty to
examine a man upon oath in his own cause ; and where the
safety and welfare of the commonwealth is concerned, as in
cases of high treason, and for the more full discovery of con-
spiracies, upon the rack : which they could not do lawfully,
if no man was bound in any case to discover himself. His
reason is silly ; — " For in vain do we make him promise, who
when he hath performed, we know not whether he have per-
formed or not^ — and makes as much against all examina-
tion of witnesses, as delinquents. "In vain do we make"
f Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 73. ullis ad se accusandum."]
g [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 208.] ^ [Ibid., — " Friistraenim promittere
[See above in c. i. pp. S.'Ki— 5;38.] eum facimus, qui cum praestiterit, nes-
i De Give, c, ii. § 19. [p. 21. — " Si- cimus an prsestiterit necne."]
militer neque tenetur quisquam pactis
OF LEVIATHAN.
557
them give testimony, '^wlio when they have testified, "we Discourse
know not whether they have given right testimony " or '
not.
But his next conclusion will uncase him fully, and shew us [And that
what manner of man he is. — " If the commonwealth come sovereignty
into the power of its enemies, so that they cannot be resisted, voideth all
he who had the sovereiarntv before, is understood to have lost '^^^y ^l,'
^ " legiance.]
it^.^^ AAliat " enemies" he meaneth, such as have the just power
of the sword or such as have not ; what he meaneth by " the
commonwealth,^^ the whole kingdom or any part of it ; what
he intendeth by " cannot be resisted," whether a prevalence
for want of forces to resist them or a victory in a set battle or
a final conquest ; and what he meaneth by " losing the
sovereignty,'^ losing it de facto or de jure, losing the posses-
sion only or losing the right also ; — he is silent. It may be,
because he knoweth not the difiFerence. " Qui pauca consi-
derate facile pronuntiaV^ — " He that considers little, giveth
sentence" more " easily^' than truly. We must search out
his sense somewhere else. — " The obligation of subjects to
the sovereign is understood to last as long and no longer
than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them,''
&:c. ; " wheresoever a man seeth protection, either in his own
or in another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and
his endeavour to maintain it™." By his leave, this is right
dogs' play, which always take part with the stronger side.
But yet this is general. The next is more particulai' : —
" When in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final
victory, so as (the forces of the commonwealth keeping the
field no longer) there is no further protection of subjects in
their loyalty, then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every
man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own
discretion shall suggest unto him"." Yet these words —
" final ^'ictory" — are doubtful. When David's forces were [2 Sam.
chased out of the kingdom, so that he was not able to protect ""'^
his subjects in their loyalty, could this be called a "final
victor}^?" The next place is home: — "He who hath no
» De Give, c. vii. § 18. [p. 87— **Si
civitas venerit in potestatem hostiuin,
ita ut resisti eis non possit, intelligitur
is qui prius summam habebat potesta-
tem, eam jam amisisse."]
I" Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. li t.
n Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix. p. 174;.]
558
THE CATCHING
Part obligation to his former sovereign but that of an ordinary
— subject/' hath '^liberty to submit" to a conqueror, "when the
means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the
enemy ; for it is then that he hath no longer protection from
him" (his sovereign), " but is protected by the adverse party
for his contribution o." And he concludeth, that " a total sub-
mission^' is as lawful as " a contribution p :" which is contrary
to the sense of all the world ; if a lawful sovereign did give a
general release to his subject, as well as he giveth him licence
to contribute, he said something. And to top up all these
disloyal paradoxes, he addeth, that " they who live under the
protection of a conqueror openly, are understood to submit
themselves to the governmental;" and that "in the very act
of receiving protection openly, and not renouncing it openly,
they do oblige themselves to obey the laws of their protector,
to which in receiving protection they have assented ^"
Where these principles prevail, adieu honour, and honesty,
and fidelity, and loyalty ; all must give place to self-interest.
What ? For a man to desert his sovereign upon the first
prevalence of an enemy, or the first payment of a petty con-
tribution, or the first appearance of a sword that is more able
to protect us for the present ? Is this his great law of nature,
pactis standum^' — "to stand to" what we have "obliged"
ourselves Then kings, from whom all men's right and
property is derived, should not have so much right them-
selves in their own inheritance as the meanest subject. It
[Marriage sccmcth T. H. did "take" his sovereign "for better," but
Seivice.j "for worsc." Fair fall those old Roman spirits, who
gave thanks to Terentius Varro, after he had lost the great
battle of Cannae by his own default, because "he did not
despair of the commonwealth*;" and would not sell the
ground that Hannibal was encamped upon, one farthing
cheaper than if it had been in time of peace"; which was
one thing that discouraged that great captain from con-
tinuing the siege of Home.
[His many His former discourse hath as many faults as lines. First,
errors
at^airist the
° Leviath., [Review and Conclu- p. 137.
sion,] p. 390. s [De Give, c. iii. § 1. p. 23.]
P [Ibid.] ♦ [Liv., xxii. Gl.]
q [Ibid., p. 301.] " [Ibid., xxvi. 11.]
Qii., [Aniniadv. u])Oii Numb, xiv.]
OF LEVIATHAN\
559
>8Sall sovereignty is not from the people. He himself acknow- Discourse
ledgeth, that "fatherly empire or power^^ was "instituted by — —
God in the creation/' and "was monarchical^/' Secondly^ a ^fl^Jorin- of
where the application of sovereign power to the person is monarchs.]
from the people, yet there are other ends besides protection.
Thirdly, protection is not a condition, thongh it be a duty.
A failing in duty doth not cancel a right. Fourthly, protec-
tion ought to be mutual. The subject ought to defend his
king, as well as the king his subject. If the king be disabled
to protect his subject by the subject's ovni fault, because he
did not assist him as he ought, this doth not warrant the sub-
ject to seek protection elsewhere. Fifthly, he doth not distin-
guish between a just conqueror, who hath the power of the
sword though he abuse it, and him that hath no power at all.
I will try if he can remember whose words these are ; — " They
that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby
bound by covenant to own the actions and judgments of one,
cannot lawfully make a new covenant among themselves to
be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without
his permission; and therefore, they that are subjects to a
monai'ch, cannot without his leave cast off monai'chy, . . nor
transfer their person from him that beareth it to another
man^." This is home, both for right and obligation. Sixthly,
there are other requisites to the extinction of the right of a
prince and the obligation of a subject, than the present pre-
valence or conquest of an enemy. Seventhly, nature doth
not dictate to a subject to violate his oaths and allegiance, by
" using his endeavours to maintain protection wheresoever he
seetli it, either in his own sword or another man's.'' Eighthly,
"total submission" is not as lawful as "contribution."
Ninthly, actual submission doth not take away the sovereign's
right or the subject's obHgation. Tenthly, to live under the
command or protection of a conqueror doth not necessarily
imply allegiance. Lastly, much less doth it imply an assent
to all his laws, and an obligation to obey them.
These are part of T. H. his faults, on the one hand, against [His ten
monarchs; opposite enough to peace and tranquillity; which sererrarsiii
favour of
monarchs.]
^' De Give, c. x. § 3. [p. lOS.— erit."]
" Quod imperium paternum institutum * Leviath., [Pt. 11. c. xviii.] p. SS.
a Deo in creatione monarchicum fii-
560
THE CATCHING
Part none can approve, who either have a settlement, or wish one.
'- — But his faults are ten times greater and grosser for monarchs,
on the other hand ; insomuch as I have thought sometimes,
that he observed the method of some old cunning Parliament-
men, who, when they had a mind to cross a bill, were always
the highest for it in the House, and would insert so many and
so great inconveniences into the Act, that they were sure it
could never pass.
Tula frequensque via est per amici fallere nomeny."
So he maketh the power of kings to be so exorbitant, that
no subject, who hath either conscience or discretion, ever did
or can endure ; so to render monarchy odious to mankind.
I pass by his accommodating of the four first Command-
ments of the Decalogue to sovereign princes'', which con-
cern our duty to Almighty God. Let his first paradox of
this kind be this : — " A monarch doth not bind himself to
any man by any pacts for the empire which he receivetha
and, It is vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent
covenants; the opinion, that any monarch receiveth his
power by covenant, that is to say, on condition^* (learnedly
expounded !) proceedeth from want of understanding this
easy truth, that covenants being but words and breath^'
(mark that) " have no force to oblige,^^ &c., " but from the
public sword^/' What is now become of all our coronation
oaths, and all our liberties and great Charters ?
Another paradox is this : — " Every monarch may make his
successor by his last will ; and that which one may transfer
to another by testament, that he may by the same right give
or sell whilst he is living : therefore, to whomsoever he dis-
poseth it, either for love or money, it is lawfully disposed^
and, " There is no perfect form of government, where the dis-
posing of the succession is not in the present sovereign'^."
The whole body of the kingdom of England were of another
mind in King John's case; and if he had disposed the
y [Ovid., Art. Amat, i, 585.—" per De Give, c. [ix.] § [13, 14. p. 102.
amiaim fallere nomen.]" — " Quare Monarcha omnis potest suc-
^ [Leviath., P. II. c. xxx.] pp. 177, cessorem sibi testamento facere. Quod
[178.] autem quis testamento transferre in
" De Give, c. vii. § 11. [p. 81. — alinm potest, id eodem jure donare vel
" Neque ergo Monarcha ullis se pactis vendere vivens potest; cuicumque ergo
cuiquam ob receptum imperium ob- is summum iniperium tradiderit, sive
stringit."] dono sive pretio, jure traditur."]
" Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xviii.] p. 89. ^ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xix.] p. 99.
OF LEVIATHAN.
561
sovereignt}^ to a Turk, as some of our liistoriograpliers relate DiSCOUKSE
that he made an overture % it is not hkely that they would — —
have turned Turkish slaves.
Hear a third paradox. — The sovereign "hath so much
power over every subject by law, as every one who is not
subject to another hath over himself, that is, absolute ; to be
limited by the power of the commonwealth, and by no other
thing f." What? Neither by the laAVS of God, nor nature,
i<; nor nations, nor by the laws of the land, neither co-actively
nor directively ? Would not this man have made an excellent
guide for princes^? But more of this anon.
I proceed. — " When the sovereign commandeth any thing
to be done against his own former law, the command, as to
that particular fact, is an abrogation of the law'\^' Parlia-
ments may shut up their shops ; there is no need of them to
repeal former laws.
His fifth excess is a grievous one : — that " before the institu-
tion of a commonwealth every man had a right . . to do what-
soever he thought necessary to his own preservation, subduing,
hurting, or killing any man, in order thereunto and " this
is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised
in every commonwealth \" And his sentence in brief is this ; —
that if the magistrate do examine and condemn the delin-
quent, then it is properlj^ punishment ; if not, it is a " hostile
act but both are justifiable'^. Judge, reader, whether thou
wilt trust St. Paul or T. H. St. Paul telleth us, that the
magistrate is " the ordinance of God — the minister of God — Rom. xiii.
the revenger of God" — the swordbearer of God " to execute
wrath upon him that doth e\dl." No, saith T. H. ; punish-
ment is not an act of the magistrate as he is a magistrate, or
as he is an officer of God to do justice, or a " revenger'^ of
evil deeds ; but as he is the only private man, who hath not
laid down his natural right to kill any man at his own dis-
• e [To " Miramoulin, Emperor of ^ [Hobbes was at one time tutor to
Africa, Morocco, and Spain;" accord- Charles II. (see the Biogr. Brit.); and
ing to Matt. Paris., Hist. Angl., p. 243. wrote his Leviatlian under the delusion
in an. 1213.] that Charles might perchance act upon
^ De Give, c. vi. § 18. [p. 70, — "Po- its principles (see Leviath., Pt. II. c.
tentiam in cives singulos jure habet xxxi. p. 193).]
tantam, quantam extra civitatem unus- •> Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 157.
quisque habet in seipsum, id est, sum- i Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] pp. 161,
mam sive absolutam, viribus civitatis [162.]
neque uUa alia re limitandnm."] ^ [Ibid., pp. 162, 163.]
BRAMHALL. q q
562
THE CATCHING
cretion, if he do but suspect that he may prove noisome
- to him, or conceive it necessary for his own preservation.
Who ever heard of such a right before, so repugnant to the
laws of God and nature ? But observe, reader, what is the
result of it ; — that the sovereign may lawfully kill any of his
subjects, or as many of them as he pleaseth, without any
fault of theirs, without any examination on his part, merely
upon suspicion, or without any suspicion, of the least crime, if
he do but judge him to be hurtful or noisome ; as freely as a
man may pluck up a weed, because it hinders the nourish-
ment of better plants. " Before the institution of a common-
wealth, every one may lawfully be spoiled and killed by every
one ; but in a commonwealth, only by oneV' that is, the
sovereign ; and, " By the right of nature, we destroy without
being unjust all that is noxious, both beasts and men°=^/'
He makes no difference between a Christian and a wolf.
Would you know what is " noxious" with him ? Even
" whatsoever he thinketh can annoy him^." Who would
not desire to live in his commonwealth, where the sovereign
may lawfully kill a thousand innocents every morning to his
breakfast ? Surely this is a commonwealth of fishes, where
the great ones eat the lesser.
It were strange, if his subjects should be in a better condi-
tion for their fortunes, than they are for their lives ; no, I
warrant you ; do but hear him ; — " Thy dominion and thy
property is so great, and lasteth so long, as the common-
wealth" (that is, the sovereign) " will°." Perhaps he mean-
etli in some extraordinary cases ? Tush, in all cases, and at
all times. When thou didst choose a sovereign, even in
choosing him thou madest him a deed of gift of all thou
hast, " et tu ergo tuumjns civitati concessisti'^ — " and therefore
thou hast granted all thy right to the commonwealth p."
Yet some may imagine, that his meaning is only that pro-
perty may be transferred by laws or Acts of Parliament from
one to another; as the Lacedsemonians, when they per-
' De Give, c. x. § 1. [p. IOC— "Ex-
tra civitatem quilibet a quoliliet jure
spoliari et occidi potest, in civitate ab
uno taiitum."]
[In the Defence, T. H. Numb,
xiv. above p. 80.]— Qu., [T. II. Numb,
xiv. J p. 1
" [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb, xiv.]
p. 140.
° De Give, c. xii. § 7.— [p. 132.—
" Dominium ergo et proprietas tua
tanta est et tamdiu durat, quanta et
quamdiu ipsa" (civitas) " vult."]
P Ibid.
OF LEVIATHAN. 563
mitted children to steal other men's goods/* they transferred Discourse
the right from the owners to the children No, no; T. H. — —
is not for general laws, but particular verbal mandates : —
The king's word is sufficient to take any thing from any
subject, if there be need; and the king is judge of that
need^'/* If by " need,^* he did understand extreme necessity,
for the preservation of the commonwealth, it might alter the
case. But this " need" is like Ahab's " need" of NabotVs [i Kings
vineyard. There is neither necessity nor commonwealth in
the case. The Lacedaemonian thefts were w^arranted by a
general law, not only consented to universally, but sworn
unto. And if it had been otherwise, the value was so small,
and the advantage apprehended to be so great to the com-
monwealth, that no honest subject would contradict it.
Right and title may be transferred by law ; and there can be
no wrong, where consent is explicit and universal ; such con-
sent taketh aw^ay all error. But if the consent be only im-
plicit, to the making or admitting of just laws, and unjust
laws be obtruded in the place of just; the subject suffers
justly by his ow^n act, but he or they that were trusted, sin :
and if he be a sovereign, oweth an account to God ; if subor-
dinate, both to God and man. But he justifieth the taking
890 away of men^s estates, either in part or in whole, without
precedent law, or precedent necessity, or subsequent satisfac-
tion ; and maintaineth, that not only the subject is bound to
submit, but that the sovereign is just in doing it.
I cannot pass by his good affection to the nobility of [His grudge
Europe : — "In these parts of Europe it hath been taken for nobimy.j^
a right of certain persons to have place in the highest council
of state by inheritance ;" but, " Good counsel comes not by in-
heritance," and "the politics is a harder study than geometry^."
I think he mistakes the "council of state" for the Parliament.
And who more fit to concur in the choice of laws, than they
who are most concerned in the laws? than they, who must
contribute most, if there be occasion, to the maintenance of
the laws ? No art is hereditary more than politics. A
q DeCive, c, xiv, § 10.[p. 162. — "Nam pientis esse censuerunt."]
Lacedsemonii olim, cum permitterent ^ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xx.] p. 106.
pueris certa lege surripere bona aliena, s Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxx.l p. 184.
ea bona uon aliena sed propria surri-
o o2
564
THE CATCHING
Pa^rt musician doth not beget a musician. Yet we see the father's
'■ — eminence in any art begets a propension in his posterity to
the same; and where two or three successive generations do
happily insist in the steps one of another, they raise an art
to great perfection. I do easily acknowledge, that "politics
are a harder study than geometry/' and the practice more
than the theory, gained more by experience than by study.
Therefore our parliaments did prudently permit the eldest
sons of barons to be present at their consultations, to fit
them by degrees for that person which they must one day
sustain. But he had a mind to shew the statesmen his
teeth, as he had done to all other professions.
[What is There are many other errors and mistakes in his politics ;
a mixed as this, — that "sovereignty cannot be divided or that
\^'inmeift"] " there cannot be a mixed form of government"." Which is a
mere mistaking of the question. For though it be sometimes
styled a " mixed'' monarchy, because it doth partake of all
the advantages of aristocracy and democracy without par-
taking of their inconveniences, yet, to speak properly, it is
more aptly called a temperated or moderated sovereignty,
rather than " divided" or " mixed." Neither did any English
monarch communicate any essential of sovereignty to any
subject or subjects whatsoever. All civil power, legislative,
judiciary, military, was ever exercised in the name of the
king, and by his authority. The three estates of the king-
dom assembled in Parliament, were but suppliants to the
king, to have such or such laws enacted''. What is it then
that hath occasioned this mistake? Though the king hath
not granted away any part of his sovereign power, yet he
hath restrained himself by his coronation oath, and by his
great charters from the exercise of some part of it, in some
cases, without such and such requisite conditions (except
where the evident necessity of the commonwealth is a dis-
pensation from Heaven for the contrary). So he hath re-
strained himself in the exercise of his legislative power, that
he will govern his su})jects by no new laws other than such
as they should assent unto. It is not then any legislative
t De Cive, c. vii. § 4. [p. 78.] x [See above in Serpent Salve, sect.
'» [De Cive, ibid.]— Leviatl'i., [Pt. xii. vol. iii. pp. 369—375 ; Disc. ii.
11. c. xxix.] pp. 171, [172.]— &c. J»t. ii.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
565
power^ which tlie two Houses of Parliament have, either ex- Discourse
cliisively without the king, or inclusively with the king, but
a receptive or rather a preparative power, " sine qua non^' —
' without which' no new laws ought to be imposed upon
them ; and as no new laws, so no new taxes or impositions,
which are granted in England by a statute law.
B}^ this it is evident, how much his discourse of three
souls animating one body- " is wide from the purpose, and
his supposition of " setting up a supremacj^ against the
sovereignty, canons against laws, and a ghostly authority
against the civiP,'' weigheth less than nothing; seeing we
acknowledge, that the civil sovereign hath an architectonical
power, to see that all subjects within his dominions do their
duties in their several callings, for the safety and tranquillity
of their commonwealth, and to punish those that are exorbi-
tant with the civil sword, as well those who derive their
habitual power immediately from Christ, as those who derive
it from the sovereign himself. Then the constitution of our
English policy was not to be blamed ; the exercise of the
power of the keys, by authority from Christ, was not to be
blamed : but T. H. deserveth to be blamed, who presumeth
to censure before he understands.
Another of his whimsies is, that no law can be unjust." — [Laws may
"By a good law I mean, not a just law, for no law can be ""J^^^-l
unjust,^' &c. ; " it is in the laws of the commonwealth, as in
the laws of gaming ; whatsoever the gamesters all agree on,
is injustice to none of them An opinion absurd in itself,
and contradictory to his own ground. There may be laws
tending to the contumely of God, to atheism, to denial of
891 God's providence, to idolatry ; all which he confesseth to be
crimes of high treason against God^. There may be laws
against the law of nature, which he acknowledgeth to be the
" Divine law, . . eternal, immutable, . . which God hath made
known to all men by His eternal word born in themselves,
that is to say, natural reason^.'' But this question — whether
J [Leviath., Pt. 11. c. xxix. pp. 171, Ibid., [c. iii. § 29. p. 38.— "Leges
172.] Natvirse immutabiles et aeterna; sunt."]
* [Ibid., p. 171.] — c. xiv. § 4. [p. 158.—" Lex Naturalis
^ Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] pp. [181,] ea est, quam Deus omnibus hominibus
182. patcfecit per verbinn Siuini leternum
De Civc, [c. XV. ^ 17 — 19. pp. ipsis innatum, niiniruni rationem ip-
188—193.] sam."J
566
THE CATCHING
P A K T any law can be uniust — hatli been debated more fullv be-
lli. " . . . . r
'- — tween him and me in my answer to his Animadversions'^.
The true ground of this, and many other of his mistakes, is
this, — that he fancieth no reality of any natural justice or
honesty, nor any relation to the law of God or nature, but
only to the laws of the commonwealth. So, " from one ab-
surdity being admitted, many others are apt to follow
[T. H. his His oeconomics are no better than his politics. He teach-
eth parents, that they cannot be injurious to their children,
so long as they are in their power^." Yes, too many ways,
CECor:omics
no better
than his
politics . , , .
He teach- both by omission and commission. He teacheth mothers,
parents^' that " they may cast away their infants or expose them at
may kill
their chil
their own discretion lawfully g." He teacheth parents indif-
dren.j fercntly, that where they are free from all subjection/^ they
may take away the lives of their children" or kill them, and
this justly^. What horrid doctrines are these !
[His dream It may be he will tell us, that he speaketh only of the
of mere na- ^tate of mere nature:" but he doth not; for he speaketh
ture."j expressly of commonwealths', and paralleleth fathers with
kings and lords ^, to whom he ascribeth absolute dominion;
Tvho have no place in his " state of mere nature." Neither
can he speak of " the state of mere nature ;" for therein, ac-
cording to his grounds, the children have as much privilege
to kill their parents as the parents to kill their children, see-
ing he supposeth it to be a " state of war of all men against all
men^" And if he did speak of " the state of mere nature,"
it were all one. For, first, his " state of mere nature" is a
droW' sy dream of his own feigning, which " looketh upon men
as if they were suddenly grown out of the ground like mush-
rooms™." The primogenious and most natural state of man-
^ [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb,
xiv. [pp. 133—139.]— [Castig., Numb,
xiv. above pp. 321—327 ; Disc. ii. Pt.
iii.]
^ [" Posito uno absurdo sequuntur
mille."]
^ De Give, c. ix. § 7. [p. 98.—" Ne-
que posse parentem, quamdiu in ejus
potestate est, filio injurium esse."]
*f De Give, c. ix. § 2. [p. 96.—
** Manifestum autem est, cum qui modo
nascitur, prius esse in potestate matris
quam cujusquam alterius, ita ut ilium
vel educare vol exponere suo arbitrio et
jure possit."]
^ Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xiv.]
p. 137.
' [In the De Give, c. ix. § 2, Hobbes
is speaking of the " state of nature: "
in § 7, he is not.]
[De Give, c. ix. § 7. p. 98.—
" Servi dominis " — " subditi illi qui
summum habet imperium in civi-
tate."]
1 [Ibid., c. i. § 12. p. 9.— "Belluni
omnium in omnes."]
>" Ibid., c. viii. § 1. [p. 89.—" Ut re-
deamus iterum in statum naturalem,
OF LEVIATHAN.
567
kind was in Adam before his fall, that is, the state of inno- Discourse
cence. Or suppose vrc should give way to him to expound — — —
himself of the state of corrupted nature, that was in Adam
and his family after his fall. But there was no such " state of
mere nature" as he imagineth. There was religion, there
were laws, government, society. And if there ever were any
such barbarous savage rabble of men as he supposeth, in the
world, it is both untrue, and dishonourable to the God of
nature, to call it " the state of mere nature,'' which is the
state of degenerated nature. He might as well call a hydro-
pical distemper, contracted by intemperance, or any other
disease of that nature, the natural state of men. But there
never was any such degenerate rabble of men in the world,
that were without all religion, all government, all laws,
natural and civil ; no, not amongst the most barbarous
Americans", wlio (except some few criminal habits, which
those poor degenerate people, deceived by national custom,
do hold for noble) have more principles of natural piety, and
honesty, and morality, than are readily to be found in his
writings. As for the times of ci\'il war, they are so far from
being without all pacts and governors, that they abound
overmuch with pacts and governors, making policy not only
to seem, but to be, double. This evident truth may be de-
monstrated from his own grounds. — " All those places of
Holy Scripture, by which we are forbidden to invade that
which is another man's, as ' Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt
not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery,' do confirm the law
of distinction of mine and thine : for they suppose the right
of all men to all things to be taken away°." How can that
be, when he confesseth every where, that these are the
eternal laws of God and nature ? But (that which is much
more true) they both suppose and demonstrate, that there
never was any such "riglit of all men to all things." Let him
call them ^Maws" or " tlieoremsP," or what he please; they
consideremusque homines, tanquam si " Legem do distinctione nostri et alieni
essent jamjam subito e terra (fungo- confirmant omnia ilia Scripturae SacrjE
rum more) exorti et adulti sine omni loca, quibus invasio in alieuum prohi-
unius ad alterum obligationc."] betur ; ut ' non occidcs,' ' non fiirabc-
" [Among whom Hobbes affirmed ris,' ' non maechaberis ; ' supponunt
Ills state of nature to be then existing; enim jus omnium in omnia sublatum
Leviath., Pt, i, c. xiii. p. 63.] esse."]
" De Cive, c. iv. § 4. [p. 43.— ^ [Leviath., Pt. L c xv. p. SO.]
568
THE CATCHING
Part coiifute that statc of mere nature/' wliicli he maketh the
III. . .
'■ — foundation of his commonwealth.
[And yet Hitherto he hath been too high for the parents. Now they
parent hath ^^^^ cxpcct a cooHug Card. " The question who is the
no natural better man, hath no place in the condition of mere nature,
right over ' ^ ^ '
the child.] where all men are equals.'' Are the parent and child equal?
Yes: "they are equal, who can do' equal things one against
another ; but they who can do the greatest things, that is to
kill, can do equal things ; therefore all men b}^ nature are equal
among themselves^.'' If the sou have as strong an arm and as
good a cudgel as his father, he is as good a man as his father.
Another of his aphorisms is, — " Paternal dominion is not
so derived from generation, as if therefore the parent had 892
dominion over his child because he begat him, but by the
child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient argu-
ments declared^." And will you see how this consent is
gained ? " The attaining to sovereign power is by two ways,
one by natural force, as when a man maketh his children -
submit themselves and their children to his government, as
being able to destroy them if they refuse*." These principles
are so false, tliat the very evidence of truth doth extort the
contrary from him at other times. " The Bishop saw there
vras paternal government in Adam, which he might do easily,
as being no deep consideration";" and again, " To kill one's
parent is a greater crime than to kill another ; for the parent
ought to have the honour of a sovereign (though he have sur-
rendered his power to the civil law), because he had it origi-
[" Magna nally by nature^." " Great is truth, and prevaileth." If
IfprZva- ^^^^^ were " no deep consideration," the more he deserveth to
let." 3 Es- blamed : who at some times robbeth both parents of their
drasiv.41.] . ^
honour, some other times the man only : as, " By the right
of nature the dominion over an infant doth belong first to
him who hath him first in his power ; and it is manifest, that
he that is born is sooner in the power of his mother than of
any other, so that she might either bring him up, or cast him
1 [Leviath., Pt. I. c. xv. p. 76.]
r [De Give, c. i. § 3. p. 5.—" lEqua-
les sunt qui scqualia contra se invicem
possunt. At qui maxima possunt, ni-
rnirum occidere, yequalia })Ossunt. Sunt
igitur ojunes homines natura inter se
aequales."]
s Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xx.] p. 102.
t Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xvii.] p. 88.
" Qu., [ Animadv. vipon Numb, xiv.]
p. 139.
Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 160.
OF LEVIATHAN.
569
out, ut her pleasure, and by right^;" — (never without the Discourse
fathei-'s licence;) — again, "In the state of nature it cannot — — — -
be known who is father of an infant but by the relation of
the mother ; therefore he is his, whom the mother would
have him to be; and therefore the mother's Doth this
man believe in earnest, that marriage was instituted by God [Gen.ii.22-
. -r^ T -.11 -1 • 1 • n 24.— Mai.
m Paradise, and hath continued ever since the creation r a. 15.—
He might as well tell us, in plain terms, that all the obliga- 4!6j!l&c.]
tion which a child hath to his parent, is because he did not
take him by the heels and knock out his brains against the
walls, so soon as he was born. Though this be intolerable,
yet there is something of gratitude in it, and in that respect
it is not altogether so ill, as his forced " pacts
How repugnant is this which he saith of the mother's
dominion over her children to the law of nations ! By the
Jaw of the twelve tables a father might sell his child twice ; —
" bis venum duat^.'' The mother had no hand in it. Neither
doth the judicial law of the Jews dissent from this ; — " If a Exod. xxi.
7nan sell his daughter to be a maid-servant." So likewise a ^'
child's vow might be invalidated by the authority of a father, Num. xxx.
but not of a mother. ^' ^"^'^
He aboundeth every where with such destructive conclu-
sions as these : — " As to generation, God hath ordained to
man a helper ; and there be always two that are equally
parents ; the dominion therefore over the child should belong
equally to both, and he be equally subject to both ; which is
impossible, for ^no man can obey two masters ''.^ Whether [Matt. vi.
had he forgotten the Commandment, Honour thy father xviTlk^^^
and thy mother,'' or thinketh he that obedience is not a
branch of " honour ?"
In the next place, his principles destroy the subordination [Hisprin-
of a wife to her husband. " The inequality of natural stToy\he"
strength is less than that a man can acquire dominion over tJJj^^^of^a*"
a woman without war^." And he giveth this reason, why ^^i^e toher
° ' husband.]
y De Give, c. ix. § 2. [p. 96. — " Jure esse ; et proinde matris est."]
igitur naturae dominium infantis ad " [See above note t.]
eum primum pertinet qui primus in [The law stood thus — " Si pater
potestate sua ipsum habet. Manifes- filiom ter venumduit, filius a patre li-
tum autem est," &c. See above p. ber esto." See the fragments of the
566, note g.] XII. Tables, Tab. iv. ; ap. Gothofred.,
^ Ibid., § 3. [p. 96. — " Adde quod De Fontibus Quatuor Juris Civilis, 4to.
in statu naturae sciri non potest, cujus Gencv. 1653.]
patris filius est, nisi indicio matris; •= Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xx.] p. 102.
ejus igitur est, quem mater vult eum De Give, c. ix. § 3. [p. 96.^
570
-THE CATCHING
^111^ the contrary custom prevaileth; — because "commonwealths"
'- — were "constituted by fathers of families_,not by mothers of fami-
lies/'and from hence it is that "the domestical dominion belongs
to the man^." The Scriptures assign another reason of the
subjection of the woman, and the rule of the man; namely,
Gen.iii.i6. the ordinance of Almighty God. And St. Paul secondeth it:
1 Cor. xiv. — Women are commanded to be under obedience, as also
34
saith the law — I trow that law was not made " by fathers of
Eph. V. 22. families:^' — "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own hus-
bands, as unto the Lord ;" — why ? because of " the civiX law ?"
[Eph. v.] no such thing ; — " for the husband is the head of the wife, even
1 Cor. xi. as Christ is the Head of the Chui'ch :" and, " The man is the
' image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the
man ; for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of
the man, neither was the man created for the woman, but
1 Tim. ii. the woman for the man.''^ He would not " suffer a woman . .
to usurp authority over a man much less over her own
[! Peteriii. husband. I might cite St. Peter to the same purpose; but
^ ^'^ I am afraid, lest he should accuse both St. Peter and St. Paul
of partiaHty, as well as the first founders of commonwealths.
[And Upon his principles, no man is sure of his own wife, if
adultery.] ^^^^ sovereign please to dispose her to another : — " For
although the law of nature do prohibit theft, or adultery,'"'
&c., " yet, if the ci\il law command a man to invade any
thing, that is not theft or adult eiy^.'''' And what is "the 893
ci\il law" in his sense ? " The command of the lawgiver ;
and his command is the declaration of his willg." So, if the
lawgiver do but declai-e his pleasure that any one shall enjoy
such a man's wife, or that she shall no longer be his wife,
according to his grounds, husband and wife must both obey.
" What is theft, what is murder, what is adultery, is known
by the civil law ; that is, by the commands of him that is
sovereign in the commonwealth^." And without the sove-
reign's commandj if either party do but suspect one another,
" Inaequalitasviriumnaturalium minor turn, adulterium, &c., si tamen lex
est quam ut mas in foeminam inipe- civilis jubeat invadere aliqiiid, non est
riuni sine bello acquirere possit."] illud furtum, adulterium, &c."]
' De Cive, § 6. [p. 98.—" In omnibus « Ibid., § 13. [p. 163.—" Est enim
civitatibus, scilicet constitutis a patri- lex legislatoris mandatum ; mandatum
bus, non a matribus familias, imperium autem est declaratio voluntatis."]
domesticum viri est."] ^ Ibid., c. vi. § 16. [p. 69. See above
f Ibid., c. xiv. § 10. [p. 162.— p. 516. note o.]
*' Naiu ctsi natura; lex prohibeat fur-
OF LEVIATHAN.
571
the party suspected is disobhged ; — " for there is no pact, Discourse
•where credit is not given to him that maketh the pact ; — —
neither can faith be violated, -where it is not had^^'
The next political relation is between the master and the [And over-
servant, which the Hobbian principles do overthrow as well relation of
as the rest. One of these principles is, that " a master hfmasterj
cannot do any wrong to his servant, because the servant hath
subjected his will to the will of his master^.'^ In all such
submissions there is evermore either expressed or impHed a
salvo, or a saving of his duty to God and his allegiance to his
prince. If his master shall puuish him for not doing contrary
to these, or by menaces compel him to do contrary to these,
he doth him wrong. No man can transfer that right to
another, which he hath not himself. The servant, before his
submission to his master, had no light to deny due obedience
to God, or due allegiance to his prince.
Another of his pai'adoxes is, that " whosoever is obhged to
obey the commands of any other, before he know what he
will command, is bound to all his commands simply and
■without restriction ; now he that is obhged, is called a ser-
vant ; he to whom he is bound, a master^^^ What if the
master^s command be contrary to the laws of God or nature '?
or the laws of the commonwealth ? ' In the presence of a
greater authority, a lesser authority ceaseth.^ Such implicit
obhgations ai'e ever to be understood qua/if urn Jus fasque
fuerW — " according to law and equity.^'
Hitherto servants have been grieved, but now they shall
be relieved, if T. H. his authority can do it. — " Servants who
ai'e holden in bonds, are not comprehended in the definition
of servants, because they serve not by pact, but to avoid
beating ; and therefore if they fly away, or kill their master,
they do nothing contrary to the laws of natm-e : for to bind'
them is a sign, that the binder did suppose them not
sufficiently bound by any other obligations'.'^ His conse-
1 De Cive, c.\\\\. § 9. [p. 93. — " Xon domiiii voluntati subjecere.""]
eniin exisiit pactum nisi ubi paciscenti 1 Ibid., c. \\u. § 1. [p. 90. — '* Nam
creditur, nec violari potest fides quae qui mandatis cujusquam obedire aute
uou est habita."] ^ obligatur quam quid imperaturus sit
Ibid., c. viii. § 7. [p. 92. — ''Quod sciat, tenetur ad omnia mandata sim-
is qui summum ci\-itatis imperium ha- pliciter et sine restrictione ; jam qui
bet, nullam iis" (subditis) *• injuriam sic tenetur servus, is cui teuetur domi-
facere potest, verum quoque de servis uus, appellatur."]
est; propterea quod voluutatem suam " Ibid., c. viii. § 4. [pp. 90, 91. —
572
THE CATCHING
Part quence is infirm, — because tlie master binds bis servant,
— — tberefore be distrusts bim, tberefore tbere were no pacts/'
A man may give bis parole for true imprisonment, and
having given it to a just enemy is obbged to bold it. What
if bis conqueror or master did spare bis life, upon condition
tbat be sbould be true prisoner, until be could find out a fit
excbange for bim ? Tbis was a lawful pact." Tben dotb not
T. H. instruct tbe prisoner well, to cut bis conquerors tbroat,
wbo spared bis life upon a lawful condition ?
But to dispel tbese umbrages, be teacbetb, tbat " a servant
wbo is cast into bonds, or any way deprived of bis corporal
liberty, is freed from tbat otber obligation wbicb did arise
from bis pact^." So as, according to bis principle, if a ser-
vant (tbat is more tban a captive), ba^dng not only bad bis
life spared by a just conqueror, but also contracted and en-
gaged bimself to be a loyal servant, as firmly as may be,
sball nevertbeless be cast into any bonds by bis master, or be
restrained of bis corporal libert}^, upon delinquency, or just
suspicion, be is acquitted of all bis "pacts" and obligations,
and as free to run away, or cut bis master's tbroat, as if be
bad never "pacted" or engaged at all.
[A bundle His defaults come so tbick, I am weary of observing tbem.
his poiiti- Take a botcbpotcb togetber. —
cai errors.] -|^^ <( ^-^^ ^^^^^ nature, profit is tbe measure of
rigbt°."
2. " Every one is an enemy to every one, wbom be neitber
commandetb nor obeyetbP."
3. "Not only to contend against one, but even tbis very
tbing — not to consent, — is odious ; for not to consent witb
one in some tbing, is tacitly to accuse bim of error in tbat
tbing; as to dissent in many tbings, is to bold bim for a
Tool^." In tbe Name of God, wbat dotb be bold tbe wbole
" Servi itaque hujiismodi, qui carceri-
bus, ergastulis, viiiculisve cohibentur,
non coniprehenduiitur definitione ser-
vorum supra tradita ; quia serviunt hi,
non pacto, sed ne vapulent ; ideoque
si aulugerint vel domiiium interfece-
rint, nihil faciunt contra leges natu-
rales ; etenini vinculis ligari signum
est, ilium qui ligat, supponere ligatum
nulla alia obligatione satis teneri."]
" Ibid., § 9. [p. 93.— "Servus qui
in vincula conjicitur, vel quoquo mode
libertate corporali privatur, altera ilia
obligatione pactitia liberatur."]
° Ibid., c. i. § 10. [p. 8.—" Ex quo
etiam intelligitur, in statu naturae
mensuram juris esse utilitatem "]
P Ibid., c. ix. § 3. [p. 96.— "Hostis
autem est quisque cuique cui nequc
paret neque iniperat."]
'1 Ibid., c. i. § 5. [p. 6.— "Etenini
non niodo contra contendere, sed etiam
OF' LEVIATHAN.
573
world to be ? I am sure lie " dissenteth" from them all ^' in Discourse
.1 • „ III.
maijy things. —
4. " It is not reasonable^ tliat one perform firsts if it be
likely that the other will not perform afterwards ; which
whether it be likely or no, he that feareth shall judge ^.^^ It
is true he addeth, that " in the civil state, w here both parties
may be compelled, he who is to perform first by the contract,
ought to perform first ^" But what if the civil power be not
;f;4able to compel him? What if there be no witnesses to prove
the contract? Then the civil power can do nothing. May a
man violate his faith in such cases, upon general suspicions
of the fraud and unfaithfulness of mankind ?
5. ^^If a people have elected a sovereign for term of life,^'
and he die, neither the people before election, nor he before
his death, having ordained any thing about a place of meeting
for " a new election,^^ it " is lawful for every one, by equal,
that is, natural right, to snatch the sovereignty to himself if
he can*.'' His opinion of the "state of nature'' is a very
bundle of absurdities.
6. '^AMien a master commandeth his servant to give
money to a stranger, if it be not done, the injmy is done to
the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey, but the
damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obli-
gation, and therefore could not injure him"." True, accord-
ing to his principles ; who maketh neither conscience, nor
honesty, nor obligation from any one to any one, but only by
"pacts" or promises. All just men are of another mind.
7. " Those men, which are so remissly governed, that they
dare take up arms to defend or introduce a new opinion, are
hoc ipsum non consentire, odiosum Supponamus jam populum trailidissa
est; etenim non consentire alicui in re summum imperium alicui uni honiini
aliqua est eum erroris in ea re tacite pro tempore titntum vitoe suae ; quod
accusare, sicut in valde multis dissen- cum fecisset, putenius primo e coetu
tire idem est atque pro stulto eum ha- unumquemqueita discessisse, utdeloco,
here."] ubi (post mortem ejus) ad novam elec-
. ' De Cive, c. ii. § 11. [p. 17. — " Ra- tionem congrcgarentur, nihil omnino
tionis enim non est, ut aliquis praestet ordinatum sit. In hoc casu manifes-
prior, si verisimile non sit alterum esse tum est, . . populuni non esse ani])lius
praestiturum post ; quod utrum verisi- personam sed multitudinem dissolu-
niile sit necne, is qui metuit judica- tarn, quorum cuilibet cum qiiibuslibet
bit."] convenire diverso tempore et loco quo
s [Ibid., pp. 17,18. — '* Caeterum in libuerit, vel imperium sibi rapere si
statu civili, ubi est qui utrumque cog(?re potuerit, lequo jure, uimirum naturali,
potest, is qui per contractum prior est licitum est."]
ad praestanduni, prior prajstare debet."] " Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xv.] p. 74.
t Ibid., c. vii. § 1(>. [pp. 83, 84.—
574
THE CATCHING
^ni ^ still in war ; and their condition not peace, but only a cessa-
'■ — tion of arms, for fear of one another ^'/^ Why is the fault
rather imputed to the ' remissness^ of the ' governor/ than to
the sedition of the people ? and a state of war feigned, where
none is ? The reason is evident ; — because he had no hand in
the government, but had a hand in the introduction of new
opinions.
8. " In a sovereign assembly, the liberty to protest is taken
away : both because he that protesteth there, denieth their
sovereignty ; and also, whatsoever is commanded by the sove-
reign power, is as to the subject justified by the command,
though not so always in the sight of God^.'' That is not
"taken away,^^ which all sovereigns do allow, even in the
competition for a crown ; as was verified in the case of the
King of Spain, and the House of Braganza, about the king-
dom of Portugal''. It is no Menial of sovereignty,^ to appeal
humbly from a sovereign misinformed to himself better in-
formedy. The commands of a sovereign person or assembly
are so far justified by the command," that they may not be
resisted ; but they are not so far justified, but that a loyal
subject may lawfully seek with all due submission to have
them rectified.
9. "If he whose private interest is to be debated and
judged in" a sovereign " assembly, make as many friends as
he can, it is no injustice in him ; . . and though he hire such
friends with money, unless there be an express law against it,
yet it is no injustice It is to be feared, that such provo-
cations as this are not very needful in these times. Is it not
[Exod. unlawful to "blind the eyes of the wise" with bribes, and make
Eccies. XX. them pervert judgment ? Others pretend expedition, or an
^^•^ equal hearing ; but he, who knoweth no obligation but "pacts,"
is for downright " hiring" of his judges, as a man should hire
a hackney coach for an hour. There is no gratitude in
hiring; which is unlawful in the buyer, though not so un-
" Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xviii.] p. 91.
w Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxii.] p. 117.
* [The revolution which placed John
Duke of Braganza upon the throne of
Portugal, took place in 1640; but the
war with Spain which ensued, did not
terminate until KUio, and at the date of
Bramh all's writing (1657, 8) was being
carried on with vigour.]
y [Plut., Apophth. Regum. Philip.
Numb, xxiv ; Op. Moral., torn. i. pp.
497, 498. ed. Wyttenb.]
Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxii.] p. 122.
OF LEVIATHAX.
0/0
Liwful as in the seller, of justice. If any man digged a pit. Discourse
and did not cover it, so that an ox or an ass fell into it, he — ^ — -
who digged it was to make satisfaction. He that hireth his 33^^ '
judges with money to be for him right or wrong, diggeth a
pit for them ; and by the equity of this ^Nlosaical law, will
appear not to be innocent.
Thus, after the ^-iew of his religion, we have hkewise snr-
veyed his politics ; as full of black ugly dismal rocks as the
former, dictated with the same magisterial authority. A man
may judge them to be twins upon the first cast of his eye.
It was Solomon^s advice, " Remove not the ancient land- Prov. xxii.
28
marks w^hich thy fathers have set.^' But T. H. taketh a pride
in removing aU ancient land-marks, between pnnce and sub-
ject, father and child, husband and wife, master and servant,
man and man. Kilus after a great overflowing doth not
leave such a confusion after it as he doth; nor a hog in a
garden of herbs. I wish he would have turned probationer
a while, and made trial of his new form of government first
in his own house, before he had gone about to obtrude it
upon the commonwealth^; and that, before his attempts and
bold endeavours to reform and to renew the policy of his
native country, he had thought more seriously and more
sadly of his own application of the fable of Peleus his " foolish
daughters,^' — "who, desiring to renew the youth of their
decrepit father, did, by the counsel of Medea, cut him in
pieces and boil him together with strange herbs ; but made
not of him a new man^/^
CHAP. III.
THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE INCONSISTENT ONE WITH ANOTHER.
My third harping iron is aimed at the head of his Le- [t. h.'s
viathan, or the rational part of his discourse; to shew that g^reof "Jif.
his principles are contradictory one to another, and conse- j^iJj'nr]^''^"
quently destructive one of another. It is his own observa-
tion : — " That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom
in him that formeth a religion, or addeth to it when it is
* [A saying of Lycurgus. — Plut., in Leviath., [Ft. II. c. xxx.] p. 177.
V. Lycurg., torn. i. p. 111. td. Bryant.]
576
THE CATCHING
Part already formed, is an enjoining a belief of contradictories :
— ^H: — for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true •
and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argument of
ignorance''/' How he will free himself from his own censure,
I do not understand. Let the reader judge.
[An here- He affirmetli, that an hereditar}^ kingdom is the best form
domX^and government ; — " We are made subjects to him upon the
is not the best Condition, whose interest it is that we should be safe and
best form n t i • i i i • ,
of govern- sound; and this cometh to pass when we are the sovereign s
ment.] inheritance^' (that is, in an hereditary kingdom) ; "for eveiy
one doth of his own accord study to preserve his own inheri-
tance Now let us hear him retract all this. " There is
no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the
succession is not in the present sovereign^ and, " Whether
he transfer it by testament, or give it or sell it, it is rightly
disposed ^'''
[Divine law Wq affirmeth, " That which is said in the Scnptiu'e — ^It is
ought and
ought not better to obey God than man,' hath place in the kingdom of
ed^i^ pre-' ^rod by pact, and not by nature ^.'^ One can scarcel}^ meet
ference to ^ more absurd, senseless paradox : — that in God's own
human _ j r ^
law.] " kingdom of nature" (where he supposeth all men equal, and
no governor but God) it should not be better to obey God
than man, the Creator than the creature, the Sovereign rather
than a fellow-subject. Of the two it had been the less ab-
surdity to have said, that it had place in "the kingdom of
God by nature," and not " by pact ;" because, in the king-
dom of God by pact, sovereigns are as " mortal gods^."
Now let us see him, Penelope like, unweave in the night
what he had woven in the day^, or rather unweave in the day
what he had woven in the night. " It is manifest enough, that
when [a] man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows
that one of them is God's, he ought to obey that, and not
the other, though it be the command even of his lawful
sovereign^." Take another place more express ; speaking of
c Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xii.] p. 58. e Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xix.] p. 99.
d De Give, c. x. § 18. [p. 119.— f De Give, c. ix. § 13. [p. 102. See
" Optima conditione illi subjicimur, above p. 560. note c]
cujus interest ut salvi et sani simus ; k Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxxi.] p. 193.
atque hoc fit, quando imperantis haere- h [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87. J
ditas sumus, unusquisque enim sponte i [Odyss. ii. 93 — 110.]
sua haereditatem suani conservare ■* Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 321.
studet."]
OF LEVIATHAN".
577
the first kingdom of God by pact with Abraham, &c., he Discourse
hath these words, " Xor was there any contract which could — Ei: —
add to or strengthen the obhgation, by which both they and all
men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty And
before any such kingdom of God by pact, " as to the moral
law they were ah'eady obliged, and needed not have been
contracted withal™/^ He fancieth, that God reigned ^^by
pact" over Adam and Eve, but "this pact became presently
void"." And if it had stood fii'm, what kingdom of God by
natui-e could have been before it ? But he reckons his king-
dom of God by pact from Abraham, — "From him the kingdom [Gen. xiv.
of God by pact takes its beginning"." But in Abraham^s time, 9' j ^'^*
and before his time, the world was fall of kings; every city had
a king ; was it not better for then- subjects to obey God than
them ? Yet that was " the kingdom of God by natui'e," or
no kingdom of God at all.
Sometimes he saith the laws of nature are God's laws : — [The laws
" hose laws (such of them as obhge all mankind), in re- are^Gocrs
spect of God, as He is the God of natm-e, are natm-al ; and in JfJ'ia^"
respect of the same God, as He is King of Kings, arelaws?;" all.]
and, "Eight reason is a law'i;" and he defines the law of
natm-e to be "the dictate of right reason \" TMiere by the
way observe, what he makes to be the end of the laws of
nature; — "the long conservation of our lives and members,
so much as is in om' power ^" By this the reader may see
what he believes of honesty or the life to come. At other
times he saith, that they are no laws : — " Those which we call
the laws of nature being nothing else but certain conclusions
understood by reason, of things to be done or to be left un-
done,— and a law, if we speak properly and accurately, is the
speech of him that commandeth something by right to others,
to be done or not to be done, — speaking properly, they are
' LeA-iath., [Pt. III. c. xxxix.] p. 249. p Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxx.] pp. 185,
Ibid. [186.]
n De Give, c. xvi. § 2. [p. 195.— q De Give, c. ii. § 1. [p. 13.—
"Initio mundi regna\-it q\iidem Deus " Est igitur lex quaedara recta ratio."]
non solum naturaliter sed etiam per r [Ibid. — " Est igitur lex naturalis,
pactum super Adamum et Evam. . . ut earn definiam, dictaraen rectse rati-
Quoniam autem pactum hoc statim ouis circa ea quae agenda vel omittenda
irritum factum est," &c.] sunt, ad vitae membrorumque conserv^a-
° [De Give, c. xvi. § 1. p. 195. — tionem, quanttim fieri potest, diutiir-
" Ab eo" (Abrabamo) "Regnum Dei nam."]
per pacta initium sumit."] » [Ibid. See last note.]
BRAMHALL. p p
578
THE CATCHING
Part not laws, as they proceed from nature*/^ It is true, he
— ~ — addeth in the same place, that " as they are given by God
in Holy Scripture, they are most properly called laws ; for
the Holy Scripture is the voice of God ruling all things by
the greatest right ""/^ But this will not salve the contra-
diction; for so the laws of nature shall be no laws to any
but those who have read the Scripture, contrary to the sense
of all the world. And even in this he contradicteth himself
also : — ^' The Bible is a law : to whom ? to all the world ? 896
he knoweth it is not : how came it then to be a law to us ?
did God speak it viva voce to us ? have we any other warrant
for it than the word of the Prophets ? have we seen the mi-
racles ? have we any other assurance of their certainty than
the authority of the Church'' And so he concludeth,
that "the authority of the Church is "the authority of the
commonwealth," the authority of the commonwealth the
authority of the sovereign, and his authority was given him
by us^. And so " the Bible was made law by the assent of
the subjects y and, " The Bible is there only law, where
the civil sovereign hath made it so^." Thus, in seeking to
prove one contradiction, we have met with two.
He teacheth, that " the laws of nature are eternal and
immutable; that which they forbid can never be lawful, that
which they command never unlawful^." At other times he
teacheth, that " in war, and especially in a war of all men
against all men, the laws of nature are silent and that they
do not oblige as laws, before there be a commonwealth con-
stituted ; — " When a commonwealth is once settled, then are
they actually laws, and not before'^."
[The sove- He saith, " True religion consisteth in obedience to
gSfrate^s Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both
t De Give, c. iii.§ 33. [p.41.— " Natu-
rae autem quas vocamus leges, cum nihil
aliud sint quam conclusiones quaedam
ratione intellectae, de agendis et omitten-
dis ; lex autem, proprie atque accurati
loquendo, sit oratio ejus qui aliquid
fieri vel non fieri aliis jure imperat ; non
sunt illse proprie loquendo leges, qua-
tenus a natura procedunt."]
a De Cive, c. iii. § 29. [p. 38.—
" Leges naturae immutahiles et aeternae
sunt; quod vetant, nunquam lieitum
esse potest ; quod jubent, nunquam
illicitum."]
* Qu., [ Animadv. upon Numb, xiv.]
p. 136.
maximo jure imperantis Dei oratio."]
^ Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 322.
y Ibid.
" [Ibid. — " Ciuatenus tamen eaedem
a Deo in Scripturis Sacris latac sunt, . .
legum nomine propriissime appellan-
tur ; est enim Scriptura Sacra in omnia
" Ibid., c. V. § 2. [p. 52. See above
p. 552. note m.]
« Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvi.] p. 138.
OF LEVIATHAN. 579
in. attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenan- Discourse
cies shall ordain;" which "lieutenant" upon earth is the
" supreme ci^il magistrate'^." And yet, contrary to this, he ^he uiti^-^*
excepteth from the obedience due to sovereign princes, " all ^^reii^<^ious
things that are contrary to the laws of God, AVho ruleth over questions.]
rulers ;" adding, that " we cannot rightly transfer the obedi-
ence due to him upon men^:" and more plainly, "If a so-
vereign shall command himself to be worshipped Avith Divine
attributes and actions, — as, such as imply an independence
upon God, or immortality, or infinite power, to pray unto
them being absent, or to ask those things of them which
only God can give, to offer sacrifice, or the like, — although
kings command us, we must abstain ^" He confesseth,
"that the subjects of Abraham had sinned," if they had
" denied the existence or pro\idence of God," or " done any
thing that was expressly against the honour of God," in obe-
dience to his commands^: and, "Actions that are naturally
signs of contumely, . . cannot be made by human power a
part of Divine worship^." " Cannot be parts of Divine wor-
ship," and yet " religion" may " consist in" such worship, is
a contradiction.
He confesseth, that "if the commonwealth should com-
mand a subject to say or do some thing that is contumelious
unto God, or should forbid him to worship God," he ''ought
not to obey':" and yet maintaineth, that " a Christian holding
firmly the faith of Christ in his heart," if he be "commanded
by his lawful sovereign," may "deny Christ with his tongue^:"
alleging, " that profession with the tongue is but an external
thing," and "that it is not he in that case, who denieth Christ
before men, but his governor and the law of his country ^"
Hath he so soon forgot himself? Is not the denial of Christ
" contumelious to God?"
•J Qu., [T. H. Numb, xxxviii.] p.
'334 ; and [Animadv. upon Numb,
xxxviii.] p. 341.
e De Give, c. vi. § 13.— [p. 66. "A
qua nihil excipiatur quod non sit con-
tra leges Dei imperantis imperantibus,
Cui debitam obedientiam transferre in
homines jure non possumus."]
^ Ibid., c. XV. § 18. [pp. 189, 190.
See aboye p. 496, note u.]
K Ibid., c. xvi. § 7. [p. 198.—" Se-
P
quitur hinc subditos Abrahami ipsi
obediendo peccare non potuisse, modo
Abrahamus non imperasset Dei exis-
tentiam vel providentiani negare, vel
facere aliquid quod esset expresse con-
tra honorem Dei."]
1' Leviath., [Ft. II. c. xxxi.] p. 192.
• De Give, c. xv. § 18. [p. 190. See
above p. 495. note s.]
^ Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 271.
• [Ibid.]
2
580
THE CATCHING
Part He affirmetli, that if a sovereign shall grant to a subject
'— "any liberty inconsistent with sovereign power, if the subiect
f A subject o X t/
may ana refuse to obey the sovereign's command/' being " contrary to
judge of liberty granted, it is a sin, and contrary to his duty, for
what IS }jg ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with sove-
good or _
evil to be rcignty," &c. ; and that such liberty was granted through
done.] ignorance of the evil consequence thereof"".'' Then a subject
may judge, not only what is fit for his own preservation, but
also what are the essential rights of sovereignty; which is
contrary to his doctrine elsewhere : — " It belongs to kings to
discern what is good and e^dl," and "private men, who take to
themselves the knowledge of good and evil, do covet to be as
kings, which consisteth not with the safety of the common-
wealth";" which he calleth "a seditious doctrine," and one
of "the diseases of a commonwealth °." Yet such is his for-
getfulness, that he himself licenseth his own book for the
pressP, and to be "taught in the Universities^," as contain-
ing " nothing contrary to the Word of God or good manners,
or to the disturbance of public tranquillity ^" Is not this to
" take to himself the knowledge of good and evil ?"
[The just In one place he saith, that the just power of sovereigns is
sovereigns " absolute, and to be limited by the strength of the common-
and*>S^' "^^^1*^ nothing else^" In other places he saith, his
limited.] power is to be limited by the laws of God and nature; as,
" There is that in Heaven, though not on earth, which he
should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey';"
and, " Though it be not determined in Scripture, what laws
every king shall constitute in his dominions, yet it is deter-
mined, what laws he shall not constitute" ;" and, " It is true,
that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because 897
such laws be Di™e, and cannot by any man or common-
wealth be abrogated
In one place he maintaineth, that " all men by nature are
™ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxvii.] p. 157. p. 395.
n De Give, c. xii. § 1. [p. 127. <J [Ibid.]
" Quoniam ergo regum est discernere ' [Ibid.]
inter bonum et makim," &c. " Privati s De Give, c. vi. § 18. [p. 70.—
autem homines, dum cognitionem boni " Summam sive absolutam, viribus ci-
et mali ad se trahunt, cupiunt esse vitatis nec ulla alia re limitandum."]^
sicut reges; quod salva civitate fieri t Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 167.
non potest."] " Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] p. 199.
o Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 168. ' Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
^ Ibid., [Review and Gonclusion,]
OF LEVIATHAN.
581
mos HI.
6.]
equal among themselves^ in another place, that " the Discourse
father of every man was originally his sovereign lord_, with — —
power over him of life and death >
He acknowledgeth, that God is not only " good," and [God is
"just," and "merciful," but "the best"';" that "nature doth yeuhe"^
dictate" to us, that God is to be honoured^; and that " to ^1^"^
honoui' is to think as highly of His power and goodness as is
possible;" and that nothing ought to be attributed to Him
but what is honom'able^\ Nothing can be more contrary to
His goodness, or more dishonourable to God, than to make
Him to be the cause of all the sin in the world. " Perhaps
he will say, that this opinion maketh God the cause of sin ;
but doth not the Bishop think Him the cause of all actions ?
and are not sins of commission actions? is murder no action?
and doth not God Himself say, ^ Nor est malum in civitate [a
(2Uod Ego non feci?' and was not murder one of those evils <^
The like doctrine he hath, Qu. pp. 108, and 234^.
I chanced to say, that "if a child, before he have the use [Children
of reason, shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he had [JJa^ j,"*^
no malice to incite him to it, nor reason to restrain him f ufe^slns
from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular
justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the
case^;" shewing only what was the law, not what was my opi-
nion.— (An innocent child, for terror to others, in some cases
may be deprived of those honours and inheritances which
were to have descended upon him from his father, but not of
his life. Amaziah slew the murderers of the king his father, 2 Chron.
"but he slew not their childi-en, but did as it is written in Deut. xxiv.
the law, in the book of Moses, 'The fathers shall not die for
the children nor the children for the fathers.^") — And he
presently taxed me for it : — " The Bishop would make but
an ill judge of innocent children ^.'^ And the same merciful
opinion he maintaineth elsewhere : — " All punishments of
innocent subjects, be they great or little, ai'e agauist the law
* De Cive, c. i. § 3. [p. 5.—" Sunt
lO.
igitiir omnes homines natiira inter se [Aniniadv. upon Numb- xii. (see
eequales."] above pp. 312, 313), and upon Numb,
y Leviath., [Pt II. c. xxx.] p. 178. xx. (see above pp. 396, 397).]
^ De Cive, c. xv. § [14. p. 184.] « [See above in the Defence, Numb,
a [Ibid., § 8. p. 181.] XXV. p. 162 ; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]
^ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxxi.] p. ISS. ^ Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xxv.]
Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xv.] p. 277.
582
THE CATCHING
Part of nature; for punishment is only for transgression of the
— law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the inno-
cents/^ Yet within few lines after he changeth his note : —
"In subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the
commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully ex-
tended, not only to the fathers, but also to the third and
fourth generation^." His reason is, because " this offence
consisteth in renouncing of subjection;" so they "suffer not as
subjects, but as enemies'." Well, but the children were born
subjects as well as the father, and they never "renounced
their subjection :" how come they to lose their birtliright
and their lives for their fathers' fault, if "there can be no
punishment of the innocent?" So the contradiction stands
still.
[The ma- But all this is but a copy of his countenance. I have
frighTas'^^ shewed formerly-" expressly out of his principles, that "the
kin" but no foundation of the right of punishing, exercised in every com-
ma^^Ltrate ^^nwcalth," is not the just right of the sovereign for crimes
to punish, committed, but "that right which every man by nature had
subject.] to kill every man which right he saith every subject hath
renounced, but the sovereign, by whose authority punish-
ment is inflicted, hath not ; so, if he do examine the crime
in justice, and condemn the delinquent, then it is properly
punishment; if he do not, then it is a "hostile act;" but both
ways just and allowable. E-eader, if thou please to see what
a slippery memory he hath, for thine own satisfaction, read
over the beginning of the eight and twentieth chapter of his
Leviathan'^. Innocents cannot be justly punished, but justly
killed, upon his principles.
[T. H. But this very man, who would seem so zealous sometimes
zealous for f^j. Ji^ixnan iusticc, that there can be no iust punishment of
human jus- ^ . . J r
tice, yet^ innoccnts, no just punishment but for crimes committed,
not Di- how standeth he affected to Divine justice ? He regardeth it
^'"^*-' not at all, grounding every where God's right to afflict the
creatures upon His omnipotence ; and maintaining, that
God may as justly afflict with eternal torments without sin
as for sin. — " Though God have power to afflict a man, and
« Lcviath., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 165. [pp. 161—163 : upon the defini-
[Ibid.] tion of punishment," and "the right to
' [Ibid., pp. 165, 166.] punish, whence derived."]
' [Above in c. ii. pp. 561, 562.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
583
not for sin, without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as Discourse
to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless — Hit —
torments? is it not cruelty? no more than to do the same
for sin, when He that afflicteth might without trouble have
kept him from sinning'/^ Whether God do "afflict" eternally,
or punish eternally; whether the sovereign proceed judicially
or in a "hostile'^ way; so it be not for any crime committed,
it is all one as to the justice of God, and the sovereign, and
all one as to the sufferings of the innocent. But "it may
898 and doth often happen in commonwealths, that a subject
may be put to death by the command of the sovereign
power, and yet neither do the other wrong™;^' that is to say,
both be innocent, for that is the whole scope of the place. It
is against the law of nature to punish innocent subjects,
saith one place ; but innocent subjects may lawfully be killed
or put to death, saith another.
Sometimes he maketh the institution of sovereignty to be [The insti-
only the laying down the right of subjects, which they had sovereignty
by nature : — " For he who renounceth or passeth away his and"njf ar?
right, giveth not to any other man a right which he had not jjj^'^®.^^,^^®^
before, because there is nothing to which every man had not ofthesove-
right by nature ; but only standeth out of his way, that he
may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from
him, not without hindrance from another And elsewhere,
— "The subjects did not give the sovereign that right, but
only in laying down theirs strengthened him to use his own,"
&c. ; " so it was not given, but left to him and to him only°."
And, " The translation of right doth consist only in not re-
sisting?.^^ He might as well have said, and with as much
sense, ' the transferring of right doth consist in not transfer-
ring of right.^ At other times he maketh it to be a surren-
der, or " giving up of the subject^s right to govern himself to
this man ;^' a " conferring of all their power and strength
upon one man, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of
voices to one will ;" an "appointing of one man . . to bear their
person," and " acknowledging themselves to be the authors of
» Qu., [Fount, of Arg.] p. 13.
m Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109.
" Ibid., [Pt. I. c. xiv.] p. f)r5.
o Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxviii.] p. 162.
P De Give, c. ii. § 4. [p. 14. — "Juris
autein translationeiu in sola non resis-
tentia consistere, ex hoc intelligitur,"
&c.]
584
THE CATCHING
whatsoever" the sovereign " shall act or cause to be acted in
those things which concern the common safety;" a "submis-
sion of their wills to his will^ their judgments to his judg-
ment^:" and, "David did no injury to Uriah, because the right
to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself
Before, we had a transferring without transferring ; now we
have a giving up without giving up, an appointing or consti-
tuting without appointing or constituting, a subjection with-
out subjection, an authorizing without authorizing. What is
this?
He saith, that "it cannot be said honourably of God,
that He hath parts or totality, which are the attributes of
finite things If "it cannot be said honourably of God,
that He hath parts or totality,^^ then it cannot be said
honourably of God, that He is a body ; for every body hath
parts and totality. Now hear what he saith : — " Every part
of the universe is body; and that which is no body, is no
part of the universe; and because the universe is all, that
which is no part of it is nothing Then if God have no
" parts and totality,^' God is " no thing.^^ Let him judge,
how honourable this is for God.
He saith, "We honour not God, but dishonour Him, by
any value less than infinite"." And how doth he set an
infinite value upon God, who every where maketh Him to
subsist by "successive duration^." "Infinite" is that, to
which nothing can be added ; but to that which subsisteth
by " successive duration," something is added every minute.
He saith, " Christ hath not a kingly authority committed
to Him by His Father in the world, but only consiliary and
doctrinal^." He saith on the contrary, that "the kingdom
of Judah was His hereditary right from king David," &c.,
"and when it pleased Him to play the king. He required
entire obedience; — Matt. xxi. 2, [3,] — 'Go into the village
over against you, and straightway ye shall find an ass tied,
and a colt with her, loose them and bring them unto Me ;
•1 Leviath., [Pt. I. c. xvii.] p. 87. ' Leviath., [Pt. IV. c. xlvi.] p. 371.
' Ibid., [Pt. II. c. xxi.] p. 109. " Ibid., [Pt. IV. c. xlv.] p. 357.
De Give, c. xv. § I k [p. 184. — Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb.xxiv.]
*' Neque dici de Deo honorifice, . . quod p. 266.
habeat partes, aut quod sit totum ali- " De Give, c. xvii. § 6. [p. 223. See
quid, quae attributa sunt finitorum."] above p. 528. note y.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
585
and if any man say ought unto you, ye shall say, The Lord Discourse
hath need of themy/^^ —iH: —
He saith, " The institution of eternal punishment was [And eter-
before sin^;" and, "If the command be such as cannot be ment!]"^^^
obeyed without being damned to eternal death, then it were
madness to obey it^;" and, "What e\il hath excommunica-
tion in it, but the consequent, eternal punishment^?" At
other times he saith, there is no eternal punishment : — " It
is evident, that there shall be a second death of every one
that shall be condemned at the Day of Judgment, after
which he shall die no more*^." He who knoweth no soul
nor spirit, may well be ignorant of a spiritual death.
He saith, it " is a doctrine repugnant to civil society, that [And sin.]
whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin^." Yet
he himself saith, " It is a sin, whatsoever one doth against
his conscience ; for they that do that, despise the law®/^
He saith, " that all power secular and spiritual, under [And the
Christ, is united in the Christian commonwealth f;" that is, the^keys!]
the Christian sovereign. Yet he himself saith on the con-
trary ; — " It cannot be doubted of, that the power of binding
and loosing, that is, of remitting and retaining sins" (which
we call the power of the keys), "was given by Christ to
future pastors in the same manner as to the present Apo-
stles, and all power of remitting sin which Christ Himself
had was given to the Apostles^." All spiritual power is in
9 the Christian magistrate, — some spiritual power (that is, the
power of the keys) is in the successors of the Apostles, that
is, not in the Christian magistrate, — is a contradiction.
He confesseth, that " it is manifest," that " from the ascen- [The Apo-
sion of Christ until the conversion of kings," the " power eccle- a^t^ ^ad
not power
y De Give, c. xi. § 6. [p. 123.— 245. ecclesiasti-
"Christi, Cm jure haereditario a Da- ^ Leviath., [Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 168. cal.]
vide derivato debebatur regnum Judae- ^ De Give, c. xii. § 2. [p. 127. —
orum," &c. " Idem cum placxiisset Ei " Peccatum est, quicquid quis fecerit
regem agere, obedientiam integram re- contra conscientiam ; nam qui id fa-
quirere; * Ite,' inquit," &c.] ciunt, legem spernunt."]
^ Ibid., c. iv. § 9. [p. 45.—" Rectius ^ Ibid., c. xviii. § 1. [p. 258.—" Ex
respondetur institutionem poenae geter- quibus colligere etiam quantumlibet
nae fuisse ante peccatum."] ingenio tardus potest, in civitati Chris-
Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 321. tiana . . omnem uniri sub Cliristo
De Give, c. xvii. § 25. [p. 245. — potestatem tam saecularem quam spi-
" Quid enim male habet excommmii- ritualem."]
catio praeter consequentem ex ea, pee- s Ibid., c, xvii. § 25. [p. 244. See
nam aeternam."] above p. 534. note g.]
Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxviii.] p.
586
THE CATCHING
Part siastical was in the Apostles/^ and so delivered unto their suc-
'- — cessors by imposition of hands ^. And 3^et straight forget-
ing himself, he taketh away all power from them, even in
that time when there were no Christian kings in the w^orld.
He alloweth them no power to make any ecclesiastical laws
or constitutions, or to impose any manner of commands upon
Christians : — " The office of the Apostles was not to com-
mand, but teach^;" as schoolmasters, not as commandersJ."
Yet schoolmasters have some power to command. He suf-
feretli not the Apostles to ordain, but those whom the Church
appointeth ; nor to excommunicate, or absolve, but whom
the Church pleaseth. He maketh the determination of all
controversies to rest in the Church, not in the Apostles ; and
resolveth all questions into the authority of the Church ; —
" The election of doctors and prophets did rest upon the
authority of the Church of Antioch and, " If it be inquired
by what authority it came to pass that it was received for the
command of the Holy Ghost, which those prophets and
doctors said proceeded from the Holy Ghost, we must neces-
sarily answer, by the authority of the Church of Antioch*^."
Thus every where he ascribeth all authority to the Church,
none at all to the Apostles, even in those times before there
[Matt. were Christian kings ; — " He saitli not, tell it to the Apo-
xvui. 17.] g^i^g „ -^^^ ff ^^11 Church,^^ that "we may know the
definitive sentence, — whether sin or no sin, — is not left to
them, but to the Church^,:" and, "It is manifest, that all
authority in spiritual things doth depend upon the authority
of the Church "".'^ Thus, not contented with single contra-
dictions, he twisteth them together; for according to his
definition of a Church, there was no Christian Church at
Antioch, or in those parts of the world, either then or long
^ Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 267.
i De Give, c. xvii. § 24. [p. 243.—
" Nam ipsorum Apostolorum munus
erat, non imperare, sed docere."]
j Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xlii.] p. 269.
^ De Give, c. xvii. § 24. [p. 243 ;—
** Etiam Ecclesiae Antiocliise authoritati
innitebatur doctorum et prophetarum
suorum electio." — p. 242 ; — " Sed si
quaeratur ulterius, qua authoritate fac-
tum sit, ut pro jussu Spiritus Sancti
receptum sit, quod prophetae et doctores
illi profectum a Spiritu Sancto esse
dixerint, respondendum necessario est,
authoritate Ecclesise Antiochenae."]
1 Ibid., c. xvii. §25. [p. 247.— "Non
dicit, ' die Apostolis,' ut sciamus, sen-
tentiam definitivam in qusestione, an
sit peccatum necne, reliuqui non illis
sed Ecclesiae."]
Ibid., c. xviii. § 1. p. 258. ["Ean-
dem" (soil. " authoritatem omnem")
" in spiritualibus ab authoritate Eccle-
siae dependere ex proximo anteceden-
tibus manifestum est."]
OF LEVIATHAN.
587
after. Hear him: — ^'^A Cliurcli is a company of men pro- Discourse
fessing Christian religion^ united in the person of one sove- —
reign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and with-
out whose authority they ought not to assemble"." Yet
there was no Christian sovereign in those parts of the world
then, or for two hundred years after, and by consequence,
according to his definition, no Church.
He teacheth, that " when the civil sovereign is an infidel, [infidel
every one of his own subjects that resisteth him, sinneth are and" are
against the laws of God, and rejecteth the counsel of the "beyed^fn
Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their princes, ^^^"^^"^
and all children and servants to obey their parents andmands. ]
masters in all things^." As for not resisting, he is in the if^'pet.'ii".
right ; but for obeying in all things," in his sense, it is an 'j^' 22*?*
abominable error. Upon this ground he alloweth Christians
to deny Christ, to sacrifice to idols, so they preserve faith in
their hearts. He telleth them, " They have the licence that [2 Kings
Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for ^' ^^'^
their faith P;" that is, they have liberty to do any external
acts, which their infidel sovereigns shall command them.
Now hear the contrary from himself. — " When sovereigns are
not Christians, in spiritual things, that is, in those things
which pertain to the manner of worshipping God, some Church
of Christians is to be followed adding, that when we may
not obey them, yet we may not resist them, but " eundum est
ad Christum per martyrium/' — we ought to suffer for it^.
He confesseth, that " matter and power are indiff'erent to [Matter
contrary forms and contrary acts^:" and yet maintaineth every are anTare
where, that all matter is necessitated by the outward causes J?JJ.gnt1o
to one individual form ; that is, it is not indifi'erent. And all contrary
power, by his principles, is limited and determined to one acts.]
particular act. Thus he scofFeth at me for the contrary : —
" Very learnedly ; as if there were a power, that were not a
n Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxix.] p. 248.
o Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 330.
P [Ibid. p. 331.]
"J De Give, c. xviii. § 13. [p. 272.—
" Imperantibus autem non Christianis,
. . in (rebus) spiritualibus,hoc est, in iis
quae pertinent ad modiim colendi Dei,
sequenda est Ecclesia aliqna Christia-
norum."]
' [Ibid. — " Quid autem ? An prin-
cipibusresistendum est ubi obediendum
non est ? Minime sane, hoc enim con-
tra pactum est civile. Quid ergo
agendum ? Eundum ad Christum per
martyrium."]
s Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb.xxx.]
p. 292.
588
THE CATCHING
Part
III.
[Th€
hie ob-
ject of
sense is and
is not the
same thing
with the
sense it-
self.]
[T. H. de-
nieth and
alloweth
inspira-
tion.]
[His con-
tradictory
assertions
about
body.]
power to do some particular act ; or a power to kill, and yet
to kill nobody in particular : . . nor doth power signify any-
thing actually, but those motions and present acts, from
which the act that is not now but shall be hereafter, neces-
sarily proceedeth*/' If every act be necessary, and all power
determined to one " particular act," as he saith here, how is
power " indifferent to contrary acts," as he saith there ?
He acknowledgeth, that " though at some certain distance
the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it
begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or
fancy is another";" and yet affirmeth the contrary, — that
" the preacher's voice is the same thing with hearing, and a 900
fancy in the hearer''." Even so he might say, that the
colour or the sight is the same thing with seeing. Men
utter their voice many times when no man heareth them.
He saith, inspiration " implies a gift supernatural, and the
immediate hand of God^." On the contrary he saith, " To
say a man speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he
finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of
himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient
reason 2." He reckoneth this opinion, — that faith and
sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by
supernatural inspiration," — among "the diseases of a com-
monwealth^." And, lastly, he acknowledgeth no proper in-
spiration, "but blowing of one thing into" another, nor meta-
phorical, but "inclining the spirit^."
He saith, — "Ordinary men understand the word 'body' and
'empty,' . . as well as learned men; and when they hear named
an empty vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned mean
and understand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing
in it that can be seen ; and whether it be truly empty, the
ploughman and the Schoolman know alike Now hear him
confess the contrary: — "In the sense of common people, not
all the universe is called body, but only such parts thereof as
they can discern by the sense of feeling to resist the force, or
' Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xii.]
p. 108.
" Leviath., [Pt. I. c. i.] p. 4.
" Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xxii.]
p. 245.
y Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 324.
z Leviath., [Pt. nr. c.xxxii.] p. 196.
a Ibid., [Pt. IT. c. xxix.] p. 169.
" Ibid., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 214.
Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb,
xxxiii.] p. 307.
OF LEVIATHAN.
589
bv the sijirlit of their eyes to hinder them from a farther Discourse
■ " III
prospect; therefore, in the common language of men^ air and ■ —
aerial substances use not to be taken for bodies^."
He holdeth, that no law may be made to command the will : [And the
— " The style of law is, Do this, or, Do not this, or. If thou do ISv over
this, thou shalt suffer this : but no law runs thus, Will this, ^^'^^
or. Will not this, or. If thou have a will to this, thou shalt
suffer this^." And yet he defineth sin, to be "that which is
done, or left undone, or spoken, o?' ivilled, contrary to the
reason of the commonwealth Then the laws of men are
made to bind the will, if that which is " willed" contrary to
the laws be a sin.
He saith, " Necessary is that which is impossible to be [And ne-
otherwise," or *^that which cannot possibly be;' and "possible ^^"^'^--J
and impossible have no signification in reference to the time
past, or time present, but only time to come^." Yet, in the
very same paragraph, he asserteth " a necessity from eternity,
or an antecedent necessity derived from the veiy beginning
of time?.''
He saith, " There is no doubt a man can will one thing or
other, or forbear to will it'\" If a man can both "will" and
'^forbear to will" the same thing, then a man is as free to will
as to do ; but he teacheth the contrary every where, — that
" a man is free to do if he Tvdll, but he is not free to will^"
He saith, " Though God gave Solomon his choice, that is,
the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow that He
did not also give him the act of election^;" that is, determine
him to that which he should choose. To give a man choice
of two things, and determine him to one of them, is con-
tradictory.
He confesseth, that " it is an absurd speech to say the will [And com-
is compelled^;" and yet with the same breath he affirmeth,
that " a man may be compelled to will"." The reason why
Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xxxiv.] p. 207. ^ Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, ix.]
e Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xiv.] p. 75.
p. 138. 1 Ibid., [Animadv. upon Numb, xix.]
^ De Give, c. xiv. § 17. [p. 168. See p. 208.
above p. 541. note f.] ^ [Ibid. — Hobbes does not affirm
^ Qu., [Animadv. upon Numbers i. tbis in terms; but after saying, tbat
and iii.] pp. 26 and 36. he "never said 'the will is compelled,' "
^ Ibid., [Animadv. upon Numb. adds, that " the necessitation or crea-
xxxiii.] p. 310. tion of the will is tlie same thing with
i [Ibid., State of Quest., p. 4. &c.] the compulsion of the 7??«h."]
590
THE CATCHING
Part, the will Cannot be compelled, is, because it implietb a contra-
— ^H: — diction. Compulsion is evermore against a man's will. How
can a man will that which is against his will? Yet, saith
T. H., " Many things may compel a man to do an action in
producing his will".'' That a man may be "compelled to do
an action," there is no doubt ; but to say he is compelled to
do that action which he is willing to do, that is, when a new
will is produced, or that a will to do the action is produced
then when the man is compelled, is a contradiction.
[The sove- He maketh the sovereign prince to be the only authentic
pHnce the interpreter of Scripture", and "to have pastoral authority y^re
preter"or' -^^^"^^^0," which "all otlicr pastors have hut jure civiliv;'' yet,
^et obii'Sd questions of faith, and interpretation of the Word of God,
to make" he obligeth the sovereign to make use of " ecclesiastical
cfesiasficai doctors, rightly ordained by imposition of hands," to whom he
dS^ol s^^t^ "Christ hath promised an infallibility^." His gloss—
dained.] that this infallibility is not such an infallibility, "that they
cannot be deceived themselves, but that a subject cannot be
deceived in obeying them*"," — is absurd; for such an infalli-
bility (upon his grounds) the sovereign had without their
advice. To pass by his confused and party-coloured dis-
course, how doth this agree with his former objection^ ?
which I shall insert here mutatis mutandis : — " That the
right interpretation of Scripture should depend upon the
infallibility of ecclesiastical doctors, many incommodities and
absurdities which must follow from thence, do prohibit ; the
chiefest whereof is this, that not only all civil obedience
would be taken away, contrary to the precept of Christ, but
also all society and human peace would be dissolved, contrary
to the laws of nature : for whilst they make the ecclesiastical 901
" Qu., [Animadv. upon Numb, xix.]
p. 208.
0 De Give, c. xvii. § 27. [p. 254.]
i* Leviath., [Pt. III. c. xliii.] p. 296.
1 De Give, c. xvii. § 28. [p. 256.
See above p. 501. note g.]
^ Qu., [Animadv., upon Numb, xix.]
p. 214.
« [De Give, c. xvii. § 24. p. 252.—" Ne
vero ab arbitrio dependeat singulorum"
(soil, "jus interpretandi Scripturas"),
" prohibent inter alia, consequutura
inde incommoda et absurda. Quorum
praecipuum est hoc, quod non modo
omnis toUeretur (contra prjEceptum
Ghristi) obedientia civilis, sed etiam
omnis societas et pax humana (contra
leges naturales) dissolveretur ; cum
enim Scripturam Sacram singuli inter-
pretentur sibi, id est, unusquisque judi-
cem se faciat quid Deo placeat, quid
displiceat, non ante principibus obedire
possunt quam ipsi de mandatis eorum,
utrum conformia sunt Scripturas necne,
judicaverint ; atque sic v el non obedi-
unt, vel obediunt propter judicium pro-
prium, hoc est, sihi obediunt, non civi-
tati; tollitur ergo obedientia civilis."]
OF LEVIATHAN.
591
doctors the infallible judges^ what pleaseth God and what Discourse
displeaseth Him, the subjects cannot obey their sovereigns,
before the doctors have judged of their commands, whether
they be conformable to Scripture or not ; and so, either they
do not obey, or they obey for the judgment of their doctors ^
that is, they obey their doctors, not their sovereign ; thus
civil obedience is taken away." These are his own words
with a little variation, only putting in " the doctors" for "the
subjects.'^ I consider not what is true or false in them for the
present, but only shew the inconsistency of his grounds, how
he buildeth with one hand and pulleth down with the other.
He saith, " It is determined in Scripture w^hat laws every [The sove-
Christian king shall not constitute in his dominions*:" and, soie"ieg^.
in the next words, " Sovereigns in their own dominions are jj^j'^^^fj'j^^^^g
the sole legislators";" and that "those books only are cano- tied by
1 • ' 1-1 iTi Scripture.]
meal m every nation, which are established tor such by the
sovereign authority''." Then the determinations of Scripture
upon his grounds are but civil laws, and do not tie the hands
of sovereigns. He teacheth us every where, that "the sub-
sequent command of a sovereign, contrary to his former laws,
is an abrogation of them^;" and that it is "an opinion
repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth," that he that
hath the sovereign power is " subject to the civil laws^." The
determinations of Scripture, upon his grounds, do bind the
hands of kings, when they themselves please to be bound ; no
longer.
To conclude. — Sometimes he doth admit the soul to be a [Summary
distinct substance from the body^, sometimes he denieth it*, contmdic-^
Sometimes he maketh reason to be a "natural" faculty ^ some- tions.]
times he maketh it to be an acquired habit In some places
he alloweth the will to be a rational appetite^, in other places
he disallows it^. Sometimes he wdll have it to be a "law of
nature," that men must " stand to their pacts ^ ;" sometimes he
' Leviarh., [Pt. III. c. xxxiii.] p. 199.
u [Ibid.]
X [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xxvii. p. 157.]
y [Ibid., Pt. II. c. xxix.] p. 169.
' [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxiv. p. 207.—
" That aerial substance, which in the
body of any living creature gives it
life and motion."]
a [Ibid., Pt. IV. c. xliv. pp. 330, .340.]
h [Ibid., Pt. III. c. xxxii. p. 195.—
&c.]
'-■ [Leviath., Pt. I. c. viii. pp. 32, 35.]
[Qu., State of Quest., p. 4. Sec
above pp. 225, 226.]
^ [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb,
xxviii. p. 184. — Leviath., Pt. I. c. vi.
p. 28.]
f [De Give, c. ii. § 1. p. 14.]
592
THE CATCHING
p R T maketh covenants of mutual trust in the state of nature" to be
'- — "void^." Sometimes he will have " no punishment but for
crimes that might have been left undone^ at other times he
maketh all crimes to be inevitable^ Sometimes he will have the
dependence of actions upon the will to be truly liberty^; at
other times he ascribeth liberty to rivers*, which have no will.
Sometimes he teacheth, that though an action be necessitated,
yet "the will to break the law maketh the action to be unjust
at other times he maketh the will to be much more necessitated
than the action^. He telleth us, that civil "law-makers may
err" and sin in making of a law**; and yet the law so made is
[Matt. XV. an infallible rule P. Yes, to lead a man infallibly into a ditch.
What should a man say to this man? How shall one know,
when he is in earnest, and when he is in jest ? He setteth
down his opinion just as gipsies tell fortunes, both ways; that
if the one miss, the other may be sure to hit ; that when they
are accused of falsehood by one, they may appeal to another ;
— " but what did I write" in such a place.
[Matt. xi. It was the praise of John Baptist, that he was not like " a
7- 3 shaken with the wind," bending or inclining, hither and
thither, this way and that way, now to old truths, then to new
errors. And it is the honour of every good Christian. St.
Paul doth excellently describe such fluctuating Christians by
two comparisons, the one of httle children, the other of a ship
Eph. iv. 14. lying at hull^; — "That we henceforth be no more children,
tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doc-
trine ;" as a child wavers between his love and duty to his
parent or nurse on the one hand, and some apple or other toy
which is held forth to him on the other hand, or as a ship lying
at anchor changeth its posture with every wave and every
puff of wind. As the last company leaves them, or the pre-
sent occasion makes them, so they vary their discourses.
[The The time was, when T. H. was very kind to me, to let me
erounds of ^66 the causcs and grounds of my errors : — " Arguments
T. H. his
errors.] g ^-^^ Give, c. ii. § 11. p. 17.] [Ibid., T. H. Numb. xiv. above
^ [Qu., Fount, of Arg., p. 13.] p. 85.]
' [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. " [Ibid., T. H. Numb. iii. above p.
pp. 105, 106. &c. See above p. 309.] 27. &c. &c.]
[In the Defence, T. H. Numb. iii. ° [Qu., Aiiimadv. upon Numb. xiv.
above p. 27.] p. 146.]
' [Ibid., T. H. Numb. xxix. above P [See above pp. 541, 542.]
p. 166.] -J [See above p. 506. note d.j
OF LEVIATHAN.
593
seldom work on men of wit and learninc^ when tbev have Discnunsn
. . . " . Ill
once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion ; if any thing '
will do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors^."
One good turn requireth another. Now I will do as much
for him. If it do not work upon himself, yet there is hope it
may undeceive some of his disciples.
A principal cause of his errors is a fancying to himself a [i. His
general state of nature ; which is so far from being general, himseifa
that there is not an instance to be found of it in the nature f^^^^ ^l
of things, where mankind was altogether without laws and nature.]
without governors, guided only by self-interest, without any
sense of conscience, justice, honesty, or honour. He may
902 search all the corners of America^ with a candle and lanthorn
at noon da}', and after his fruitless pains, return a ' non est
inventus.^
Yet all plants and living creatures are subject to degene-
rate and grow wild by degrees. Suppose it should so happen,
that some remnant of men, either chased by war or persecu-
tion, or forced out of the habitable world for some crimes by
themselves committed, or being cast by shipwreck upon some
deserts, by long conversing with savage beasts, lions, bears,
wolves, and tigers, should in time become more "brutish^" (it
is his own epithet) than the brutes themselves, would any
man in his right wits make that to be the universal condition
of mankind, which was only the condition of an odd handful
of men ? or that to be " the state of nature,^^ which was not
the state of nature, but an accidental degeneration?
He that will behold the state of nature rightly, must look
upon the family of Adam, and his posterity in their succes-
sive generations from the creation to the deluge, and from
the deluge until Abraham^s time, when the first '^kingdom of
God by pact" is supposed by T. H. to begin ^ All this while
(which was a great part of that time the world hath stood)
from the creation, lasted " the kingdom of God by nature,^^ as
r [In the Defence, T. H. Numb. world: but there are many places
xxxviii. above p. 193.] — Qu., [T. H. wliere they live so now. For the sa-
Numb. xxxviii.] p. o34. vage people in many places of Ame-
* [Leviath., Pt. I. c. xiii. p. 63 — rica, . . have no government at all, and
"It may peradventure be thought, live at this day in that brutish man-
there was never such a time nor condi- ner."]
tion of war as this; and I believe it " [Do Cive, c. xvi. § 1. p. 195.]
was never generally so, over all the
BU AM HALL. q q
594
THE CATCHING
Pa^rt he phraseth it"; and yet in those days there were laws and
'■ — governments, and more kings in tlie world than there are at
Gen. xiv. this present ; we find nine kings engaged in one war, and yet
all their dominions but a narrow circuit of land. And so it
continued for divers hundreds of years after ; as we see by all
[Josh.xii.] those kings which Joshua discomfited in the land of Canaan.
Every city had its ow n king. The reason is evident ; — the
original right of fathers of families was not then extinguished.
Indeed T. H. supposeth, that men did spring out of the
earth like mushrooms or mandrakes : — That we may return
again to the state of nature, and consider men as if they were
even now^ suddenly sprouted and grown out of the earth, after
the manner of mushrooms, without any obligation of one to
another'^." But this supposition is both false and atheistical,
howsoever it dropt from his pen. Mankind did not spring
out of the earth, but was created by God ; not many suddenly,
but one, to whom all his posterity were obliged as to their
father and ruler.
[2. His A second ground of his errors is his gross mistake of
fak?of the l^^vs of nature, which he relateth most imperfectly and
nature^] ^^^^t untruly. A moral heathen would blush for shame, to
see such a catalogue of the laws of nature.
First, he maketh the laws of nature to be laws and no
laws : — just as, ' A man and no man, hit a bird and no bird,
with a stone and no stone, on a tree and no tree :' — not
"laws^' but " theorems'';" laws which required not "per-
formance," but " endeavours y;" laws which were '^silent,"
and could not be put in execution in the state of nature^,
" where nothing was another man^s, and therefore a man
could not steal ; where all things were common, and there-
fore no adultery ; where there was a state of war, and there-
fore it was lawful to kill ; where all things were defined by a
man's own judgment, and therefore what honours he pleased
to give unto his father ; and, lastly, where there were no
public judgments, and therefore no use of witnesses^." As
u [Leviatli., Pt. II. c. xxxi. p. 186. above p. 552. note m.]
title, &c.] ^ De Cive, c. xiv. § 9. [p. 161.—
De Cive, c. viii. § 1. [p. 89. See *' Nam lex naturalis obligabat in statu
above p. 566. note m.] naturali : ubi primo (quia natura omnia
* [Leviath., Pt. I. c. xv. p. 80.] omnibus dedit) nihil alienum erat, et
^ [Ibid., Pt. I. c. XV. p. 79.] pvoinde alienum invadere impossibile ;
* [De Cive, c. v. § 2. p. 52. See deinde, ubi omnia communia erant,
OF LEVIATHAN.
595
for the first Table, he doth not trouble himself much with it : Discourse
III
except it be to accommodate it unto kings ^, Every one of '■ —
these grounds here alleged, are most false, mthout any veri-
similitude in them; and so his superstructure must needs fall
flat to the ground.
Secondly, he relateth the laws of nature most imperfectly,
smothering and concealing all those principal laws, which
concern either piety and our duty towards God, or justice
and our duties towards man.
Thirdly, sundry of those laws which he is pleased to take
notice of, ai-e either misrelated or misinterpreted by him.
He maketh the only end of all the laws of nature to be " the
long conservation of a man^s life and members*^;" most
untruly. He maketh every man by nature the only judge
of the means of his own conservation^; most untruly. His
father and sovereign in the weightiest cases, is more judge
than himself. He saith, that by the law of nature every
man hath right to all things, and over all persons ^ most
untruly. He saith, the natural condition of mankind is " a
war of all men against all men^;" most untruly: and that
" nature dictatetli to us to relinquish this'* (feigned) " right
of all men to all things^;" most untruly: and that nature
dictateth to a man to retain his right of preserving his life
903 and limbs, though against a "lawful" magistrate, lawfully pro-
ceeding*^; most untruly. I omit his uncouth doctrine about
pacts made in the state of nature^; and that he knoweth no
gratitude, but where there is a " trust" — "fiducia^." These
things are unsound; and the rest of his laws, for the most
part, poor trivial things, in comparison of those weightier
dictates of nature which he hath omitted.
All other writers of politics do derive commonwealths from [Origin of
common-
wealths not
from mu-
quare etiam] concnbitus omnes liciti ; [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xxviii. p. 161.] ♦"^•l ^^ar>
tertio, ubi status belli erat, ideoque « [De Give, c. i. § 10. p. 8. — Leviath., H. af-
licitum occidere ; quarto, ubi omnia Pt, I. c. xiv. p. 64.] nrmeth. J
proprio cujusque judicio definita erant, ^ [De Give, c. i. § 12. p. 9. — Leviath.,
ideoque etiam honores paterni; post- Pt. I. c. xiii. p. 63.]
remo, ubi nulla judicia publica erant, ^ [De Give, c. ii. § 3. p. 14. — Le-
et propterea nullus usus testimonii di- viath., Pt. I. c. xiv. pp. 64, 65.]
cendineque veri neque falsi."] ^ [De Give, c. ii. § 18. p. 20. — Le-
[Leviath,, Pt. II. c. xxx. pp. 177 viath., Pt. II. c. xxi. p. 111. margin.
178.] ' See above p. 555. notes b — d.]
' [De Give, c. ii. § 1. p. 13. See ' [De Give, c. ii. § 11. p. 17.]
above p. 577. note r.] k [Ibid., c. iii. § 8. p. 28.]
596
THE CATCHING
the sociability of nature, which is in mankind ; most truly.
But he will have the beginning of all human society to be
'^from mutual fear^j" as much contrary to reason as to autho-
rity. We see some kind of creatures delight altogether in
solitude, rarely or never in company. We see others (among
which is mankind) delight altogether in company, rarely or
never in solitude. Let him tell me, what mutual fear of
danger did draw the silly bees into swarms ? or the sheep
and doves into flocks ? and what protection they can hope
for, one from another ? and I shall conceive it possible, that
the beginning of human society might be from fear also.
And thus having invented a fit foundation for his intended
building, ycleped " the state of mere nature"^," which he
himself first devised for that purpose, he hath been long
moduling and framing to himself a new form of policy, to be
builded upon it : but the best is, it hath only been in paper ;
all this while he hath never had a finger in mortar. This is
the new frame of " absolute sovereignty";" which T. H.
knew right well would never stand, nor he should be ever
permitted to rear it up in our European climates, or in any
other part of the habitable world, which had ever seen any
other form of civil government. Therefore he hath sought out
for a fit place in America*', among the savages ; to try if per-
haps they might be persuaded, that the laws of God and
nature, the names of good and evil, just and unjust, did
signify nothing, but at the pleasure of the sovereign prince.
And because there hath been much clashing in these
quarters about religion, through the distempered zeal of some,
the seditious orations of others, and some pernicious princi-
ples, well meant at first, but ill understood, and worse pur-
sued ; to prevent all such garboils in his commonwealth, he
hath taken an order to make his sovereign to be " Christ^s
lieutenant upon earth, in obedience to whose commands true
religion doth consistP;'^ thus making policy to be the build-
ing, and religion the hangings, which must be fashioned just
according to the proportion of the policy ; and not (as Mr.
' [De Give, c. i. § 3. p. 5.]
[Ibid., c. V. § 2. p. 52.—" Status
naturae mei'se."]
" [Ibid., c. vi. § 13. p. 60.]
o [Leviath., Pt. i. c. xiii. p. 63.]
P [In the Defence, T. H. Numb,
xxxviii. above p. 193.]
OF LEVIATHAN.
597
Cartwright would have had it^) making religion to be the Discourse
building, and policy the hangings, which must be conformed — —
to religion.
Well, the law is costly, and I am for an accommodation; —
that T. H. should have the sole privilege of setting up his form
of government in America, as being calculated and fitted for
that meridian ; and if it prosper there, then to have the
liberty to transplant it hither. Who knoweth (if there could
but be some means devised to make them understand his
language), whether the Americans might not choose him to
be their sovereign ? But all the fear is, that if he should put
his principles in practice as magistrally as he doth dictate
them, his supposed subjects might chance to tear their
" mortal God^"'^ in pieces with their teeth, and entomb his
sovereignty in their bowels.
AN ADVERTISEMENT TO THE READER.
Because I know but of one edition of Mr. Hobbes his
Leviathan % and of his Questions concerning Liberty*, there-
fore I have cited them two by the page ; Le [^iath] . standing
for Leviathan, and Qu. for Questions. But because there
are sundry editions of his book De Cive^, I have cited that
by the chapter and section, according to his Paris edition^.
•1 [Reply to an Answer made ofM. " [4to. Paris. 1642; first edition:
Doctor Whitgift against the Admoui- — 8vo. Amstelod. 1647 ; second edit. ;
tion to the Parliament, by T. C, p. and again in 1657 (according to the
181. 4to. n. p. or year; publ. about Athen. Oxon.. vol. iii. p. 1209. ed.
1573.] Bliss): — all in Latin. Bramhall's tract
r [Leviath., Pt. II. c. xvii. p. 87.] was published in 1658.]
s [folio Lond, 1651 ; in English.] * [The same editions of each work
• [4to. Lond, 1656.] have been used in the present volume.]
THE END.
OXFORD
I'RINTED BY I. SHRIMPTOX.
ERRATA.
23. note a. col. 2. _/or * = written also in 1645," r<?arf " written in 1646."
130. 1. 11 — "cap. 17" "cap. xvii."
170.11.8,9. — "appetibility, the under-'] r"appetibility, some in-
( vide p. 449.) (jtanding by directing, I J ward, as the under-
go [mo inward, as] pas- [ | standing by directing :
pions" J (^so passions"
273. note u. 1. 3. — " igitur nostra" " igitur nostra"
320. title, — " Castigations upon the"! f" Castigatious of the
Auimad versions ; — I — •( Animadversions; —
Number xiv." I I Number xiv."
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